Lewis v. StateLewis v. State
Fоllowing a jury trial, Appellant Brian David Lewis was convicted of malice murder and concealing the death of another in connection with the beating death of Ronald Redding.1 Appellant claims that the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient to
1. Appellant contends that the evidence presented at trial was constitutionally insufficient to sustain his murder conviction.2 When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence as a matter of constitutional due process, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Citation and emphasis omitted.) Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). “This Court does not reweigh evidence or resolve conflicts in testimony; instead, evidence is reviewed in a
Viewed in this light, the evidence presented at trial showed that, at all relevant times, Appellant and his wife Stephanie Lewis lived with Stephanie‘s 66-year-old father, Redding, at a house in Chatham County. The relationship between the three was volatile and abusive. Katie Everette Craft, Redding‘s granddaughter, testified at trial that the living situation in the house between Redding, Appellant, and Stephanie was “toxic.” On the morning of Redding‘s death, Redding told Craft that he was planning to evict Appellant and Stephanie from the house, that “he was in fear for his life,” and “that he was going to kill [Appellant] before [Appellant] killed him.” Jordan Tyler Everette, Redding‘s grandson, testified that Redding, Appellant, and Stephanie “were all really on medication” and that “drugs consumed” Appellant. He also testified that Appellant once called him and asked whether muriatic acid
On October 13, 2016, the day before Redding‘s death, law enforcement officers responded to two separate 911 calls regarding domestic incidents between Appellant, Redding, and Stephanie. Officers testified that they had been called out to the Redding residence on numerous prior occasions in response to domestic incidents between Appellant, Redding, and Stephanie. During one of the response calls on October 13, Redding informed the responding officer that Appellant was stealing Redding‘s medications and acсused Appellant of throwing a lamp at him. Redding also informed the responding officer that he was in the process of having Appellant and Stephanie evicted from the house.
On January 20, 2017, law enforcement officers arrived at Redding‘s home for a welfare check. Stephanie allowed officers to search the residence and a shed on the property. During their
Appellant was immediately arrested and, during a search incident to arrest, officers discovered Appellant‘s wallet, which contained a note stating the following:
To all y‘all bastards that hate me and have been trying to get rid of me for years, congrats! Y‘all did it! I‘m dead! Throw a party! I killed Ron Redding. He tried to stab my wife and then he tried to stab me. I didn‘t do it on purpose. He lunged at me with a knife and because of natural reaction I hit him and he tripped on the front porch mat and fell and hit his head on the threshold at the front door. I panic[k]ed and lied to my wife and told her that he went to the mountains. She isn‘t responsible in any way.
She found out about it but was afraid for her safety so she didn‘t turn me in because of fear of losing her life. I love Stephanie and would never hurt her and even though he tried to kill her and many other women, I didn‘t want him to die. He told me, Stephanie, and several people that he hated me and was going to kill me but I am still so sorry and ashamed that it happened. I hope God and Stephanie will forgive me. I am solely responsible for his death. Stephanie has tried to turn me in several times but I scare her each time so she doesn‘t tell on me to protect herself.
During his interview with law enforcement officers, Appellant admitted that he wrote the letter found in his wallet and stated that the incident described in the letter occurred on October 14, 2016.
Subsequent investigation revealed a surveillance video showing Appellant carrying two bottles of muriatic acid to the checkout counter of a home improvement store, the date and time of which corresponded with the receipt officers located inside Redding‘s house. An autopsy revealed that Redding died from multiple blows to the head with a blunt instrument. While the external examination of Redding‘s body revealed five injuries to the back of the head and two to his eyes, an internal examination revealed evidence of eighteen injuries, including numerous rib,
Appellant testified at trial and gave the following account of the incident. The initial confrontation took place on the front porch of the home on the morning of October 14, 2016. Redding told Appellant to pаck up and leave before turning to go back inside. When Redding had trouble opening the front door, Appellant came up behind him and reached around Redding to open the door, at which point Redding pulled a knife from his bathrobe and tried to stab Appellant. Appellant then punched Redding in the face with his fist, which caused Redding to drop the knife. Redding then picked up the knife and moved toward Appellant, at which point Redding tripped, hit his head on the door threshold, went into convulsions, and never got back up. Appellant subsequently pulled Redding inside the home and cheсked on Stephanie to ensure she
Appellant testified that he was arrested on an unrelated charge that evening and, after spending four days in jail, he returned to the house and noticed that the trashcan was starting to smell. He wrapped the trashcan in plastic wrap and moved it from the carport into the shed behind the house. Appellant also admitted that he wrote checks to himself from Redding‘s bank account after Redding‘s death and continued to use Redding‘s credit cards after his death to purchase takeout food. Additionally, he testified that he purchased the bottles of muriatic acid and that he taped the trashcan containing Redding‘s body because he did not want anyone to find the body.3 Appellant maintained that he acted in self-
Appellant alleges that the evidence was insufficient to support his murder conviction because the State failed to disprove his claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. However, based on the evidеnce presented at trial and recounted above, the jury was authorized to reject Appellant‘s theory of self-defense and find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of murder. See Jackson, supra, 443 U. S. at 319 (III) (B). See also Morris v. State, 301 Ga. 702, 705 (1) (b) (804 SE2d 42) (2017) (reiterating that “questions about the existence of justification are for the jury to resolve. The jury is free to reject any evidence in support of a justification defense and to accept the evidence that the [killing] was not done in self-defense“) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant‘s murder conviction.
