GILBERT SAUCILLO; JAMES R. RUDSELL, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and JOHN BURNELL; JACK POLLOCK, Plaintiffs, v. LAWRENCE PECK, Objector-Appellant, v. SWIFT TRANSPORTATION COMPANY OF ARIZONA, LLC, an Arizona corporation, Defendant-Appellee, and SWIFT TRANSPORTATION COMPANY INCORPORATED; DOES, Defendants.
No. 20-55119
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
February 11, 2022
D.C. No. 5:10-cv-00809-VAP-OP
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-55159
D.C. No. 5:10-cv-00809-VAP-OP
OPINION
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Virginia A. Phillips, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 16, 2021 Pasadena, California
Filed February 11, 2022
Before: MILAN D. SMITH, JR. and SANDRA S. IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and JOHN E. STEELE,* District Judge.
Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.
SUMMARY**
Class Action Settlement / CA Private Attorney General Act
The panel dismissed an objector‘s appeal of the district court‘s approval of a California Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA“) settlement, vacated the district court‘s approval of the class-action settlement, and remanded for further proceedings.
Plaintiffs and Swift Transportation Company reached a settlement pertaining to plaintiffs’ class claims, alleging violations of California labor law, and claims brought pursuant to PAGA, which allows private citizens to recover civil penalties on behalf of themselves “and other current or former employees” for violations of the California Labor
The panel held that Peck may not appeal the PAGA settlement because he was not a party to the underlying PAGA action. The PAGA claim was brought by two private plaintiffs, and Peck was not a party to the PAGA action. Accordingly, the panel held that Peck failed to show that he had any right to appeal the district court‘s approval of the PAGA settlement. The panel rejected Peck‘s arguments as to why he may appeal the PAGA settlement anyway. Although Peck is a class member of the class action, a PAGA action is distinct from a class action, and objectors to a PAGA settlement are not “parties” to a PAGA suit in the same sense that absent class members are “parties” to a class action. The fact that Peck may ultimately receive a portion of the PAGA settlement did not make him a party to the lawsuit. Moreover, a PAGA action has “no individual component.” Finally, although Peck has a separately filed PAGA action, that does not make him a party to this PAGA case. The panel dismissed Peck‘s appeal and did not consider whether the district court erred in approving the PAGA settlement.
The panel next considered the objection to the class action settlement. Mares contends that because the district court approved the settlement before certifying a class, the court should have applied a heightened standard of review.
Swift argued that the panel could not reach the merits of Mares‘s objection because he did not raise such an objection in the district court. Mares countered that “he could not pre-object” to the district court employing the incorrect legal
Concerning the proper legal standard for the class action settlement, the panel held that the district court erred in applying a presumption that the settlement was fair and reasonable, and the product of a non-collusive, arms-length negotiation. The district court applied the presumption that this court reversed in Roes 1-2 v. SFBSC Mgmt., LLC, 944 F.3d 1035, 1048 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that “[w]here ... the parties negotiate a settlement agreement before the class has been certified, settlement approval requires a higher standard of fairness and a more probing inquiry than may be normally required under
* The Honorable John E. Steele, United States District Judge for the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
Neal J. Fialkow (argued) and James S. Cahill, Law Office of Neal J. Fialkow Inc., Pasadena, California, for Objector-Appellant Lawrence Peck.
Joseph Clapp (argued), Aiman-Smith & Marcy, Oakland, California, for Objector-Appellant Sadashiv Mares.
Deepak Gupta (argued) and Urja Mittal, Gupta Wessler PLLC, Washington, D.C.; James R. Hawkins and Gregory Mauro, James Hawkins APLC, Irvine, California; Stanley D. Saltzman, Marlin & Saltzman LLP, Agoura Hills, California; for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Paul S. Cowie (argued), Karin Dougan Vogel, and John D. Ellis, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP, San Francisco, California, for Defendant-Appellee.
