William Louis Kranz v. State of Maryland
No. 63
Court of Appeals of Maryland
June 21, 2018
Opinion by Barbera, C.J. Hotten, J., dissents.
September Term, 2017. Circuit Court for Cecil County Case No. 07-K-06-000806. Argued: March 2, 2018.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE — MARYLAND UNIFORM POSTCONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT — Jurisdiction under the Maryland Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act,
Hotten, J., dissents.
Filed: June 21, 2018
I.
Background and Procedural History
Following a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Cecil County, Petitioner William Kranz was convicted of two counts each of first-degree assault and reckless endangerment. On July 31, 2009, the court sentenced Petitioner to ten years’ imprisonment, five of which were suspended, and three years’ supervised probation. On direct appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction. Kranz v. State, No. 1548 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Nov. 9, 2010), cert. denied, 418 Md. 191 (2011).
On February 17, 2012, Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief.1 He contended that the State had committed a violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
On August 31, 2016, more than three years after Petitioner filed the application for leave to appeal, the Court of Special Appeals granted the application and placed the case on its regular appeals docket. Petitioner briefed the merits of his claim that the State had committed a Brady violation. The State, in addition to responding to the merits of that claim, included a motion to dismiss the appeal. In support of dismissal, the State made two arguments: First, Petitioner was no longer incarcerated, on parole, or on probation, and therefore was not “in custody” for purposes of
The Court of Special Appeals issued a reported opinion granting the State’s motion to dismiss the appeal. Kranz v. State, 233 Md. App. 600 (2017). The intermediate appellate court opted not to address the State’s mootness argument. The court instead rested its dismissal of the appeal on its interpretation of the UPPA, agreeing with the State that the court lost jurisdiction to entertain the appeal once Petitioner was no longer in custody. Id. at 603.
In reaching that decision, the Court of Special Appeals relied principally on McMannis v. State, 311 Md. 534 (1988), and Obomighie v. State, 170 Md. App. 708 (2006). Kranz, 233 Md. App. at 607–10. We shall discuss both cases in detail below. It is enough to note at this point that each court—this Court in McMannis and the Court of Special
Upon the Court of Special Appeals’ dismissal of the appeal, Petitioner sought further review in this Court. We issued a writ of certiorari to consider whether the full expiration of a petitioner’s sentence during the litigation of a timely-filed post-conviction petition divests the courts of jurisdiction over the action. Kranz v. State, 456 Md. 254 (2017).
II.
The Parties’ Contentions
Petitioner argues that appellate courts retain jurisdiction to review petitions for post-conviction relief, even if the petitioner is no longer in custody at the time of review, so long as the petitioner filed the petition while “in custody,” as that term is employed in the UPPA. Such a rule, in Petitioner’s view, is consistent with the holding of this Court in McMannis v. State, 311 Md. 534 (1988), is supported by the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968), and would harmonize the various provisions of the UPPA.
The State disagrees not only with Petitioner’s read of the UPPA but also his assessment of the impact of McMannis and Carafas. The State also looks to Obomighie v. State, 170 Md. App. 708 (2006), upon which the Court of Special Appeals relied in
Carafas
We begin with Carafas. Petitioner James Carafas was tried in a New York state court, convicted of certain crimes, and sentenced to a term of incarceration. 391 U.S. at 235. While incarcerated, he pursued a direct appeal and state court collateral review, without success, id. at 235–36, then filed a federal habeas corpus petition under
New York argued that the case was moot because Carafas, having fully served his sentence, no longer was eligible for habeas corpus relief. For that proposition, New York evidently relied on a per curiam opinion of the Court, Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960). That case involved a federal habeas corpus petition brought by Parker, who was then serving a sentence for a conviction in a Texas state court. Id. at 574. The federal district court dismissed the petition, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Id. The Supreme Court granted Parker’s petition for writ of certiorari, but before the case could be heard, Parker completed his sentence and was released from prison. Id. at 574–75.
In Carafas, the Supreme Court first rejected New York’s claim that the case was moot. 391 U.S. at 237. The Court noted that because of his conviction, Carafas “cannot engage in certain businesses; he cannot serve as an official of a labor union for a specified period of time; he cannot vote in any election held in New York State; he cannot serve as a juror.” Id. (footnotes omitted). Given those “‘disabilities or burdens [that] may flow from’ petitioner’s conviction, he has ‘a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him.’” Id. (quoting Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 222 (1946)).
New York further argued that because appellate review had not yet concluded, Carafas’s release from any form of custody before securing Supreme Court review of his case divested the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to address the merits of his claim. Id. at
Instructive for our purposes, the holding of Carafas is not based on or limited to the facts presented in that case. The holding of Carafas is much broader, establishing that once federal jurisdiction attaches by filing a habeas petition, the federal trial and appellate courts retain jurisdiction to entertain the petition, even if at some point during the litigation the petitioner is no longer “in custody” for purposes of that statute. Id. at 238.