2. Appellant argues thаt the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter. The record shows
As this Court has previously explained:
We may remedy an error under plain error review if (1) the error was not affirmatively waived by the appellant; (2) the error is “cleаr or obvious, rather than subject to
reasonable dispute“; (3) the error “affected the appellant‘s substantial rights“; and (4) “the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
(Citation omitted.) Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 147, 151-152 (2) (805 SE2d 873) (2017). Here, Appellant cannot satisfy the first prong of the plain error test because he affirmatively waived the alleged trial court error. “To constitute an affirmative waiver, an error must have been ‘intentionally relinquished or abandoned.‘” Davis v. State, 311 Ga. 225 (2) (857 SE2d 207) (2021) (quoting State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 33 (718 SE2d 232) (2011)). Not only did trial counsel withdraw the requested charge on voluntary manslaughter with Appellant‘s agreement, but she also affirmatively opposed the instruction during the charge conference. Consequently, Appellant cannot show plain error as he intentionally relinquished the alleged error for which he now seeks relief on appeal. See Cheddersingh v. State, 290 Ga. 680 (2) (724 SE2d 366) (2012) (explaining that affirmative waiver, as opposed to mere forfeiture by failing to object,
3. Appellant alleges that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel based upon counsel‘s failure to: (a) adequately investigate, prepare, and present Appellant‘s theory of self-defense; (b) timely advise Appellant of a guilty plea offer and to explain the consequences of a plea or trial, including differences in parole eligibility; and (c) explain the option for a bench trial. In order to
“A court considering a claim of ineffective assistance must apply a ‘strong presumption’ that counsel‘s representation was within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable professional assistance.” (Citation omitted.) Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 104 (IV) (131 SCt 770, 178 LE2d 624) (2011). Indeed, “[t]rial tactics and strategy . . . are almost never adequate grounds for finding trial counsel ineffective unless they are so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen them.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) McNair v. State, 296 Ga. 181, 184 (2) (b) (766 SE2d 45) (2014). “In reviewing the trial court‘s decision, we accept
(a) Trial claims
Appellant claims that trial counsel failed to adequately investigate, prepare, and present at trial Appellant‘s theory of self-defense in that she failed to: (i) obtain and review all of the evidence in his case and spend sufficient time consulting with him prior to trial, (ii) failed to procure and present the testimony of Stephanie Lewis at trial, (iii) failed to present the recorded 911 calls from the day before Redding‘s death in order to corroborate Apрellant‘s self-defense claim, and (iv) failed to present evidence from recordings seized from Appellant‘s home that purportedly included previous threats made by Redding. Based on the record before this Court, however, Appellant has failed to meet his burden under Strickland
(i) Trial preparation
Appellant alleges that trial counsel failed to obtain and review all of the evidence in his case and spent an inadequate amount of time consulting with him prior to trial. At the motion for new trial hearing, both William Lewis,5 Appellant‘s pre-trial attorney, and Katherine Kelly, Appellant‘s trial attorney, рrovided testimony regarding their representation. William Lewis testified concerning his representation of Appellant during the early stages of the case. After pre-trial counsel transferred to another division within the public defender‘s office, Appellant‘s case was re-assigned to Kelly. Kelly testified that, when she took over Appellant‘s representation, she reviewed the case file, had discussions with Appellant concerning his case, made investigative requests, had an investigator contact all members of Appellant‘s family, met with pre-trial counsel and rеviewed all of his notes from his work on the case, went to the District Attorney‘s office and reviewed the entire case
The trial court credited Kelly‘s testimony in support of its determination that counsel was not deficient in her trial preparation. Giving the proper deference to the trial court‘s factual findings and credibility determinations, we conclude that Appellant has failed to show deficient performance under Strickland. See Jones v. State, 287 Ga. 270, 272 (695 SE2d 271) (2010) (“Thе trial court was authorized to credit the testimony of [appellant‘s trial] counsel, and its factual findings and credibility determinations will be accepted unless clearly erroneous.“); Ruffin v. State, 283 Ga. 87, 91 (12) (d) (656 SE2d 140) (2008) (“Appellant‘s claim that counsel spent inadequate time conferring with him is not dispositive, as there exists no magic amount of time which counsel must spend in actual conference with his client.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)).
