LAND USA, LLC v. GEORGIA POWER COMPANY
S15A0406
Supreme Court of Georgia
JUNE 1, 2015
297 Ga. 237 | 773 SE2d 236
THOMPSON, Chief Justice.
The evidence adduced at trial and summarized above was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, appellant guilty but mentally ill of the crimes for which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Foster v. State, 283 Ga. 47 (1) (656 SE2d 838) (2008). Dr. Gunnin testified that appellant knew right from wrong and that his Asperger‘s disorder did not impact his ability to discern right from wrong. Although Dr. Butryn opined that appellant was delusional, appellant presented no evidence that he was suffering from a delusion that “if it had been true, would have justified [his] actions.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Alvelo v. State, 290 Ga. 609 (724 SE2d 377) (2012). See also Hudson v. State, supra, 273 Ga. at 125. The trial court did not err when it entered judgment on the jury‘s verdicts. Alvelo v. State, supra, 290 Ga. at 613.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
DECIDED JUNE 1, 2015.
John W. Donnelly, for appellant.
Kenneth W. Mauldin, District Attorney, Jon R. Forwood, Assistant District Attorney; Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew B. Crowder, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
THOMPSON, Chief Justice.
Appellant Land USA, LLC (“Land USA“) filed suit against Georgia Power Company (“Georgia Power“) for quiet title, trespass, and ejectment, challenging the validity of an easement Georgia Power claimed on property owned by Land USA in Fulton County, Georgia. Finding that Georgia Power had a valid easement, the Fulton County Superior Court granted Georgia Power‘s motion for summary judgment on all counts. Land USA filed a timely appeal to this Court. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the order of the
The underlying facts are not in dispute. In 2009, the Georgia Department of Transportation (“GDOT“) began a road-widening project which required Georgia Power to update and relocate an electrical transmission line Georgia Power had maintained along Donald Lee Hollowell Parkway since the 1960s. Seeking to clarify its rights with respect to maintaining the electric line, Georgia Power sought an easement from L. J. Fuller, the owner of a piece of property (the “Property“) abutting the parkway.1 Among other things, Georgia Power sought to explicitly prohibit Fuller and any future owner of the Property from building structures within 25 feet of the electrical line‘s center. Fuller, however, was behind on his property taxes and, on March 3, 2009, the Fulton County Sheriff sold the Property at a tax sale to Investga.com, LLC (“Investga“). On April 22, 2009, Investga recorded a tax deed on the Property. Although aware of the tax sale, Georgia Power continued to negotiate the easement with Fuller.
After negotiations between Georgia Power and Fuller stalled, Georgia Power filed a condemnation action against the Property on July 14, 2009, but dismissed the action without prejudice two months later when Fuller granted it the requested easement in exchange for $24,000.2 Upon completion of the GDOT road-widening project in January 2010, Georgia Power‘s electrical line was re-energized and put back into service.
On March 3, 2010, Investga properly served notices of foreclosure of the right to redeem the Property to all interested parties, including Georgia Power. Interested parties had until June 10, 2012 to redeem the Property, but none did. Thereafter, Investga sold the Property to Land USA and, on December 6, 2013, Land USA filed the instant action challenging the validity of the easement Georgia Power had obtained from Fuller and sought to maintain over the Property. Land USA moved for partial summary judgment and Georgia Power filed a cross-motion seeking summary judgment on all of Land USA‘s claims. Granting summary judgment to Georgia Power, the trial court found Fuller not only had the ability to convey an easement to Georgia Power following the tax sale of the Property, but that the post-tax sale easement obtained by Georgia Power was
1. Land USA contends that the trial court erred in finding Georgia Power had a valid and enforceable written easement over the Property. Land USA contends that the easement Georgia Power obtained from Fuller in 2009 after he had already lost the property to a tax sale became a nullity when the property was not redeemed after Investga properly invoked the state barment statutes set forth in
In Georgia, when property is sold for unpaid taxes, the tax sale purchaser obtains a deed to the property. See Bennett v. Southern Pine Co., 123 Ga. 618, 621 (51 SE 654) (1905). This deed, however, does not provide the tax sale purchaser with absolute title to the property, but rather gives the purchaser a defeasible fee interest therein with the title remaining subject to encumbrance for at least one year after purchase due to other interested parties’ statutory rights of redemption. See National Tax Funding, L.P. v. Harpagon Co., LLC, 277 Ga. 41, 42 (1) (586 SE2d 235) (2003). As previously outlined by this Court,
[a]fter the tax sale, the delinquent taxpayer or any other party holding an interest in or lien on the property may redeem the property by paying to the tax sale purchaser the purchase price plus any taxes paid and interest. If the property is redeemed, the tax sale is essentially rescinded and a quitclaim deed is executed by the tax sale purchaser back to the owner of the property at the time of levy and sale. . . . This right of redemption, however, may be terminated by the tax sale purchaser anytime after one year following the tax sale. After that year has run, the tax sale purchaser may “terminate, foreclose, divest, and forever bar” all rights to redeem the property by giving notice under
OCGA § 48-4-40 et seq. (“the barment statutes“) to all parties with redemption rights. The barment statutes apply to “all persons having . . . any right, title or interest in, or lien upon” the subject property.
