C.L., by аnd through his next friend, K.L.; M.P., by and through her next friend, T.P.; A.C., by and through her next friends, N.F. and R.C.; B.J., by and through her next friend, L.J.; P.S., by and through his next friends, F.N. and C.S.; H.W., by and through her next friend, A.W.; N.W., by and through his next friend, A.W., Plaintiffs, -against- HASTINGS-ON-HUDSON UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT; ROY R. MONTESANO, SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS; DEBORAH AUGARTEN, DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL EDUCATION SERVICES; HASTINGS-ON-HUDSON BOARD OF EDUCATION; NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT; JOHN R. KING, JR., COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION, Defendants.
14-cv-4422 (NSR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
April 21, 2015
NELSON S. ROMAN, United States District Judge
OPINION & ORDER
NELSON S. ROMAN, United States District Judge:
Plaintiffs C.L., M.P., A.C., B.J., P.S., H.W., and N.W. (“Plaintiffs“), through their above-captioned representatives, commenced this action by complaint filed June 18, 2014 (dkt. no. 1) and amended October 15, 2014 (dkt. no. 13). The amended complaint (the “Complaint“) asserts causes of action against defendants Hastings-on-Hudson Union Free Schoоl District (the “District“), Roy R. Montesano, Deborah Augarten, and the Hastings-on-Hudson Board of Education (collectively, the “District Defendants“), and against the New York State Education
Count One asserts a violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA“),
Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief on these claims, including a comprehensive assessment of the District‘s compliance with the IDEA and other special education laws—laws designed to ensure that children who arе disabled, as Plaintiffs are, receive appropriate special education and related services—and a corrective action plan to remedy perceived systemic defects in the District‘s provision of such education.
The District Defendants and the State Defendants both now move to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to
I. COMPLAINT
For purposes of this opinion the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the Complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor. The Complaint describes each plaintiff‘s disability and alleges that Plaintiffs, and others, systematically have
Specific examples of these actions and omissions are given. For instance, one plaintiff repeatedly was denied necessary speech therapy sessions, and another was denied occupational therapy sessions to which she was entitled. Id. ¶ 5. Notably, however, the Complaint alleges that particular violations concerning the particular plaintiffs who have commenced the action are the “tip of the iceberg,” and that Defendants’ actions and omissions also have violated other disabled children‘s rights “on a broader, systemic basis.” Id. ¶ 6. Systemic failures purportedly are adversely affecting more than 182 children at this time. Id. ¶ 8.
In contrast to allegations directed toward the District and the District Defendants, the Complaint largely is silent on the State Defendants’ role. The New York State Education Department (the “SED“) allеgedly “is responsible for overseeing the provision of public education in New York State,” id. ¶ 23, and John R. King, Jr. serves as the State Commissioner of Education, id. ¶ 24. The Complaint alleges that at least three complaints were filed with the SED since 2009, at least two of which were adjudicated and decided against Hastings. Id. ¶ 69. Apparently under State oversight after those adjudications, the District was required to take corrective action рursuant to a “compliance assurance plan.” Id. Allegedly, the plan and the SED focused narrowly on addressing only the complainants’ problems, and did not undertake systemic remedial measures, despite one family specifically complaining about the pervasiveness of missed services in the District. Id. Judging, however, by the Complaint‘s silence as to other
II. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARDS
“A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Nike, Inc. v. Already, LLC, 663 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation omitted). “A plaintiff asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists.” Morrison v. Nat‘l Australia Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008). In assessing whether there is subject matter jurisdiction, the Court must accept as true all material facts alleged in the complaint, Conyers v. Rossides, 558 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 2009), but “the court may resolve [any] disputed jurisdictional fact issues by referring to evidence outside the pleadings such as affidavits, Zappia Middle E. Contr. Co. v. Emirate of Abu Dhabi, 215 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir. 2000).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the inquiry is whether the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‘” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); accord Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir. 2010). The Court, again, must take all material fаctual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiff‘s favor, but the
III. DISCUSSION
A. Rule 12(b)(1) Motions
The District Defendants and the State Defendants move to dismiss the three federal claims—the IDEA, Rehabilitation Act, and ADA claims—for lack of subjеct matter jurisdiction, on grounds that each of the individual plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies. All Plaintiffs concede that they did not exhaust those remedies, namely, by requesting a due process review and hearing at the school district level, to address individual grievances.
