MICHAEL LASCHE and JENNIFER LASCHE, Plaintiffs, vs. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al, Defendants.
Civil Action No.: 18-17552 (FLW)(TJB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
June 4, 2020
WOLFSON, Chief Judge
*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*
WOLFSON, Chief Judge:
Plaintiffs Michael and Jennifer Lasche (collectively, “Plaintiffs“), formerly licensed foster parents, allege that defendants Kyle Higgins, Katie Epperly, Mary Lippencott, and Janelle Clark (“Defendants“), who are all employees of the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (the “DCPP“)1, violated their constitutional rights when the DCPP removed a foster child from their home and suspended Plaintiffs’ foster parent license. In an Opinion dated September 26, 2019 (“prior Opinion“), I granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the original complaint and gave Plaintiffs leave to amend their New Jersey Civil Rights Act, Section 1983, and Section 1985 claims premised on alleged violations of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint asserting
For the reasons set forth below, Defendant‘s motion is GRANTED.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
For the purposes of this motion, the relevant facts are derived from Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint and assumed as true.
In September 2017, the DCPP contacted Plaintiffs, who were then-licensed foster parents and “devout Christians who hold to traditional values and beliefs about family, marriage and sex” about potential foster children. ECF No., 16, Am. Compl. (“AC“) ¶¶1,8. The DCPP informed Plaintiffs that two sisters, ages 13 (“Foster Child 1“) and 10 (“Foster Child 2“), were in need of a foster home placement and asked if Plaintiffs would be willing to care for them. Id. ¶8. Plaintiffs, experienced foster parents, agreed to foster the two girls. Id. ¶¶1,8.
Kyle Higgins (“Higgins“), the DCPP case worker assigned to the foster children, informed Plaintiffs that the girls’ cases were proceeding toward adoption and that the biological father‘s rights had already been terminated. Id. ¶¶3,9. Throughout October and November 2017, Higgins allegedly advised Plaintiffs that the cases were still moving toward adoption and that they would be given “first choice” to adopt the girls. Id. ¶10. During that time period, the biological mother surrendered her rights and the children became eligible for adoption, and Plaintiffs were allegedly informed that they were still in consideration. Id. at ¶¶11-12. However, in late December 2017, Higgins informed Plaintiffs that a family in Illinois was interested in adopting Foster Child 1 and 2, as well as their three siblings. Id. at ¶13. When Plaintiffs and the children asked Higgins and
Thereafter, during a conversation with the other foster parents of Foster Child 1 and 2‘s siblings, the Lasches learned that the potential adoptees “were two wealthy gay men with lots of family around to support them and the adoption.” Id. Plaintiffs were “baffled” as to why the DCPP withheld that information from them, but chose to share it with the other foster parents. Id. A few days later, Higgins visited the Lasches’ home and allegedly questioned Foster Child 1 about her religious beliefs concerning homosexuality and asked if she would change her religious beliefs if she were living with another family. Id. ¶15.
In April 2018, Foster Child 2 was removed from Plaintiffs’ home “for confidential reasons unique to Foster Child 2,” pursuant to an agreement between Plaintiffs and the DCPP. Id. at ¶16. On May 22, 2018, Mrs. Lasche met with Higgins and Foster Child 1‘s therapist. Id. at ¶17. At that meeting, Mrs. Lasche, Higgins, and the therapist agreed not to discuss adoption with Foster Child 1 for the foreseeable future because it was too soon after Foster Child 2‘s removal. Id. They also discussed the possibility of Foster Child 1 spending additional time with her siblings to determine if she would like to be adopted by the same family as them, and Mrs. Lasche indicated that she “was not opposed to letting Foster Child 1 explore that and allowing her to make the decision without any questions or resentment.” Id. at ¶¶16-17. During that meeting, Higgins indicated that a court hearing would be held on June 4, 2018, and a judge would decide whether all of the children should be adopted by their current foster families, or if it would be in the children‘s best interest for the Illinois couple to adopt all five siblings. Id. at ¶18. The morning of the scheduled court hearing, Plaintiffs purportedly received a text message from Foster Child 1‘s Law Guardian
Plaintiffs contend that after the adoption with the Illinois couple fell through, “the attitude of the case worker toward the Plaintiffs’ radically changed.” Id. Thereafter, Higgins allegedly contacted Plaintiffs to discuss transitioning Foster Child 1 to another foster home, where her younger brother resided, and Mrs. Lasche expressed confusion, because she was under the impression that since the Illinois family was no longer pursuing the adoption, the DCPP‘s intention was to allow each of the siblings to be adopted by their then-foster families. Id. at ¶21. To obtain more information, Mrs. Lasche contacted Foster Child 1‘s Law Guardian, and the Law Guardian was allegedly surprised and offered to investigate the situation. Id. at ¶22.
