Daron EDISON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Tommy DOUBERLY, Warden, Brenda Williams, AFA Programs, Mr. Lovell, Corrections Officer, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 08-15819.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
April 30, 2010.
604 F.3d 1307
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court‘s judgment entered on March 31, 2009, as to Palmyra‘s claims against Phoebe Putney and Phoebe Putney Health Systems, and REMAND the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Marlysha Myrthil (Court-Appointed), Holland & Knight, LLP, Jacksonville, FL, for Edison.
Brett M. Waronicki, Wiederhold & Moses, P.A., West Palm Beach, FL, for Douberly.
HILL, Circuit Judge:
Daron Edison, a prisoner in a Florida state prison, filed this action pro se, alleging violations of the American With Disabilities Act,
I.
Daron Edison brought this action against Timothy Douberly, Brenda Williams, and Timothy Lovell, alleging violations of Title II of the ADA by defendants in their “official capacities” as employees of GEO Care Group, Inc., (“GEO“), a private prison management corporation operating a Florida state prison. Edison sought injunctive relief and damages as the result of defendants’ alleged violations of Title II, which prohibits a “public entity” from discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities because of their disabilities.
Only public entities are liable for violations of Title II of the ADA.
II.
Edison contends that GEO is a public entity under the ADA because Section 12131(1)(B) of the statute defines a public entity, in part, as an “instrumentality of a State.” Edison bolsters his contention by application of traditional canons of statutory interpretation to the term “instrumentality of a State.”
We agree with this approach to interpreting the term instrumentality of a Statе. In fact, we agree with the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that interpretation of the ADA‘s use of the term “instrumentality of a State” is entirely controlled by the statutory language itself. Green v. New York, 465 F.3d 65, 78-79 (2d Cir.2006).
In Green, the plaintiff alleged that a private hospital was a public entity for purposes of the ADA because it carried out a public functiоn pursuant to a contract
The court observed that, under the rules of statutory interpretation, the term “public entity” must be given its plain meaning, and, if those words are susceptible to more than one such meaning, their intеrpretation must be guided by the canons of statutory construction. Id.2 Courts are not free, and may not elect, to adopt other interpretations of statutory language and expand the reach of a statute merely because some might find it desirable.
With these limitations in mind, the Second Circuit looked to the definitions section оf Title II. That section defines “public entity” to mean “any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government.”
“Instrumentality,” the Second Circuit observed, is a word susceptible of more than one meaning. Id. at 79. Turning then to the canons of statutory construction, the court noted that under the canon noscitur a sociis, “a word is known by the company it keeps.” Id. (citing Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307, 81 S.Ct. 1579, 6 L.Ed.2d 859 (1961)) (although noscitur a sociis is not an inescapable rule, “it is often wisely аpplied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress“).
The “company” which “instrumentality” keeps in this definition of public entity include the words “department, agency, and special purpose district.” The court noted that all of these words are qualified by the remаining words in the definition---“of a State or States or local government.” Green, 465 F.3d at 79. Agencies and departments are units of a governmental entity. A special purpose district (in New York, as well as in Florida) is set up to serve the special needs of a governmental entity, such as water conservation. The defining characteristic of аll of these entities is that they are either traditional governmental units or created by one. Thus, the Second Circuit concluded, the words “instrumentality of a State” were intended to refer, as do all the other words around them, to a governmental unit. Id.4
The private hospital in Green was not such a governmental unit, the court concluded. Nor was it created by a govеrn
We too have long recognized that our authority to interpret statutory language is constrained by the plain meaning of the statutory language in the context of the entire statute, as assisted by the canons of statutory construction. Nguyen v. United States, 556 F.3d 1244, 1252-57 (11th Cir.2009); Shotz v. City of Plantation, Fla., 344 F.3d 1161, 1167 (11th Cir.2003). We have affirmed many times that we do not look at one word or term in isolation but rather look to the entire statute and its context. See United States v. Silva, 443 F.3d 795, 798 (11th Cir.2006). Our job in this case, then, is to interpret the ADA‘s use of the words “instrumentality of a State” in a manner consistent with their plain meaning and context, and in this endeavor we are persuaded that the Second Circuit has “got it right.” We, too, hold that the term “instrumentality of a State” refers to governmental units or units created by them.
All of the courts that have considered this question have come to the same conclusion. In Cox v. Jackson, 579 F.Supp.2d 831, 852 (E.D.Mich.2008), the district court held that a private medical provider for a prison could not be considered a “public entity” under the statute because it was not a governmental entity. The court adopted the holding of Green that a private contractor does not become a public entity under Title II merely by contracting with a governmental entity to provide governmental services. Id.
In Hahn v. Linn County, 191 F.Supp.2d 1051, 1055 n. 2 (N.D.Iowa 2002), the district court held that the plain meaning of the language of Title II limits its liability to a public entity and that a contractual relationship between a private corporation and a county government does not transform the private corporation into a “public entity.”
Similarly, in O‘Connor v. Metro Ride, Inc., 87 F.Supp.2d 894, 900 (D.Minn.2000), the district court held that a private corporation was not a public entity merely becаuse it contracted with the public entity to provide a specialized transit program for disabled persons.
