Larry BRYANT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 13-1142.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Decided Feb. 28, 2014.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied May 19, 2014.*
746 F.3d 239
Submitted Oct. 17, 2013.
The marshals might also reasonably have believed that it was acceptable to invite additional representatives of PPCW to join the raid, because outside involvement in the execution of a court order is sometimes permissible. For example, in United States v. Clouston, 623 F.2d 485, 486-87 (6th Cir.1980), this circuit approved assistance by a telephone company‘s employees in the execution of a warrant related to wiretapping, partly because the employees were present to aid in the identification of electronic devices covered by the warrant. Although here the writ of execution identified the number of PPCW representatives who were authorized to be present, a marshal might nonetheless have concluded that it was permissible to invite additional representatives of PPCW to execute the writ, because officers may sometimes seek the aid of third parties in executing court orders. Further buttressing this conclusion, the marshals’ actions in seeking outside assistance were distinct from those in which this circuit has recognized a possible constitutional violation. For example, the marshals did not invite private individuals to join them after they had already completed a search authorized by a warrant, as occurred in Bills v. Aseltine, 958 F.2d 697, 702 (6th Cir.1992).
An officer who was unaware that the additional representatives of PPCW were not authorized to be present might also have reasonably concluded that the individuals could film the home. Other circuits have assumed without deciding that videotaping the execution of a valid search warrant is lawful. See, e.g., Marks v. Clarke, 102 F.3d 1012, 1033 n. 37 (9th Cir.1996). In addition, several circuits have held that warrantless filming does not violate the Constitution if the cameramen are authorized to be present in the home. See United States v. Wahchumwah, 710 F.3d 862, 867 (9th Cir.2013); United States v. Brathwaite, 458 F.3d 376, 380-81 (5th Cir.2006); United States v. Davis, 326 F.3d 361, 366 (2d Cir.2003). Although here the cameraman was not authorized to be present in the Brays’ home, reasonable officers who were mistaken about the lawfulness of inviting additional representatives of PPCW to join the raid might likewise have been mistaken about whether those representatives could film the home, particularly in light of the camera‘s utility in capturing the condition of the property prior to its sale. Therefore, the rights the marshals breached were not clearly established at the time of the violations.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
PER CURIAM.
Larry Bryant, an Illinois inmate, appeals both the dismissal of his untimely civil-rights suit against the City of Chicago and several of its police officers, as well as the denial of his motion for post-judgment relief. We vacate the district court‘s order and remand for further proceedings.
On August 20, 2010, Mr. Bryant was riding his bike on a Chicago street when he was stopped by two police officers, searched without a warrant and arrested for possessing a controlled substance. He was arraigned on September 23, and a couple of months later was released after a favorable ruling on a motion to suppress evidence and to quash the arrest. His case was dismissed on December 13. He was arrested for a different crime a few months later and has since remained in custody.
On September 18, 2012, Mr. Bryant brought this action under
On October 4, the district court screened Mr. Bryant‘s request to proceed in forma pauperis under
Two weeks later, Mr. Bryant submitted another motion to proceed in forma pauperis and a show-cause response. He explained that his claims should not be deemed time-barred because he was incarcerated (a disability, in his view), did not have access to a law library, lacked financial resources and had attempted several times to obtain his arresting officers’ names (writing letters to the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County and the Chicago Police Department, filing Freedom of Information Act requests, and moving to compel the City of Chicago to disclose the officers’ names). He also explained that he had difficulty obtaining proper postage and mailing his complaint; he said that he first tried to mail his complaint on July 20, 2012.
On November 19 Mr. Bryant moved for an extension of time, but nine days later the court denied the motion as futile and dismissed the case as time-barred. Allowing Mr. Bryant additional time to amend the complaint would be futile, the court explained, because he failed to meet the November 22 deadline to identify the proper defendants.
Mr. Bryant then moved under
The court denied the Rule 59(e) motion, stating that his incarceration did not constitute a disability to toll the statute of limitations, that his “belated attempts” to identify his arresting officers were not grounds for equitable tolling, and that identifying the officers as John Doe and Richard Roe was insufficient. The court did not mention his September 18 motion to compel.
On appeal, Mr. Bryant challenges only the district court‘s order regarding his false-arrest and false-imprisonment claims. He first argues that the district court erred by refusing to equitably toll the statute of limitations when his incarceration and lack of legal and financial resources prevented him from timely filing. But Illinois does not toll the statute of limitations for inmates, Wilson v. Giesen, 956 F.2d 738, 741 (7th Cir.1992), nor does it consider a lack of resources sufficiently extraordinary to equitably toll the statute of limitations, see Tucker v. Kingston, 538 F.3d 732, 734-35 (7th Cir.2008).
Mr. Bryant‘s more substantial arguments are that the district court abused its discretion by failing to rule upon his motion to compel the City of Chicago to disclose his arresting officers’ names, and relatedly that his diligence in seeking that information should have led the court to equitably toll the statute of limitations.
District courts abuse their discretion when they fail to acknowledge a plaintiff‘s timely discovery request that would produce relevant and necessary information. See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. Ohio Gear, 462 F.3d 701, 706-07 (7th Cir.2006) (finding an abuse of discretion where district court invoked local rule to grant summary judgment without addressing multiple discovery requests that would have produced information previously identified by the court as essential).1
Mr. Bryant‘s related argument concerns equitable tolling. “If despite the exercise of reasonable diligence [the plaintiff] cannot discover his injurer‘s (or injurers‘) identity within the statutory period, he can appeal to the doctrine of equitable tolling to postpone the deadline for suing until he can obtain the necessary information.” Fid. Nat. Title Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Howard Sav. Bank, 436 F.3d 836, 839 (7th Cir.2006); see also Griffin v. Willoughby, 369 Ill.App.3d 405, 311 Ill.Dec. 21, 867 N.E.2d 1007, 1016 (2006); Donald v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff‘s Dep‘t, 95 F.3d 548, 562 (7th Cir.1996). Because we apply Illinois‘s statute of limitations, we also apply Illinois‘s equitable tolling principles. See Ray v. Maher, 662 F.3d 770, 772-73 (7th Cir.2011); Jenkins v. Vill. of Maywood, 506 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.2007).
Illinois case law does not define “reasonably diligent,” but our cases supply some contours of a definition for a plaintiff in Mr. Bryant‘s circumstances. For instance, when a pro se incarcerated plaintiff seeks to identify unknown defendants and has filed a motion that would help him identify those defendants, and the statute of limitations expires while the motion is pending, equitable tolling can be appropriate. See Donald, 95 F.3d at 562 (a court‘s delay and denial of a motion to appoint counsel combined with the plaintiff‘s misunderstanding about whom he needed to sue “helped to ensure that his ignorance of the identities of the unknown officials would continue“). Additionally, because an incarcerated pro se plaintiff is limited in what he can do to obtain missing information, he is reasonably diligent if he files a motion that directly affects his ability to file a claim. See id. at 562; Williams-Guice v. Bd. of Educ., 45 F.3d 161, 164-65 (7th Cir.1995) (noting limitations period is suspended while the judge rules on a motion that will affect the filing of the case).
The district court should have equitably tolled the statute of limitations because Mr. Bryant acted with reasonable diligence to obtain the missing information. As in the cases applying equitable tolling because plaintiffs awaited a response that was necessary for them to proceed with their claims (i.e., a response to their motions to appoint counsel or proceed in forma pauperis), Mr. Bryant was unable to proceed with his case until he received the identifying information he requested in his motion to compel. This discovery request would have provided him with the only additional information that he needed to amend his complaint in a timely manner and to name properly his defendants. Additionally, Mr. Bryant, as a prisoner proceeding pro se, should have been given more latitude and assistance in seeking to identify the officers’ names. See Donald, 95 F.3d at 555 (stating that the court should take steps to permit the adjudication of pro se claims on the merits “rather than to order their dismissal on technical grounds“); Billman v. Indiana Dep‘t of Corr., 56 F.3d 785, 790 (7th Cir.1995) (when a pro se plaintiff is attempting to identify defendants, the district court should assist him in investigating).
Accordingly, we VACATE the district court‘s order and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
* Judge Flaum took no part in the consideration of petition for rehearing.