“It is well-settled that the IDEA requires an aggrieved party to exhaust all administrative remedies before bringing a civil action in federal or state court.” J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Central Schools, 386 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2004). The process includes review by an impartial due process hearing officer and an appeal from that hearing.
The exhaustion requirement also applies where plaintiffs seek relief under other federal statutes when relief also is available under the IDEA. Attica Central Schools, 386 F.3d at 112 (citing
Significantly, the IDEA exhaustion requirement is excused when exhaustion would be futile, which is the case where administrative procedures do not provide an adequate remedy. Taylor v. Vermont Dep‘t of Educ., 313 F.3d 768, 788-91 (2d Cir. 2002). Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving such futility, Polera v. Bd. of Educ. of the Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 288 F.3d 478, 488 n. 8 (2d Cir. 2002), but courts within the Second Circuit have deemed that burden met and have excused exhaustion where systemic violations are alleged, Attica Central Schools, 386 F.3d at 113 (collecting precedents). The rationale for so holding is that it is futile to complete the administrative review process where a hearing can, at most, redress an individual child‘s grievance and cannot thereby cure systemic failures. Id.
Having carefully considered the parties’ submissions and all arguments therein, this Court agrees with Plaintiffs’ contention that this case falls squarely within the “systemic failures” exception to the exhaustion requirement. Id. at 113 (the Second Circuit “excuse[s] exhaustion of administrative remedies in cases that include allegations of systemic violations“); see also M.H. ex rel. K.H. v. Mt. Vernon City Sch. Dist., No. 13-cv-3596, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32620, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2014) (“allegations of systemic failures render exhaustion futile
The Complaint is rife with allegations that systemic, pervasive failures have manifested within the District‘s special education program. Defendants attempt to frame the case as one implicating only eight individuals whose disabilities and grievances are not monolithic. Indeed the case is not a class action, and Plaintiffs’ disabilities and grievances vary. But the Complaint states in multiple places that Plaintiffs’ experiences represent an endemic problem within the District.
At this stage of the proceedings, the Court is obligated to accept as true all well-pleaded allegations. Having scrutinized the Complaint, the Court finds the “systemic failures” contention to be supported adequately with factual allegations whose truth must be assumed. Anecdotal descriptions of the atmosphere of intimidation, coercion, and unresponsiveness under Augarten‘s watch (аnd largely at her behest) are one example. Adding to those descriptions are allegations of teacher coalition-sponsored memoranda summarizing pervasive problems, adverse budget, enrollment, and classification trends, and survey results demonstrating widespread dissatisfaction. Defendants argue that much of the alleged evidence, in particular, the trends and the survey results, is spurious and can be explainеd away. But an inference of endemic special education failures is at least equally plausible. There need only be fact-based systemic failure allegations to establish prima facie the futility of exhausting administrative remedies, and the Court sees many in the Complaint.
Accordingly, the Court denies the District Defendants’ and the State Defendants’ motions to dismiss the IDEA, Rehabilitation Act, and ADA claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court likewise denies the District Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss Count Two, the New York Education Law claim, over which the Court will continue to exercise
B. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion
For the three claims asserted against the State Defendants, Plaintiffs theory is that those defendants failed adequately to oversee the District and to ensure special education compliance, thus rendering the State potentially liable for District-level failures. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 150. For its part, the IDEA requires State Defendants to ensure that “(i) the requirements of [the statute] are met; and (ii) all educational programs for children with disabilities in the State, including all such programs administered by any other State or local agency (I) are under the general supervision of individuals in the State who are responsible for educational programs for children with disabilities; and (II) meet the educational standards of thе State educational agency.”
Plaintiffs therefore correctly note that the State may not abdicate wholesale its oversight duties. See Straube v. Fl. Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F. Supp. 1164, 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“The State bears ultimate responsibility for ensuring that every child has an appropriate placement . . . is essentially responsible for the actions taken by the local agency.“). Equally true, however, is the State Defendants’ assertion that the State has considerable discretion in exercising its supervisory and monitoring authority under the IDEA. See A.A. ex rel. J.A. and Franklin Alvarez v. Philips, 386 F.3d 455, 459 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting the absence of specific guidance within the IDEA on how the State should ensure local compliance).
