LEO L. BOATMAN, Appellant, vs. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.
No. SC2022-1547
Supreme Court of Florida
October 17, 2024
Leo L. Boatman appeals his conviction and death sentence for the first-degree premeditated murder of William L. Chapman, a fellow inmate in Florida State Prison. We have jurisdiction. See
I. BACKGROUND
The murder took place on July 5, 2019, in the dayroom in the prison‘s I-Wing. Unsurprisingly, the relevant events were largely
During Boatman‘s post-murder interview with law enforcement, he explained that he and Wells decided to commit murder after they were denied their respective reviews to be released from Close Management (CM) level 3 confinement status and into the general prison population.3 Boatman also explained
At trial, defense counsel largely argued the murder was “generally heat of passion, provocation, or self-defense.” But the jury rejected any such defense and convicted Boatman of premeditated first-degree murder. A few days into the penalty phase, Boatman waived the jury for the remainder of the penalty phase. The judge later sentenced Boatman to death.
Guilt Phase
The State presented the testimony of six witnesses—three individuals who worked at the prison on the night of the murder, two Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) special agents (David Meacham and Garrett Carlisle), and the medical examiner
On July 5, 2019, the Defendant, along with his co-defendant, William E. Wells, entered the dayroom in I-Wing in Florida State Prison with the premeditated intent to kill the victim, William Chapman. Florida State Prison is a maximum-security prison. And, at the time of the murder, the Defendant was serving two life sentences for first-degree murders which he committed in Marion County, Florida. Additionally, the Defendant was on Close Management (level 3) at the prison.
Upset that their Close Management level would not be reduced, the Defendant and Wells decided to kill a fellow inmate as an act of revenge against the Department of Corrections. Ultimately, they chose inmate William Chapman as the intended victim because he had “tried“/disrespected the Defendant on the prison wing. In preparation for the murder, the Defendant and Wells acquired shanks and ligatures to facilitate the killing. It appears that the Defendant acquired the shanks (metal rods) while Wells acquired the ligatures. The Defendant would not disclose from where he obtained the shanks.
The events which occurred on July 5, 2019, were captured on video (both inside the dayroom and in the hallway outside the dayroom). The dayroom video reflects the Defendant, his co-defendant Wells, the victim, and approximately 10-12 other inmates in the dayroom before the attack began. The dayroom‘s singular door is the only entry and exit point into the room. Approximately ten minutes before the attack began, the Defendant leaves the dayroom with a correctional officer to go to the bathroom; and he returns
two minutes later. After the Defendant returns to the room, Wells leaves the room and is escorted to the bathroom. Once Wells returns to the room, the Defendant walks over to the victim, speaks to him, and the two walk out of the dayroom camera‘s view into an area that contains a blind spot. Wells then moves toward where the Defendant and Chapman are standing and wraps a white ligature around Chapman‘s neck. While Wells is strangling Chapman, the Defendant begins punching him. Chapman can be seen struggling as the two co-defendants are choking and hitting him. The Defendant then moves in front of the dayroom door, blocking it with his foot. He then pulls out two large shanks, one in each hand, tied to his wrists. The Defendant tied the shanks to his wrists to prevent Chapman from taking them from him during the attack. During the attack, correctional officers unsuccessfully attempted to open the dayroom door, blocked by the Defendant with his body and foot. Further, the Defendant threatened the officers, telling them that he and Wells intended to kill Chapman (“This guy‘s going to die today“); and if they entered the dayroom they would be killed, or harmed, as well. As the attack continued, the Defendant and Wells stabbed Chapman in his eyes, neck, torso, back, and face. Although the correctional officers were ordering the Defendant to stop, the Defendant persisted in viciously attacking Chapman.
At this point, correctional officers were able to slightly open the dayroom door and deploy a chemical agent into the room. Once the door was ajar, Chapman places his fingers in the gap, trying to open the door and escape. However, Chapman was unable to get away from the Defendant and Wells’ attack. Wells then began leaning against the dayroom door while the Defendant continued stabbing Chapman. The Defendant then gives Wells one of the shanks. Wells begins stabbing Chapman, ultimately leaving one of the shanks in the victim‘s neck. As he and Wells are stabbing Chapman,
the Defendant continues to communicate with the correctional officers who were situated outside of the dayroom door. Ultimately, Chapman falls to the floor; and the Defendant and Boatman take a short break. The Defendant can be seen on the dayroom video, covered in the victim‘s blood, appearing to revel in what he has done. The Defendant subsequently stomps on the victim seven times. After which, he stabs the victim with the second shank, leaving it in the back of his neck. The Defendant then stomps on the shank with such strength that it bends the metal. The entire attack lasted approximately 12 minutes. Once the Defendant and Wells were certain that Chapman was dead, they allowed the correctional officers into the room. Ultimately, Chapman was unable to be revived. And it was determined that his death was the result of being beaten, stabbed, and strangled. The medical examiner testified that Chapman had multiple traumas to his head, neck, eyes, face, and body, including: 25 stab wound/cuts on the right-side of his neck; 13 stab/cut wounds on the back of his neck; a penetrating injury to his neck by a metal rod (which was still in the victim‘s neck at the time of the autopsy); a deep ligature furrow in his neck (indicating that he had been strangled with a ligature); hemorrhaging around the eyes (the eyes themselves were intact); internal injuries (brain hemorrhaging caused by blunt force trauma[)]; and multiple torso injuries (both internal and external) caused by penetrating injuries due [to] sharp force trauma. There were multiple modalities of injury and any of the more serious forms of blunt force trauma or sharp force trauma could have been the fatal act.
Hours after the murder, the Defendant was interviewed by FDLE Special Agents David Meacham and Garrett Carlisle. During the interview, the Defendant stated that he decided, after being required to stay on Close Management, that he was no longer going to put up with “the bullshit“; and that the next person who “crossed the line” would die. That person ended up being
William Chapman. The Defendant felt betrayed by Chapman, whom he considered to be a friend. According to the Defendant, Chapman was “an undercover fag” who was acting on behalf of another inmate to trick him and Wells into performing homosexual acts in exchange for coffee, and related items. The Defendant further acknowledged that he had been planning the murder for up to a week prior, but at least for a few days.
Sentencing Order at 3-6.
For its part, the defense called five witnesses, including Boatman, in an unsuccessful attempt to establish “heat of passion, provocation, or self-defense.”
Boatman largely testified to his chaotic upbringing—including being born in a mental institution; never meeting his father; and being sexually abused by multiple males and by his mother, beginning at age seven—and to prison life. As to the latter, he testified that violent persons get respect, that weapons are needed for defense, that he is not gay, and that a straight inmate cannot wait long to act in retaliation after being propositioned by a gay inmate, otherwise others will begin propositioning you, eventually opening the door to someone “taking what they want” from you. He explained why he thought Chapman—with whom he associated and who initially denied being gay—was a threat, including that
Another defense witness, Dr. Tonia Werner, a psychiatrist who had diagnosed Boatman with an adjustment disorder, opined that being denied CM review and discovering a plan between inmates to sexually target you (after you have a history of sexual abuse) is a “stressor” that can trigger a heightened response.
The other three defense witnesses were the Assistant Warden (Jeffrey McClellan), who was not aware of any sexual battery on CM, and two inmates (Reginald Arline and Smurf).
As noted above, the jury rejected the defense‘s theory and convicted Boatman of first-degree premeditated murder.
In the penalty phase, the State presented four witnesses. Agent Carlisle provided additional testimony regarding the Chapman murder, and the other three witnesses testified about Boatman‘s prior violent felonies inside and outside the prison system. Eric Dice, an officer with the Marion County Sheriff‘s Office, testified about the first-degree murders Boatman committed—using an AK-47—of a young couple in the Ocala National Forest in 2006. Joseph Lee Hamner, a retired Department of Corrections (DOC) inspector, testified regarding Boatman‘s conviction for attempted second-degree murder stemming from a 2009 incident at Cross City Correctional Institution, where Boatman was observed pulling on a sheet tied around the neck of a fellow inmate (Mark Apicella). And Kevin Michael Ortiz, a senior inspector with DOC, testified about Boatman‘s third-degree murder conviction stemming from a 2010 incident with a fellow inmate (Ricky Morris) at Charlotte Correctional Institution, where Boatman was seen slamming Morris‘s head into the concrete floor.
The defense called over a dozen witnesses. Three witnesses were fellow inmates, one of whom described the difference in
Other defense witnesses, including several of Boatman‘s relatives, testified about Boatman‘s dysfunctional upbringing and the chaotic and abusive nature of his family. The testimony largely established the following.
Boatman was born in a mental hospital to a mother, Sheila, who was a long-term patient (Boatman‘s father may have been a patient). While pregnant with Boatman, Sheila likely took psychiatric drugs, did not get proper prenatal care, and consumed alcohol. Sheila‘s mother, Lucille, had six children with six different men and married between eight and ten times. Lucille was physically and verbally abusive to her children, and later to Boatman, whom Lucille ended up adopting (along with Boatman‘s sister).
When Boatman was seven years old, he began rebelling after his best friend was killed in front of him by a distracted driver. Other tragedies endured by Boatman as a child included Sheila‘s body being found in another state when Boatman was almost nine. After his mother‘s death, Boatman started getting into fights. Lucille eventually gave up her rights to Boatman, who ended up in
Another defense witness, retired judge Irene Sullivan—whose years on the bench included handling juvenile dependency and delinquency matters but who never interacted with Boatman while he was in the juvenile system—testified that she reached out to Boatman after he committed the Ocala murders, and they became pen pals. During Retired Judge Sullivan‘s testimony, defense counsel read to the jury some letters Boatman wrote to her about his life. Among other things, the letters outlined the sexual abuse Boatman experienced, including that perpetrated by his mother.
Other witnesses included: a woman who lived near Boatman‘s grandmother; a member of the team that represented Boatman in the Ocala murders; a mitigation specialist; and Dr. Werner, who reminded the jury about her adjustment-disorder diagnosis of Boatman.
Dr. Joseph Wu, a professor of psychiatry and human behavior who specializes in neuropsychiatry and neurocognitive imaging, reviewed a PET scan of Boatman‘s brain and “found many different kinds of abnormalities” consistent with different clinical neuropsychiatric diagnoses, including fetal alcohol spectrum disorder (FASD). Dr. Wu opined that Boatman “is a neurological perfect storm,” the result of which is “a catastrophic breakdown . . . in terms of his ability to regulate his aggressive impulses” and conform his conduct, that “Boatman was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,” and that Boatman‘s capacity to conform his conduct to requirements of the law “was
Dr. Geoffrey Colino, a forensic neurologist who evaluated Boatman, opined that Boatman “no doubt . . . has FASD” and that he had suffered traumatic head injuries. Dr. Colino opined that Boatman meets the criteria for a diagnosis of fetal alcohol syndrome, the most severe form of FASD. According to Dr. Colino, someone like Boatman cannot stop himself from following through once a decision to act is impulsively made in response to a setting-off event—even if the action is deferred and involves planning—and the syndrome that most characterizes Boatman‘s behaviors is orbitofrontal cortex syndrome. Dr. Colino correlated his findings to the two statutorily enumerated mental health mitigators, namely that “[t]he capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,” and “[t]he capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.”
Not all the defense witnesses testified in front of the jury. After the defense‘s first five witnesses testified (including Boatman‘s sister), defense counsel informed the judge that Boatman desired to waive and dismiss the jury. The next day, after extensive colloquies with Boatman, the judge granted Boatman‘s waiver request.
Spencer5 Hearing
At the Spencer hearing, the defense presented additional argument, but neither the defense nor the State had any additional witnesses to call or evidence to present.
Sentencing
On November 9, 2022, the court held a sentencing hearing, during which the court sentenced Boatman to death. The court found all four proposed aggravators were proven beyond a
Regarding mitigation, the court first addressed five statutorily enumerated mitigating circumstances, finding four were not established by the evidence, namely: (1) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; (2) the victim was a participant in the defendant‘s conduct or consented to the act; (3) the defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person; and (4) the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. As to the fifth
The court then addressed any other factors in Boatman‘s background that would mitigate against imposition of the death penalty. See
As noted above, the trial court imposed a sentence of death for the murder. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
Boatman raises fifteen issues, including the sufficiency of the
Motion to Adjudicate Boatman Incompetent to Proceed
Boatman argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to adjudicate him incompetent to proceed, given that Dr. Werner opined that he was incompetent to proceed. We conclude that no reasonable grounds to question Boatman‘s competence were presented. Indeed, Dr. Werner‘s report and testimony make clear that Boatman was not incompetent to proceed. The trial court thus did not err in denying Boatman‘s motion.
Two years before the guilt-phase trial commenced, Boatman filed the motion, attaching a report by Dr. Werner, who, at the request of defense counsel, evaluated Boatman for the stated purpose “of opining on competency to proceed.” In her report, Dr. Werner addressed the statutorily enumerated competence factors in
At a hearing two days after the motion was filed, Dr. Werner conceded that, aside from the potential plea, she had no issues with Boatman‘s competence to participate in a trial. After some discussion, the judge recognized that Dr. Werner‘s opinion was wholly detached from her report and testimony. The judge further stated that Boatman had “always manifested appropriate courtroom behavior” and that there was no “factual basis” to otherwise “question” his “competency to go forward.” The judge ultimately rejected the notion that he “must find [Boatman is] incompetent to proceed based [solely] upon [Dr. Werner‘s report and testimony],” given that Dr. Werner herself gave “overwhelming evidence” to the contrary. The judge left open the possibility of appointing a doctor if later necessary. But nothing in the evidence presented at the hearing convinced the judge that was necessary. The judge then set a hearing date for one month later to discuss Boatman‘s
On this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Boatman‘s motion and determining there were no reasonable grounds on which to further pursue the issue of potential incompetence. Indeed, this record suggests that defense counsel and Dr. Werner seemingly conflated the “competence” standard with the “heightened” standard for pleading guilty.
