Kravetz v. Streetsboro Bd. of Edn.Kravetz v. Streetsboro Bd. of Edn.
Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2010 CV 746.
Judgment: Affirmed.
Leonard F. Carr, L. Bryan Carr, and William A. Watson, Carr, Feneli & Carbone Co., L.P.A., 1392 S.O.M. Center Road, Mayfield Heights, OH 44124 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Matthew J. Markling and Patrick Vrobel, McGown & Markling Co., L.P.A., 1894 North Cleveland-Massillon Road, Akron, OH 44333 (For Defendants-Appellants).
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J.
{¶1} Appellants, Streetsboro Board of Education, Streetsboro City School District, Linda T. Keller, and James Estille, appeal the judgment of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas denying their motion for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to
{¶2} In May 2010, appellee, Jennifer Kravetz, filed a complaint against appellants alleging nine causes of action, to wit: intentional infliction of emotional
{¶3} The complaint alleged that appellants were legally and contractually obligated to conduct an investigation regarding the allegations and “keep all facts and information confidential.” After accepting the resignation of appellee, a public school board meeting was held, and in violation of their “legal and contractual obligation, the [appellants] copied and provided for public consumption and dissemination * * * documents regarding [appellee], the * * * allegations against [appellee] and the discipline of [appellee].” Appellee also asserts that appellants provided the newspaper with letters sent to appellee, although the investigation was ongoing. Consequently, the newspaper published an article that announced appellеe‘s name and described, in detail, the allegations made against appellee. As a result of appellants’ actions, appellee asserts that she was ostracized and forced to relocate outside the state.
{¶4} Appellants filed an answer. Appellants then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to
{¶6} [1.] The Portage County Court of Common Pleas erred in failing to determine that Defendants-Appellants Linda T. Keller and James Estille have been sued in their official capacities only.
{¶7} [2.] The Portage County Court of Common Pleas erred in failing to determine that
{¶8} [3.] The Portage County Court of Common Pleas erred in denying Defendants-Appellants Streetsboro Board of Education and Streetsboro City School District the benefits of statutory immunity under
{¶9} [4.] To the extent they have been named in their individual сapacities, the Portage County Court of Common Pleas erred in denying Defendants-Appellants Linda T. Keller and James Estille the benefits of statutory immunity under
{¶10} At the outset, we note that appellants’ appeal relates to appellee‘s intentional tort claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, slander per se, libel, civil conspiracy, and abuse of process, as well as appellee‘s claim for negligent inflictiоn of emotional distress. Further, appellants requested a stay pending the outcome of the Ohio Supreme Court‘s decision in Sampson v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., 2012-Ohio-570, indicating that the decision of the Supreme Court would likely determine many of the issues on appeal. This court, however, denied such
{¶11} While the instant appeal was pending, the Ohio Supreme Court released its decision in Sampson, supra. The Sampson Court was asked to determine whether ”
Standard of Review
{¶12} ‘Because
{¶14} In Ganzhorn v. R & T Fence Co., this court stated:
{¶15} The distinсtion in this analysis is clear: while we construe all of the allegations as true in the complaint, and we may consider the responses and affirmative defenses raised in the answer, those are not entitled to any inferences. In other words, the assertion of an affirmative defense does not place a burden on the non-moving party to affirmatively demonstrate or plead the absence of, or any exception to, immunity. 11th Dist. No. 2010-P-0059, 2011-Ohio-6851, ¶13.
R.C. Chapter 2744
{¶16} Generally, political subdivisiоns are immune from civil liability.
Political Subdivision Employee Immunity
{¶17} Immunity is extended to claims against individual employees of political subdivisions. Instead of employing
{¶18} In her brief, appellee contends that Keller and Estille were sued both as individuals and as employees of the political subdivision. Appellants, however, assert that Keller аnd Estille have been sued only in their official capacities as employees of a political subdivision, as all acts alleged by appellee against them arose exclusively from the exercise of their official duties and responsibilities as Treasurer and Superintendent.
{¶19} In Lambert v. Clancy, 125 Ohio St.3d 231, 2010-Ohio-1483, the Ohio Supreme Court discussed political subdivision immunity under
{¶20} In Lambert, the identity of Ms. Lambert was stolen allegedly by using her personal information from the Hamilton County Clerk of Courts office. Ms. Lambert filed a complaint against “Greg Hartmann, Hamilton County, Ohio Clerk of Courts.” Id. at ¶6. The trial court dismissed Ms. Lambert‘s complaint pursuant to
{¶21} The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, holding:
{¶22} [B]ecause the allegations contained in the complaint are directed against the office of the political subdivision, the officeholder was sued in his official capacity rather than in his individual or personal capacity. We also conclude that the three-tiered political subdivision-immunity analysis set forth in
{¶23} The Lambert Court noted that the complaint does not add the “words ‘personally,’ ‘individually,’ ‘an employee of the Hamilton County Clerk of Courts,’ or anything similar to denote that Mr. Hartmann was being sued in his individual capacity as a county employee as opposed to bеing sued in his official capacity as the clerk of courts.” Id. at ¶15. Further, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that “the allegations in the state-filed complaint pertain to the policies and practices of the clerk of courts’ office and not to actions taken by Hartmann personally.” Id. at ¶17.