Dispositive here is the Complaint‘s near-silence regarding notice provided the State Defendants of the allegedly systemic failures within the District. Plaintiffs argue that discontent among parents was widespread, and widely voiced, but there are virtually no specific allegations in the Complaint supporting an inference that discontent trickled up to the State. See, e.g.,
The authorities upon which Plaintiffs rely, rather, demonstrate the Second Circuit‘s and this Court‘s focus on actual notice provided the State. See, e.g., N.Y. State Educ. Dep‘t., 87 Fed. App‘x 216, 217 (2004) (noting the absence of record proof that the State received notice of certain IDEA violations, which violations were not documented in a written report the SED did receivе, and thus affirming the district court‘s finding that those violations did not support an IDEA claim against the State); Mt. Vernon City Sch. Dist., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32620, at *34-35 (“[W]hen, as here alleged, the SED—which is the state education agency in this case—has identified and detailed a district‘s failures to meet state-imposed targets for performance in special education, courts have found the SED a proper defendant to an action to compel the district‘s compliance with the IDEA.” (emphasis added)).
The sole actual notice upon which Plaintiffs rely is described in a single subparagraph in the Complaint, which asserts that “[a]t least three state complaints were filed with the NYSED since 2009.” Compl. ¶ 69. Immediately following that assertion, the Complaint concedes that at least two of the three complaints “were adjudicated and decided against Hastings” at the State administrative level. Id. In other words, for those two complaints, the process worked. Because of the SED adjudicators’ adverse decisions against the District, a compliance assurance plan was put in place. Id. The Complaint asserts that the plan redressed the individual students’ grievances, but did so narrowly and without curing broader systemic failures. Id. Fatally,
Plaintiffs thus, in briefing, place great weight on the one complainant‘s stаtement. But this is an awfully thin reed to stand on, especially when the authorities Plaintiffs cite are unsupportive or distinguishable. See N.Y. State Educ. Dep‘t, 87 Fed. App‘x at 217 (generalized failures within District do not support State liability where not memorialized in a report provided the State); Mt. Vernon City Sch. Dist., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32620, at *34-35 (an IDEA claim may proceed against the State because the State had “identified and detailed” the district‘s systemic failures, and yet had not redressed them). Further, the State Defendants havе cited publicly-available, judicially-noticeable information suggesting the District actually was meeting the federal government‘s IDEA benchmarks. Even if that information was inaccurate, the presence of the information in the public domain undercuts the notion that the State was on notice of a systemic problem because of one parent‘s complaint to that effect.
The Court concludes that the Complaint lacks well-pleaded allegations supporting an inference that the State Defendants were on notice of systemic failures in the District. Absent such notice, there is no vicarious State liability under the IDEA. Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942, 954 (10th Cir. 1994). As such, the IDEA claim against the State Defendants does not survive Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny.
As for the Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims, their requirements are substantially
The Complaint contains no unique allegations supporting the Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims, but rather, incorporates by reference the breadth of the Complaint and the IDEA allegations. Compl. ¶¶ 155-60. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims against the State Defendants fail for the same reason the IDEA claim fails against those defendants—absent notice, there is no vicarious State liability. See Rodriguez, 197 F.3d at 619 (the State must adhere to the ADA‘s and Rehabilitation Act‘s non-discrimination requirements for services the State provides, and safety monitoring is not such a service); see also R.B. ex rel. L.B. v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 99 F. Supp. 2d 411, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“bad faith or gross misjudgment” required for Rehabilitation Act Section 504 and ADA claims in special education context); Scaggs v. N.Y. Dep‘t of Educ., No. 06-cv-0799, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35860, at *54 (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2007) (“something more than a mere violation of the IDEA is necessary in order to show a violation of Section 504 in the context of educating children with disabilities, i.e., a plaintiff must demonstrate that a school district acted with bad
faith or gross misjudgment“).
In sum, the Court grants the State Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the IDEA, Rehabilitation Act, and ADA claims against them on the grounds that the Complaint lacks sufficient allegations regarding State-directed failures, notice of District failures provided the state, or bad faith or gross misjudgment on the State‘s part.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Rule 12(b)(1) motions are DENIED in their entirety, but the State Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion is GRANTED in its entirety. The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to terminate the motions at docket numbers 15 and 23, and to terminate the State Defendants (i.e., the New York State Education Department and John R. King, Jr., Commissioner of Education) from the action. The District Defendants are directed to answer the Complaint on or before May 15, 2015.
Dated: April 21, 2015
White Plains, New York
SO ORDERED:
NELSON S. ROMAN
United States District Judge