Mеlvin LEE, Plaintiff, v. CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA/CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT FACILITY, Defendant.
Civil Action No. 14-cv-772 (ESH)
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Signed August 1, 2014
34 F. Supp. 3d 139
Both the CJA and the IDEA attorneys’ fees provisions are directed to providing competent counsel to individuals who otherwise may not be able to afford it. The two statutes have different approaches to achieving this goal, but the CJA‘s compensation system does not conflict with the rationale underlying the IDEA‘s attorneys’ fees provision. Appointed panel attorneys are situated differently from non-appointed special educatiоn attorneys, and the different compensation schemes reflect that. When appointed to represent a party, counsel does need to expend resources to identify potential clients and compete for the opportunity to represent thеm. Appointed panel attorneys are guaranteed a rate that the D.C. Superior Court system has judged to be sufficient to attract competent attorneys in these cases, and they are entitled to be compensated for all of the hours they reasonably expend on a case.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant‘s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. #12] is GRANTED, and Plaintiff‘s Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. # 8] is DENIED. An appropriate order shall accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
Daniel P. Struck, Anne Marie Orcutt, Struck Wieneke & Love, P.L.C., Chandler, AZ, Mariana Del Valle Bravo, Matthew D. Berkowitz, Carr Maloney PC, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE, United States District Judge
Plaintiff Melvin Lee, a resident of the District of Columbia, brings this action against the Corrections Corporation of America (“CCA“). CCA is a Maryland corporation that owns and operates the Correctional Treatment Facility (“CTF“), a private prison that incarcerates inmates in the custody of the D.C. Department of Corrections. Plaintiff was seriously injured when he fell down a flight of stairs while detained at CTF. Plaintiff, who was disabled before his fall, alleges that defendant violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA“) and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by transferring him from CTF‘s medical unit to a non-handicap-accessible area of the prison prior to his fall. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant‘s employees were negligent in ordering him to descend a flight of stairs unassisted. Before the Court is defendant‘s motion to dismiss plaintiff‘s complaint pursuant to
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff suffers from numerous physical аilments and must walk with a prosthetic right leg. (Pl.‘s First Am. Compl., May 23, 2014 [ECF No. 8] (“Am.Compl.“) at 1.) Starting on or about April 7, 2011, he was detained at CTF. (Id.) On April 20, 2011, a magistrate judge for the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland ordered the “United States Marshal and/or his contracting agencies” to provide plaintiff with a prompt medical evaluation and offer him “care and treatment consistent with the standard of care for the illness(es) and/or condition(s) revealed by the evaluation.” (Order for Medical Evaluation and Appropriate Treatment of Detainee, April 20, 2011 [ECF No. 10-1].) On or about May 16, 2011, plaintiff was transferred from the CTF medical unit to Unit D, which is not handicap accessible. (Am. Compl. at 1-2.) Plaintiff informed CTF employees in Unit D about his disabilities and was told that he would be transferred back to the medical unit. (Id. at 2.) Before this could take
On April 1, 2014, plaintiff filed suit against CCA in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia alleging that CCA employees were negligent in that they “disregarded a Court order requiring the [p]laintiff to remain in the medical unit,” “knew or should have known that plaintiff‘s disability would make it impossible for him to safely navigate the steps, especially without a walker or cane,” and “knew or should have known that by requiring the [p]laintiff to attempt to navigate the steps he was likely to fall and sustain serious and permanent injuries.” (Compl., April 1, 2014 [ECF No. 1-1] ¶¶ 9-11.)
On May 5, 2014, defendant removed the case to this Court pursuant to
ANALYSIS
I. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “statе a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court must “accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint and draw all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Autor v. Pritzker, 740 F.3d 176, 179 (D.C.Cir.2014). However, a “pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.‘” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.‘” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
II. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (COUNT II)
Plaintiff fails to state a claim under Title II of the ADA. To state a claim
As a private prison company, defendant is not covered by Title II of the ADA. The ADA‘s text provides no indication that a private company is a “public entity” for the purposes of Title II. Further, the regulation states that Title II “applies to public entities” that operate or manage prisons thrоugh contracts with private entities, not to contractors themselves.