Recently, we explained that “the standard for competence to stand trial . . . is the same standard of competence required to plead guilty.” Noetzel v. State, 328 So. 3d 933, 945-46 (Fla. 2021). There is also “a ‘heightened’ standard for pleading guilty,” but that heightened standard “is not a heightened standard of competence.” Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401 (1993). Rather, the heightened standard means that “[i]n addition to determining that a defendant who seeks to plead guilty . . . is competent, a trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver of his constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary.” Id. at 400 (citing Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28-29 (1992); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)). Whether Boatman met that heightened standard is not at issue—he never pleaded guilty. We deny this claim.
Boatman asserts that the judge erred in denying his motion to disqualify and that he “did not receive a just and fair trial.”
“The standard of review for a trial judge‘s decision on a motion to disqualify is de novo.” Davis v. State, 347 So. 3d 315, 322 (Fla. 2022) (citing Gore v. State, 964 So. 2d 1257, 1268 (Fla. 2007)). Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.330 requires the movant to “allege specifically the facts and reasons upon which the movant relies as the grounds for disqualification.” Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.330(c)(2). The judge against whom the motion is directed “may determine only the legal sufficiency of the motion and shall not pass on the truth of the facts alleged.” Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.330(h). In determining legal sufficiency, the judge “must consider ‘whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial.‘” Davis, 347 So. 3d at 322 (quoting Livingston v. State, 441 So. 2d 1083, 1087 (Fla. 1983)).
Boatman‘s motion—which included his sworn statement—set forth a portion of a conversation between the judge and defense counsel at a pretrial conference on July 28, 2021, “to discuss the
readiness of Mr. Boatman‘s case for an August trial.” After counsel argued for a continuance, the judge expressed a reluctance to grant it. The judge, while outlining his recollections of counsel‘s representations at prior conferences and inviting counsel to respond, questioned whether counsel was “like sort of willfully putting [himself] in a position to continue to state [they] are not ready,” and noted it was difficult “to discern between legitimate not ready and [counsel] engaging in a scheduling strategy.” After co-counsel stated the defense was not “even close to being ready,” the judge responded that the defense had for five months been saying they were “extraordinarily close.” The motion alleged that this response “mischaracterized the previous representations by [counsel].” The court denied the motion, citing cases for the proposition that coaxing counsel to get a case to trial or to resolve discovery issues does not create a well-grounded fear of bias.We conclude that Boatman‘s motion was legally insufficient. The motion at most alleged—without adequate explanation—that the judge “mischaracterized” certain prior statements. In that regard, Boatman failed to “allege specifically the facts and reasons upon which [he] relie[d].”
Here, Boatman alleged in his motion that the judge expressed frustration with and invited an explanation from counsel regarding prior representations on the topic of scheduling and trial readiness. Although it has been said that “a statement by a trial judge that he or she feels a party has lied in the case is generally regarded as indicating a bias against the party,” Campbell Soup Co. v. Roberts, 676 So. 2d 435, 436 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), that proposition does not apply here.
Even if counsel never said the defense was “extraordinarily close,” the judge‘s frustration centered around the defense failing to calendar depositions the defense represented would be completed. This additional context supports the denial of the motion. See Wall v. State, 238 So. 3d 127, 143 (Fla. 2018) (“[T]he context of the hearing and history of the case as reflected in the record are relevant to understanding whether a movant has a well-founded fear of judicial bias.“).
The judge‘s comments “contain clear qualifiers,” Pilkington v. Pilkington, 182 So. 3d 776, 779 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015), and the judge did “not make any decisions based upon first impressions,” id., instead agreeing to take the defense‘s “request under advisement.” Boatman‘s sworn statement that he subjectively “felt that” the judge accused counsel “of being liars” is insufficient. See Krawczuk v. State, 92 So. 3d 195, 201 (Fla. 2012) (“The subjective fear of a party seeking the disqualification of a judge is not sufficient.” (quoting Parker v. State, 3 So. 3d 974, 982 (Fla. 2009))). We deny this claim.
Motion to Exclude Photographs and Video
Boatman argues the court erred in denying his motion in limine that sought to exclude “crime-scene and autopsy photographs and video” as “gruesome, inflammatory and unnecessary.” At a hearing, defense counsel offered little argument regarding video of the murder, and, with respect to the photos—which counsel had not seen—“ask[ed] that [the State] produce [the
A trial court‘s ruling on a motion in limine is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Joseph v. State, 336 So. 3d 218, 228 n.7 (Fla. 2022). Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Although a trial court‘s “discretion is limited by the rules of evidence,” Patrick v. State, 104 So. 3d 1046, 1056 (Fla. 2012), Boatman misstates the rules of evidence. He largely argues the photos and video “were not necessary.” But “[t]he test for admissibility of photographic evidence is relevancy rather than necessity.” Smith v. State, 28 So. 3d 838, 861 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Douglas v. State, 878 So. 2d 1246, 1255 (Fla. 2004)). Here, the videos of the crime itself were plainly relevant—including to establish the disputed element of premeditation—and their probative value was not “substantially outweighed by the danger of
Motion to Preclude Penalty Phase
Boatman argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to preclude the State from seeking the death penalty should the State secure a conviction of first-degree murder. His motion asserted that because the indictment failed to allege aggravating factors, the indictment could only support a maximum sentence of life in prison. The gist of his argument was that in the wake of Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016), and this Court‘s decision on remand in Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), receded from in part by State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2020), aggravators under
This Court has repeatedly rejected this claim, both before and after deciding Hurst v. State. See, e.g., Cruz v. State, 320 So. 3d 695, 730 (Fla. 2021); Pham v. State, 70 So. 3d 485, 496 (Fla. 2011). “We decline to revisit” this issue. Cruz, 320 So. 3d at 731.