{¶24} In her complaint, appellee asserts a claim against Keller and Estille both in their official and individual capacities. The complaint states that “Keller and Estille are individuals employed by the Board of Education and/or School District in the capacity of Superintendent and Interim Treasurer respectively. Defendants Keller and Estille are sued in their individual capacities and in their official capacities due to their conduct as
{¶25} In their brief, appellants argue that even if this court determines Keller and Estille are named in their individual capacities, they are afforded immunity, as none of the exceptions enumerated in
{¶26} As a general matter, whether an employee is entitled to
{¶27} In order to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings on the issue of immunity under
{¶28} Appellee‘s complaint alleges that both Keller and Estille, although having a duty to keep all facts of the investigation confidential, copied documents and then made them available to the public at a school board meeting. The documents related both to the allegations against appellee and her discipline. Additionally, the complaint alleges
{¶29} Appellants’ first and fourth assignments of error are without merit.
Political Subdivision Immunity
{¶30}
{¶31} Section
{¶32} Section
{¶33} In Fleming, this court analyzed the relationship between
{¶34} Several courts, including the Eighth Appellate District, have held that:
{¶35} ‘“An employer‘s intentional tort against an employee does not arise out of the employment relationship, but occurs outside the scope of employment. Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 624, 576 N.E.2d 722, paragraph one of the syllabus.“’ Chase v. Brooklyn City School Dist., 141 Ohio App.3d 9, 19, 749 N.E.2d 798 (2001), quoting Ventura v. City of Independence (May 7, 1998), 8th Dist. No. 72526, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 2093, *22. (Secondary citations omitted.) This court has also applied the Brady holding to an immunity case under
{¶36} In Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., a truck driver sought damages for an intentional tort allegedly committed by his employer. Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 61 Ohio St.3d at 625. The Supreme Court of
{¶37} Fleming notes there are several cases that cite to
{¶38} In many instances, the Brady holding is readily applicable to an immunity case under
{¶39} In Sampson v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., 2012-Ohio-570, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the same argument made by appellant‘s herein. That is, that an intentional tort claim is not a “‘matter’ that ‘arises out of the employment relationship,’ because an employer‘s action in committing an intentional tort against an emрloyee in the workplace necessarily occurs outside the employment relationship and cannot arise from it.” Id. at ¶12.
{¶40} The Ohio Supreme Court rejected this argument in Sampson, supra, and adopted reasoning similar to this court‘s in Fleming, supra. Id. at ¶23. The Sampson Court also recognized the distinction between political subdivision immunity and workers’ compensation immunity, noting the underlying policy with respect to each immunity. Id. at ¶14. Further, the Sampson Court recognized the plain meaning of the language as written and held that when “an employee of a political subdivision brings a civil action against the political subdivision alleging аn intentional tort, that civil action may qualify as a ‘matter that arises out of the employment relationship’ within the meaning of
{¶42} Appellants also argue that appellee‘s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress did not arise out of the employment relationship, and thus, such claim is not exempt from immunity under
{¶43} Based on our above reasoning, we find that the trial court properly denied appellants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings under
{¶44} Appellants’ second assignment of error is without merit.
{¶45} Under the third assignment of error, appellants maintain that the trial court erred in denying the Board and Streetsboro the benefits of statutory immunity under
{¶46} As discussed above, we found that when considering the allegations of the complaint in a light most favorable to appellee, there are facts that could be construed to indicate that the alleged torts occurred during the course and scope of the employment relationship under
{¶47} Appellants’ third assignment of error is without merit.
{¶48} Based on the opinion of this court, the judgment of the Pоrtage County Court of Common Pleas is hereby affirmed.
MARY JANE TRAPP, J., concurs,
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J., concurs with a Concurring Opinion.
____________________
{¶49} I agree with the majority‘s decision to affirm the trial court‘s judgment denying the appellants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. I write separately to expand upon and clarify the law as to two issues.
{¶50} First, I agree that Keller and Estille are being sued in their individual capacities, such that this court must apply the immunity analysis under
{¶51} In Coleman v. Portage Cty. Engineer, 191 Ohio App.3d 32, 2010-Ohio-6255, 944 N.E.2d 756 (11th Dist.), this court reached the opposite result of the present matter and found that the three-tiered political subdivision immunity analysis in
{¶52} Also, in Curry v. Blanchester, 12th Dist. Nos. CA2009-08-010 and CA2009-08-012, 2010-Ohio-3368, the court was faced with a similar situation to the present case, since the complaint stated both that the defendant was being sued “in his official capacity as [m]ayor,” but also that he was being sued “individually.” Id. at ¶ 22. The court found that upоn reviewing the complaint, the acts asserted in the intentional
{¶53} Second, it is important to emphasize that, in the past, there has been a conflict between the aрpellate districts as to whether an intentional tort falls under the scope of the employment relationship for the purposes of applying immunity under
{¶54} For the reasons stated herein, I concur with the decision to affirm the trial court‘s judgment, denying the appellants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.