*1
Kain
v
LaGuire
v KAIN
LaGUIRE
SALOONS, INC
TIME
v CHEERS GOOD
WARANICA
(Calendar
Argued
Nos.
December
Nos.
Docket
6-7).
29, 1992.
July
Decided
LaGuire,
representative
personal
the estate
Betty
as
J.
minor,
Mihailuk,
and
Michael G.
deceased
and
Michael
a
J.
Mihailuk,
dramshop
brought
parents,
a
S.
the decedent’s
Janet
Kain,
against
J.
Court
William
the Genesee Circuit
action in
owner,
wrongfully
to the
alleging
served alcohol
that he
tavern
subsequently
center line of
his car over the
drove
decedent who
court,
The
head-on with another vehicle.
a road and collided
J.,
Elliott,
summary disposition
Philip
granted
for the defen-
C.
amended,
act,
precludes
dant,
dramshop
finding that
minor,
including
recovering
party,
from
dam-
noninnocent
Sawyer, P.J.,
Appeals,
ages.
and Michael
The Court
Kelly
JJ., reversed, holding
the mi-
Murphy,
that both
and
to sue under
the minor’s
were able
nor’s estate and
115325).
(Docket
that its
The Court certified
amended act
No.
Damore,
App
Mich
Rosas
decision
(1988),
v
conflicted
Ghannan,
App
The
v
and Saavedra
appeals.
defendant
Waranica,
parents of Deborah Wara-
Thomas and Barbara
dramshop
nica,
minor,
siblings brought a
and
a deceased
two
Good Time
Kent
Court
Cheers
Circuit
action.in
Saloons,
unlawfully
Inc., claiming that
licensee
served
subsequently
her
drove
car on
the decedent who also
alcohol to
highway
wrong
head-on with
of a
and collided
side
state
Snow,
court,
J.,
the defen-
The
Roman J.
denied
another car.
Appeals,
summary disposition.
Court
dant’s motion
affirmed,
Maher, P.J.,
JJ.,
Reilly,
and
conclud-
Sullivan
though
ing
the minor’s suit
even
that under
amended
doctrine,
family’s
precluded by
party
the noninnocent
was
118556).
(Docket
ap-
permissible
The defendant
suit was
No.
peals.
joined Brickley,
opinion Chief Justice
In an
Justice
References
2d, Intoxicating Liquors
593-594.
§§
Am Jur
Alcoholism;
under Alcholics and
the Index to Annotations
See
Children;
Shop Acts; Intoxicating Liquors.
Dram
Amici Curiae: (by Treado, P.C.
Kallas, Lower, & Henk 440 Mich Opinion of the Court Hurley), Constantine N. Kallas and Robert P. Michigan Beverage Michigan Association, Licensed Beverage Liability Licensed Pool, Association Limited Bowling Michigan, Centers Association of Bowling Proprietors Michigan Liability Limited Northpointe Company, Pool, rity Insurance First Secu- Company, Insurance and Sourceone Insurance Company. question presented J. The
Brickley,
in these
companion
Michigan’s Liquor
cases is whether
Act,
Control
1986,1
amended in
a mi-
entitles
nor’s estate or a minor’s
to recover from a
liquor
injuries allegedly resulting
licensee for
from
illegal provision
the licensee’s
of alcohol to a mi-
nor. We hold that
the 1986 amendments of the
dramshop act bar both a minor’s estate and the
recovery
of that minor from
under the act.
Therefore, we reverse the decisions of the Court of
Appeals in Waranica v
Saloons,
Cheers Good Time
App
(1990),
Inc, 186 Mich
398;
A plaintiff’s In Kain, LaGuire v the decedent, purport- Michael Mihailuk, John seventeen, then seq.; 1 1986 PA seq. MCL 436.22 et MSA 18.993 et Kain LaGuire v Court of the purchase edly license driver’s an altered used liquor beverages li- from the defendant alcoholic doing Kain, as business James censee, William leaving bar, the Copa dece- After the Nite Club. the line and across center his car dent drove collided head-on driver, injuring vehicle, the with another killing Lisa Lord Lord, himself. and Lisa personal representative Betty LaGuire, sued Jane decedent, Mihai- John the Michael of the estate of parents, Mihailuk and luk, Grant his Michael and origi- in the Mihailuk. The defendants Janet Sue nal parents, filed cross- suit, and the minor’s estate against Lord, Lisa After the licensee. claims the original plaintiff, es- with the minor’s settled against gave up her claim tate and realigned parties and licensee, the trial court caption, represented the which a revised ordered original defendants, his minor’s estate and plaintiffs, family, as the defen- and the licensee dant.2 summary dis- moved for
The defendant
licensee
position
failed to
on
that
the statute
the basis
plaintiffs.
of action in favor
create a cause
App
Sweeney,
Relying
375;
v
127 Mich
on Cornack
(1983),
argued
no
339 NW2d
the defendant
minor
or his
of action existed
favor
cause
estate before the
and that
amendments
no
created
cause
1986 amendments
the statute
response,
plaintiffs
favor. In
their
action
dramshop act,
MCL
on
10 of
focused
18.993(10).
pro-
436.22(10);
analyzing
MSA
plaintiffs
Wolodzko,
vision,
on
v
relied
Stowers
(1971),
the rule of
119;
191 NW2d
expres-
statutory
providing
construction
parents
also filed cross-claims
The minor’s
minor’s
estate
defendant,
Scott, III,
ground
Baker
on the
another
Charles
parties
supplied the
with alcohol. When the
that he had
decedent
restructured,
caption
third-party
realigned
defen
and the
were
appeal.