A few weeks later, on or about June 31, 2018, Foster Child 1 came home from a regularly scheduled therapy session and informed Plaintiffs that she was upset because her “therapist kept bringing up religion and told her she should not feel pressured to follow her foster family‘s religious beliefs.” Id. at ¶20. On another occasion, while Foster Child 1‘s therapist was at Plaintiffs’ home for a therapy session, Mrs. Lasche asked the therapist why the therapist had inquired whether Foster Child 1 was “being pressured” to follow Plaintiffs’ religion. Id. at ¶23. Initially, the therapist allegedly responded that “it was normal to discuss how people have different beliefs, ethics, religion, etc.” Id. After further questioning from Mrs. Lasche, however, the therapist eventually divulged that Higgins had called before the session and mentioned the potential adoption with the Illinois counsel and they had discussed Plaintiffs’ “ideas about same-sex couples.” Id. Higgins also purportedly asked the therapist to discuss the possibility of relocating Foster Child 1 to another foster home with her brothers. Id. Plaintiffs aver that at that
On another occasion, on or about June 21, 2018, Higgins picked up Foster Child 1, ostensibly for the purpose of visiting one of her siblings. Id. at ¶25. Plaintiffs allege that it was “very rare” for Higgins to transport Foster Child 1 to such visits. Id. While on the way to the visit, Higgins allegedly stopped at a Dunkin Donuts with Foster Child 1 and informed her that Plaintiffs would not be able to “meet her needs.” Id. at ¶25. Plaintiffs assert that during the visit, Higgins “interrogated Foster Child 1 about her religious beliefs” and “lied to her in an effort to intimidate her into agreeing that she did not want to be adopted by Plaintiffs.” Id. at ¶¶25-26.
Upon returning from the visit, Higgins met with Plaintiffs and informed them that the DCPP intended to meet with them to “work with” Plaintiffs in order to reach a result that was in Foster Child 1‘s best interest. Id. at ¶28. When Plaintiffs inquired about the purpose of the meeting, they were allegedly informed by Epperly that the DCPP “was concerned that both Foster Child 1 and Foster Child 2 indicated that same-sex relationships were against their religion,” a belief which the DCPP regarded as coming from Plaintiffs. Id. at ¶29. In that regard, Plaintiffs acknowledge that they took their foster children to church and “freely shared their religious beliefs with the children,” but believe “the Foster Children had picked up their religious beliefs regarding homosexuality prior to coming to Plaintiffs’ home.” Id. at ¶32.
On Friday, June 29, 2018, the Lasches, their attorney, an attorney for the State of New Jersey, Higgins, Epperly, Epperly‘s supervisor Mary Lippencott, Janelle Clark, and one or two other DCPP employees whom Plaintiffs did not identify, attended a meeting at the DCPP‘s Monmouth County Office. Id. at ¶33. During the meeting, the DCPP representatives allegedly expressed concern about Plaintiffs’ belief that homosexuality is a sin and its potential impact on
A few days later, on July 2, 2018, a hearing was held before a New Jersey family court judge, and the DCPP sought to remove Foster Child 1 from Plaintiffs’ home. Id. at ¶35. At the hearing, Foster Child 1‘s Law Guardian purportedly objected to the removal. Id. Nonetheless, the next day, presumably pursuant to a court order, the DCPP removed Foster Child 1 from Plaintiffs’ home, and placed her in the same foster home as Foster Child 2. Id. at ¶38. Plaintiffs allege that a therapist had previously advised the DCPP that it was in Foster Child 1‘s best interest to be adopted alone, rather than with her siblings, due to trauma she experienced while the children were residing with their biological parents. Id. at ¶39. Plaintiffs contend that, despite that advice, the DCPP sought to have Foster Child 1 adopted along with her siblings due to Defendants’ “hostility to Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs.” Id. Additionally, Plaintiffs assert that they were not given notice that they had a right to be heard at the meeting, and, in their view, the lack of notice is further indicative of bad faith and hostility by Defendants. Id. at ¶36.
