3:18-cv-17552
D.N.J.Jun 4, 2020Background
- Plaintiffs Michael and Jennifer Lasche were licensed foster parents and alleged they are devout Christians who believe homosexuality is a sin; DCPP placed two sisters (ages 10 and 13) with them in 2017.
- DCPP caseworker Higgins told the Lasches the children were moving toward adoption and later that an Illinois couple (later reported to be a same-sex couple) sought to adopt the siblings; DCPP employees questioned the older child and discussed Plaintiffs’ religious views.
- In July 2018, following a family-court hearing, the court-authorized removal of the 13-year-old (Foster Child 1) from the Lasches’ home; Plaintiffs learned in October 2018 that their foster-license had been suspended.
- Plaintiffs sued in state court asserting NJLAD, NJCRA, § 1983 (First Amendment retaliation and Equal Protection) and § 1985 conspiracy claims; the case was removed to federal court; some official-capacity/state claims were previously dismissed.
- Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint re-asserting § 1983 (Equal Protection and First Amendment retaliation) and § 1985 claims; Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
- The district court granted Defendants’ motion in full: Equal Protection, First Amendment retaliation, and § 1985 claims dismissed without prejudice; qualified immunity not reached.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Equal Protection: whether Lasches allege disparate treatment based on religion | Lasche: DCPP discriminated because of their religious belief and treated them differently than other foster parents | Defendants: Amended Complaint lacks facts showing similarly situated foster parents were treated differently or that defendants harbored discriminatory intent | Dismissed without prejudice for failure to plead specific instances of differential treatment or discriminatory intent |
| First Amendment retaliation — communicating religion to foster child: whether sharing beliefs with a non‑adopted foster child is protected conduct | Lasche: sharing religious beliefs with foster child is protected expression and they were retaliated against for it | Defendants: foster parents lack an unfettered constitutional right to control or preach religion to non‑adoptive foster children; DCPP’s inquiries were within its statutory duties | Dismissed — court found no clear First Amendment protection for that conduct and no actionable retaliation claim |
| First Amendment retaliation — holding religious beliefs: whether DCPP’s actions were causally linked to Plaintiffs’ beliefs | Lasche: suspension and removal were retaliation for holding anti‑homosexual beliefs; meeting comments and questioning show animus | Defendants: timing (seven months), neutral/statutory duties, and judicial approval of removal defeat causal inference; no pattern of antagonism alleged | Dismissed without prejudice for failure to allege unusually suggestive temporal proximity or other circumstantial evidence of causation; judicial intervention severed causal chain for removal; no personal‑involvement allegations re license suspension |
| § 1985 conspiracy: whether plaintiffs alleged a conspiratorial agreement to deprive rights | Lasche: defendants conspired to deprive First and Fourteenth Amendment rights | Defendants: no factual allegations of an agreement or concerted action | Dismissed without prejudice for failure to plead a meeting of the minds or concerted action |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (complaint must plead factual content plausibly showing entitlement to relief)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard; courts disregard naked conclusions)
- Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009) (district court must accept well‑pleaded facts and construe complaint favorably on 12(b)(6))
- City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (Equal Protection requires similarly situated persons be treated alike)
- Shuman v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2005) (plaintiff must show differential treatment of similarly situated individuals for Equal Protection claim)
- Luren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2007) (causation in First Amendment retaliation: timing or pattern of antagonism)
- McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2006) (retaliatory conduct must be sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness)
- Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2011) (superseding cause doctrine can break chain of causation for § 1983 claims)
- Egervary v. Young, 366 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 2004) (judicial intervention can be a superseding cause barring § 1983 liability)
- Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1988) (§ 1983 liability requires personal involvement by each defendant)
- Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (parents’ rights to direct religious upbringing of their children)
- Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Free Exercise Clause protects traditional parental control over religious upbringing)
