LICENSE ACQUISITIONS, LLC, еt al., Appellants, vs. DEBARY REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC, et al., Appellees. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS & PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, et al., Appellants, vs. DEBARY REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC, et al., Appellees.
No. SC13-968, No. SC13-1028
Supreme Court of Florida
November 26, 2014
LABARGA, C.J.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF FILED, DETERMINED.
This case is before the Court on appeal from a decision of the First District Court of Appeal, Debary Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. State, Department of Business & Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 112 So. 3d 157 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013),
FACTS
Appellants, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (DBPR), License Acquisitions, LLC, and West Volusia Racing, Inc., f/k/a Volusia Jai-Alai, Inc., appeal the First District‘s per curiam decision declaring
Effective July 1, 2010,
(14)(a) Any holder of a permit to conduct jai alai may apply to the division [of pari-mutuel wagering] to convert such permit to a permit to conduct greyhound racing in lieu of jai alai if:
- Such permit is located in a county in which the division has issued only two pari-mutuel permits pursuant to this section;
- Such permit was not previously converted from any other class of permit; and
- The holder of the permit has not conducted jai alai games during a period of 10 years immediately preceding his or her application for conversion under this subsection.
(b) The division, upon application from the holder of a jai alai permit meeting all conditions of this section, shall convert the permit and shall issue to the permitholder a permit to conduct greyhound racing. A permitholder of a permit converted under this section shall be required to apply for and conduct a full schedule of live racing each fiscal year to be eligible for any tax credit provided by this chapter. The holder of a permit converted pursuant to this subsection or any holder of a permit to conduct greyhound racing located in a county in which it is the only permit issued pursuant to this section who operates at a leased facility pursuant to s. 550.475 may move the location for which the permit has been issued to another location within a 30-mile radius of the location fixеd in the permit issued in that county, provided the move does not cross the county boundary and such location is approved under the zoning regulations of the county or municipality in which the permit is located, and upon such relocation may use the permit for the conduct of pari-mutuel wagering and the operation of a cardroom. The provisions of s. 550.6305(9)(d) and (f) shall apply to any permit converted under this subsection and shall continue to apply to any permit which was previously included under and subject to such provisions before a conversion pursuant to this section occurred.
West Volusia Racing, Inc. (West Volusia Racing), and License Acquisitions, LLC (License Acquisitions), applied for the conversion of their jai alai permits under
The appellees then filed a motion for summary judgment supporting their contention that the statute was a special law with the following facts. At the time of the statute‘s enactment, there were twenty-one total section 550.054 permits existing in nine counties in Florida, eleven of which were jai alai permits. West Volusia Racing and License Acquisitions held jai alai permits that were eligible for conversion at the time of the statute‘s enactment because the permits were dormant for ten years and were located in counties where the DBPR had issued exactly two section 550.054 permits, which include permits for greyhound racing, jai alai,
The appellees then sought leave to amend their first amended complaint, which was granted.1 Thereafter, License Acquisitions moved for summary judgment regarding the allegation that
After the appellees filed another amended complaint, which no longer alleged unconstitutionality of the statute,2 the court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, but noted that the appellees could seek relief under
First District‘s Decision
On appeal, the First District held that the trial court erred in denying the appellees’ motion for summary judgment and instructed the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of the appellees.
The First District began its analysis by discussing the appropriate standards for determining whether a law is special or general. The court observed that a law is general when it operates on the basis of a classification system if the class affected or regulated is potentially applicable to people or entities in the future, and
Turning to the appellants’ arguments, the First District rejected the argument that subsections (a) and (b) of
On appeal to this Court, the appellants contend that
ANALYSIS
Special Law v. General Law
“A law that operates universally throughout the state, uniformly upon subjects as they may exist throughout the state, or uniformly within a permissible classification is a general law.” Classic Mile, Inc., 541 So. 2d at 1157 (citing State ex rel. Landis v. Harris, 163 So. 237 (Fla. 1934)). A special law is one designed to operate upon particular persons or things, or one that purports to operate upon classified persons or things when classification is not permissible or the classification adopted is illegal; a local law is one relating to, or designed to operate only in, a specifically indicated part of the State, or one that purports to operate within a classified territory when classification is not permissible or the classification is illegal. Id.