OPINION
M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
Gilbert Saucillo and James Rudsell (Plaintiffs) are plaintiffs in actions brought against Swift Transportation Company of Arizona and associated entities and individuals (Swift). In 2019, after years of litigation, Plaintiffs and Swift reached a settlement pertaining to Plaintiffs’ class claims and claims brought pursuant to the California Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA),
We hold that Peck may not appeal the PAGA settlement because he is not a party to the underlying PAGA action, and so we dismiss his appeal. However, we vacate the district court‘s approval of the class action settlement agreement and remand the class action for further proceedings, as we agree with Mares that the district court abused its discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard when evaluating the settlement.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
Swift is a trucking company that operates throughout the United States. In September 2009, John Burnell, a former Swift driver, informed the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) of Swift‘s alleged violations of California labor law. Burnell specifically claimed that Swift was violating
In February 2010, Burnell filed a class action against Swift in California state court alleging various wage and hour violations pursuant to California law. In June 2010, Swift removed the case to federal court. Burnell then amended the complaint in October 2010, adding Pollock as a named plaintiff. The amended complaint asserted both an independent cause of action pursuant to
In 2012, Rudsell, another Swift driver, sent his own letter to the LWDA, similarly alleging that Swift had violated various California labor laws. Rudsell did not specifically cite
In May 2019, Burnell, Saucillo, and Rudsell reached a settlement with Swift pertaining to the class claims and PAGA claims in both their suits. The settlement provided that Swift would pay $7,250,000 for the class claims, $2,416,666.66 for attorneys’ fees, and $500,000 for the
Upon the instruction of the district court, Plaintiffs1 filed a new, consolidated complaint in June 2019. In the consolidated complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that Swift violated
Peck and Mares, two Swift drivers, objected to the proposed settlement. Both Peck and Mares had filed their own suits against Swift. Peck filed a PAGA complaint in California state court, while Mares filed a class action.2
Despite these objections, the district court granted final approval to the settlement agreement in January 2020. In outlining the legal standard by which to evaluate the agreement, the district court wrote:
As previously found by this Court, the parties engaged in arm‘s-length, serious, informed,
and non-collusive negotiations between experienced and knowledgeable counsel. Additionally, the Settlement Agreement was reached after mediation with a neutral mediator, Mark Rudy. The Settlement Agreement is therefore presumptively the product of a non-collusive, arms-length negotiation. See Roe v. SFBSC Management, LLC, No. 14-cv-03616-LB, 2017 WL 4073809, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2017) (holding that a settlement that is the product of an arm‘s-length negotiation “conducted by capable and experienced counsel” is presumed to be fair and reasonable); Satchel v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 03-cv-2878-SI, 2007 WL 1114010, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2007) (“The assistance of an experienced mediator in the settlement process confirms that the settlement is non-collusive.“). This factor weighs in favor of approval.
(Some citations omitted.) The district court then evaluated the agreement pursuant to the eight-factor test in Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998).3
Mares contended that the monetary award in the settlement was “inadequate for several reasons, the common theme of which is that he believes the parties’ estimate of [Swift‘s] maximum possible exposure is too low.” The district court concluded that the settlement agreement was fair and reasonable, and that the parties’ calculation of Swift‘s possible exposure was accurate. The district court granted final approval to the settlement agreement for both the class claims and the PAGA claim, though the court reduced the attorneys’ fees.
III. Developments on Appeal
Peck raises his same objection on appeal, while Mares now argues that the district court applied an incorrect presumption that the settlement agreement was the product of arm‘s-length negotiations. Both appeals were fully briefed, oral argument was held, and both Peck‘s and Mares‘s cases were submitted in April 2021.