McMannis
This Court relied to a certain extent on Carafas in deciding McMannis. In 1970, McMannis pled guilty to charges of felony storehouse breaking and theft. 311 Md. at 536. He completed the entirety of his sentence, including a period of probation, and sometime later, traveled to West Virginia. Id. at 536–37. There, McMannis, over the span of several years, was charged and convicted of various separate crimes. Id. at 537. He eventually
McMannis attempted to have the West Virginia sentence reduced by challenging the validity of the earlier Maryland conviction. Id. at 535–36. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief in a Maryland circuit court under
This Court affirmed the intermediate appellate court, though on different grounds. Id. We looked to Carafas and, as the Supreme Court had done, held that McMannis’s case was not moot. We reasoned that “[i]f Petitioner is correct in his assertion that his guilty plea in Maryland in 1970 was not knowing and voluntary, it is clear that he suffers anew from that constitutional infirmity by the imposition of an enhanced sentence in West Virginia that is dependent upon the earlier [Maryland] conviction.” Id. at 538–39 (citing Carafas, 391 U.S. at 237–38).
We then turned to the State’s alternative argument that the post-conviction court had no jurisdiction to entertain McMannis’s petition because at the time of filing, he was no longer in custody for purposes of the post-conviction statute. Id. at 539. That argument was based on the text of then-Article 27, § 645A(a), the predecessor statute to
This Court rejected McMannis’s argument, concluding that the custody requirement in § 645A(a) was “jurisdictional” and therefore “supersede[d]” the language in § 645A(e)
initial proceeding. — (1) Subject to the provisions of paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subsection, any person convicted of a crime and either incarcerated under sentence of death or imprisonment or on parole or probation . . . may institute a proceeding under this subtitle in the circuit court for the county to set aside or correct the sentence[.]
Subsection 645A(a)(2) provided that only one petition may be filed and, “[u]nless extraordinary cause is shown,” may not be filed more than ten years from the imposition of sentence. The substance of former § 645A(a)(2) can now be found in
CP § 7-103(b) .Subsection (a)(3) generally provided for the time within which a petition may be filed in a death penalty case. The substance of former § 645A(a)(3) is not addressed in the present version of the UPPA, as Maryland abolished the death penalty in 2013. 2013 Md. Laws 2298 (Vol. III, Ch. 156, S.B. 276).
Each provision pertinent here that was housed in either § 645A or § 645J of Article 27 now resides in subtitle 1 of Title 7.
CP §§ 7-101 to 7-109 . The Revisor’s Notes accompanying the newly codified Title 7 of the Criminal Procedure Article state that all sections were recodified without substantive change.
Obomighie
Unlike the petitioner in McMannis, petitioner Obomighie filed his post-conviction petition while in custody but was released from custody before the circuit court held a hearing on the petition. 170 Md. App. at 709–10. The circuit court determined that, because Obomighie was no longer “in custody,” the court was divested of jurisdiction over the matter. Id. Accordingly, the circuit court dismissed the petition. Id. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. Id. at 710.
The Court of Special Appeals concluded that the General Assembly’s use of the present tense in
The Parties’ Respective Views of the UPPA in Light of Carafas, McMannis, and Obomighie
Petitioner’s Perspective
Petitioner argues here that Obomighie was wrongly decided and McMannis should stand, although it contains dicta that requires clarification. Petitioner points out what he sees as a fundamental factual distinction between the two cases: Obomighie was in custody when he filed his petition for post-conviction relief, and McMannis was not. As a consequence, Petitioner argues, only Obomighie, but not McMannis, satisfied the in-custody “jurisdictional” requirement of the post-conviction statute. In Petitioner’s view, the substantively identical language in
As Petitioner sees it, the Court of Special Appeals erred in Obomighie by drawing upon certain dicta in McMannis to reason that courts would be divested of jurisdiction to entertain an otherwise properly filed post-conviction petition when, at some point after
Petitioner also views
Petitioner further asserts that the UPPA is consistent in purpose with the federal habeas statute,
Petitioner also asks this Court to bear in mind that the UPPA, as a remedial statute, Douglas v. State, 423 Md. 156, 175 (2011), is to be “construed liberally in favor of claimants seeking its protection,” Hass v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 396 Md. 469, 495
The State’s Perspective
The State urges affirmance of the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals. The State asserts two grounds, one of which—that the appeal is moot—was not considered by the intermediate appellate court. The State argues that Petitioner’s case is moot because he has been released from custody. To support this contention, the State cites cases in which this Court held that petitions for post-conviction relief are moot where the petitioner was released from custody prior to the completion of appellate proceedings. See, e.g., Tucker v. Warden, 240 Md. 738 (1966) (per curiam); Noble v. Warden, 221 Md. 581 (1959) (per curiam). For reasons we shall explain, we dispose of that argument in short order.
The State’s second ground for affirmance, to which it devotes much of its attention, adheres to the intermediate appellate court’s analysis. The State contends that the Court of Special Appeals properly determined, under the plain language of the UPPA, that it was divested of jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s claim. The State asserts that, by its terms, the UPPA “applies to a person convicted in any court in the State who is: (1) confined under sentence of imprisonment; or (2) on parole or probation.”
The State also points out that, although the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws released versions of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act in 1966 and 1980, neither of which retained a custody requirement, Maryland did not adopt either of the revised versions. Instead, the custody requirement has survived in substantially the same form, even through the 2001 recodification of Article 27 into the Criminal Procedure Article. Moreover, the State claims, this Court has consistently—and from the outset—dismissed applications for leave to appeal where, as here, the applicant
IV.
Analysis
Mootness
“Ordinarily, a case becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” McMannis v. State, 311 Md. 534, 538 (1988). The State contends that Petitioner’s post-conviction petition is no longer “live” for consideration by the Court of Special Appeals, given his release from custody prior to the conclusion of the appellate proceedings. In McMannis, this Court rejected a similar claim of mootness, id at 538–39, and, relying on the reasoning of that Court, we do likewise here.
The McMannis Court looked to the Supreme Court’s decision in Carafas for guidance. “The United States Supreme Court has held that a federal habeas corpus proceeding is not necessarily rendered moot by a petitioner’s release from custody, and that where the conviction results in collateral consequences in the form of substantial civil penalties, the claim is not moot.” McMannis, 311 Md. at 539 (citing Carafas, 391 U.S. at 237–38). Significant collateral consequences flow from Petitioner’s felony convictions for first-degree assault. For example, he is disqualified from jury service6; regulated firearm
Jurisdiction under the UPPA
The ultimate question before us is whether the Court of Special Appeals properly dismissed Petitioner’s case because it was divested of jurisdiction at the moment Petitioner was no longer “in custody” for purposes of the UPPA. For reasons that follow, we conclude that jurisdiction under the UPPA is determined upon the filing of a petition for post-conviction relief and, absent a procedural default by the petitioner at the outset or any time thereafter, is not defeated upon the release of the petitioner from custody prior to completion of any appellate review. To reach that conclusion, we must look to the UPPA. We rely on the rules of statutory construction in our analysis.
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the General Assembly’s intent. “[O]ur primary goal is always to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision, be it statutory, constitutional or part of the Rules.” Evans v. State, 420 Md. 391, 400 (2011) (quoting Ray v. State, 410 Md. 384, 404 (2009)). The starting point of any statutory
It is settled that when a statute’s language is “clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute’s provisions and our analysis ends.” Phillips, 451 Md. at 197 (quoting Douglas v. State, 423 Md. 156, 178 (2011)). Yet, it is also “settled that the purpose of the plain meaning rule is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative intent.” Allen v. State, 402 Md. 59, 73 (2007). “What we are engaged in is the divination of legislative purpose or goal. Indeed, . . . the plain-meaning rule is not a complete, all-sufficient rule for ascertaining a legislative intention. The meaning of the plainest language is controlled by the context in which it appears.” Id. at 74 (quoting Kaczorowski v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 309 Md. 505, 514 (1987)). To that end, “we may find useful the context of a statute, the overall statutory scheme, and archival legislative history of relevant enactments.” Evans, 420 Md. at 400 (quoting Ray, 410 Md. at 405).
To best understand
When we read
We disagree with the State that even in the thirty years since McMannis was decided, this Court has consistently restricted post-conviction relief to those petitioners who remained in custody until full completion of litigation. For that proposition, the State cites Ruby v. State, 353 Md. 100, 106 n.4 (1999); Fairbanks v. State, 331 Md. 482, 492 n.3 (1993); and Randall Book Corp. v. State, 316 Md. 315, 321 (1989). Those cases do not assist the State’s cause. The only mentions of the UPPA in Ruby and Fairbanks are limited to footnotes. Ruby, 353 Md. at 106 n.4; Fairbanks, 331 Md. at 492 n.3. Ruby, moreover, is not a post-conviction case, but rather involved the writ of error coram nobis. 353 Md. at 102. Fairbanks merely restated the holding of McMannis that one must be in custody at the time of filing; Fairbanks did not hold, as the State claims, that post-conviction relief is (or should be) limited to those in custody throughout appellate review. 331 Md. at 492 n.3.