Motion for Individual and Sequestered Voir Dire
Boatman argues the court erred in denying his motion seeking individual and sequestered voir dire to “inquir[e] into the
A trial court‘s decision regarding “whether prospective jurors must be questioned individually about publicity the case has received” is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Bolin v. State, 736 So. 2d 1160, 1164 (Fla. 1999) (citing Pietri v. State, 644 So. 2d 1347, 1351 (Fla. 1994)). “Individual voir dire to determine juror impartiality in the face of pretrial publicity is constitutionally compelled only if the trial court‘s failure to ask these questions renders the trial fundamentally unfair.” Id. (citing Mu‘Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 430 (1991)). Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The decisions cited by Boatman, namely the
Among other things, Mu‘Min held “that the voir dire examination conducted by the trial court . . . was consistent with [the
Bolin—which limited its holding to “the facts of th[e] case,” 736 So. 2d at 1166—held that the trial court erroneously denied the defendant‘s “motion for individual and sequestered voir dire of prospective jurors who had been exposed to prejudicial pretrial publicity and who eventually served on [the] jury.” Id. at 1161. But the publicity at issue involved newspaper articles containing “inadmissible and prejudicial information.” Id. at 1162-63. Here, the court agreed to individual and sequestered voir dire, if necessary. And there is no indication any juror was exposed to inadmissible and prejudicial information. We deny this claim.
Motion to Use Photographs and Video During Voir Dire
Boatman claims the court erroneously denied his motion which asked that of the photographs or videos deemed admissible, the defense be permitted “to show a representative sample of crime-scene and autopsy photographs and/or relevant portion of the video of the crime to prospective jurors during voir dire and to question prospective jurors about their ability to deliberate fairly and
“The scope of voir dire questioning rests in the sound discretion of the court and will not be interfered with unless that discretion is clearly abused.” Hoskins v. State, 965 So. 2d 1, 13 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Vining v. State, 637 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1994)). Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Indeed, Hoskins supports the trial court‘s decision.
In Hoskins, defense counsel “sought to show potential jurors [a graphic autopsy] photograph and ask whether it would cause them to vote for the death penalty.” Id. at 12. The trial court denied the request but “did permit questioning about the effect of viewing graphic autopsy photographs.” Id. at 13. In holding that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion,” Hoskins reasoned in part that “defense counsel, in effect, sought an advance opinion of
Here, defense counsel similarly “sought an advance opinion of the evidence,” id., namely “whether it would cause [the prospective jurors] to vote for the death penalty,” id. at 12. The trial court properly denied the request while otherwise allowing counsel to discuss the information with potential jurors. And the record does not show that the court otherwise “restricted [Boatman‘s] ability to determine the jurors’ fairness.” Id. at 13. We deny this claim.6
Motion to Strike the Jury Panel
Boatman argues the court erred in denying defense counsel‘s ore tenus motion to strike the jury panel during voir dire. At the mid-afternoon bench conference during jury selection, after it became obvious that defense counsel needed many more hours for the initial voir dire, the judge and defense counsel discussed timing for the day. When the judge asked counsel if they were “going to be
First, any asserted error was “invited” and is therefore “unreviewable.” Allen v. State, 322 So. 3d 589, 598 n.4 (Fla. 2021). Indeed, counsel “expressly” agreed to the judge‘s proposal. Cf. Woodbury v. State, 320 So. 3d 631, 653 n.10 (Fla. 2021) (concluding that “asserted error was invited” where defendant argued on appeal “that after the Spencer hearing, the trial court should have ordered a recess and convened a separate proceeding for imposition of the sentence,” even though defendant “expressly objected to the court delaying the pronouncement of sentence and told the court to proceed directly to sentencing“).
Third, any error was harmless. As the State notes, “the court did not inform the [prospective jurors] of anything that they would be unable to conclude on their own.”
The cases cited by Boatman are easily distinguished. See, e.g., Richardson v. State, 666 So. 2d 223, 224 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (involving an exchange between prosecutor and venire member “implying that [defendant] was a convicted felon who previously served time“). We deny this claim.
Challenges for Cause
Boatman argues the court erred in denying his cause challenges of four potential jurors. Defense counsel used peremptory challenges to remove all four individuals. Later, when the defense was denied another cause challenge and requested an
A ruling on a cause challenge is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Lowe v. State, 259 So. 3d 23, 38 (Fla. 2018) (citing Singleton v. State, 783 So. 2d 970, 973 (Fla. 2001)). “Where the record demonstrates a reasonable doubt about a juror‘s ability to be impartial, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the cause challenge.” Hilton v. State, 326 So. 3d 640, 654 (Fla. 2021) (citing Carratelli v. State, 961 So. 2d 312, 319 (Fla. 2007)). “[I]t is the adversary seeking exclusion who must demonstrate, through questioning, that the potential juror lacks impartiality.” Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985) (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 157 (1879)). Even if a defendant establishes the erroneous denial of a cause challenge, the defendant must also “demonstrate . . . that the denial of the challenge resulted in prejudice.” Hilton, 326 So. 3d at 654 (citing Carratelli, 961 So. 2d at 319). Here, even assuming this issue is adequately briefed, Boatman fails to establish error or prejudice.
For each of the four individuals, Boatman simply provides a transcript citation to where defense counsel, based on his recollection of the individual‘s responses, indicated the basis for the
In any event, given the conflicting recollections of defense counsel and the judge—and after reviewing the uncited portions of the transcript—we cannot say “the record demonstrates a reasonable doubt about” any of the four potential jurors’ “ability to be impartial.” Hilton, 326 So. 3d at 654. For example, Boatman asserts one of the four prospective jurors stated that, among other things, “he thought it was a first-degree murder, then the death penalty comes with it.” But according to the judge, that prospective juror was initially confused and, after explanation, “seemed to indicate he understood.” That prospective juror did in fact clarify he “would feel obligated to” consider mitigation, that he was “confused earlier” about the penalty phase, and that it would be his
Even assuming any error occurred, to establish prejudice Boatman must “show that an objectionable juror has served on the jury.” Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 96-97 (Fla. 2004) (citing Trotter v. State, 576 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1991)). Said differently, he must show he “subsequently exhaust[ed] all of his . . . peremptory challenges and an additional challenge [was] sought and denied.” Hill v. State, 477 So. 2d 553, 556 (Fla. 1985) (emphasis added). He cannot. Indeed, he was granted the only additional peremptory he requested.7 We deny this claim.
Evidentiary Issues in Guilt and Penalty Phases
Boatman claims numerous evidentiary errors occurred during
Beginning with the guilt phase, Boatman‘s meritless claims include alleged violations of the best evidence rule. That rule requires the “original writing, recording, or photograph” to be introduced into evidence “to prove [its] contents.”
Boatman refers to the transcript of Special Agent Meacham‘s interview with Boatman but does not advance any argument. The trial court instructed the jury regarding the use of transcripts of recordings, allowed the audio to be published, and allowed the transcript to be followed along by the jury. Boatman does not allege
Boatman takes issue with “the number of [autopsy] pictures” (and one x-ray) admitted during the medical examiner‘s testimony. The seven or so photos, which showed separate injuries, were not unfairly prejudicial. See Smith v. State, 320 So. 3d 20, 30-31 (Fla. 2021) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing twenty-six autopsy photos—most of which “identified separate injuries on [the victim‘s] body“—to be introduced during medical examiner‘s testimony).
Boatman also raises guilt-phase hearsay and Confrontation Clause arguments, none of which we find convincing. For example, he takes issue with Sergeant Prock testifying he “overhear[d] Mr. Boatman handing the weapon to Mr. Wells and telling him to -- he needed to stab the inmate as well.” But for a statement to be hearsay, it must be offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”
As another example, Boatman takes issue with Special Agent
Boatman‘s evidentiary arguments pertaining to the penalty phase mostly involve hearsay and confrontation.9 They center
For example, Boatman takes issue with testimony from Inspector Ortiz regarding Boatman‘s conviction for the third-degree murder of inmate Ricky Morris at Charlotte Correctional. Ortiz, who arrived at the scene after the attack, testified about certain things said and done by the CO who discovered Morris facedown and bleeding in Boatman‘s cell and who witnessed Boatman continuing to beat Morris. Over objection, Ortiz testified the CO said that after Morris was discovered facedown and bleeding in Boatman‘s cell, “Boatman began to beat Morris some more,” and that he (the CO) “tried to get attention from staff and that Boatman continued to beat Morris.” But Boatman‘s own admissions were introduced, also through Inspector Ortiz, including Boatman telling investigators that after the CO “discovered them,” Boatman “started
Boatman takes issue with six photos admitted during Detective Dice‘s testimony about the first-degree murders Boatman committed in the Ocala National Forest. The photos are of that crime scene and those two victims’ bodies. Dice, who was involved in the investigation, testified that the photos were in the case file and accurately reflect what was described to him at the time of the investigation. Boatman‘s specific claim on appeal is unclear. He does not provide any authority to support a claim that hearsay was erroneously admitted or that the Confrontation Clause was violated; the photos were not a feature of the penalty phase; and he fails to explain how the judge erred in rejecting a “gruesomeness” argument.
As to the testimony about Boatman‘s conviction for the attempted second-degree murder of inmate Apicella at Cross City Correctional, Boatman takes issue with Inspector Hamner‘s testimony about a sworn interview the since-deceased lead inspector conducted with Apicella. Of relevance, Apicella stated
In short, we reject Boatman‘s assertion that “evidentiary rulings prevented him from receiving a fair trial.”
Sufficiency of Evidence / Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
In two related issues, Boatman argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and that the court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. We disagree.
To prove first-degree premeditated murder, the State was required to establish three elements: (1) the victim is dead; (2) the death was caused by the criminal act of the defendant; and (3) the victim‘s death was premeditated. Allen, 322 So. 3d at 603 (citing
Here, the testimony of numerous witnesses (including the medical examiner), the videos, and Boatman‘s own words sufficiently established that Chapman is dead, that his death was caused by the criminal act of Boatman, and that his death was premeditated.
We have defined “premeditation” as “a fully formed conscious purpose to kill.” Sexton v. State, 221 So. 3d 547, 558 (Fla. 2017) (quoting Asay v. State, 580 So. 2d 610, 612 (Fla. 1991)). Here, the murder videos show that, among other things, Boatman procured two shanks in advance of the murder, blocked the dayroom door, and, with Wells, viciously attacked Chapman for more than ten minutes before Boatman stomped on a shank in the back of Chapman‘s neck. Boatman stated during his interview that he and Wells decided days earlier to kill Chapman at the earliest
Because competent, substantial evidence supports the conviction, the evidence was necessarily sufficient to survive Boatman‘s motion for judgment of acquittal. See, e.g., Sievers v. State, 355 So. 3d 871, 883 (Fla. 2022) (“We review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo and uphold convictions supported by competent, substantial evidence.” (citing Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792, 803 (Fla. 2002))). We deny these claims.
Standard Criminal Jury Instruction 7.7(b)
Boatman argues the court abused its discretion in denying his request for Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) 7.7(b) (“Unnecessary Killing to Prevent an Unlawful Act“), which is based on
- (Victim) attempted to commit [a felony] [an unlawful act].
(Victim‘s) attempt to commit [a felony] [an unlawful act] was independent of a[n] [[threatened] unlawful act] directed solely toward (defendant). - (Defendant) resisted (victim‘s) [failed] attempt to commit [a felony] [an unlawful act] by intentionally committing an act or acts that caused the death of (victim).
- (Defendant‘s) killing of (victim) was unnecessary.
Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.7(b). The exact nature of Boatman‘s argument on appeal is unclear.
To the extent Boatman argues Instruction 7.7(b) applies because he acted to prevent being sexually battered, he overlooks that, during the charge conference, after the judge stated there was “no evidence, under any strain of persuasion, that would support that Mr. Chapman was committing an unlawful sexual battery,” defense counsel conceded the instruction does not apply to self-defense and was “not directed at Mr. Boatman.” Moreover, Boatman overlooks State v. Carrizales, 356 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 1978), which held that a jury instruction on
Waiver of Penalty-Phase Jury
Boatman argues the court erred in accepting-over the objection of defense counsel-his pro se waiver of the penalty-phase jury. Boatman asserts he “was not competent to knowingly and intelligently . . . waive said right.” We disagree.
“A waiver of the right to a [penalty-phase] jury trial must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” Knight v. State, 211 So. 3d 1, 17 (Fla. 2016). “[T]he law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in the circumstances.” United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) (emphasis omitted); see Figueroa-Sanabria, 366 So. 3d at 1054
The knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of a waiver of a penalty-phase jury is something “the record must affirmatively show.” Lamadline v. State, 303 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1974). Here, the record-including Boatman‘s lengthy colloquies and his written waiver-firmly supports the trial court‘s decision. See, e.g., Lynch v. State, 254 So. 3d 312, 319-20 (Fla. 2018) (concluding that, based on the “extensive colloquy with [defendant] with regard to his understanding of the rights he sought to waive,” and “both the oral and written waiver,” which evidenced that defendant “was fully advised of his right to a penalty phase jury,” defendant “knowingly and voluntarily waived that right“).
