REV. DR. WILLIAM DAVID LEE, a/k/a W. David Lee v. SIXTH MOUNT ZION BAPTIST CHURCH OF PITTSBURGH, d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church; TIMOTHY RALSTON, Individually and d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church; NATHANIEL YOUNG, Individually and d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church; GEOFFREY KEVIN JOHNSON, Individually and d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church; ROCHELLE JOHNSON, Individually and d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church; ALEXANDER HALL, Individually and d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church; RAYMOND JACKSON, Individually and d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church; JAMES GROVER, Individually and d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church; ARTHUR HARRIS, Individually and d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church; JEROME TAYLOR, Individually and d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church; TOMMIE NELL TAYLOR, Individually and d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church; ROY ELDER, Individually and d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church
No. 17-3086
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
September 5, 2018
PRECEDENTIAL
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA (D.C. No. 2:15-cv-01599) District Judge: Hon. Nora B. Fischer
Argued July 12, 2018
Before: SHWARTZ, ROTH, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: September 5, 2018)
Gregg L. Zeff [ARGUED] Zeff Law Firm, LLC 100 Century Parkway, Ste 305 Mount Laurel, NJ 08054 Counsel for Appellant
Daniel Blomberg [ARGUED] Eric Rassbach The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty 1200 New Hampshire Ave, NW Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20036 Counsel for Appellee
Andrew G.I. Kilberg David W. Casazza Brian M. Lipshutz Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP 1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 Counsel for Amici Curiae Church of God in Christ, Inc., mPact Churches, Plymouth Brethren, and Bishop William H. Stokes
Todd R. Geremia Jones Day 250 Vesey Street New York, NY 10281
Victoria Dorfman Mark R. Kubisch Daniel D. Benson Jones Day 51 Louisiana Avenue NW Washington, DC 20001 Counsel for Amici Curiae Douglas Laycock, Michael W. McConnell, Thomas C. Berg, Carl H. Esbeck, Richard W. Garnett, and Robert F. Cochran
OPINION
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.
Reverend Dr. William David Lee was terminated from his position as pastor of the Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church (the Church) and sued the Church for allegedly breaching his employment contract. The District Court granted summary judgment in the Churchs favor because the adjudication of Lees contract claim would impermissibly entangle the Court in religious doctrine in violation of the First Amendments Establishment Clause. We agree and will affirm.
I
A1
In December 2012, the Churchs Deacon board recommended, and the Church voted unanimously to accept, Lee for the position of church pastor. In March 2013, Lee and Church officials executed an employment contract (the Agreement) establishing that Lee would serve as the Churchs pastor for a twenty-year term, beginning December 2012 and subject to for-cause early termination. If the Church removed Lee without cause before the twenty-year term expired, it would be required to pay Lee the salary and benefits he would have received for the unexpired term of the Agreement, subject to additional reductions. The Agreement specified that Lee could be terminated for cause if he commits any serious moral or criminal offense (serious offense)—including but not limited to adultery, embezzlement, or fraud—is convicted of a felony, or commits any other act which is a violation of applicable law or if he became incapacitated through illness or injury. App. 39 (Agreement § 12.3).
The Agreement also allowed either party to terminate upon material breach of the Agreement and specified that the enumerated rights of termination existed in addition to any other rights of termination allowed by law. App. 39 (Agreement § 12.3). Under the Agreement, Lee agreed to abide by the employment policies and procedures existing or established by the Church from time to time, App. 37 (Agreement § 7c) (capitalization
All executing parties understood that the congregation was required to approve the Agreement for it to become effective. During an April 2013 congregation meeting, Lee acknowledged that his failure to perform his job would constitute cause for termination under the Agreement. App. 165 ¶¶ 25-27. He also said that just cause would occur if the Church [was] not growing ... [was] stagnant, ... [or was] not a better place, and that if [he did not] perform [his] duties well, [he would be] out. App. 166-67 ¶¶ 28-32. Based on these statements, the congregation approved the Agreement.