III. REHABILITATION ACT (COUNT III)
Plaintiff also fails to state a claim under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Section 504 provides that:
No qualified individual with a disability in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of hеr or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United Stаtes Postal Service.
Although defendant receives federal funding through its contracts with the Bureau of Prisons and U.S. Marshals Service, it does not receive “Federal financial assistance” within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. Courts interpreting § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act have cоnsistently construed “Federal financial assistance” to mean the federal government‘s provision of a subsidy to an entity, not the federal government‘s compensation of an entity for services provided. See Nolley v. Cnty. of Erie, 776 F.Supp. 715, 742-43 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that a correctional facility receiving federаl funds for detaining prisoners did not receive “Federal financial assistance” and therefore was not covered by the Rehabilitation Act); see also Shotz v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 420 F.3d 1332, 1335 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that an entity receives “Federal financial assistance” within meaning of the Rehabilitation Act when it receives a subsidy from the fedеral government). Because plaintiff does not allege that defendant receives subsidies from the federal government, the Court will dismiss his Rehabilitation Act claim.
IV. NEGLIGENCE (COUNT I)
Plaintiff does, however, state a facially plausible negligence claim. To state a claim for negligence in the District of Columbia, a plaintiff must allege “(1) a duty, owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, to conform to a certain standard of care; (2) a breach of this duty by the defendant; and (3) an injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by the defendant‘s breach.” Dist. of Columbia v. Fowler, 497 A.2d 456, 462 n. 13 (D.C.1985).
As indicated in his amended complаint, plaintiff‘s negligence theory relates to the actions of defendant‘s employee in ordering plaintiff down the stairs unassisted, not, as defendant argues, the decision to transfer him out of the medical unit. (Compare Am. Compl. at 4, with Def.‘s Reply in Supp. of Its Mot. to Dismiss, June 30, 2014 [ECF No. 13] at 7-8.) Although plaintiff has not identified a specific duty that defendant owed him, his amended complaint states that at the time of his fall he was detained in a prison operated by defendant. (Am. Compl. at 1.) Because the Court draws all inferences in favor of a plaintiff at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court can conclude from these facts that defendant owed plaintiff a common-law “duty of care to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in the
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that plaintiff‘s motion to file a surreply [ECF No. 14] is GRANTED; it is further
ORDERED that defendant‘s motion to dismiss [ECF No. 10] is GRANTED IN PART as to Counts II and III; it is further
ORDERED that Counts II and III of plaintiff‘s amended complaint [ECF No. 8] arе DENIED WITH PREJUDICE.
SO ORDERED.
ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE
United States District Judge
Notes
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services, 73 Fed.Reg. 34,466, 34,495 (June 17, 2008).Prisons that are built or run by private entities have caused some confusion with regard to requirements under the ADA. The Department believes that title II obligаtions extend to the public entity as soon as the building is used by or on behalf of a state or local government entity, irrespective of whether the public entity contracts with a private entity to run the correctional facility. The power to incarcerate citizens rеsts with the state, not a private entity. As the Department stated in the preamble to the current title II regulation, “[a]ll governmental activities of public entities are covered, even if they are carried out by contractors.” 56 FR 35694, 35696 (July 26, 1991). If a prison is occupied by state prisonеrs and is inaccessible, the state is responsible under title II of the ADA. In essence, the private builder or contractor that operates the correctional facility does so at the direction of the state government, unless the private entity elects to use the facility for something other than incarceration, in which case title III may apply. For that reason, the proposed Sec. 35.152(a) makes it clear that this section‘s requirements will apply to prisons operated by public entities directly or through contractual or other relationships.