On October 12, 2018, a DCPP representative visited Plaintiffs’ home in order to conduct a yearly inspection which was necessary for Plaintiffs to renew their foster parent license. Id. at ¶41. The representative asked Plaintiffs if they knew that their foster parent license had been suspended by the Monmouth County DCPP office, and Plaintiffs stated that they were unaware of the suspension. Id. The representative allegedly informed Plaintiffs that they should have been
On November 19, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a four-count complaint against Defendants in New Jersey state court, alleging violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD“), the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA“),
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to
To determine whether a plaintiff has met the facial plausibility standard mandated by Twombly and Iqbal, courts within this Circuit engage in a three-step progression. Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). First, the court must “outline the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim for relief.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012). Next, the Court “peel[s] away those allegations that are no more than conclusions and thus not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. Finally, where “there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Equal Protection Claim
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction, the equal protection of the laws.”
Here, Defendants argue that the Amended Complaint does not remedy the previously identified deficiencies in Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Claim. Def. Br. at 18-19. Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have only proffered “bald assertions” that they were discriminated against on the basis of their religious beliefs, and have not alleged any facts sufficient to establish that they were treated differently than similarly situated foster parents. Id. at 19.
In my prior Opinion, I explained that Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim failed because “Plaintiffs have not alleged that the DCPP treated similarly situated foster parents, who did not share their religious beliefs, differently than Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ Complaint merely summarily alleges that Plaintiffs were denied equal protection of the law.” Prior Opinion at 26. The Amended Complaint is similarly deficient. In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert that “Defendants have discriminated against [Plaintiffs] on the basis of their religious beliefs and treated them differently than similarly situated people who do not hold those religious beliefs.” AC. ¶52. Although I previously directed Plaintiffs to allege facts suggesting that they were treated differently than similarly situated foster parents, Plaintiffs have not done so. Instead, Plaintiffs assert in their opposition brief that
they could name people who did not hold the same religious beliefs as they do, that when the Court ordered an evaluation for adoption they were actually evaluated and allowed to proceed with the adoption. They could also name people who don‘t hold the same religious beliefs as they do who were not suspended without being advised why they were suspended or even notified that they were suspended as required by the rules. In short they could specifically name every other foster parent they have ever personally known . . . but in the context of this particular case that would add nothing to Plaintiffs’ claim.
ECF No. 22, Pl. Br. at 12. I disagree. First, these additional factual allegations are not included in the Amended Complaint which is, itself, fatal to Plaintiffs’ claims. See Commonwealth of Pa. ex rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[I]t is axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to the motion to dismiss.“); Gundlach v. Reinstein, 924 F. Supp. 684, 688 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (refusing to consider factual allegation that was not in complaint but appeared for the first time in plaintiff‘s legal memoranda regarding a
B. The First Amendment Retaliation Claim
To plead a retaliation claim under the First Amendment, Plaintiffs must allege “(1) constitutionally protected conduct, (2) retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint proffers two potential theories of First Amendment retaliation: Plaintiffs were retaliated against for simply holding the religious belief that homosexuality is a sin and/or Plaintiffs were retaliated against for sharing their religious beliefs with Foster Child 1 while she resided in their home. See Am. Compl. ¶¶48-49. I will address the second theory first.
it is unclear whether such conduct is constitutionally protected. Although Plaintiffs have an absolute right to practice whatever religious beliefs they choose, their right to free exercise does not, necessarily, permit them to engage in religious practice and share their beliefs with Foster Child 1, who was not Plaintiffs’ adoptive child and Plaintiffs were not her legal guardian.