Approximately one month later, we decided Magadia v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc., 999 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2021),
[T]he parties shall give their views as to whether Plaintiffs-Appellees suffered an injury in fact, and whether that injury in fact gives Plaintiffs-Appellees the ability to seek relief on behalf of other current or former employees in light of our previous holding that a PAGA claim cannot be brought as a class action under the Class Action Fairness Act. The parties shall also give their views as to whether the current and former employees, on whose behalf the Plaintiffs-Appellees filed their PAGA action, have also suffered an injury in fact in light of the language in
Section 2699(g)(1) of the California Labor Code providing that a PAGA plaintiff may recover the civil penalty in a civil action “filed on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed,” and the language in inSection 2699(i) providing that 25 percent of the civil penalties recovered are allocation “to the aggrieved employees.” Finally, the parties shall address whether current and former employees who may receive part of the penalties recovered must themselves have Article III standing, given that such employees are not parties before the courtbecause a PAGA claim cannot be brought as a class action.
(Cleaned up.)
We have reviewed the parties’ supplemental briefs, as well as the parties’ letters directing us to additional, recent authorities. For the reasons given in Part I of our discussion below, we conclude that we have no occasion to reach many of these issues.
DISCUSSION
The cases before us include both a class action and a representative PAGA action. As explained below, these two actions are distinct, with different parties and procedures. Consequently, we address each action separately.
I. Objections to the PAGA Settlement
In renewing his objection to the district court‘s approval of the PAGA portion of the settlement, Peck identifies three potential errors made by the district court: (1) Rudsell and Saucillo lack standing to enter into the PAGA settlement because they allegedly did not ask the LWDA to investigate a potential
A. Right to Appeal a PAGA Settlement
The PAGA claim before us was brought by two private plaintiffs, Saucillo and Rudsell. Although Peck brought his own PAGA claim in a different case, he is not a party to the PAGA action here. “The rule that only parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment, is well settled,” and so Peck has failed to show that he has any right to appeal the district court‘s approval of the PAGA settlement here. United States ex rel. Alexander Volkhoff, LLC v. Janssen Pharmaceutica N.V., 945 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988) (per curiam)); see also
Peck raises several arguments as to why he may appeal the PAGA settlement anyway. None of them has merit. First, he argues that because he is a class member of the class action, he may also object to the PAGA action. However, as indicated above, a PAGA action is distinct from a class action. A class member may appeal from approval of a class-action settlement, because he “has an interest in the settlement” and the “legal rights he seeks to raise are his own.” Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2002). “But a representative action under PAGA is not a class action. There is no individual component to a PAGA action because every PAGA action is a representative action on behalf of the state. Plaintiffs may bring a PAGA claim only as the state‘s designated proxy ....” Kim v. Reins Int‘l Cal., Inc., 459 P.3d 1123, 1130–31 (Cal. 2020) (cleaned up); see also Canela v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 971 F.3d 845, 851, 856 (9th Cir. 2020) (stating that “PAGA causes of action [are]
To put a finer point on it:
Nonnamed class members are parties to [class action] proceedings in the sense of being bound by the settlement. It is this feature of class action litigation that requires that class members be allowed to appeal the approval of a settlement when they have objected at the fairness hearing. To hold otherwise would deprive nonnamed class members of the power to preserve their own interests in a settlement that will ultimately bind them, despite their expressed objections before the trial court.
Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10 (emphasis added).
Conversely, while “a judgment from a PAGA suit binds all those, including nonparty aggrieved employees, who would be bound by a judgment in an action brought by the government ... without an opportunity to opt out,” that preclusive effect extends only to an employee‘s ability to seek “civil penalties” under PAGA. Canela, 971 F.3d at 851 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “[U]nlike class action judgments that preclude all claims the class could have brought under traditional res judicata principles, employees [precluded from bringing a PAGA claim] retain all rights to pursue or recover other remedies available under state or federal law.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). That is consistent with PAGA‘s “remedial scheme,” which is “different” than a class action: while class actions typically seek compensation for individual wrongs,
Relatedly, Peck argues that he may appeal because he may be entitled to some part of the PAGA award as an aggrieved employee. This argument also fails. The fact that Peck may ultimately receive a portion of the PAGA settlement does not make him a party to the lawsuit. Analogously, in class action settlements, “Federal district courts often dispose of ... unclaimed [funds] by making what are known as cy pres distributions,” Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 2011), which generally go to charitable organizations. See, e.g., In re Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc‘ns Litig., — F.4th —, 2021 WL 6111383, at *6 (9th Cir. 2021); Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2012). In such cases, proceeds from the settlement go “to a third party,” Klier, 658 F.3d at 475, not to the named plaintiffs or absent class members who are parties to the underlying litigation.