(ii) Testimony of Stephanie Lewis
[Stephanie] would not accept service. She was cooperative with my office, with me and my investigators, and with my assistant up and to a point, and then she was outside the area where she could be served personally. So, we mailed it. She didn‘t sign for it. We FedEx‘d it. She didn‘t sign for it. We attempted to contact her. She wouldn‘t take our phone calls, which was unusual, because up until that point, she had been very cooperative and indicated to us that she would come to testify.
Appellant called Stephanie as a witness at the motion for new trial hearing. She testified about the events surrounding the 911 calls made on October 13, 2016. She also testified that, at the time of her father‘s death, she was suffering from psychosis and on both antidepressants and antipsychotic medication, although she was not
In its order denying this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court credited trial counsel‘s testimоny concerning her attempts to serve Stephanie, finding that the defense team “did everything they could to subpoena Mrs. Lewis and force her to appear at trial; however, they were unable to serve her with a subpoena to appear.” The court further concluded that, even if trial counsel had procured Stephanie‘s attendance at trial, her testimony would not have produced a different result at trial because of issues surrounding her mental state at the time of the murder and because her testimony would not have been helpful to the defensе.
We agree with the trial court that Appellant has failed to show
(iii) 911 recordings
[w]hile other counsel, had they represented appellant, may have exercised different judgment, the fact that trial counsel chose to try the case in the manner in which it was tried, and made certain difficult decisions regarding the defense tactics to be employed with which appellant and his present counsel now disagree, does not require a finding that the representation below was so inadequate as to amount to a denial of effective assistance of counsel.
Lewis v. State, 246 Ga. 101, 105 (3) (268 SE2d 915) (1980). Consequently, Appellant has failed to show deficient performance under Strickland.
(iv) Redding recordings
Appellant alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to tender into evidence and play for the jury recordings seized from Appellant‘s home, which purportedly included previous threats made by Redding. Appellant asserts that these recordings would have further supported his theory of self-defense. The trial court found, and the record shows, that most of the recordings seized by law enforcement officers were on a broken digital memory card and could not be played. Appellant testified at the motion for new trial
(b) Plea offer
Next, Appellant asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely advise him that the State had extended a plea offer and to explain the consequenсes of accepting a guilty plea versus going to trial, specifically by not describing the differences in parole
(c) Bench trial
4. Lastly, Appellant argues that he is entitled to a new trial on the basis of cumulative prejudice pursuant to State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 14 (1) (838 SE2d 808) (2020). However, because Appellant has not raised any trial court evidentiary errors and has only argued the cumulative effect of multiple alleged deficiencies on the part of trial counsel, Lane does not apply. See Woods v. State, No. S21A0862, 2021 WL 3727808 at n.7 (Ga. Aug. 24, 2021). Nonetheless, this Court assesses prejudice “based on the cumulative effect of all of trial counsel‘s deficiencies.” Debelbot v. State, 305 Ga. 534, 544 (2) (826 SE2d 129) (2019). “It is the prejudice arising from counsel‘s errors that is constitutionally relevant, not that each individual error by counsel should be considered in a vacuum.” (Citation and punctuation omittеd.) Davis v. State, 306 Ga. 140, 150 (829 SE2d 321) (2019). Here, “we conclude that the cumulative prejudice from any assumed deficiencies [in Division 3 (a) (ii and iv) and 3 (c)] is insufficient to show a reasonable probability that the results of the proceedings would have been different in the absence of the alleged deficiencies.” Snipes v. State, 309 Ga. 785, 798 (3) (f) (848 SE2d 417) (2020). Consequently, Appellant is not entitled to relief on this basis.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.