LARRY E. PARRISH, P.C., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANDY D. BENNETT, FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., and W. NEAL MCBRAYER, Judges of the Tennessee Court of Appeals, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 20-5898
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Decided and Filed: March 2, 2021
File Name: 21a0051p.06
RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville. No. 3:20-cv-00275—Marvin E. Aspen, District Judge.
Before: McKEAGUE, GRIFFIN, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Larry E. Parrish, PARRISH LAWYERS, P.C., Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellant. Laura Miller, OFFICE OF THE TENNESSEE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellees.
OPINION
In this action, Larry E. Parrish, P.C., a Tennessee law firm (the “Parrish Firm“) sued three judges of the Tennessee Court of Appeals because they allegedly made false statements in a written opinion resolving an appeal to which the Parrish Firm was a party. Plaintiff claims that the false statements were a violation of its Fourteenth Amendment rights, but as a remedy, it seeks no damages or injunctive relief—instead, requesting only a declaration that defendants violated its constitutional rights.
The district court, however, granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, reasoning that it was “not a close issue” that it lacked jurisdiction, and that even if it had jurisdiction, dismissal was required by judicial immunity and the relevant statute of limitations. Finally, even ignoring these sizable defects, the district court concluded that the facts pleaded by plaintiff were insufficient to state a claim. Now on appeal, plaintiff primarily challenges the district court‘s rulings regarding jurisdiction and judicial immunity. We affirm the judgment of the district court and direct plaintiff and plaintiff‘s counsel to show cause why sanctions should not be assessed against them on appeal.
I.
After a falling out in the early 2000s, business partners Paul Braden and Nancy Strong used the Tennessee state courts to resolve issues stemming from the dissolution of their partnership. See Larry E. Parrish P.C. v. Strong, No. M2017-02451-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 6843402, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2018). During that process, Ms. Strong believed she was the victim of legal malpractice, so she hired plaintiff, Larry E. Parrish, P.C, to represent her in a civil action against her original attorney. Id. Strong‘s malpractice case was later dismissed when the Parrish Firm did not comply with discovery deadlines. Id. Thereafter, Strong assigned some of her rights in the partnership dissolution action to the Parrish Firm to secure payment and reimbursement of money advanced to defray costs and expenses for the malpractice action. Id.
A few months later, the Parrish Firm filed suit to recover $116,316 pursuant to the assignment. Id. Strong responded with counterclaims. Id. Those claims were resolved in yet more protracted state-court litigation when a jury found for Strong on
The Parrish Firm appealed, seeking to vacate the trial court judgment. Defendants were the assigned panel of the Tennessee Court of Appeals, and the opinion they issued forms the basis of this action. See Larry E. Parrish P.C., 2018 WL 6843402. That court affirmed in relevant part the judgment of the trial court, while making factual statements that plaintiff claims were false. Id. at *4–5. After defendants issued the opinion, plaintiff unsuccessfully pursued “a string of appeals and dilatory motions, concerning the same underlying case.”1
Undaunted, the Parrish Firm turned its attention to the federal courts and filed this action against defendants, alleging that two assertions in the Tennessee Court of Appeals opinion were false. Specifically, plaintiff disagreed with the Tennessee Court of Appeals regarding whether Strong‘s counterclaim was against the Parrish Firm or against Larry Parrish individually and alleged that the court misconstrued a motion to strike it had filed in the state trial court. The Parrish Firm claims that these statements contained in the judicial opinion violated its right to a “fair trial” under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and its right “to access justice” under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and sought a declaratory judgment to vindicate those rights. Defendants responded with a motion to dismiss under
II.
We review de novo a district court‘s decision to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Intern. Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Troy, 974 F.3d 690, 701 (6th Cir. 2020). Here, the district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because plaintiff‘s claims were barred by Rooker-Feldman,3 and because the complaint did not present a justiciable controversy. We agree with the district court that it was without jurisdiction for both reasons.