Moreover, a PAGA action has “no individual component.” Kim, 459 P.3d at 1131; see also Canela, 971 F.3d at 852 (describing civil penalties allocated to aggrieved employees as an incentive to bring an enforcement suit, and not as restitution for harm suffered). The aggrieved employees’ 25% portion of the PAGA proceeds “is not restitution for wrongs done to members of the class” but is instead “an incentive to perform a service to the state.”
We do not view this reasoning as inconsistent with statements in Magadia suggesting that “PAGA ... creates an interest in penalties, not only for California and the plaintiff employee, but for nonparty employees as well,” and disagreeing with “the notion that the aggrieved employee is solely stepping into the shoes of the State rather than also vindicating the interests of other aggrieved employees.” 999 F.3d at 676–77. Magadia addressed the narrow question of whether PAGA “hew[ed] closely to the traditional scope of a qui tam action ... under Article III,” thereby allowing an “uninjured plaintiff to maintain suit” in federal court. Id. at 675. More precisely, Magadia was concerned with whether “PAGA‘s features diverge from” a specific “assignment theory of qui tam injury” articulated by the Supreme Court in Vermont Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773 (2000). 999 F.3d at 678. That is an altogether different inquiry than whether Peck‘s right to share in settlement proceeds makes him an actual party to the underlying PAGA suit. Cf. Johnson v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., 281 Cal. Rptr. 3d 478, 484 & n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021) (holding that Magadia was “not instructive” on PAGA standing question because it addressed only “standing under Article III of the United States Constitution and does not address Kim whatsoever“).
Finally, Peck argues that his separately filed PAGA action gives him standing to object and to appeal in Saucillo‘s and Rudsell‘s case. But maintaining a parallel action does not change the fact that Peck is not a party to the PAGA lawsuit brought by Saucillo and Rudsell. See Kim, 459 P.3d at 1130 (“[A] PAGA claim is an enforcement action between the LWDA and the employer, with the PAGA plaintiff acting on behalf of the government.“).
B. Conclusion
Because Peck lacks the right to appeal the PAGA settlement, we dismiss his appeal and do not consider whether the district court erred in approving the PAGA settlement. See Baranowicz v. Comm‘r of Internal Revenue, 432 F.3d 972, 976 (9th Cir. 2005). Two final observations are warranted. First, Peck did not move to intervene in the cases before us. See
II. Correct Legal Standard for the Class Action Settlement
“We review a district court‘s approval of a class action settlement for clear abuse of discretion. Such review is extremely limited, and we will affirm if the district judge applies the proper legal standard and his findings of fact are not clearly erroneous.” In re Bluetooth Headset Prod. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). However, “[a]pplying the incorrect legal standard is an abuse of discretion.” Manufactured Home Cmtys. Inc. v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022, 1037 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Campbell v. Facebook, Inc., 951 F.3d 1106, 1121 (9th Cir. 2020) (“A district court clearly abuses its discretion by either failing to apply the correct legal standard or by making clearly erroneous factual determinations.“).
To the district court, Mares objected to the size of settlement for the class claims, believing that it was inadequate. Mares does not renew his same objections on appeal. Instead, he now argues that “the district court erroneously applied a presumption of fairness.” Mares contends that because the district court approved the settlement before certifying a class, the court should have applied a heightened standard of review, in line with our decision in Roes, 1–2 v. SFBSC Mgmt., LLC, 944 F.3d 1035
A. Waiver
Swift first argues that we cannot reach the merits of Mares‘s objection because he did not raise such an objection in the district court. Generally, an objector to a class action settlement must raise an issue before the district court if he or she wishes to preserve it for appeal. See Devlin, 536 U.S. at 9. However, “[s]uch waiver is a discretionary, not jurisdictional, determination. We may consider issues not presented to the district court, although we are not required to do so.” In re Mercury Interactive Corp. Sec. Litig., 618 F.3d 988, 992 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted).
Mares concedes that he did not raise this particular objection to the district court, but he argues that “he could not pre-object” to the district court employing the incorrect legal standard. In other words, Mares believes that an objector cannot waive an objection to the district court‘s application of an incorrect legal standard. For support, Mares highlights the following passage from the Newberg treatise on class actions:
The sole exception to the requirement that only issues raised below may be appealed is that issues that surface for the first time in the court‘s final order may be appealed even if they were not the basis for an objection. For example, if the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in granting final approval or made some other error that had not existed prior to the objection deadline, the waiver doctrine does not apply. Because the issue
was not available to be objected to until final judgment, the parties and objectors did not “waive” objections by not objecting prior to that time.
4 Newberg on Class Actions § 14:18 (5th ed.).
We do not adopt this language verbatim.7 However, we agree that when “the district court considered [an] issue” in its final order approving a class action settlement, the issue is “not waived on appeal” even if no objector to the settlement raised that issue to the district court.8 JL Beverage Co., LLC v. Jim Beam Brands Co., 828 F.3d 1098, 1108 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 490 F.3d 1041, 1054 (9th Cir. 2007)); see also Thompson v. Runnels, 705 F.3d 1089, 1098 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e have the authority to identify and apply the correct legal standard, whether argued by the parties or not.“). In other words, an objector need not be an oracle and predict issues that will arise for the first time in the district court‘s final order.
B. The District Court‘s Legal Standard
In Roes, the district court approved a settlement “in the absence of a certified class.” 944 F.3d at 1039. On appeal, objectors to the settlement “contend[ed] that the district court was required to, but did not, apply heightened scrutiny of the settlement after being faced with several indicia of collusion.” Id. at 1048. We held that “[w]here ... the parties negotiate a settlement agreement before the class has been certified, settlement approval requires a higher standard of fairness and a more probing inquiry than may normally be required under
We specifically critiqued the language employed by the district court in Roes:
Nowhere in the final approval order, however, did the district court cite or otherwise acknowledge our longstanding precedent requiring a heightened fairness inquiry prior to class certification. To the contrary, the district court declared that, “[w]here a settlement is the product of arms-length negotiations conducted by capable and experienced counsel, the court begins its analysis with a presumption that the settlement is fair and reasonable.” (Emphasis added.) But such a presumption of fairness is not supported by our precedent, and the district court cites no Ninth Circuit case which adopted this standard. Particularly in light of the fact that we not only have never endorsed applying a broad presumption of fairness, but have actually required that courts do the opposite—by employing extra caution and more rigorous scrutiny—when it comes to settlements negotiated prior to class certification, the district court‘s declaration that a presumption of fairness applied was erroneous, a misstatement of the applicable legal standard which governs analysis of the fairness of the settlement.
Id. at 1048. Because the Roes district court both “misstate[d] the legal standard” and “failed to apply the correct legal
The district court here stated:
As previously found by this Court, the parties engaged in arm‘s-length, serious, informed, and non-collusive negotiations between experienced and knowledgeable counsel. Additionally, the Settlement Agreement was reached after mediation with a neutral mediator, Mark Rudy. The Settlement Agreement is therefore presumptively the product of a non-collusive, arms-length negotiation. See Roe v. SFBSC Management, LLC, No. 14-cv-03616-LB, 2017 WL 4073809, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2017) (holding that a settlement that is the product of an arm‘s-length negotiation “conducted by capable and experienced counsel” is presumed to be fair and reasonable) ....