Prior Opinion at 31. On this motion, Plaintiffs have not proffered any legal support for the proposition that they possessed such a First Amendment right, nor has the Court‘s own research revealed such a right. To the contrary, the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment indisputably protects an individual‘s right to control the religious upbringing of his or her children. See Pierce v. Soc‘y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 532-535 (1925) (recognizing parents’ rights to send their children to religious schools); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231 (1972) (recognizing that the Free Exercise clause protects “traditional concepts of parental control over the religious upbringing and education of their minor children.“). Consistent with the Free Exercise clause, various federal courts have held that that the state should make some effort to accommodate the child and parents’ religious needs when making foster care placements. See Pfoltzer v. Fairfax Cty. Dep‘t of Human Dev., 966 F.2d 1443 (4th Cir. 1992) (“With respect to children in foster care, a state is required to make reasonable efforts to accommodate the parent‘s religious preferences.“); Wilder v. Bernstein, 848 F.2d 1338, 1341-42 (2d Cir. 1988) (“So long as the state makes reasonable efforts to assure that the religious needs of the children are met during the interval in which the state assumes parental responsibilities, the free exercise rights of the parents and their children are adequately observed“); Walker v. Johnson, 891 F.Supp. 1040, 1049 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (recognizing parents’ “limited rights to control the religious upbringing” of a child in foster care). In that regard, there is no legal support for Plaintiffs’ assertion of a First Amendment right to share their religious
Plaintiffs also assert that they were retaliated against for holding the religious belief that homosexuality is a sin. In my prior Opinion, I found that, although Plaintiffs clearly alleged constitutionally protected conduct, they had “not demonstrated the requisite causal connection between their religious beliefs and the adverse actions they suffered” or “pled evidence of a causal link between Plaintiffs’ beliefs and the alleged retaliatory conduct.” Prior Opinion at 28-29. Specifically, I found:
[t]he order of events, as currently pled, belies Plaintiffs’ position that the Individual Defendants’ actions were in retaliation for Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs. Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that in December 2017, the foster parents of Foster Child 1‘s siblings were informed that the potential adoptive parents were a same-sex couple, yet when Plaintiffs inquired about the potential adoptive family, Defendants Higgins and Epperly claimed not to know any information about the potential adoptive family. Thus, Plaintiffs factual allegations suggest that the Individual Defendants were aware of Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs regarding homosexuality, as early as December 2017. However, the alleged retaliatory actions – the removal of Foster Child 1 and the suspension of Plaintiffs’ foster parent license – did not occur until July 2018, seven months later. Seven months is not “unusually suggestive.” . . . Although “timing plus other evidence” may be sufficient to establish causation “where the temporal proximity is not so close as to be ‘unduly suggestive,‘” Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts from which a fact finder could reasonably discern that [Defendants] acted out of hostility towards Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs. . . . Plaintiffs’ Complaint identifies various instances in which the DCPP employees questioned Foster Child 1 about her beliefs. Notably, DCPP is required by regulation to “work with the resource parent to provide the child in placement with reasonable opportunities to attend religious activities and
services in accordance with the child‘s preference and the wishes of the child‘s own parents.”
N.J. Admin. Code § 3A:14-4.1(a) . Defendants’ questioning of Foster Child 1 regarding her religious beliefs was appropriate in light of the DCPP‘s regulatory obligations, and the imminent possibility that Foster Child 1 might be adopted by a same-sex couple. Plaintiffs identify only one occasion on which [Defendants] inquired about Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs, and in that respect, the inquiry appears to have been a limited one in which the Individual Defendants queried whether Plaintiffs would “reject Foster child 1 if she ever decided to explore her sexuality” and “sought assurance from the Plaintiffs that would not be the case.” Compl. ¶29. Such questioning is not indicative of hostility towards Plaintiffs’ particular religious beliefs, but rather, the Individual Defendants’ exercise of their administrative functions as employees of the entity prescribed with the duty of safeguarding Foster Child 1‘s well-being. In light of the temporal chasm between [Defendants] discovery of Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs and the alleged retaliatory conduct, and the lack of other circumstantial evidence from which causation could be inferred, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim premised on retaliation for their religious beliefs.
Id. at 28-29 (citations omitted). The Amended Complaint does not remedy those deficiencies. I find, as I did before, that Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint has not adequately alleged temporal proximity or any other circumstantial evidence of causation. See Mash v. Twp. of Haverford, No. 06-4479, 2007 WL 2254417, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2007), aff‘d sub nom., 298 F. App‘x 169 (3d Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted) (dismissing First Amendment retaliation claim when plaintiff did “not present any evidence demonstrating either an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory act” or “a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to establish a causal link“).
