Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Services, Inc.

Corps on findings the relied the based on site is purpose. used for its intended Nor highly this uncertain con- new model to does the Corps analyze when and how salinity clude that would increase likely only much erosion is that occur— by ppt per shallows less than .5 (parts it profound devastating. will be Its thousand) and that this would have no analysis of toxicity increased re- impact. sult from dredging completely is inade- relied, The apparently district court not quate, analysis its of possible changes is record, on evidence upon within the but its Last, least, in salinity. certainly but Corps’ own search Google about the salini- analysis highly suspect. economic ty Corps model. upon The relied model My Corps bottom line is that has admittedly fraught with uncertainty to substantially my more work to do. Hence reach its conclusion that the deep- channel ening dissent. produce impact would no adverse on

the salmonids from salinity the estuar- suggest

ies. I employing studies an

older, inadequate by model followed com-

plete reliance on an untested model does required

not constitute the “hard look”

NEPA.

IV. CONCLUSION

Fundamentally, majority' takes an

ostrich’s approach head-in-the-sand to re-

viewing the agency’s analysis, settling Corps’ explanation without undertak-

ing required review of its decision making. true, It is permitted we are not CLARK; Jerry Clark, Linda L. V. judgment substitute our for the rea- Plaintiffs-Appellants, Neither, soned decision of agency. however, are we permitted to rubber- stamp agency’s decision of what fac- CAPITAL CREDIT & COLLECTION

tors must be considered and what factors SERVICES, INC., Oregon corpora need not be considered an without taking tion; detailed look at whether the agency’s Brumley; Jeffrey rea- Janine I. Has Here, soning is sound. it not. son, Defendants-Appellees.

The “hard awry. look” here went The Clark; Jerry Clark, Linda L. V. must, Corps, as it acknowledged profound Plaintiffs-Appellees, consequences from erosion if large quanti- ties of sand are removed from the littoral system. Anyone familiar with the Wash- ington coastline has seen the devastation Capital Credit Services, & Collection past from (consequences erosion Corps Oregon corporation; Janine admits were caused own past its bad Brumley, Defendants-Appellants,

practices). Corps acknowledges that designated has a deep-water disposal huge site hold quantities dredge

spoils, but no plan mitigation has if Jeffrey Hasson, I. Defendant. Clark, Clark; Jerry V. L.

Linda

Plaintiffs-Appellees, Services,

Capital Credit & Collection corporation; Oregon Janine Defendants,

Brumley, Hasson, Defendant-Appellant.

Jeffrey I. 04-35563,

Nos. 04-35795. Appeals,

United States Court

Ninth Circuit. 5, 2005. Dec.

Argued and Submitted Aug.

Filed Goode, Portland, OR, R.

William for de- fendants-appellees Credit & Col- Services, Inc., lection Brumley. and Janine Brown, Lagesen, Thomas W. Frank H. Wendy Margolis, and Coers- Christine Mitchell, LLP, Cosgrave Vergeer Kester Portland, OR, for defendant-appellee Jef- I. frey Hasson. BROWNING, NELSON,

Before: D.W. O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges. NELSON, D.W. Senior Judge: Circuit In their pursuant action to the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Oregon Unfair Debt Collection Practices Act, Linda Jerry Clark make several Here, assignments of error. we address (1) only appeal their of the following: granting summary district court’s order judgment Jeffrey in favor of Hasson and granting partial summary judgment Capital Services, Credit & Collection Brumley respect Janine to the cease communication directive and debt (2) verification; and the district court’s failure discovery to rule on pending mo- tion deciding before judg- ment motions.1 jurisdiction pursuant We have to 28 affirm, U.S.C. we in part, and reverse, part. in

BACKGROUND years, For number of Linda Clark Gerlt, Portland, (“Mrs.Clark”) Danny OR, H. for the was treated for mental plaintiffs-appellants. problems by health Dr. J. Michael Sulli- separately 1. aIn filed disposi- attorneys' memorandum Oregon fees under statute tion, reject assignments the Clarks’ Capital, Brumley, other following entry and Hasson of error and affirm judgment the district court’s denial in their favor. Hasson, Jeffrey Capital, On behalf of Clinic Bea- & at the Evans Sullivan van attorney, re- also sent the agency’s Dr. Sullivan verton, When Oregon. Evans, his business That notice tired, Kathryn a collection notice. Dr. Clarks the clin- his interest partner, purchased information about the Clark ac- recited in all of out- an interest ic and claimed “com- that Hasson had taken from a count approximately After standing accounts. Capital to him. plaint praecipe” provided indirect discussions direct and year of one 1, 2002, May Hasson received letter On billing, Dr. “serious errors” regarding alleged disputed Mr. from Clark outstanding Mrs. Clark’s Evans referred verification, debt, and “of course requested & Collection Credit account our home or phone calls to preclude[d] Services, for collection. (“Capital”), Inc. employment.” response, Hasson assigned her claim Dr. Evans Eventually, letter, enclosing “doc- mailed a verification agen- the collection against Mrs. Clark claim Capital’s uments substantiate” cy. against the Clarks. The enclosure consist- alleged with Mrs. Clark’s In connection of the same itemized statement sent ed (the Capital employ- debt, Janine Brumley. activities on for collection responsible ee Capital and A after both few months account) Capital’s stan- followed Clark letters, Mr. Hasson had received Clark’s to the instant Relevant procedures. dard Hasson’s office re- Mrs. Clark called Mrs. Clark a collec- first sent appeal, she alleged information about debt. quest In subse- tion notice on March disagree to the Although parties communications, and oral quent written request, of Mrs. exact nature Clark’s validity the of the disputed Clark Mrs. secretary is undis- spoke she to Hasson’s billing explained and detail alleged debt secretary called When Hasson’s puted. the Ev- had problems experienced she relay Capital in- Capital message, to the & Sullivan Clinic. ans La- not to talk with debtors. structed her (initiated by AfteSrthese communications Brumley day, same returned Mrs. ter the Clark), sent a second notice Brumley Mrs. do not telephone parties call. Clark’s letter, an item- enclosing copy of and a call, of that but the on the substance agree re- of the Clark account statement ized that the inter- presented evidence Clarks Capital claimed Dr. ceived from Evans. Mrs. that she was upset action so Clark the debt. itemized verified the statement therapy. required to obtain letter notice and verification The second of a lawsuit Following resolution state Mrs. and to both Clark were addressed the the initiated by Capital, filed Clarks (“Mr.Clark”). husband, Jerry Clark her Brumley Capital, against action instant Clark account Brumley him to the added Oregon, alleg- district of and Hasson the paid for policy his insurance had because Fair Debt of the federal ing both violations On health treatment. Mrs. Clark’s mental Act, §§ U.S.C. Practices Collection 10, 2002, Brumley requested also April Oregon Debt Col- seq., et the Unfair and suit against to file authorization Act, 646.639 Or.Rev.Stat. lection Practices Brumley’s collection activities Clarks. sought partial Initially, the Clarks seq. et Capital. until Mr. wrote continued Clark claims, on their federal summary judgment 24, 2002, letter, April he dis- In his dated sought and Hasson Capital, debt, “proper

puted alleged requested all Clarks’ summary judgment on verification,” and the collection directed oral district court heard claims. After the Clark at work or not to call Mrs. agency cross-motions, original argument on at home. Mr. or Mrs. