LIBERTARIAN PARTY OF ARKANSAS; Kristin Vaughn; Robert Chris Hayes; Debrah Standiford; Michael Pakko Plaintiffs-Appellees v. Mark MARTIN, in his official capacity as Secretary of State for the State of Arkansas Defendant-Appellant
No. 16-3794
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
November 30, 2017
Submitted: September 20, 2017
876 F.3d 948
Michael Fincher, Arkansas Secretary of State, Legal Division, Little Rock, AR, AJ Kelly, Kelly Law Firm, Little Rock, AR, Andres Fernando Rhodes, Associate General Counsel, Arkansas Secretary of State Office, Little Rock, AR, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before WOLLMAN, MELLOY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.
The Libertarian Party of Arkansas, Kristin Vaughn, Robert Chris Hayes, Debrah Standiford and Michael Pakko (collectively Libertarian Party) brought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief action against the Arkansas Secretary of State, claiming that the ballot access statutory scheme violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The scheme required new
The Libertarian Party of Arkansas petitioned for recognition as a political party under Arkansas law in June 2015.2 See
The Libertarian Party held its nominating convention on October 24, 2015, and
The Libertarian Party‘s complaint alleged that it should be allowed to select its nominees for partisan political office at the same time that the Republicans and Democrats conduct their preferential primary election. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that Arkansas Code sections
Applying the Supreme Court‘s balancing test in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997), the district court concluded that “[e]ven though the Court finds the Libertarian Party of Arkansas’ burden to be minor, there is no interest, regulatory or otherwise, to justify this restriction by the State.” See also Green Party of Ark. v. Martin, 649 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 2011) (analyzing the constitutionality of a ballot access statute under the Timmons balancing test). The court granted declaratory relief and found the Arkansas statutory scheme unconstitutional. The court denied the request for injunctive relief, however, concluding that one of the nominees had missed the filing deadline for personal reasons and that the remaining nominees had offered no evidence that they were unable to file by the required deadline.
The Libertarian Party thereafter sought an award of costs and attorney‘s fees pursuant to
After the appeals were briefed, the Arkansas General Assembly amended its statutory requirements by changing the certificate of nomination filing deadline for new political parties to 12:00 p.m. on the day of the preferential primary election. Act 297, 2017 Ark. Acts. 297 (Feb. 28, 2017), codified at
Mootness
Federal court jurisdiction is restricted to “cases” and “controversies.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968). This jurisdictional “requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate.” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990). We will dismiss a case as moot when “changed circumstances [have] already provide[d] the requested relief and eliminate[d] the need for court action.” Teague v. Cooper, 720 F.3d 973, 976 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting City of Mesquite v. Aladdin‘s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 n.10, 102 S.Ct. 1070, 71 L.Ed.2d 152 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “When a law has been amended or repealed, actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief for earlier versions are generally moot unless the problems are capable of repetition yet evading review.” Phelps-Roper v. City of Manchester, 697 F.3d 678, 687 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (internal citation and alterations omitted).
The Libertarian Party argues that the amended statute remains problematic because an independent party will still be required to hold its nominating convention earlier than the primary election in order to comply with the 12:00 p.m. filing deadline, given that it will have to accommodate voter travel time and the time required to certify the nominations. Further, it contends that by requiring new political parties to hold a nominating convention before the preferential primary election, the statute gives Republicans and Democrats the advantage of learning the identities of the minority party candidates, thus allowing them to select their candidates accordingly. Finally, it argues that the previously existing requirements could be reenacted, resulting in a problem that might well again evade review.
With respect to the argument that the Arkansas General Assembly could amend the statute in the future to impose an unconstitutional deadline, we have recognized the well-established principle “that a defendant‘s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice.” Teague, 720 F.3d at 977 (quoting City of Mesquite, 455 U.S. at 289). We have also expressed our agreement with the Fourth Circuit‘s position “that statutory changes that discontinue a challenged practice are usually enough to render a case moot, even if the legislature possesses the power to reenact the statute after the lawsuit is dismissed.” Teague, 720 F.3d at 977 (quoting Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. Paige, 211 F.3d 112, 116 (4th Cir. 2000)). Exceptions to this position are rare and “typically involve situations where it is virtually certain that the repealed law will be reenacted.” Id. (quoting Native Village of Noatak v. Blatchford, 38 F.3d 1505, 1510 (9th Cir. 1994)).
We see no indication that the Arkansas General Assembly intends to reenact an earlier filing or convention deadline. Following the district court‘s ruling, the 2017 Act was unanimously passed in the House of Representatives and by a vote of 23 to 2 in the Senate, actions that bespeak of legislative finality and not of for-the-moment, opportunistic tentativeness. See Teague, 720 F.3d at 978. Moreover, “as judges, we must assume that the General Assembly will properly perform its legislative duty by taking into account the di-
Whatever the merits of the Libertarian Party‘s additional above-described challenges to the amended statute, we decline to address them in the first instance on appeal.
Attorney‘s Fees
When a plaintiff garners success in a civil rights action, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, . . . a reasonable attorney‘s fee as part of the costs.”
The Libertarian Party was the prevailing party in this case because the district court awarded it declaratory relief and deemed the statutory scheme unconstitutional. See Bishop v. Comm. on Prof‘l Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass‘n, 686 F.2d 1278, 1290-91 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that the plaintiff was the prevailing party under § 1988 because he had obtained declaratory and injunctive relief, even though his case was later rendered moot); see also Diffenderfer, 587 F.3d at 454 (concluding that plaintiffs were the prevailing party because the district court granted their requested injunction, even though the case was later rendered moot by legislative action). The Libertarian Party obtained a material alteration in its legal relationship with the Secretary of State, prior to the legislative action that rendered its lawsuit moot. It was not required to succeed on all of its claims to be deemed the prevailing party, and so the district court acted within its discretion in awarding the Libertarian Party costs and attorney‘s fees.
The district court‘s order dated July 15, 2016, and judgment dated July 18, 2016, are vacated, and the case is remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint as moot. See United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 39-40 (1950).