Twenty months later, in December 2014, Church leaders gathered the congregation and recommended that the Church vacate the pulpit immediately, void the pastors[] employment contract, and approve the severance terms. App. 101 ¶ 16; App. 164 ¶ 16. They presented three reasons for their recommendation: (1) Failures in Financial Stewardship, (2) Failures in Spiritual Stewardship, and (3) Failure[s] to Respond to Church Leaders. App. 45. Specifically, the Church reported that from 2013-14, there was a 39% decline in tithes and offerings, a 32% drop in Sunday morning worship attendance, a 61% decrease in registered members, a doubling of Church expenditures, and a decline in the quality of the Churchs community outreach. Furthermore, according to the Church, Lee scheduled but then cancelled several meetings to discuss these financial and ministerial issues between June and December 2014. Based on the recommendations of Church leaders, the congregation voted in January 2015 to terminate Lees employment.
B
Lee filed a complaint against the Church and eleven of its deacons, alleging breach of contract due to termination without cause and seeking $2,643,996.40 in damages. The District Court dismissed Lees claims against the individual deacons because they were not parties to the Agreement.
Lee moved for summary judgment on his breach of contract claim against the Church and both parties submitted briefs, with the Church asserting several defenses,2 including that Lee committed material breach of contract. Lee did not file a reply brief. After briefing, the District Court became skeptical that the case could proceed under the First Amendments Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses and ordered both parties to file additional briefs addressing whether the ministerial exception, grounded in the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, prevented the court from adjudicating Lees contract claim. Lee v. Sixth Mount Zion Church of Pittsburg, Civ. No. 15-1599, 2017 WL 3608140, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2017). After receiving supplemental briefs, the District Court determined that (1) the Agreement could be terminated by one party upon the other partys material
II3
We review orders granting summary judgment de novo. Daubert v. NRA Grp., LLC, 861 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2017). Summary judgment is warranted if a party shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
A court may grant summary judgment to a non-moving party, as long as the opposing party has notice and an opportunity to respond. See
Here, the District Court granted summary judgment to the Church, a non-moving party, after the District Court gave notice to the parties that it was considering the applicability of the ministerial exception and receiving supplemental briefing regarding whether and to what extent the ... exception ... affects further adjudication of this matter. Lee, 2017 WL 3608140, at *9. The District Courts order seeking arguments on the ministerial exception specifically referenced
Lee argues that the ministerial exception does not apply and the District Court erroneously granted judgment to the Church. We disagree.
The First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 181, 188 (2012), the Supreme Court recognized, based on these two Clauses, a ministerial exception that bar[s] the government from interfering with the decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers. Hosanna-Tabor involved a disabled religion teacher who was fired from a religious school and sued, alleging that her termination violated the Americans with Disabilities Act. 565 U.S. at 176-80. The Supreme Court held, on a motion for summary judgment, that the suit was barred under the ministerial exception because [t]he members of a religious group put their faith in the hands of their ministers, and [r]equiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister . . . interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs. Id. at 180-81, 188-89, 194. By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious groups right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments[,] and [a]ccording the state the power to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions. Id. at 188-89. Even though the discharged teacher did not seek reinstatement at the school and instead requested frontpay, [a]n award of such relief would operate as a penalty on the Church for terminating an unwanted minister, and would be no less prohibited by the First Amendment than an order overturning the termination, since it would still depend on a determination that [the religious school] was wrong to have relieved [the teacher] of her position, and it is precisely such a ruling that is barred by the ministerial exception. Id. at 194.
Hosanna-Tabor involved a statutorily-based employment discrimination
Here, the parties dispute whether Lee was properly terminated with or without cause in accordance with the employment agreement. Section 12.3 of the Agreement allows either party to terminate the contract upon the material breach of the Agreements terms. App. 39. Material breach6 is not defined in the
The Church argues that Lee materially breached the Agreement by failing to provide adequate spiritual leadership, as reflected in decreased church contributions and attendance during Lees tenure. In particular, the Church cites a report by a joint board of Deacons and Trustees discussing, among other things, Lees failures in spiritual stewardship reflected by a drop in [the] number of registered members, drop in [the] number of Sunday morning worshippers, and drop in [the] level of tithes and offerings, and concludes that the Churchs capacity to cultivate new ambassadors for Christ has grown progressively more negative than positive over the two years of Pastor Lees leadership, [he] dimi[ni]shed [the Churchs] capacity to fulfill the great mission described in Matt[hew] 28:19-20, and [u]nder [his] leadership we were unable to launch and sustain the type of ministries likely to promote the spiritual health of families, neighborhoods, and the city. App. 51-55 (emphasis omitted and capitalization altered). Lee has not pointed to any materials in the record to contradict the Churchs reasons for his dismissal but instead responds that the case turns on the question of whether or not the attendance and financial issues plaguing [the Church] were [Lees] fault.... Reply Br. at 3.