(Some citations omitted.) The district court not only applied the same presumption that we reversed in Roes, but it
Swift and Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish the district court‘s order from our decision in Roes in a number of ways. First, Swift argues that Roes applies only to cases where a party never sought class certification. According to Swift, because “Saucillo moved for certification of a litigation class ... , which the district court denied,” the heightened legal standard does not apply. This argument is plainly at odds with our decision in Roes. We apply the heightened standard “in the absence of a certified class,” not in the absence of a motion for class certification. Roes, 944 F.3d at 1039; see also id. at 1048 (applying the heightened standard “before the class has been certified“); Lane, 696 F.3d at 819 (applying the heightened standard “when ... the settlement takes place before formal class certification“). Saucillo‘s unsuccessful motion for class certification meant there was an “absence of a certified class” and that the district court approved the settlement “before the class ha[d] been certified.” Roes, 944 F.3d at 1039, 1048.
Next, Swift argues that the district court “held only that” the presumption of fairness “was a factor that weighs in favor of approval.” Swift is correct that the district court noted that the presumption was a “factor” that “weighs in favor of approval.” The district court then applied the Hanlon factors. However, the district court in Roes did the same thing, only for us to reverse. The Roes district court stated that it “be[gan] its analysis with a presumption that the settlement is fair and reasonable.” Roe, 2017 WL 4073809, at *9 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The
Plaintiffs also argue that we should ignore the district court‘s error, citing our decision in Campbell, 951 F.3d 1106, as authority for that proposition. There, we noted that the district court erred in applying a single factor from the three-factor list in Bluetooth that district courts should apply when a settlement is approved prior to class certification. See Campbell, 951 F.3d at 1125 (listing the Bluetooth factors). We held that “any error in the district court‘s discussion of” one of the factors was “harmless” because “[n]o one factor is dispositive.” Id. at 1127. Unlike in Campbell, however, the district court here overlayed its entire discussion of the settlement agreement with the erroneous presumption. The district court never applied Bluetooth because it did not utilize the heightened standard for pre-class certification settlements. Although the district court stated that the presumption was a “factor,” our precedent is clear that district courts must apply a more searching review for a pre-class certification settlement. See Lane, 696 F.3d at 819.
Swift additionally tries to distinguish Roes by arguing that the concerns underlying our decision are not present here, where “the parties actively litigated for several years, conducted comprehensive discovery, and contest certification of a litigation class on the merits.” But the
Finally, Swift and Plaintiffs ask us to affirm the district court‘s approval of the settlement despite application of an erroneous legal standard. We generally do not employ “a harmless error standard for class action settlement review.” In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prod. Liab. Litig., 895 F.3d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 2018); but see Campbell, 951 F.3d at 1127. However, we have affirmed a district court‘s approval of a settlement, despite that court making an error. For example, in Volkswagen, we assumed that the district court failed to respond to a non-frivolous objection, which the district court was required to do. See id. at 612-13. Nevertheless, we affirmed the district court because “the objector‘s complaint appear[ed] to be purely technical—it dr[ew] no link between the district court‘s supposed oversight and any substantive deficiency in the settlement.” Id. at 613.
Failure to respond to a “purely technical” objection, id., is not analogous to employing an incorrect legal standard. The district court here began its analysis by applying the presumption that the settlement was “the product of a non-collusive, arms-length negotiation.” Applying that
“[W]hen a district court‘s findings are based upon an incorrect legal standard, the appropriate remedy is to remand so that findings can be made in accordance with the applicable legal standard.” Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1231 (9th Cir. 1994). That is because “factfinding is the basic responsibility of district courts, rather than appellate courts.” Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291 (1982). We offer no opinion as to whether there is merit to Mares‘s allegations. On remand, the district might decide to once again approve the settlement pursuant to the correct legal standard, or it might not. We, however, cannot review the settlement in the first instance under the appropriate legal standard.
CONCLUSION
We dismiss Peck‘s appeal of the district court‘s approval of the PAGA settlement because we conclude that his appeal is not properly before us. However, because the district court abused its discretion by employing an erroneous legal standard, we vacate its approval of the class-action settlement and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See McKinney-Drobnis v. Oreshack, 16 F.4th 594, 612 (9th Cir. 2021).10