A statutory classification scheme must bear a reasonable relationship to the purpose of the statute in order for the statute to constitute a valid general law. Id. at 1157 (citing West Flagler Kennel Club, Inc. v. Fla. State Racing Comm‘n, 153 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1963)). Statutes that employ arbitrary classification schemes are not valid as general laws. Id. A statute is invalid if “the descriptive technique is employed merely for identification rather than classification.” Id. at 1159 (quoting West Flagler, 153 So. 2d at 8). Ultimately, the criterion that determines if a reasonable relationship exists between the classification adopted and the purpose of the statute is whether the classification is potentially open to additional parties. Id. at 1158-59 (quoting Dep‘t of Legal Affairs v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 434 So. 2d 879, 882 (Fla. 1983)); see also Ocala Breeders’ Sales Co., Inc. v. Fla. Gaming Ctrs., Inc., 731 So. 2d 21, 25 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (“If it is possible in the future for others to meet the criteria set forth in the statute, then it is a general law аnd not a special law.“). A classification scheme is not considered closed “merely because it is unlikely that it will include anyone else.” Fla. Dep‘t of Bus. & Prof‘l Regulation v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, Inc., 967 So. 2d 802, 808-09 (Fla. 2007). However, a classification scheme is not considered open “merely because there is a theoretical possibility that some day it might include someone else. That approach would undermine the constitutional requirements for the adoption of special laws.... [T]he proper standard is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the class will include others.” Id. at 809.
The parties do not dispute that the Legislature did not provide notice of its intent to enact the statute or condition its effectiveness on a referendum of the electors of the areas affected. Thus, the issue on appeal to this Court is whether
The parties herein are in agreement that the statute when enacted and at the time of the trial court proceedings only applied to License Acquisitions and West Volusia Racing. The basis of their divergence—rooted in their disagreement regarding the definitions of “has issued” and “only” as they appear in
(14)(a) Any holder of a permit to conduct jai alai may apply to the division to convert such permit to a permit to conduct greyhound racing in lieu of jai alai if:
- Such permit is located in a county in which the division has issued only two pari-mutuel permits pursuant to this section;
Interpretations of “Only” and “Has Issued”
Here, the appellees argue that the statute‘s plain language simply merits literal effect, whereas the appellants argue that the plain language is open to alternative interpretations, which requires the Court‘s application of principles of statutory construction. Legislative intent controls construction of statutes in Florida. Florida Dept. of Bus. & Prof‘l Regulation, Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering v. Inv. Corp. of Palm Beach, 747 So. 2d 374, 382 (Fla. 1999). To determine legislative intent, the courts look primarily to the language of the statute and its plain meaning. Id. (citing St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414 So. 2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 1982)); see also Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984); Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, 434 So. 2d at 882; Carson v. Miller, 370 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla. 1979). “‘[W]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” Inv. Corp. of Palm Beach, 747 So. 2d at 382 (quoting Holly, 450 So. 2d at 219). However, this Court will not give a statute a literal interpretation if such an interpretation would result in “an unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion.” Id. at 383 (quoting Perkins v. State, 682 So. 2d 1083, 1085 (Fla. 1996)). The Legislature did not define “only” and “has issued” in
The word “has” is defined in Merriam-Webster‘s Collegiate Dictionary 571 (11th ed. 2005) as the third-person singular of have, which is defined as “to stand in a certain relationship to.” “Issued” is defined as “to put forth or distribute.” Id. at 665. As the First District noted, the plain and literal meaning of the present perfect verb tense the Legislature used here refers to the number of permits that have been issued in a given county at the time the DBPR considers a permit holder‘s application to convert. Debary, 112 So. 3d at 166. Nothing from this language suggests that any other fact beyond whether a permit has been issued is considered in determining whether an applicant for permit conversion has met the statutory requirements.