While the amount of church contributions and members is a matter of arithmetic, assessing Lees role, if any, in causing decreased giving and reduced membership in the Church requires a determination of what constitutes adequate spiritual leadership and how that translates into donations and attendance—questions that would impermissibly entangle the court in religious governance and doctrine prohibited by the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Fratello v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 863 F.3d 190, 203 (2d Cir. 2017) (Judges are not well positioned to determine whether ministerial employment decisions rest on practical and secular considerations or fundamentally different ones that . . . are perfectly sensible—and perhaps even necessary—in the eyes of the faithful.); Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d at 209 ([H]ow are we, as Article III judges, to gainsay the Congregatio Pro Clericis conclusion that Father Justinian is insufficiently devoted to ministry? How are we to assess the quality of his homilies?); Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ([E]valuation of the gifts and graces of a minister must be left to ecclesiastical institutions. (citation omitted)). Moreover, parsing the precise reasons for
Lees termination is akin to determining whether a churchs proffered religious-based reason for discharging a church leader is mere pretext, an inquiry the Supreme Court has explicitly said is forbidden by the First Amendments ministerial exception. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 194-95 (rejecting the argument that a churchs religious-based reason for firing a teacher was mere pretext by explaining that the argument misses the point of the ministerial exception, which is not to safeguard a churchs decision to fire a minister only when it is made for a religious reason but instead [to] ensure[] that the authority to select
Our sister circuit courts have repeatedly dismissed breach of contract claims asserted by terminated religious leaders against their religious institution employers based on the ministerial exception. See Bell v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 126 F.3d 328, 329-32 (4th Cir. 1997); Lewis v. Seventh Day Adventists Lake Region Conference, 978 F.2d 940, 941-43 (6th Cir. 1992); Natal v. Christian & Missionary All., 878 F.2d 1575, 1576-77 (1st Cir. 1989); Hutchinson v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392, 392-96 (6th Cir. 1986). Indeed, we are not aware of any court that has ruled on the merits (i.e., not applied the ministerial exception) of a breach of contract claim alleging wrongful termination of a religious leader by a religious institution. Instead, there have been only cases allowing a discharged plaintiff the opportunity to proceed beyond the pleading stage and attempt to show with discovery that resolution of his or her claim would not entangle courts in internal religious doctrine and governance. See Petruska, 462 F.3d at 310-12 (vacating and remanding the district courts dismissal of a chaplains breach of contract claim alleging that religious university changed—through restructuring—the responsibilities she was entitled to have, and stating that the claim at the outset did not turn on an ecclesiastical inquiry, but if further proceedings
For all of these reasons, the District Court correctly entered judgment in favor of the Church.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.
Notes
App. 39 (Agreement § 12.3).Termination for Cause: This AGREEMENT may be terminated at the option of either party upon thirty (30) days prior written notice by either party of the material breach of the terms of this AGREEMENT by the other party, which breach is not cured within such thirty (30) days. The rights of termination set forth in this contract are in addition to any other rights of termination allowed to either party by law. Without limiting other rights or grounds for termination which the CHURCH may have under this Agreement or by law, it is agreed that the CHURCH may terminate this Agreement for cause upon the occurrence of any of the following events:
- The pastor commits any serious moral or criminal offense (serious offense)—including but not limited to adultery, embezzlement, or fraud—is convicted of a felony, or commits any other act which is a violation of applicable law (except for misdemeanors or traffic offenses); or
- The pastor becomes incapacitated by reason of illness, injury or other disability so that he cannot, in the reasonable good faith opinion of the Church, fully carry out and perform his duties and responsibilities under this Agreement for a period of at least six (6) months.