(Citations omitted.) Id. at 43.
It is undisputed that at the time Georgia Power sought an easement from Fuller in 2009, the last deed in the chain of title to the Property belonged to Investga. As the redemption period had not yet terminated, Fuller retained possession of the Property. However, he lacked a sufficient interest therein to grant Georgia Power the perpetual, express easement it sought. See Georgia Lien Svcs., Inc. v. Barrett, 272 Ga. App. 656, 658 (613 SE2d 180) (2005) (stating that after a tax sale, the record owner has only a right to redeem the property, and once that period expires, the former record owner has no interest in the property). At best, the easement granted to Georgia Power by Fuller conveyed an interest in the Property which provided Georgia Power with a right of redemption. See Leathers v. McClain, 255 Ga. 378 (338 SE2d 666) (1986) (parties acquiring an interest in property following a tax sale are entitled to notice and to exercise the right of redemption).
Here, Investga gave proper notice under the barment statutes to all interested parties, including Georgia Power, of Investga‘s intent to foreclose redemption of the Property. Had the Property been redeemed by any party, title thereto would have reverted to Fuller and the easement Georgia Power purchased would have been validated. See
While
Construing
In the instant case, both the tax fi. fa. and the tax deed were recorded prior to Georgia Power‘s recording of the express easement it obtained from Fuller. As a result, Georgia Power‘s express easement over the Property was taken subject to the tax deed. Accordingly, when the right of redemption expired and Investga‘s tax deed ripened into fee simple title, Georgia Power‘s express easement was extinguished. See Forrester, supra (once the owner and all other interested parties authorized by law to redeem the property lose their redemptive rights, they cease to have any interest in the land).
Nor do we agree with Georgia Power‘s claim that it obtained a prescriptive easement over the Property which not only entitles it to operate and maintain the electric line, but allows it to enforce the required 25-foot building prohibition.11 “Prescriptive rights are to be strictly construed.” MEA Family Investments, LP v. Adams, 284 Ga. 407, 408 (667 SE2d 609) (2008). Having sought permission from and paid consideration to Fuller for an express easement relating to the building restriction, Georgia Power abandoned any adverse claim it might have had to a prescriptive easement with respect to this prohibition. See Keng v. Franklin, 267 Ga. 472 (480 SE2d 25) (1997). Moreover, inclusion of a 25-foot building restriction incorporates and traverses more territory over the Property than any prior prescriptive easement claimed by Georgia Power and clearly exceeds the statutorily limited width of 20 feet allowed for such easements.12 See id.; Jackson v. Norfolk Southern R., 255 Ga. App. 695, 696-697 (566 SE2d 415) (2002); Lopez v. Walker, 250 Ga. App. 706, 707 (551 SE2d 745) (2001).
For the foregoing reasons, we find the trial court erred when it determined Georgia Power had a valid and enforceable easement over the Property and erred in granting summary judgment to Georgia Power on Land USA‘s claims based on this determination.
2. Our inquiry does not end here, however, as we must additionally consider whether the trial court erred in determining Land USA‘s claims for trespass and ejectment also failed as a matter of law.
(a) Relying on a survey conducted by Georgia Power and submitted into evidence, the trial court found that the power line at issue was primarily located within the public GDOT right-of-way along
(b) Similarly, the trial court erred in deciding Land USA lacked standing to bring a trespass action against Georgia Power.13 Land USA contends that any building restrictions on the Property caused by the presence thereon of Georgia Power‘s electric line constitutes a continuing trespass for which Land USA would be entitled to seek damages. Georgia Power conceded at oral argument that the $24,000 it paid Fuller for the easement was primarily to obtain a building prohibition which had not been part of any previous prescriptive easement. To the extent such a building prohibition is now required on portions of the Property due to the presence of the line, the line arguably impinges on Land USA‘s use and enjoyment of the property and creates an additional servitude over the Property for which Land USA has standing to seek damages. See Faulkner, supra, 243 Ga. at 650.
(c) Finally, we agree with the trial court‘s conclusion that Land USA‘s ejectment claim against Georgia Power fails as a matter of law. See Waldrop v. Georgia Power Co., supra, 233 Ga. 851 (213 SE2d 847) (1975); Adams v. Georgia Power Co., 299 Ga. App. 399 (682 SE2d 650) (2009). A public utility company has the right to acquire land necessary for
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court‘s order granting summary judgment to Georgia Power on Land USA‘s claim for ejectment is affirmed, while the trial court‘s grant of summary judgment to Georgia Power on Land USA‘s other claims is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for further action consistent with this opinion.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part, and case remanded. All the Justices concur.
DECIDED JUNE 1, 2015.
Ayoub & Mansour, John A. B. Ayoub, Carolina D. Bryant, for appellant.
Troutman Sanders, Douglas A. Henderson, Benjamin W. Cheesbro, for appellee.