not involved in this
listed as a defendant. He is
dant was
*5
under the
statute.
plaintiffs sought
authority
to undermine the
suggesting
erroneously
Rosas
that
it
relied on
Longstreth Gensel,
675;
v
423 Mich
respect to the claims of the minor’s estate and the claims of the minor’s parents. Appeals holding reversed,
The Court of that both the minor’s estate and the minor’s were entitled to sue under the amended statute.3 Noting that before the 1986 amendments the ac- Ap- barred, tions would have been the Court of peals examined the and structure of Appeals The Court of consolidated LaGuire v Kain with Falker v (Docket Hanibal’s, 117778), Inc No. an unrelated cause of action involving seriously injured purchased minor who claimed he had beverages providing alcoholic tion and who their from the defendant without identifica sought damages injuries. parties for his The settled dispute stipulated request this Court dismiss their appeal prior argument. to oral LaGuire v Kain Opinion of the Court light of several rules of con-
amended statute concluding struction, a minor and the both then certified minor’s could sue. Court opinion Damore, its conflicted with Rosas v App supra, Ghannan, v Saavedra 234; 454 NW2d *6 granted appeal. 437
We leave to (1991).
B Saloons, Inc, In Waranica v Cheers Good Time parents Waranica, of decedent Deborah siblings, Waranica, Thomas and and Barbara two liquor Waranica, licensee, Colleen and John sued a claiming Saloons, Cheers Good Time the li- unlawfully gave sold, censee furnished alcohol Waranica, minor, to Deborah before her death in April plaintiffs a car accident on 1987. The that, intoxication, claimed as a result of her Debo- wrong her car on the side of a rah Waranica drove highway state and collided head-on with another car. unsuccessfully sought summary
The defendant disposition, contending seq.; 436.22 that MCL et seq. provide MSA 18.993 et did not a cause of action for the of a minor who had been Appeals illegally served alcohol. The Court of granted appeal the defendant leave to the trial denying summary disposition. court’s order Appeals the trial court’s The Court of affirmed deciding ruling, the minor’s had a under the amended statute. The cause of action Appeals starting point took as its Court dramshop interpretation of the act that traditional person’s precluded action, the non- party doctrine. It then examined the innocent 1986 amendments to see whether 440 Mich Opinion op the Court give changed prior a cause law to the imbiber Disagreeing Court’s the LaGuire with action. rationale, Legislature Court concluded
the Waranica
minors who are
intend to allow
did not
Reviewing
parties
the effect of
to sue.
noninnocent
changes
4, 6, 8,
the Court
subsections
although
was
that,
the minor’s suit
concluded
party
precluded by
doctrine, the
the noninnocent
permissible.
family’s
was
suit
ap-
granted
leave
This Court
defendant
argued
peal
be
and ordered that
case
together
LaGuire v
to the Court
submitted
(1991).
Kain.
II occupies liability dramshop the field of act4 furnishing arising selling, giving out of the visibly intoxicated to minors or alcoholic persons. Corp, 262, 279; v PKM Jackson enacting 422 NW2d act, remedy, not created a new *7 specific "provided law, and a at common available action with der NW2d edged remedy.” Brow which to achieve that Fidelity Co, 603, 613; 413 Mich v Int’l Ins (1982). previously acknowl Court This keep attempted has resulting internally 614, in balanced, id. at the act "complete to a social and self-contained solution a problem adequately at common not addressed interpreting Therefore, in at 615. law.” Id. dramshop provisions act, of the this Court various seeming possible, inconsistencies, if reconcile must give act effect to the entire in order to a common Legislature’s intent. consistent with the Hwy Comm, 709, 714; 178 re State NW2d Sess) (Ex 8, Act, Liquоr PA as Control Section 22 of the seq.; seq. by MSA 18.993 et 1986 PA MCL 436.22 et
amended LaGuire v Kain Opinion of the Court
Statutory interpretation analysis begin must with an examination of the chosen by words Legislature. 4 of dramshop Subsection as in amended sets forth the entitled to bring a cause of action: section, Except provided in otherwise this
individual damage personally who suffers or is injured by reason of the unlawful ing person visibly minor or selling, giving, or furnish- liquor visibly alcoholic to the minor or person, proven intoxicated to be a if the unlawful sale is proximate damage, injury, cause of the or death, child, spouse, parent, or guardian or individual, right shall have of action in his against person or her by selling, name who giving, furnishing liquor or the alcoholic has caused or contributed the intoxication of the the person or who has caused or contributed damage, injury, 436.22(4); or death. MSA [MCL 18.993(4).Emphasis added.] Before its amendment act provided: wife, husband, child, A parent, guardian, or person injured person, other property, means of support, person by otherwise, by or selling, giving, reason of the unlawful or
furnishing intoxicating liquor if to the proven proximate the sale is injury to be a shall have a cause of the death, right of action in his selling, or her name who giving, furnishing has caused or or contributеd to the intoxication of the injury. Control who has caused or contributed to the [Sub- 22(5) Act, Michigan Liquor section 1980 PA 351.]