Here, Plaintiffs assert that the removal of Foster Child 1 in July 2018, and the subsequent suspension of their foster parent license, were both acts of retaliation spurred by Plaintiffs’ expression of their religious beliefs regarding homosexuality.4 Plaintiff has not established
Rather, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ hostility toward them was triggered by the possibility that the Lasches might be viable adoptive parents for Foster Child 1, and thereafter, the DCPP employees engaged in a pattern of actions demonstrating their hostility toward Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs. Plaintiffs assert that “[t]he first indication that [the DCPP] may have been aware of the Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs is in late December 2017” when the caseworkers allegedly concealed that the potential adoptive family was a same sex couple, and that from that point onward, “[e]ach and every time the Defendants tried to convince [Foster Child 1] to be adopted by someone else they also raised the issue of Plaintiffs and the child‘s religious beliefs about homosexuality,” ultimately culminating in the late June meeting and the subsequent removal of Foster Child 1. Pl. Br. at 7. Plaintiffs maintain that the DCPP worker‘s comment during the June
Plaintiffs’ allegations present a close-question regarding causality, nonetheless, I find that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts demonstrating “a pattern of antagonism,” or other circumstantial evidence from which retaliatory or discriminatory motives can be inferred. DeFranco, 387 F. App‘x at 155. On this point, the Amended Complaint is largely unchanged; like in the prior complaint, the only acts of alleged hostility leading up to the alleged acts of retaliation are the June 21, 2018 meeting between Higgins and Foster Child 1, and the June 29, 2018 meeting between Plaintiffs, their attorney, an attorney for the State of New Jersey, and the DCPP employees. From these two incidents – one of which involved a conversation with Foster Child 1 rather than an act of discrimination directed toward Plaintiffs – Plaintiffs seek to infer a discriminatory intent. However, a plaintiff‘s supposition that a defendant‘s conduct was motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory intent is not sufficient to allege a retaliation claim, absent supporting factual allegations. See Kundratic v. Thomas, 407 F. App‘x. 625, 628 (3d Cir. 2011); Mitchell v. Miller, 884 F. Supp. 2d 334, 359 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (“[t]he issue of causation pertaining to a First Amendment claim against a particular defendant generally turns on his or her ‘specific intent’ at the time of the alleged retaliatory action). As pled, it appears that in both instances Defendants were exercising their administrative functions as employees of the entity
As I previously noted, the DCPP is required by regulation to “work with the resource parent to provide the child in placement with reasonable opportunities to attend religious activities and services in accordance with the child‘s preference and the wishes of the child‘s own parents.” See Prior Opinion at 30 (quoting
On their face, each of the allegedly discriminatory acts identified by Plaintiffs seems calculated to serve that goal; Plaintiffs have not alleged any other facts suggesting that there was, in fact, a retaliatory motive behind those actions. For example, Plaintiffs highlight the unidentified caseworker‘s comment, at the June 29, 2018 meeting that in the future Foster Child 1 might need therapy to resolve her views on homosexuality, as evidence of DCPP‘s alleged animus. However,
Here, even assuming that Plaintiffs had alleged facts sufficient to infer religious animus on the part of Defendants, judicial authorization for the removal of Foster Child 1 would break the causal connection, if any, between Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs and the alleged retaliatory conduct – the removal of Foster Child 1. The ultimate decision approving or denying the DCPP‘s placement decision was made by the New Jersey family court judge following the placement hearing. Moreover, Plaintiffs have not alleged that Defendants misrepresented facts or withheld any relevant information from the Family Court judge approving the placement decision, such that this Court can infer that Defendants’ alleged animus was the cause of Plaintiffs’ harm, despite judicial authorization for the removal of Foster Child 1. C.f. Bowser v. Blair Cty. Children & Youth Servs., 346 F. Supp. 2d 788, 797 (W.D. Pa. 2004) (finding that court‘s issuance of an ex parte order, based on child welfare workers’ false allegation that mother had violated a child safety plan, did not constitute a supervening cause sufficient to break the causal link between workers’ actions and the child‘s removal because “the Plaintiffs have alleged a situation of misrepresentation upon which the doctrine of supervening causes, in regard to judicial actions, cannot apply“). Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot trace the alleged First Amendment violation to Defendants’ alleged animus.
Unlike the removal of Foster Child 1, it does not appear that the suspension of Plaintiffs’ foster parent license was subject to judicial approval; nonetheless, Plaintiffs’ claims regarding the revocation of their foster parent license suffer from their own causal deficiency. Plaintiffs seek to infer, based on Defendants’ questions regarding Plaintiffs’ religious views, that the revocation of
For those reasons, Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to infer a causal connection between either their constitutionally protected religious beliefs and either of the retaliatory actions they allegedly suffered. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation claim is dismissed. To the extent Plaintiffs believe they can allege additional facts to remedy the identified pleading deficiencies related to any actions taken by Defendants in connection with the non-renewal of Plaintiffs license, Plaintiffs may file a motion to amend their Complaint within thirty days. If Plaintiffs do not file such a motion, this case will be closed.
C. The Section 1985 Claim
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants conspired for the purpose of denying Plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In order to assert a violation of Section 1985, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.” Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828–29 (1983)).
D. Qualified Immunity
Defendants also assert that Plaintiffs’ Complaint should be dismissed because Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. See Def. Br. at 25-26. Because Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim as to a violation of their constitutional rights, I need not address whether the Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified Immunity on any of Plaintiffs’ claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss is granted in its entirety.
Date: June 4, 2020
/s/ Freda L. Wolfson
Hon. Freda L. Wolfson
U.S. Chief District Judge