The appellants note, however, that such an interpretation of “has issued” would result in the DBPR considering all pеrmits that have ever been issued even if an issued permit has been revoked, abandoned, or consolidated with another permit. Specifically, appellants argue that the total number of permits issued in a given county could be reduced in the future by reduction of permits in those
Although legislative intent must be determined primarily from the language of the statute, see Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 761 So. 2d 294, 297 (Fla. 2000), this Court will not give a statute a literal interpretation if such an interpretation would result in an unreasonable conclusion. Inv. Corp. of Palm Beach, 747 So. 2d at 383. This Court has noted in the past that “Florida has a legitimate pecuniary interest in racing because of the substantial revenue it receives from pari-mutuel betting. . . .” Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, 434 So. 2d at 881-82. Further, this Court has previously observed that “it is the public policy of this state to limit the distance within which additional establishments of like character may be licensed for operation” to avoid over-competition. See Rodriguez v. Jones, 64 So. 2d 278, 279 (Fla. 1953). A permit previously issued by the DBPR that no longer exists either because it has been revoked, abandoned, or merged with another permit in the same geographic area does not create additional revenue for the state and does not result in over-competition. Thus, in the context of the pari-mutuel wagering industry, interpreting “has issued” to require the DBPR to consider permits that no
The appellees argue that “only,” when used as an adjective, is defined as “alone in a class or category,” and “as a single fact or instance and nothing more or different” in Merriam-Webster‘s Collegiate Dictionary. As noted by the First District, Black‘s Law Dictionary in 1979 defined “only” to mean “[s]olely; merely; for no other purpose; at no other time; in no otherwise; alone; of or by itself; without anything more; exclusive; [or] nothing else or more.” Black‘s Law Dictionary 982 (5th ed. 1979). Thus, according to the authorities listed above, the definition of “only” indicates that the statutory condition in
An alternate definition of “only,” however, demonstrates that the Legislature‘s use of “only” is ambiguous and, therefore, subject to statutory construction. Although “only” can be defined to mean solely or merely, other dictionaries and thesauruses equate “only” to “nothing more than” or some approximate variation when “only” is used as an adverb. See American Heritage Roget‘s Thesaurus 554 (2013) (“nothing more than“); Oxford American Dictionary & Thesaurus (2d ed. 2009) (“no more than“); and The Merriam-Webster Thesaurus (2005) (“nothing more than“). Further, the definition of “only” quoted in the First District‘s opinion contains “without anything more,” which can mean “no more
For instance,
As demonstrated above, “only” as used in
The Court is obligated to accord legislative acts a presumption of constitutionality and to construe challenged legislation to effect a constitutional outcome whenever reasonably possible. See, e.g., Scott, 107 So. 3d at 384; State v. Adkins, 96 So. 3d 412, 416-17 (Fla. 2012); Crist v. Fla. Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, Inc., 978 So. 2d 134, 139 (Fla. 2008); Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 405 (Fla. 2006); Fla. Dep‘t of Revenue v. Howard, 916 So. 2d 640, 642 (Fla. 2005). “[E]ven where the statute is reasonably susceptible of two interpretations, one of which would render it invalid and the other valid, we must adopt the constitutional construction.” State v. Lick, 390 So. 2d 52, 53 (Fla. 1980); see also Dep‘t of Ins. v. Se. Volusia Hosp. Dist., 438 So. 2d 815, 820 (Fla. 1983); Miami Dolphins, Ltd. v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 394 So. 2d 981, 988 (Fla. 1981) (“Given that an interpretation upholding the constitutionality of the act is available to this Court, it must adopt that construction.”); Corn v. State, 332 So. 2d 4, 8 (Fla. 1976) (holding that the Court has a duty “to adopt a reasonable interpretation of a statute which removes it farthest from constitutional infirmity”); Overstreet v. Blum, 227 So. 2d 197, 199 (Fla. 1969) (citing Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Mason, 177 So. 2d 465, 467 (Fla. 1965)). Thus, where terms in a statute are ambiguous and the statute “may reasonably be construed in more than one manner, this Court is obligated to adopt the construction that comports with the dictates of the Constitution.” Vildibill v. Johnson, 492 So. 2d 1047, 1050 (Fla. 1986). In that circumstance, we will adopt the construction that will effect a constitutional outcome so long as it is a fair construction of the statute consistent with legislative intent. See State v. Globe Commc’ns Corp., 648 So. 2d 110, 113 (Fla. 1994).