A *8 question The first we address is whether Mich 367 op the Court provides an im- of subsection amended bibing a cause of action. We minor’s estate with it not. conclude that does to the the 1986 amendments
Before parties who 5 set forth the former subsection proximately injuries to recover for were entitled furnishing selling, giving of intox- caused person. icating liquor visibly Un- intoxicated to a wording, the enumeration of the der the former parties wife, "[a] hus- could recover included who person guardian, parent, child, band, or other support, property, injured means of person . . .” otherwise, . added). 22(5) (emphasis 351, § PA Construing substantially similar Cook, 617, 618-619; 7 NW Brooks v (1880), considered whether the intoxi- this Court person act. We cated could recover under person "may generally noted that the intoxicated degree by supposed injured in some intoxi- be to be cation, furnish the most so that his case would frequent fit to occasion for a suit if he should see legal proceedings.” concluded, Id. We resort although person however, the intoxicated scope of the words could be included within the person,” had thе intended "other person it have ex- benefit the intoxicated would unequivocally. pressed distinctly its intention Therefore, Id. this Court held that an intoxicated person under the did not have a cause of action judicially previously created act as worded. The adopted party doctrine,” in the "noninnocent first applied consistently case, has been bar Brooks recovery by under the dram- shop act since plaintiffs that before the concede an intoxicated had
amendments of act *9 LaGuire v Kain Opinion of the Court argue plaintiffs However, the no cause of action. creating language of the new subsection plaintiffs referred as "individuals” and class of "individuals,” relatives of those broadened certain the class of persons who could recover to include a minor or his estate. The defendants assert that the precludes by a suit new an subsection imbibing minor or that minor’s estate because imbibing an minor is not an individual who suffers damage personally injured by or is a minor or a visibly person. agree intoxicated We with the de- imbibing fendants that neither an minor nor that minor’s estate has a cause of action under the dramshop act, as amended in 1986. While question former of the aсt left some person recover, whether an intoxicated could be- Legislature’s cause of the inclusion of the words person” persons "other in its enumeration of the may who sue under now imbibing may leaves no that an doubt minor not recover. persons amended,
Subsection as at divides categories: issue under the act into three distinct 1) damage per- "individuals] suffer[] [are] who or spouses, sonally injured,” parents, children, as well as the guardians individuals, or of those all of 2) given action; whom are cause minors visibly persons damage person- who or 3) ally injure persons who, "individuals”; and selling, giving, furnishing liquor, or alcoholic have or caused contributed to the intoxication person or to the dam- have caused or contributed ages, injury, death, or whom the "individu- spouses, parents, category etc., als” and in the first Thus, under the act. have a cause of action dramshop act, under as order recover qualify amended, a must as an "individual” parent, guardian "spouse, child, Opinion of the Court imbibing Clearly, an minor falls into individual.” injure, category of those who rather visibly injured by a minor or than those who are intoxicated referred to in subsection Therefore, because an intoxicated "individuаls.” damage minor is not "individual” who "suffers personally injured a minor or or is 436.22(4); .,” . . MCL MSA 18.993(4), neither the minor nor his estate has a under the act. cause action
B language Having the revised of concluded ordinary meaning, subsection contemplate in its does not imbibing recovery by party, the whether he is a minor or a person, ily intoxicated the fam- we must next determine whether imbibing of an minor has a cause of action under minor does not the amended act. Because an intoxicated
qualify as an under "individual” family subsection qualify neither do of his members parents, guardians, etc., of an "individ- Therefore, in ual” as used to have a cause of that subsection. order action, the relatives imbibing qualify minor must as "individuals” recovery by themselves. the We conclude that plaintiffs in the instant cases was not contem- plated by Legislature. the emphasis
Originally,
act
placed
recovery by
was
on
the wives and children
to
cating liquors, to and to drunkards; persons, drunken provide and to habitual selling liquor remedy against persons in certain husbands children cases. Kain LaGuire v op the Court person
Although was barred from an intoxiсated recovery former of the dram- under the shop party by doctrine, act the noninnocent supra, early Brooks, of an cases allowed person commonly, the intoxicated to recover. Most sue a wife of an habitual drunkard would of her means of due to seller loss intoxicating beverages her husband.5 The sale of original gave of action to
version of act cause "[e]very parent wife, child, in- . . . who shall be support, jured property, means of any intoxi- or means of the any person 231, § 3. . . . .” 1875 PA cation Although right of an members under the to recover was clear this Court considered former strangers person had a to the intoxicated whether Witkovsky, 69 in Flower v cause of action plaintiff case, 371; 37 In that NW Unlawfully sold claimed that the defendant had whiskey the minors dam- to two minors and aged plaintiff’s property by reason of their argued only intoxication. The defendant under the act were entitled to recover *11 persons in to the those intoxicated who stood some relation
person. rejected This Court such reasoning interpretation act, narrow Legislature’s per- the son” use of the "or other words plaintiffs possible of was its enumeration persоns injured or all intended to cover persons, specifically property by and just a case as the one at was meant to cover such bar. Id. at 373-374. wording act,
Thus,
the
the
under the former
of
persons
possible plaintiffs
both
included
class
Peters,
(1874); Kehrig
Nichols,
See,
v
v
e.g.,
Kreiter
separates persons action who have a cause of First, into two distinct classes. an "individual” damage injured by personally or is a a who suffers minor or given person is 18.993(4). 436.22(4); cause of action. MCL MSA guardian spouse, parent, child, Further, may Thus, also recover. Id. as that "individual” persons under the of the former both person, directly injured by are an intoxicated who injuries and dependent upon whose are more indirect person’s injury, such as
another support, may How- the loss of means of recover. wording, pool ever, under amended plaintiffs potential have a cause of action for who injury significantly indirect include ian of an has been narrowed spouse, parent, guard-
only child, injured "individual.” wording 4 indicates The amended protecting Legislature’s emphasis shift in from protecting of an habitual drunkard to persons. emphasis recovery by on third third This new
persons, opposed recovery by of an intoxicated conclusion that does not intended the term *12 LaGuire v Kain op the Court apply to the of an "individual” members intoxi- Legislature family. minor’s cated While re- relatives, tained a cause of action for certain Legislature carefully specified only the rela- "individual,” tives of an as used in subsection could recover. To allow a minor’s members to recover under the act as "individu- Legislature’s contrary als” would be to the ex- pressed significantly intent and would also in- potential plaintiffs, crease the number of a result Lеgislature’s that is inconsistent with the creation narrowly right remedy of a tailored unknown supra. Browder, at common law. example,
For in order for Michael and Janet parents recover, Mihailuk to of an these intoxi- pursuant cated minor must be "individuals” according interpre- Therefore, to that wording, par- tation of the revised the Mihailuks’ grandparents ents, minor, of the intoxicated also have a Likewise, cause action under subsection 4. siblings minor, of an intoxicated Waranica, Colleen and John would also have a cause 4, action as "individuals” under subsection despite the fact if Colleen and John Wara- siblings injured they nica were of an "individual” would not be able to recover because subsection 4 "siblings” does not extend a cause of action to the allowing absurd, of an "individual.” Even more imbibing the relatives of an minor to recover as spouses, par- "individuals,” children, then their guardians may ents, and also under the recover act.
Clearly,
could not have intended
enjoy
the
greater potential
of an intoxicated minor
narrowly
recovery
than the
"individual,”
relatives of an
delineated classes of
when the minor himself does not even have a
nothing
argues
causе of action. The dissent
*13
Neither tory” by our counsels cited the dissent imbibing holding family minor of an cannot recover under subsection See Boyle, at 391-394. question the dissent characterizes While to allow the minor’s whether the conference recover as a "critical committee, issue” before that such was there is no indication "legis- Although the dissent describes case. showing groups history” lative that various lobbying on the individuals focused their issue efforts would entitled to sue under what be by the dissent the amended the sources cited critical debate the conclusion that the reаl any intoxicated concerned whether minor, an adult or a would be whether fact, argues 4 was amended because the dissent that subsection interpreted broadly, ex- the former was even to allow the person.” as an "other This broad wife of a decedent recover litigation duplicative because construction dramshop caused confusion and " 'other defendants could not be sure that some additional ” However, bring Boyle, person’ not a claim. J. at 389. would Legislature’s pur interpretation 4 defeats the dissent’s pose of subsection giving limiting potential plaintiffs by to the term the class of given to the the same construction that was "individual” liberal person” act. words "other under the former LaGuire v Kain Opinion op the Court
given 393, n 14. It of action. See id. at a cause appears resolved this debate eliminating, through the new of sub- any of an of action for the families section cause person. Finally, the dissent’s claim that subsection give an intoxicated minor’s should be read family Legisla- action, a cause of because of the "special treatment” of minors and ture’s continued statutory provisions, id. at their families other agreement clearly 394, is underсut the dissent’s holding minor, the intoxicated like with our per- counterpart his adult *14 dramshop recovery son, from under the is barred act, as amended. quite
Thus, we believe that
was
may
family
careful
to limit which
members
re-
they
cover and to whom
must be related
order
to have a cause of action. Because we hold that
imbibing
minor cannot recover under the
family
amended, we also hold that the
members of
pursuant
minor,
who are not "individuals”
have no cause of action.
also
III
holding that neither a minor’s estate nor
Our
may
of an intoxicated minor
recover
dramshop
sup-
4 of the
act is
under subsection
portéd by
wording
the literal
of other subsections
using
term "minor.” Subsection 6
of the act
provides:
against
An
this
a retail
action under
section
shall,
licensee
not be commenced unless the minor
alleged
or the
is a named defen-
dant
in the action and is retained
the action
litigation
until
is concluded
trial or settle-
436.22(6);
18.993(6).]
ment.
