Kitty Yinling Zhang v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.
601 F. App'x 567
9th Cir.
2015
Check Treatment
Docket

KITTY YINLING ZHANG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 12-15952.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 22, 2015. Filed May 1, 2015.

610 F. Appx 567

Before: GOODWIN, BYBEE, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

Kitty Yinling Zhang, San Leandro, CA, pro se. Ori Edelstein, Charles Scott Greene, Andrea McDonald Hicks, Joseph James Poppen, Bryan Cave LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellees.

MEMORANDUM ***

Kitty Yinling Zhang appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her action alleging federal and state law claims in connection with foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, and may affirm on any ground supported by the record. . We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Zhang’s Real Estate Settlement Practices Act (“RESPA“) claim alleging inadequate disclosures, because Zhang failed to allege facts sufficient to show that any defendant failed to provide a required disclosure with respect to the transfer of a loan. See 12 U.S.C. § 2605(a)-(c) (setting forth disclosures that must be made regarding the transfer of a loan).

Dismissal of Zhang’s RESPA claim alleging inadequate responses to her Qualified Written Request was proper because Zhang failed to allege facts sufficient to show that she suffered any actual damages as a result of the alleged violation. See 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1)(A) (allowing recovery of “actual damages“).

The district court properly dismissed Zhang’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim because, even assuming that defendant ReconTrust was a “debt collector” and was “collecting” a debt, records subject to judicial notice show that ReconTrust provided Zhang all statutorily required information. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) (setting forth information a debt collector must provide when a consumer disputes a debt or seeks information regarding the original creditor); see also (“[V]erification of a debt involves nothing more than the debt collector confirming in writing that the amount being demanded is what the creditor is claiming is owed.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See (per curiam).

AFFIRMED.

Sharon BENCIC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Carolyn W. COLVIN, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 13-15295.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted April 16, 2015. Filed May 4, 2015.

610 F. Appx 568

Before: SCHROEDER and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI,* Judge.

Mary Kay Fowler, Taylor and Associates, PLLC, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellant. James Burgess, Assistant Regional Counsel, SSA-Social Security Administration General Counsel‘s Office, Region VIII, Denver, CO, Michael A. Johns, USPX-Office of the U.S. Attorney, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant-Appellee.

MEMORANDUM **

Appellant Sharon Bencic appeals the denial of her claim for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. The ALJ concluded that Bencic suffered from two severe impairments, but could perform “light work,” including her previous work as a waitress. On appeal, Bencic argues that the ALJ erred in weighing her physicians’ medical opinions.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. The ALJ did not err in giving more weight to the opinions of non-examining and non-treating physicians over the opinion of treating physician Dr. Hurley. The ALJ gave “specific and legitimate” reasons for giving less weight to Dr. Hurley’s opinion, including that it was inconsistent with the opinion of three spine specialists, and with Dr. Hurley’s own conservative course of treatment. See . These reasons were supported by substantial evidence in the record. Despite Bencic’s arguments to the contrary, the ALJ could rely on the opinions of examining and non-examining physicians to discount Dr. Hurley’s opinion to the extent these opinions were supported by and consistent with the objective medical evidence. See .

Because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Bencic was not disabled at step four, we do not reach Bencic’s argument that the ALJ erred at step five. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (“If we can find that you are disabled or

Notes

*
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge for the U.S. Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
**
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
***
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.