LAYNE AUCOIN, Plаintiff - Appellant v. ANDREW CUPIL, Lieutenant; REGINALD ROBINSON, Sergeant, Defendants - Appellees
No. 19-30779
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
May 6, 2020
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana
Before SMITH, GRAVES, and HO, Circuit Judges.
Police officers and prison guards sometimes must use physical force to enforce our laws and keep people safe. But as with any use of government power, the law places important limits on the use of such force. People are imperfect. And the greater the power, the greater our fear of abuse. So when a prison inmate engages in willful misconduct, a prison guard may use reasonable force to restrain him—but after the inmate submits, there is no need, and thus no justification, for the further use of force.
This appeal presents a question of procedure, but our analysis reflects the same underlying principle. Under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), a convicted criminal may not bring a claim under
In this case, Prisoner Layne Aucoin complains that Lieutenant Andrew Cupil and Master Sergeant Reginald Robinson, guards at the Dixon Correctional Institute, assaulted him. He says they first assaulted him in his cell—and then again later in the prison lobby and showеr. At a subsequent prison disciplinary proceeding, Aucoin was found guilty of defiance, aggravated disobedience, and property destruction for misconduct in his cell. But his misconduct ceased while he was in his cell.
We conclude that Heck bars his
I.
On August 24, 2015, Aucoin placed a paper cup over the surveillance camera in his prison cell, preventing prison staff from monitoring the cell. According to the complaint, Cupil and Robinson then “snuck up” on him and sрrayed him with a chemical agent. The officers then ordered Aucoin to present himself to be restrained, an order with which he complied.
Aucoin then alleges he was taken out of the cell to the showers, wherе Cupil “maced” him. He concludes his narrative by claiming the guards beat and kicked him in the prison lobby.
For purposes of a motion to dismiss, we must of course accept these factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). But we may also examine the prison disciplinary reports to understand the basis of the underlying conviction. See, e.g., Davis v. Hodges, 481 F. App‘x 553, 555 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (consulting the prison disciplinary report for a motion to dismiss under Heck). Here, the disciplinary reports round out our understanding of the events leading up to Aucoin‘s disciplinary infraction—and provide a fuller account of what transpired in the prison cell: Aucoin disregarded repeated, direct orders to remove thе obstruction from the camera. He screamed profanities at the officers. He attempted to force a paper gown down the sink in an effort to flood the cell. And he spat in Sergeant Robinson‘s faсe. Only after the prisoner repeatedly refused to cooperate voluntarily did Cupil deploy a one-second burst of chemical agent into the cell before restraining him. As a result, Aucoin faced disciplinary charges for defiance, aggravated disobedience, and property destruction. He was found guilty and received a punishment of thirty days’ loss of good-time credits.
II.
After holding at one point that portions of Auсoin‘s case survive Heck, the district court ultimately dismissed all of Aucoin‘s claims as barred by Heck. We
A.
Heck prohibits suit under
The only way to proceed on a
But if the “plaintiff‘s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff,” the claim implicates none of these concerns and may therefore proceed. Id. at 487 (emphasis added). Determining whether the
A few recent cases demonstrate this principle. In Bush v. Strain, the plaintiff sought damages for injuries sustained after she was arrested for battery and resisting arrest. 513 F.3d at 495. She contended that the arresting officer unreasonably pushed her head into the back of an automobile after she was already handcuffed and compliant. Id. The officer responded that both he and the plaintiff had inadvertently fallen оnto the vehicle during the arrest itself, while plaintiff was still resisting. Id. at 496. He further argued that the complaint failed to “allege that [plaintiff‘s] claims of excessive force are separable from the events underlying her resisting аrrest conviction.” Id. at 499. But our court denied summary judgment and allowed her claim to proceed. Id. at 500. As we explained, her complaint presented a chronology of events, and that was enough for us to find that the plaintiff had “adequately pleaded a claim for excessive force occurring after she was restrained.” Id. (emphasis added). Consequently,
Similarly, in Bourne v. Gunnels, 921 F.3d 484 (5th Cir. 2019), a prisoner jammed the food-tray slot in his сell and refused to clear it, necessitating prison staff to disperse a chemical agent into the cell before entering and removing the impediment. 921 F.3d at 488. As a result, the prisoner was found guilty of tampering with his cell door and creating a disturbance, subjecting him to a loss of good-time credits. Id. at 491. Our court nevertheless permitted the plaintiff to proceed with his excessive force claim, because he alleged that he was beаten after he submitted and was already restrained. Id. We concluded that the basis of the
B.
Applying this analytical framework here, we hold that Aucoin‘s excessive force claims for events occurring in his cell are barred by Heck—but that the alleged beatings in the prison showers аnd lobby are not.
Aucoin argues that Heck does not apply to any of his claims, because he never challenged the loss of the time credits and, by extension, the validity of the underlying conviction. We disagree.
First, it is of no consequence thаt he does not contest the loss of his good-time credits. See, e.g., Okoro v. Callaghan, 324 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir. 2003) (“It is irrelevant that [a plaintiff] disclaims any intention of challenging his conviction; if he makes allegations that are inconsistent with the conviction‘s having been valid, Heck kicks in and bars his civil suit.“).
Second, Aucoin overlooks one critical failing: He does challenge the conviction by maintaining his innocence in the events that led up to his disciplinary conviction. Specifically, he alleged both in his complaint and in his live testimony that prison staff “snuck up” on him, sprayеd him with mace, and beat him—all unprovoked. He has insisted, in other words, that he is wholly blameless for the use of force against him in his cell. But a claim is barred by Heck if the plaintiff‘s factual allegations supporting the claim are necessarily inconsistent with the validity of the conviction. See, e.g., Bush, 513 F.3d at 497; DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 656–57 (5th Cir. 2007). That is the case here: If the factual account of Aucoin‘s complaint is taken as true, then he cannot be guilty of defiance, aggravated disobеdience, and property destruction—in direct conflict with his disciplinary conviction. As we have stated before, when a plaintiff‘s claim “is based solely on his assertions that he . . . did nothing wrong, and was attacked by the [] officers for no reason,” that suit “squarely challenges the factual determination that underlies his conviction” and is necessarily at odds with the conviction. Walker v. Munsell, 281 F. App‘x 388, 390 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). It is precisely this “type of claim that is barred by Heck in our circuit.” Id. The district court was therefore right to dismiss his claim for excessive force within the cell and up to the point that he was restrained.
But the district court erred in dismissing all of Aucoin‘s claims under Heck. Aucoin‘s pleadings include allegations that he was beaten and maced in the prison showers and lobby after he had surrendered. His complaint makes clear that these actions occurred after whatever he
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In sum, Heck bars Aucoin‘s claims of assault while he was in the cell, up to the point he was restrained. But it does not bar the alleged assault in the showers and lobby after he surrendered—allegations we must take as true at the motion to dismiss stage. We reverse and remand.