As for Randall Book Corp., under no circumstances could that case be read to require that a petitioner remain in custody throughout post-conviction proceedings. There, the petitioner’s sentence was limited to the payment of fines, and we held that the predecessor to the UPPA was therefore inapposite because it “applies only to persons who are ‘either incarcerated under sentence of death or imprisonment or on parole or probation.’” 316 Md. at 321 (quoting
Finally, though we are not required to duplicate here the Supreme Court’s treatment of the federal habeas statute in Carafas, we are persuaded nonetheless to follow it. Before the Supreme Court was the question whether the Court was divested of jurisdiction to consider the petitioner’s application for writ of habeas corpus because he was released from custody before the completion of appellate review. 391 U.S. at 237. In concluding that it was not divested of jurisdiction, the Court first examined the federal habeas statute, which, like the UPPA, requires an applicant to be “in custody” at the time of filing.
Like Carafas, Petitioner’s path to correct an alleged injustice has been long and, so far, unfruitful. Petitioner was convicted in 2009 and, like Carafas, “has been attempting to litigate his constitutional claim ever since”—first on direct appeal and then through post-conviction relief. Id. at 239–40. Petitioner should not be denied full disposition of his challenge simply because, like most convicted defendants who choose to contest their judgments, he chose to seek direct appeal before a collateral attack. Nor should he be penalized by the happenstance beyond his control that his post-conviction petition lingered in the lower courts for more than five years. In the words of the Supreme Court, “[t]here is no need in the statute, the Constitution, or sound jurisprudence for denying [] petitioner his ultimate day in court.” Id. at 239.
That we are persuaded by the reasoning underlying the Carafas decision is not to say, however, that our holding applies only to those who have suffered such delays. Rather, as in Carafas, our holding is broader: Whenever a timely petition for post-conviction relief is filed, absent the petitioner’s procedural default at any point in the process, Maryland courts retain jurisdiction throughout consideration of the petition, including appellate review, notwithstanding any intervening release from custody.
We also take this opportunity to clarify the reach of our decision in McMannis. McMannis simply established the jurisdictional requirements of filing, which are satisfied if a petitioner is in custody at the time he or she files a petition for post-conviction relief. This Court’s dicta notwithstanding, that case should not be interpreted to require custody at every stage of post-conviction proceedings or to divest a reviewing court of jurisdiction if the petitioner is released from custody. Accordingly, our holding today—that courts retain jurisdiction even if the petitioner is released from custody after filing—is not in conflict with and does not require overruling that decision.
Our holding today does mandate overruling the Court of Special Appeals’ decision in Obomighie. Obomighie filed his petition in circuit court while on probation. Seven days later, he completed his probation, and therefore was no longer in custody, but the circuit court had not yet held a hearing on the petition. 170 Md. App. at 710. The intermediate appellate court dismissed Obomighie’s petition, holding that the circuit court was divested of jurisdiction when Obomighie was released from custody. Id. That holding is in direct conflict with our decision today and must be overruled.
V.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Court of Special Appeals’ judgment dismissing the appeal and remand the case to that court to consider the merits of Petitioner’s appeal.
WILLIAM LOUIS KRANZ v. STATE OF MARYLAND
No. 63
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
June 21, 2018
Dissenting Opinion by Hotten, J.
September Term, 2017. Circuit Court for Cecil County Case No. 07-K-06-000806. Argued: March 2, 2018.
This title applies to a person convicted in any court in this State who is:
(1) confined under sentence of imprisonment; or
(2) on parole or probation.
As the Court of Special Appeals explained, imbedded in
To be eligible for relief under Title 7, the convicted person must, as we explained in Obomighie, be presently either incarcerated or on parole or probation, because Crim. Proc.
§ 7-101 “uses the present tense when it states that ‘[t]his title applies to a person . . . who is . . . on parole or probation.’” 170 Md. App. [708], 711, 908 A.2d 132, [134 (2006)] (emphasis added). And, concomitantly, as we further explained, the language, inCrim. Proc. §7-101 , setting forth those to whom the Act applies, “is equivalent, under the doctrine of expressio unius, to saying that people who do not meet [the ‘custody’ requirement] are ineligible” for postconviction relief “because they are outside the scope if the statute.” Id.
Kranz v. State, 233 Md.App. 600, 609, 168 A.3d 986, 991 (2017).
I agree with the Court of Special Appeals that Petitioner was neither “confined under sentence of imprisonment,” or “on parole or probation” during the pendency of his appeal, thereby divesting the appellate courts of jurisdiction. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.