Finally, in Doe v. Adkins, 110 Ohio App.3d 427, 674 N.E.2d 731 (1996), the court held that a private mental health services corporation that provided contract services to a local mental health agency was not an instrumentality of that governmental unit for the рurposes of the ADA. The court opined that “because [the defendant] is not a department, agency, or special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a state or local government we find that it is not a public entity for purposes of Section 12132 [of the ADA].”
III.
We agree with these courts that a private corрoration is not a public entity merely because it contracts with a public entity to provide some service. Since GEO is such a private corporation, we hold that GEO is not a public entity subjecting it to liability under Title II of the ADA and is, therefore, not a proper defendant in this action. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.5
The mаjority‘s analysis is flawed because it conflates government contracting with government function. In doing so, the majority fails to recognize the extremely significant distinction between a private company that can lawfully perform a function without state involvement and one that cannot. It is simply not possible for any entity to lawfully operate a prison without authorization from and a contract with the state. Unlike hospitals, which can be operated on behalf of the government through a contractual agreement or can be operated independently, prisons can never be operated independently of the government. Thаt vital difference leads me to dissent.
The Supreme Court has made clear that the operation of a prison is a “primary function[] of government“---so much so that “[i]t is difficult to imagine an activity in which a State has a stronger interest.” Pa. Dept. of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998) (quotation and citation omitted). “One of the primary functions of government... is the preservation of societal order through enforcement of the criminal law, and the maintenance of penal institutions is an essential part of that task.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added). The government is the only entity with the power and authority to imprison individuals; thus, the operation of a prison is purely a government function. Absent authorization from and a contract with a government, GEO could not---nor could any other private entity---establish and operate a prison.1 It is thus clear that GEO is fulfilling a primary government function by operating Moore Haven and is therefore an “instrumentality of a State” for purposes of Title II of the ADA.
In the case upon which the majority relies, Green v. City of New York, the nongovernmental еntity involved (a hospital) was lawfully able to provide the very same services to others in a commercial setting without contracting with the state. 465 F.3d 65 (2d Cir.2006). The court found that merely contracting with the state did not transform a private entity into a government unit, and therefore held that the hospital was not an “instrumentality of a State” under Title II. Id. at 78-79. Whilе state involvement was not necessary to perform the function at issue in Green, that cannot be said of operating a prison. Similarly, the district court opinions cited by the majority involved companies that (1) operated a group home for disabled individuals, Hahn v. Linn County, 191 F.Supp.2d 1051 (N.D.Iowa 2002); (2) provided transportation, O‘Connor v. Metro Ride, Inc., 87 F.Supp.2d 894 (D.Minn. 2000); (3) provided medical services, Cox v. Jackson, 579 F.Supp.2d 831 (E.D.Mich. 2008), and (4) operated a mental health facility, Doe v. Adkins, 110 Ohio App.3d 427, 674 N.E.2d 731 (1996). Not one of these cases involved the performance of аn exclusive governmental function that could be performed by a private entity only with the state‘s authorization to act in its place. GEO‘s operation of a prison is an exclusive governmental function, making it an “instrumentality of a State” subject to the requirements of Title II of the ADA.2
Moreover, because the majority holds that GEO is not a proper defendant, this case should be remanded to the district court with instructions that Edison, who litigated his case pro se in the district court, be allowed to amend his complaint. Under the district court‘s and the majority‘s view, Edison should have sued the Flоrida Department of Corrections.3 However, it is certainly excusable for Edison to have believed that GEO, which fully operates the prison where Edison alleges discrimination, was a proper party.
Edison attempted to obtain counsel by filing a motion for appointed counsel both before the district court and befоre this circuit. The district court denied Edison‘s motion for appointment of counsel after concluding, mistakenly, that this case raised no novel or complex issue of law. The district court also found that Edison had demonstrated his ability to litigate pro se.4
The district court erred in construing Edison‘s ability to file a pro se complaint as evidence that he did not need assistance from appointed counsel.5 His ability to file a case with writing assistance is not evidence that Edison could develop legal theories on his own or otherwise effectively research nuanced claims.6
Furthermore, contrary to the district court‘s conclusions, Edison raises an issue of first impression in this cirсuit and as such raises a novel legal issue in an area where there is sparse caselaw. In light of the fact that Edison is legally blind, his case raises novel issues of law, and he did not benefit from the assistance of counsel during the district court proceedings, the case should be remanded with the opportunity for Edison to amend his complaint.7 Leaving the majority‘s holding on the ADA aside, it is an injustice to
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
Patricia FRAZIER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITIFINANCIAL CORPORATION, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.
John Frazier, Plaintiff, Patricia Fraziеr, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CitiFinancial Corporation, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.
Nos. 08-15188, 08-15709.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
April 30, 2010.
Lee Wendell Loder, Loder, P.C., Law Firm, Birmingham, AL, for Patricia Frazier.
Alan Daniel Leeth, Reid Stephens Manley, Burr & Furman, LLP, Birmingham, AL, for CitiFinancial Corp., LLC.
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, and BIRCH and SILER,* Circuit Judges.
* Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.