First District‘s Interpretations Render the Statute Unconstitutional
Pursuant to the First District‘s interpretations of “has issued” and “only,” and review of the record, only two counties had permit holders with the ability to convert to a greyhound permit at the time of the statute‘s enactment. Indeed, License Acquisitions and West Volusia Racing, located in Palm Beach County and Volusia County, respectively, were the only two jai alai permit holders, out of eleven in the state, to apply for conversion of their permits to permits for greyhound racing. Further, evidence in the record establishes that no other counties have a jai alai permit holder who can convert the permit under the statute. For instance, Gadsden County is ineligible due to a previous conversion that disqualifies the permit holder. See
Alternative Interpretations Render the Statute a Valid General Law
The appellants claim that adoption of their suggested interpretations would result in a class open for conversion to all of the remaining permits except one—thus a total of ten of the eleven existing permits at the time of the statute‘s enactment—without a change in the law. Indeed, review of the record demonstrates that Hillsborough County had three total
(14)(a) Any holder of a permit to conduct jai alai may apply to the division to convert such permit to a permit to conduct greyhound racing in lieu of jai alai if:
- Such permit is located in a county in which the division has issued only two pari-mutuel permits pursuant to this section;
- Such permit was not previously converted from any other class of permit; and
- The holder of the permit has not conducted jai alai games during a period оf 10 years immediately preceding his or her application for conversion under this subsection.
The restriction regarding the number of permits in a county is consistent with the Legislature‘s policy of limiting the number of similar permits,
This Court has held that the law must be upheld unless the Legislature could not have any reasonable ground for believing that there were public considerations justifying the particular classification and distinction made. North Ridge Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. City of Oakland Park, 374 So. 2d 461, 465 (Fla. 1979). Further, this Court has held that “one who assails the classification has the burden of showing that it is arbitrary and unreasonable.” Id. at 465. The appellees have not met this burden. Thus, we hold that these interpretations render the statute a valid general law.
This case, when considered in light of our precedent, supports our conclusion that this statute is a valid general law pursuant to this construction of the statute. In Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, this Court considered whether a statute that permitted the conversion of any harness racing track to dog racing was
In Biscayne Kennel Club, Inc. v. Fla. State Racing Comm‘n, 165 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1964), this Court considered the constitutionality of a statute that provided “for the transfer, under certain conditions, of existing racing permits to allow establishment of harness racing operations in counties which have by previous referendum for two years approved the operation of race track pari-mutuel pools, excluding those having more than one horse track permit or one with an average daily pari-mutuel pool less than a specified minimum.” Id. at 763-64. The Court
Other cases from this Court holding a statute unconstitutional largely involved classification schemes that were clearly applicable to only one individual, entity, or geographic area. See, e.g., Gulfstream Park, 967 So. 2d at 809 (addressing a statute that prohibited thoroughbred permit holders from engaging in intertrack wagering in “any area of the state where there are three or more horserace permitholders within 25 miles of each other,” and holding that it was unconstitutional because there was no reasonable possibility that these conditions would ever exist in another part of the state); City of Miami v. McGrath, 824 So. 2d 143, 146, 151 (Fla. 2002) (addressing a statute which authorized only municipalities with populations of more than 300,000 on a date certain to impose a parking tax, and holding that the statute was a special law because its express terms limited its application and excluded any other municipalities from joining the class in the future); Classic Mile, 541 So. 2d at 1158-59 (declaring statute unconstitutional because conditions only applied to Marion County, could never apply to others, and the appellants made no attempt to demonstrate a reasonable relationship between the classification and the subject of the statute); W. Flagler Kennel Club, 153 So. 2d at 8 (holding the statute applicable only to Broward
Finally, we also find that the alternative interpretations of “has issued” and “only” represent a fair construction of the statute consistent with legislative intent. As we noted previously, the Legislature has a pecuniary interest in this industry because of the substantial revenue it generates and has historically avoided over-competition of pari-mutuel wagering activities within a given geographic area. When “only” is used as an adjective in this context, it does not serve a discernible purpose—no articulated legislative policy would be served by requiring exactly two
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the First District‘s decision holding
It is so ordered.
PARIENTE, CANADY, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur.
LEWIS, J., dissents.
QUINCE, J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the District Court of Appeal – Statutory or Constitutional Invalidity
First District - Case No. 1D12-1654
(Leon County)
for Appellants
David S. Romanik of David S. Romanik, P.A., Oxford, Florida,
for Appellees