First, under what is known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, district courts may not consider “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The doctrine is derived from
Applying these standards, we conclude that plaintiff‘s suit is barred by Rooker-Feldman. Plaintiff alleges only that the Tennessee Court of Appeals made false statements about the facts of a case before it, and that the resulting errors—memorialized in the court‘s opinion—injured it. The district court correctly observed that the complaint essentially sought another round of state appellate review in disguise because “[e]valuating whether statements in the [Tennessee Court of Appeals‘] opinion were intentionally false would require” it “to impermissibly review the factual basis of the relevant opinion.” It is not the function of the lower federal courts to correct state court judgments—even supposedly incorrect state court judgments. See In re Sun Valley Foods Co. v. Detroit Marine Terminals, Inc., 801 F.2d 186, 189 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass‘n Inc., 336 F.3d 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2003). Thus, “[w]hile Rooker-Feldman ‘applies only to an exceedingly narrow set of cases,’ this is one of them.” Kost v. Kreeger, 832 F. App‘x 438, 439 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at 400).
The Parrish Firm‘s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive at best, and nearly incoherent at worst. It begins by dubiously suggesting that “[t]he decision of no state court is at issue in this case[,]” despite the allegedly false statements that form the basis of the action being contained in a decision of the Tennessee Court of Appeals. Second, plaintiff posits that to resolve the claims, the district court “need[ed] only look at the evidence to see if [defendants], with knowledge and forethought, deliberately fabricated statements, known to be objectively contradicted by indisputable evidence in the record on appeal.” This, it claims, does not run afoul of Rooker-Feldman because even if “the evidence is collected from the record in state court,” it “does not mean that the state court record is being reviewed to make a judgment about whether a state court made an error in its judgment.” In other words, plaintiff asserts that the district court needed to determine whether the decision of the Tennessee Court of Appeals contained “deliberately fabricated statements,” while simultaneously not deciding whether the state court “made an error in its judgment.” We are unable to reconcile these blatantly inconsistent views.
Second, the Declaratory Judgment Act provides that the district court, in a case of actual controversy “may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.”
Once a court is satisfied that the jurisdictional prerequisites are met, it considers five factors to determine whether exercising jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action is appropriate:
(1) whether the declaratory action would settle the controversy; (2) whether the declaratory action would serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations in issue; (3) whether the declaratory remedy is being used merely for the purpose of “procedural fencing” or “to provide an arena for a race for res judicata;” (4) whether the use of a declaratory action would increase friction between our federal and state courts and improperly encroach upon state jurisdiction; and (5) whether there is an alternative remedy which is better or more effective.
Grand Trunk W. Rail Co. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 746 F.2d 323, 326 (6th Cir. 1984).
The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after concluding that the Grand Trunk factors did not weigh in favor of exercising jurisdiction. We need not even get that far. Instead, we conclude that the complaint failed to present a justiciable case or controversy because plaintiff requested a ruling only on whether the past actions of defendants were right or wrong, which could not affect the present relationship between the parties. In other words, plaintiff sought only an advisory opinion from the district court as to whether its constitutional rights had been violated. The court therefore lacked an Article III controversy to adjudicate. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 18; Hemlock Semiconductor Corp., 747 F. App‘x at 292; Ward v. City of Norwalk, 640 F. App‘x 462, 468 (6th Cir. 2016) (concluding that plaintiff‘s declaratory judgment claim was “actionable only to the extent it [sought] prospective relief“).
For these reasons, we affirm the district court‘s order granting defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Because the district court lacked jurisdiction, we need not discuss its other reasons for dismissal.
III.
Finally, defendants request that we sanction the Parrish Firm and Larry Parrish individually under
It appears that those standards have been met here. First, we agree with the district court that the jurisdictional defects presented by the complaint were “not . . . close issue[s],”4 and plaintiff‘s arguments on appeal did not narrow the issues in any meaningful way. And beyond those flaws, the appeal appears frivolous because plaintiff has not provided any cogent argument to explain why the statute of limitations did not bar his claim, nor how the complaint pleaded facts to plausibly establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation—two additional grounds the district court gave for granting the motion to dismiss. In other words, even if plaintiff had
prevailed on the two issues it briefed (jurisdiction and judicial immunity), we would still affirm the district court‘s dismissal of the complaint because the Parrish Firm has forfeited case-dispositive issues by failing to raise them for review. Finally, we share the district court‘s concern for attorney Parrish‘s penchant for calling state judges’ integrity into question seemingly whenever they disagree with him.
Accordingly, defendants may file an affidavit setting forth their reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees incurred by this appeal not later than fourteen days after the issuance of this opinion. Once defendants’ affidavit is filed, plaintiff and plaintiff‘s counsel shall have fourteen days to show cause why they should not be sanctioned, addressing both
IV.
We affirm the judgment of the district court and retain jurisdiction pending our resolution of sanctions on appeal.