KLEVER, APPELLEE, v. CANTON SACHSENHEIM, INC., APPELLANT.
Nos. 98-1906 and 98-1966
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
September 15, 1999
86 Ohio St.3d 419 | 1999-Ohio-117
Submitted May 5, 1999
Torts—Wrongful death—No cause of action in Ohio against liquor permit holder by voluntarily intoxicated patron who is “underage” pursuant to
In Ohio there is no cause of action against a liquor permit holder by a voluntarily intoxicated patron (or his representative) who is “underage” pursuant to
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Stark County, No. 1998CA0010.
{¶ 1} Jeffrey M. Klever attended a wedding reception at the Sachsenheim Club in Canton, Ohio, where he drank alcoholic beverages though he was only nineteen years old. He was killed in a single-car accident while traveling home from the reception.
{¶ 2} Jeffrey’s mother, appellee Patricia Klever, sued the club’s owner, appellant Canton Sachsenheim, Inc. (“Sachsenheim“), for Jeffrey’s wrongful death, alleging Sachsenheim’s employees failed to properly verify Jeffrey’s age prior to serving him, knew he was underage yet continued to serve him, and, as a result, negligently sold him alcohol in violation of
{¶ 3} The Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding that “an intoxicated patron or his representative may maintain a cause of action against a liquor permit holder under
{¶ 4} Case No. 98-1906 is before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal. Case No. 98-1966 is before this court upon our determination that a conflict exists.
Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, L.L.P., Scott A. Richardson and Jacqueline A. Marks, for appellant.
COOK, J.
{¶ 5} In Smith v. The 10th Inning, Inc. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 289, 551 N.E.2d 1296, we reviewed the proposition that a liquor-serving establishment could be held responsible to a patron who self-inflicts injury or death due to being intoxicated. We held that an intoxicated patron could not maintain a cause of action against the liquor permit holder for injuries resulting from his intoxication. Today we are asked to decide whether the Smith bar to recovery applies where the intoxicated patron has not attained the legal drinking age (twenty-one) but has attained the age of majority (eighteen). We conclude that an underage adult who is served alcohol by a liquor permit holder is legally indistinguishable from the adult in Smith and may not maintain a cause of action against the liquor permit holder. Both the statutory text and case precedent support our conclusion that Ohio’s Dramshop Act does not provide an intoxicated, underage adult with a cause of action against a liquor permit holder for self-inflicted injuries.
{¶ 6} Ohio historically refused to recognize claims against tavern owners for any injuries caused by their intoxicated patrons. The Ohio Dramshop Act,
{¶ 7} The Dramshop Act’s limited exception to non-liability codified the “preexisting public policy.” Gressman v. McClain (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 359, 362, 533 N.E.2d 732, 735. That policy, developed through decisional law, was that an innocent third party could recover from a commercial proprietor for injuries caused by an intoxicated patron under certain circumstances. Because this statutory exception creates a cause of action not previously recognized by common law, the exception must be narrowly construed.
II
{¶ 8} The appellee here claims that the Ohio Dramshop Act allows a cause of action by an intoxicated, underage patron (or his representative) against a liquor permit holder for injuries (or death) that the intoxicated, underage patron inflicts upon himself. We conclude that the language of
{¶ 9} The phrasing and structure of
{¶ 10} Our holding here comports with this court’s judgment in Smith, supra, and with judgments of other courts that have considered the issue. See LaGuire v. Kain (1992), 440 Mich. 367, 487 N.W.2d 389; Nutting v. Zieser (Iowa 1992), 482 N.W.2d 424; Randall v. Excelsior (1960), 258 Minn. 81, 103 N.W.2d 131.
III
{¶ 11} Though we anchor our decision here on statutory construction rather than the personal responsibility/public policy rationale of Smith, if we were to apply Smith, we would nonetheless hold that the Smith rule should apply to an underage adult drinker.
{¶ 12} Rather than characterizing an underage adult drinker as statutorily “ineligible” or “not capable of making a legal decision to become voluntarily intoxicated,” as did the court of appeals in this case, we think it more legitimate public policy to regard drinking by a nineteen-year-old as unlawful.
{¶ 13} We reject the proposition that the public policy setting the drinking age at twenty-one trumps the personal-responsibility policy favored in Smith. The Dramshop Act itself certainly offers no basis for such a proposition. The General Assembly’s preference for twenty-one as the legal drinking age could easily have sprung from an effort to protect the peace and third persons from youthful drinkers rather than from an effort to protect the youthful drinker. “[T]here are statutes which are considered to create no duty of conduct toward the plaintiff, and to afford no basis for the creation of such a duty by the court. * * * [I]n
{¶ 14} Our decision harmonizes with jurisdictions that lack a Dramshop Act. For example, although Hawaii has concluded that innocent third parties may recover from a liquor permit holder via common law, it has refused to further modify the common law by permitting a voluntarily intoxicated underage adult to recover for his self-inflicted injuries. See Winters v. Silver Fox Bar (1990), 71 Hawaii 524, 797 P.2d 51. Like the Supreme Court of Hawaii, we believe that to place persons between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one within a protected class for Dramshop liability purposes would be “inconsistent with the expression of legislative intent to treat those within [the] age bracket of eighteen to twenty years as responsible adults in all other respects.” Winters, 71 Hawaii at 531-532, 797 P.2d at 54-55.
IV
{¶ 15} Accordingly, we hold that in Ohio there is no cause of action against a liquor permit holder by a voluntarily intoxicated patron (or his representative) who is “underage” pursuant to
{¶ 16} Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed.
Judgment reversed.
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
DOUGLAS and RESNICK, JJ., concur in judgment only.