At the end of the second day of the penalty phase, defense counsel informed the judge that Boatman was “expressing desires to potentially dismiss the jury.” After some discussion, Boatman agreed to the judge‘s suggestion to think about it for one more night and to discuss the matter with counsel. The next morning, the judge conducted a lengthy colloquy with Boatman and came away with no “reasonable belief” that he was incompetent or that the
After Dr. Werner testified, the judge conducted another lengthy colloquy with Boatman, who reaffirmed his desire to waive the jury. Among other things, Boatman stated that: he considered the decision for three years; his attorneys had persuaded him to stay with the jury, but he regretted that decision; he had “[s]everal reasons” for waiving the jury, including not wanting the jurors to “have to . . . make a decision that could weigh on their conscience“; he understood all jurors would have to recommend death before death could be considered; he was not under the influence of anything; he considered the advice of counsel; the court would continue to listen to the evidence and arguments and then apply the law; he believed the judge would be fair; and his decision was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Boatman also signed a written waiver. And he stated he was not hoping for or trying to get a death sentence and was not waiving further mitigation.
Boatman then privately talked with Dr. Werner, who returned
After Boatman informed the court that his decision had not changed, and after final argument, the judge granted the waiver,
Florida‘s Death Penalty Scheme
Boatman argues Florida‘s death penalty scheme “does not narrow the death-eligible class in a way consistent with the Eighth Amendment.” Citing Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988), Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and certain law review articles, Boatman asserts that the “large class of death eligible murder offenses” under Florida‘s scheme is problematic. Last year, we explained that this Court has “repeatedly rejected” the argument regarding “the sheer number of aggravating factors in the statute,” including “recently-even with the statute in its current form.”
CCP; HAC; Mental Illness; Proportionality
In this final claim, Boatman appears to present four sub-issues, namely that: (1) the court erred in finding CCP; (2) the court erred in finding HAC; (3) Boatman‘s “serious mental illness” exempts him from the death penalty in the same way Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), exempt juveniles and those with intellectual disability, respectively; and (4) Boatman‘s death sentence is disproportionate.
Sub-issues (3) and (4) are plainly foreclosed by our case law. Indeed, this Court “lacks the authority to extend Atkins to individuals who . . . are not intellectually disabled as provided in Atkins,” Barwick v. State, 361 So. 3d 785, 795 (Fla.), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2452 (2023), and is “forbid[den] . . . from analyzing death sentences for comparative proportionality in the absence of a statute establishing that review,” Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544,
The CCP aggravator requires proof that
the killing was the product of cool and calm reflection and not an act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of rage (cold); that the defendant had a careful plan or prearranged design to commit murder before the fatal incident (calculated); that the defendant exhibited heightened premeditation (premeditated); and that the defendant had no pretense of moral or legal justification.
Joseph, 336 So. 3d at 239 (quoting Franklin v. State, 965 So. 2d 79, 98 (Fla. 2007)). Boatman appears to take issue with the “cold” and “no pretense of moral or legal justification” elements. But he invites this Court either to reweigh evidence or to “judge this aggravator by the prison code.”
Our role is not to reweigh the evidence. Rather, “[t]he trial court‘s finding of [CCP] is reviewed for competent, substantial evidence.” Santiago-Gonzalez v. State, 301 So. 3d 157, 178 (Fla. 2020). Here, the sentencing order lays out how CCP was established by the evidence. As the trial court explained, “[t]he manner and circumstances of the crime demonstrate careful planning to ensure the desired result (the death of the victim) which
We reject Boatman‘s assertion that “any planning would have been secondary to his fight or flight response” from “being passed over” on CM review fifteen days earlier. The evidence does not reflect “an act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of rage.” Joseph, 336 So. 3d at 239 (quoting Franklin, 965 So. 2d at 98).
We also reject Boatman‘s “prison code” proposal, which lacks any authority. In any event, the sentencing order explains there was “no credible evidence of a moral or legal justification for the murder,” including “no credible evidence” either that Chapman “had any intent to attack [Boatman]” or that Boatman “was under any actual threat prior to, or at the time of, the murder.”
As to HAC, this Court has said the aggravator
Here, as noted in the sentencing order and as established by the medical examiner, “the primary mechanism of death was multiple stabbings by metal shanks, blunt force trauma, and strangulation by use of a ligature.” (Emphasis added.) The evidence shows a torturous attack lasting “over 10 minutes” and “intended not only to kill the victim but to make him suffer physically and mentally.” Chapman clearly “was conscious and aware of impending death.” Colley v. State, 310 So. 3d 2, 15 (Fla. 2020). In short, “[c]ompetent, substantial evidence supports the trial court‘s finding of HAC.” Santiago-Gonzalez, 301 So. 3d at 179. The cases
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm Boatman‘s conviction and death sentence.
It is so ordered.
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
LABARGA, J., concurring in result.
In Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020), this Court abandoned its decades-long practice of comparative proportionality review in the direct appeals of sentences of death. Because I continue to adhere to my dissent in Lawrence, I can only concur in the result.
James Matthew Colaw, Judge
Case No. 042019CF000706CFBXMX
David J. Joffe of Joffe Law, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Appellant
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Rick A. Buchwalter, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee