License Acquisitions, LLC v. Debary Real Estate Holdings, LLC
155 So. 3d 1137
Fla.2014Background
- In 2010 the Legislature enacted §550.054(14)(a) allowing a jai alai permit holder to convert to a greyhound permit if (1) the permit is in a county where the Division has issued only two §550.054 permits, (2) the permit was not previously converted, and (3) the permit holder has not conducted jai alai for 10 years.
- License Acquisitions and West Volusia Racing applied for conversion the day the statute took effect; DBPR granted the conversions shortly thereafter.
- Debary Real Estate sued, alleging §550.054(14)(a) is an unconstitutional special law because the classification was closed (applied only to the two existing permits) and the Legislature did not follow article III, §10 notice or referendum requirements.
- The trial court denied summary judgment to Debary; the First District reversed, holding the statutory language (“only” and “has issued”) produced a closed class and thus an invalid special law.
- The Florida Supreme Court granted review and framed the dispute around statutory construction of “only” and “has issued” and whether the classification is reasonably open to others (i.e., a valid general law).
- The Court construed “only” as meaning “no more than” and “has issued” to exclude permits that no longer exist (e.g., revoked/merged), held the classification could apply to additional permits in the future, and reversed the First District, upholding §550.054(14)(a) as a valid general law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §550.054(14)(a) is a special law in violation of art. III, §10 | Debary: statutory terms create a closed class that only applied to two existing permits, so notice/referendum required | Appellants: statute is a general law; “only” means “no more than” and “has issued” excludes revoked/merged permits so class is open to others | The Court held the statute is a valid general law because it is reasonably open to others under a fair construction of the terms |
| Proper interpretation of “only” in §550.054(14)(a)(1) | Debary: “only” = precisely/totally (creates closed class) | Appellants: “only” = no more than/maximum (permits in more counties could qualify) | Court adopted appellants’ construction: “only” can mean a maximum; adopts construction that preserves constitutionality |
| Proper interpretation of “has issued” in §550.054(14)(a)(1) | Debary: present perfect tense requires counting every permit ever issued (including historical permits), closing the class | Appellants: “has issued” should be read to exclude permits that no longer exist (revoked/merged) because such permits don’t create revenue or competition | Court adopted appellants’ construction to avoid unreasonable result (counting extinct permits) and to effect legislative intent |
| Whether the statutory classification bears a reasonable relationship to the statute’s purpose | Debary: classification arbitrary because it effectively targets two permit holders | Appellants: conditions (county permit limit, non-conversion, 10-year dormancy) reasonably relate to revenue/competition goals for pari‑mutuel regulation | Court held the classification reasonably relates to the legislative purpose (limit competition, preserve revenue) and upheld the statute |
Key Cases Cited
- Classic Mile, Inc. v. Dep’t of Bus. Regulation, 541 So. 2d 1155 (statutory classification must be potentially open to others)
- Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of Legal Affairs, 434 So. 2d 879 (classification open even if it initially applies to few permits; uniform treatment within class controls)
- Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, Inc., 967 So. 2d 802 (standard: reasonable possibility that others will join class; statute invalid when no reasonable possibility exists)
- Biscayne Kennel Club, Inc. v. Fla. State Racing Comm’n, 165 So. 2d 762 (upheld classification where others could qualify in future)
- State ex rel. Landis v. Harris, 163 So. 237 (definition of general vs. special law; legislative procedural limits)
- Rodriguez v. Jones, 64 So. 2d 278 (public policy to limit distance between similar pari‑mutuel establishments)
- State v. Lick, 390 So. 2d 52 (where two interpretations exist, adopt constitutional construction)