MSA
[MCL
that neither of these could requirements of subsection the "name аnd retain” App Rhoades, 736, 743- See Scholten v 744; 242 NW2d Appeals exception
The Court of has created an requirement to the name and retain on facts simi- presented lar to those in the instant cases. Schol- supra. Scholten, ten, the Court reasoned parent under the dram- because could recover shop injury act for to a child occasioned misdoing, by child’s own reason of the sale application child, intoxicants to that a literal provision the name and retain would be "awk- ward, strained and absurd.” Id. at 744. Whatever persuasiveness Appeals opinion may the Court of predated had, have the Scholten decision the 1986 As held amendments of the above, clearly act. we although wording the former of the act recovery by allowed for of an the new of subsection recovery. Therefore, 4 has eliminated such al- though application a literal of the name and re- requirement tain would have been strained and Scholten, absurd in under the amended version of reading the statute a literal of subsection 6 is *15 entirely holding consistent with our that neither imbibing family an minor’s nor estate of that may minor recover under the act. holding supported by
Likewisе, our the literal provides, perti- 8, of subsection which part: alleged visibly nent "All defenses of the person intoxicated to the or the minor shall be available 436.22(8); . . .” licensee. MCL MSA 18.993(8). Because we cannot mi- envision that a nor’s estate and the relatives of a minor would 385 Kain LaGuire v Opinion op the Court the minor of action a cause
have application injuring himself, of subsection literal plaintiffs by these of action that a cause 8 means against Thus, also fail.7 licensee would exception 6, to this subsec- an subsection as with required or strained an absurd to avoid tion is not family his minor’s estate and result because already 4.8 from suit under subsection barred are holding Finally, not inconsistent with our is also face, 10, neither on its 10.9 Subsection subsection preserves recovery the act under nor eliminates family intoxicated of an a minor’s estate or interpret plaintiffs urge subsec us to minor. The statutory according construc the rule of tion 10 thing express in a mention of one tion that implies 2A of others. See the exclusion statute (5th ed), Statutory Sands, Sutherland Construction purports p ff. 10 to estab § 47.23, 216 Subsection operation 4. of subsection lish exclusions from the Thus, interpretation statutory maxim would apply to all cases indicate that subsection should specifically 10. Id. at excluded subsection not interpretation plaintiffs’ Therefore, 217. under the together, minor’s both a of the two subsections of the minor have a cause estate and the amendments, provision only made available this Before the alleged intoxicated defenses of the to the licensee the factual 22(5). 351, PA or minor. See 1980 § respect argument to subsec our The dissent misconstrues recovery by "indirectly” 6 and 8. We do not seek to abolish tions reading through of these subsec a literal intoxicated minor’s Boyle, contrary, recovery is such J. at 397. On the tions. See barred reading of subsections and a literal respect merely supports to subsection our conclusion with alleged visibly not have a cause shall any person pursuant have a this section nor shall of action pursuant the loss of financial to this section for cause of action love, services, training, guidance, gifts, parental support, soci person. alleged visibly companionship ety, of the 18.993(10).] 436.22(10); MSA [MCL *16 440 367 Opinion of the Court merely they are action under subsection because precluded recovery explicitly not from under sub- disagree. section 10. We wording ambiguous,
If the of subsection 4 were perhaps plaintiffs’ interpretation then of sub- tip balance.-However, section would while holding regard appears our to subsection surplusage,10 make subsection 10 the alternative upon would be to force a construction subsection 4 supported by wording is not of that sub- explain language merely section absence legislative Further, in subsection 10. to divine a intent from "minor” in the omission of the word recovery by subsection in order to allow family, minor’s estate and his creates substantial conflicts between the other of the act. subsections holding require explain away Such a would us to specific language 4, 6, the supporting of subsections parties
the conclusion that these do not acknowledge possible have a cause of action. We ambiguity arising from the absence of yet adopt plain- subsection we decline to tiffs’ construction of the act. interpretations
We hold that consistent of sub- 4, 6, sections and 8 the conclusion that the Legislature, emphasis protect- in its shift of from ing protect- of an intoxicated ing persons, prevent recovery by third intended to family. both a minor’s estаte and the minor’s Thus, we reverse the decisions of the Court of 10We note as well that even the dissent’s construction of the act part surplusage. agrees makes holding subsection The dissent with our the amended 4 does not allow an subsection imbibing minor or to recover. The dissent explain why explicitly precludes recovery by does not subsection visibly However, preclude recovery by but does not a minor. theory the dissent rests its entire conclusion on the recovery by may those not excluded from subsection 10 Boyle, recover under 4. See J. at 391. Kain LaGuire v Boyle,
Appeals Time v Cheers Good Waranica both LaGuire v Kain. Saloons *17 Cavanagh, C.J., Riley, Griffin, Levin, and and J. JJ., concurred jvith Brickley, dissenting (concurring part in in J. Boyle, agree majority’s Although part). con- we no cause of minor’s estate has clusion Michigan’s Liquor Act, as action under .Control agree 1986,1 that the in are unable to amended family we action. has no cause of of the minor spe- language that does not contain The statute suggests cifically members of an imbibing ought deemed individuals minor not be damage of the minor’s suffer as a result who having unlawfully liquor. alcoholic
obtained assumption requires majority’s conclusion indirectly eliminated an histori- through recognized cally the sub- cause of action omitting authorizing claims, clear while section language exception would have in clause that accomplished directly cannot the same result. We agree. in to assist of the factors available After review 2
construing
statute,
conclude that
we
ing
interpret
factors
Detroit,
opinions
and as articulated
purpose,
(1988);
Club Ins
i originally constructed, As in the provided a cause of persons through action to families of intoxicated *18 potential plaintiffs, wife, the enumeration husband, child, "[a] of parent, guardian origi- . . . .” The language provided nal parties a cause of action to third
through
language
person.”
the
"other
Gradually,
person” expanded
"other
to include
siblings
various third
of the intoxi-
cated
"wife,
and the enumeration of
hus-
language
encompass
band, child”
was extended to
party.3
the heirs of an innocent
third
This broad-
emphasis
text,
is,
purpose,
has occurred because neither
nor intent
or
judicial
reasoning.
can be the sole touchstone of
The Court has
historically
approach”
statutory
adhered to a "modest
construction
grounded upon "practical
Eskridge
Frickey,
reason.” See
&
Statutory interpretation
practical
reasoning,
42 Stan L R
322-
323
3
(1948)
Hylo
Co,
568;
Surety
See
v Mich
322 Mich
ening of the of both duplici- arguably confusion, resulted caused dramshop interfering litigation, defen- tous they ability could not cases because to settle dants’ might person” "other additional be sure that some bring claim. not still Legislature this, subsec reworded
To avoid
plaintiffs
eliminating
listing
potential
tion
recognition
resulting
phrase
included
decedent, the
ex-wife of a
of a claim for even an
Legislature pro
person.”
place,
its
"other
"spouse, child,
that "an individual” or
vided
right
parent
guardian
had a
or
of that individual”
time, the
made
At the same
of action.5
(1912) (the
Co,
354;
Leiphart
Court refused
&
NW
damages
bring
seeking
for herself and
a mother to
one suit
to allow
her minor children for the
brother, suggesting that
death of their
Tippman,
separate
App
appropriatе);
v
actions were
Brannstrom
(1985) (the
parents
671;
ex-wife and
who suffers visibly or is selling, person by of the unlawful intoxicated reason visibly furnishing liquor giving, to the minor or or of alcoholic proven person, to be if the unlawful sale intoxicated proximate death, spouse, damage, injury, or the or cause of the 440 Boyle, changes wording in subsection several other minor .6 supports Nothing in text the asser 4 the revised per of an intoxicated tion that a son or minor member might category the of not fall within damages injured or are "individual[s]’’ who suffer provision of alcoholic of the unlawful because beverages proximate cause of the dam that is the ages. supports
Thus, the text of the view In- are to recover. that deed, members entitled majority concedes that "as under are of the former both who directly injured by an intoxicated persons pendent upon injuries more and de- whose are indirect person’s injury, such as the
another (Ante, p support, may recover.” loss means of 380.) in of the structure of the statute Consideration conjunction 10, also with the text of subsection against majority’s interpretation counsels recovery the statute. Subsection аuthorizes individual, child, right parent, guardian of or shall have by selling, of action in his or her name who giving, furnishing or the alcoholic has caused or contrib- uted to the intoxication of the or who has caused or damage, 436.22(4); injury, contributed to the MSA or death. [MCL 18.993(4).] 6Specifically, Legislature replaced "injured person, property, in damage means of personally intoxicated "who suffers or is otherwise” with addition, Legislature replaced visibly injured.” "by visibly person” "by person.” a minor language defining The addition of the word "minor” who had a designed prove cause of action was minor was ently to eliminate the need to that the visibly change appar order recover. The response Representative was made in to concerns articulated to Stopczynski, Representatives Liquor Cháir of the House of Control Committee, Knox, Liquor Patricia J. then Chair of Control urged Commission. The commission selling action when the sale act beverages alcoholic to a minor be sufficient for a cause of injury, to or results in contributes death or requiring without also Archives, the minor be intoxicated. State State, History, Department Bureau of drafters’ folder for 1986 amendments to the act. *20 391 Kain LaGuire v by Opinion Boyle, J. categories persons.
particular persons Sub- of categories exception of to the 10 creates an section persons Thus, 4. to sue under subsection entitled necessarily 4 is in subsection the class created exception larger created class and inclusive of the Family the intoxi- members of in subsection cated category person the or minor fall within who can recover as "individuals” who injured damage personally as a or who are suffer result of minor or intoxicated provision of alcohol to the unlawful person. Then, 10 subsection visibly excepts recovery intoxi- from claims of person.7 person of that cated legislative reading Additionally, a fair recovery provides support history mi- for the for family. House Bill for The Senate substitute nor’s 4550 added to what is now
the word "minor” clarifying of action that a cause provided alcoholic bever- when the licensee existed ages person.8 visibly intoxicated to a minor or a either change made in substitute A was similar majority of subsection "were that if the conceded tip ambiguous,” interpretation 10 "would the bal of subsection 386.) ambiguity” arising (Ante, Recognizing "possible p from a ancе.” subsection against granting majority a cause of it resolves long despite minor’s of intoxicated for members action recovery persons. standing history If the for these action, historically recognized cause of we believe wants to abolish clearly these amend speak it has done with more than it should ments. provided 22H Except and sections in this section as otherwise property by person injured a minor or or and visibly giving, visibly selling, person by of the unlawful reason intoxicated furnishing liquor or the to the minor of alcoholic or furnishing selling, giving, person, or if the intoxicated death, injury proximate or the proven spouse, or cause of to be a child, injured parent, guardian shall of the or against right the retail in his or her name of action have furnishing giving, selling, of the alco who licensee holic person to the intoxication has caused or contributed injury. Except as contributed to the or has caused or child, guardian 22K, parent, spouse, provided in section visibly shall not have minor or the of the cause of action this section. licensee under a retail Boyle, changes Bill 4550.9 House These the House begin- and Senate versions the bill marked the ning throughout of the distinction made the finаl statute between a minor and a person.10
Both the House and Senate versions included language providing a cause of action to an individ injured by person ual a minor or intoxicated or the family injured person. of the The versions differed regarding right family the of of the the non- 11 party innocent precluded to recover. The House version by visibly person
suit the intoxicated person’s visibly family.12 and the intoxicated The Senate version eliminated a cause of action for section, Except provided as otherwise in this an individual personally injured by visibly who is a minor or intoxicated person by of alcoholic selling, giving, furnishing reason of the unlawful or liquor visibly person, to the minor or if intoxicated proven proximate the unlawful sale is injury individual, to be a cause of the death, child, spouse, parent, guardian or or the or of that individual, child, spouse, parent, guardian if the or to, substantially participated has not caused or contributed or in, drinking activity resulting in the the intoxication of the right against shall have a action his or her name person by selling, giving, furnishing the holic person who the the alco liquor has caused or contributed to the intoxication of the injury or who has caused or contributed to the or death. language finally by The enacted mentions both a 3, 4, 6, visibly person minor and a intoxicated in subsections only visibly person. Subsections 7 and 10 mention intoxicated regarding provisions The versions also differed various other including right right licensee’s to indemnification and to person plaintiff’s obliga raise the tion to defenses the intoxicated and the provide potential notice to the licensee of a suit. alleged visibly The intoxicated shall not have a cause pursuant any of action cause of action support, ety, to this section nor shall have pursuant to this section for the loss financial services, gifts, parental training, love, guidance, soci companionship alleged visibly person. of the intoxicated 6, reported Bill 4550-Substitute from the House 1985 and [House Com (with 1, Liquor passed mittee on several on Control October amendments) 10, by the House on December 1985.] Kain LaGuire v by Boyle, family family and the the minor person.13
both visibly intoxicated
Eventually ato were submitted the two versions issue before A critical committee. conference committee language preclud- adopt was whether person’s, visibly by ing suit both adopt family family guage lan- or to minor’s and the precluded only which bringing person’s The confer- suit.14 from supra, p n 8. In version is set forth of the Senate The text language Substitute, dealt Bill proposed Senate Senate limitation on and the entitled to sue the class of both party doctrine. the noninnocent created that class history legislative for the in the There is abundant to sue. The was entitled on the issue who that debate focused notion legislative groups individu lobbying history various evidences analysis notes that proposed regarding of the bill. versions als Mothers Driving opposed eliminate the Against Drunk person. House the intoxicated members of action of cause of Development Program Sec Analysis and 1985. Republican Bill —Research Michigan (H-6), Bar of The State HB 4550 November tion of "put proposals objecting to position the bill took a also limit on what condition, ingly those who responsible for a drunk’s those recovered from could .be suing know dependents those who from the drunk’s *22 bar ability drunk, seriously significantly of limit the and otherwise made him fully injured by recover their drunks are Frank, Release, Michigan, State Michael damages.” Bar of State Press addition, 1, 91-286, the Michigan, Folder 12. RG Box of Archives Michigan regarding survey prepared insurers Bureau Insurance gathered liability their com availability insurance the ments within major proposed dramshop insurers regarding reforms. Several right to sue from of the commented that removal the state problems help solve would and their families intoxicated insurance. Bureau, liability Liquor A Michigan insurance: Insurance Michigan Michigan, Licensed Bever survey 1985. of insurers liquor industry. Some the age on Association lobbied Dealers behalf 389, Finally, forth, p supra, n 4. House proposals the are set their of Republican tioned differences the Update specifically Report men Conference Committee version, law, House-passed existing the between pertaining entitled to to who was Senate-passed the bill version of Republican Shop, Report Update House Cau Conference sue. cus, —Dram Williams, update under noted that That June Ben It further family could sue. .existing of the intoxicated law the version, family House-passed of the that under observed injuries intox[icated] to minor can’t sue for “minor/drunk pre Senate-passed reported version Finally, it individual.” except minor/visibly family intoxicated of drunk” by cluded suit was entitled drunk hurt as result “minor child of that a control. damages in trust under court to be held 440 Mich by Boyle, rеport language ence from included the House adopted by signed version. It was both houses and by the Governor.
The conclusion that the minor’s has a cause of action is also buttressed the observa- Legislature special tion that continued the treatment afforded to minors and their families 436.33; fact, virtue of MCL MSA 18.1004. In while revising the act in increased penalties serving persons the age, who are under- 436.20; 18.991,
MCL MSA and made no changes recognized to eliminate the cause of action may § under 33 in which minors sue social hosts in Longstreth Gensel, 675, 681-683; v 423 Mich NW2d
Although support majority finds for its con- clusion that the minor’s lacks a cause of reading action in a literal of subsection provision, agree name and retain we are unable reading with a literal of that subsection to abolish historically recognized an language, prior judicial cause of action when the legisla-
construction, and
history
approach.
tive
all
a different
Subsection 6 was
first enacted
1972 as an
incep-
amendment of the
act.15From its
scope
provision
tion,
of the
has occasioned
difficulty. Both this Court and various Court of
Appeals panels
judicial exceptions
have fashioned
applicаtion
to the literal
of subsec-
sure,
note,
tion 6.16To be
as the defendants
this
where the Scholten v ing did not know the name of the intoxicated *23 (1976) Rhoades, 736; App (recogniz 67 Mich 242 509 NW2d judicial exception provision a to the name and retain where no by parent against cause of action exists party tortfeasor); a a child who is not a third Murphy, App 386; Schutz v 99 Mich 297 676 NW2d (1980) (recognizing judicial exception provi- to the name and retain 395 LaGuire Kain v by Boyle, strictly the name retain has construed
Court
parties
sought
provision
to circum-
the
have
where
against
protections
and fraud.17
collusion
its
vent
However,
opinions in
this Court
which
even after
construction,”18
of strict
to the course
"returned
panels
Appeals
find
of
continued to
of the Court
6
the claims of
did not bar
that subsection
person.
v
In Newman
of the intoxicated
families
(1984),
App
253
Hoholik,
66; 359
138 Mich
NW2d
holding
Appeals
of
the Court of
considered
continuing
.noting
Putney,
it
affirmed
vitality
rationale,
it
failed to
of
and its
Salas
employed
Scholten,
it
narrow
and that
reference
panel
language.
factors, the
these
On the basis оf
Putney
impliedly abrogate
not
concluded that
did
holdings
progeny.19
Scholten and its
compre-
this
embarked on
When
dramshop
opinions
hensive review of
Appeals
existed that
this Court and the Court
provision
scope
limited the
of the name and retain
must be cautious
in some circumstances. One
meaning
legislative
imputing
inaction,20
about
against her
has no
of action
husband
sion where wife
damages
self).
cause
arising
injuries upon
negligent
his
infliction
him-
out of
17
(1982);
See,
Haskins,
181;
e.g., Putney
414 Mich
with no in subsection Legislature the view that whatever accomplish intended to with the name and retain provision, it did not intend to abolish the minor’s family’s cause of action. strengthened by
This conclusion is consideration Legislature’s explicit rejection proposal of the of a to abolish the cause of action of the minor’s If, contend, subsection as the defendants provision name and retain had eliminated claims by inexplicable minor, of the it seems question that family’s whether to exclude the minor’s
claims subsection 10 would be the focus Yet, of debate. that issue was one of several that resulting divided Senate, the House and in the passage of two versions of the bill and the neces- sity for a conference committee to create a com- promise. engaged implausible Legislature It that regarding scope
in this debate
previously existing
subsection
if a
already
had
family.
eliminated the claims of the minor’s
Ultimately,
language
of subsection 10 barred
the claims of the families of
persons,
omitting language
while
which would
have barred the claims of the families of the
majority
despite
minor.
concludes,
this omis-
Legislature implicitly
sion, that the
eliminated the
family through
claims of the minor’s
subsection 6.
recognized
Legisla-
This Court has
that where the
baptize
statutory gloss
impermissible”);
a
that
is otherwise
Johnson v
Transportation Agency,
616, 672;
Santa Clara Co
480 US
107 S Ct
(1987)
1442;
(Scalia, J.,
("vindication
dissenting)
ture interpretation statute, would legislative rejection intent toward evidences existing light contrary construction.21 interpretation suggesting a different case law provision, as well as retain name and explicit rejection Legislature’s precise accomplished result, we this have would *25 that did not intend conclude that provision these claims. bar the name retain and majority its conclusion also finds The 8.22We dis- of subsection in the literal agree. Statutory en- is an holistic
construction unlikely that that it seems reiterаte deavor. We sought Legislature indirectly in to achieve explicitly rejected in it 8 a result that subsection subsection isolation, of sure, if read
To be
suscepti-
6,
8, like that of subsection
subsection
preclude
interpretation
would
suit
to an
that
ble
reading
family.
A
the minor’s
more natural
to
it
intended
8 would be that
was
to assert available defenses
allow the licensee
plaintiff
the third
had a claim
when
Supreme
party.
on Standard
Court Committee
The
proba-
postulated
Jury
the most
Instructions
21
221,
See,
Petrella,
243-244;
e.g., People
380
11
424 Mich
NW2d
v
Co,
538,
(1985);
410
Farm Mut Automobile Ins
Mich
Miller v State
567;
(1981);
Uptown
537
Teamsters Union v
302
General
NW2d
Hatters,
(1959);
240;
People v
Mich
97
593
Cleaners &
356
NW2d
Adamowski,
429;
(1954); Miles ex rel
Mich
ii interpretation This short falls of the most desir- ap- result, able which would reflect a consistent proach to the situation the addressed. decision-making process engaged we are in is "purely Eskridge neither "linear” nor & deductive.” Frickey, Statutory interpretation practical reasoning, L Stan R It involves range consideration of a broad evidence meaning particular factors to determine the text within the context of a of a
particular applica- result, however, tion.24We reach this because the legislative critical debate indicates an alteration of 23SJI2d, p 11-8b. *26 description process apt: We think Justice Frankfurter’s of the is language emergence intrinsic The difficulties of and the after anticipated by gifted enactment of not situations the most legislative imagination, utes that ambiguities reveal doubts and in stat compel judicial process construction. The of construc tion, therefore, logic is not an exercise or dialectic: aids The reаsoning irrelevant; they may of formal inadequate. ment of solution of that speak are simply not be purpose being of construction the ascertain meaning, every brought consideration to bear for the problem must be devoted to end alone. To practical problem indulge of it as a is not to a fashion in instance, that, Not, something It
words. must be opportunity which he can tions, not else. judge "empty for a to use words as vessels into pour anything caprices, he no will”—his fixed Nor, particular policy. even statesmanlike in a beliefs on by hand, process the other is ritual be observed unimaginative professional phrases. adherence to well-worn [Frankfurter, Col L R statutes, reading Some reBections on the (1947).] v Kain LaGuire Boyle, purpose may of subsec- initial have been what "minor” in subsec- of the word 4. The addition tion precluding the on not the insistence and tion family’s in subsection of action cause minor’s ignore may purpose in the not we indicates edges up ragged tidying of the interest of legislation. pull case, will values "different this Eskridge interpreter directions,” & in different conjunction Frickey, supra, p read When whole, text, its back- its with ground statute structure, within the context pull passed, think the we it was which 6) (or subsection literal pull interpretive toward than the force of the less other factors. Boyle. with Justice concurred
Justice Mallett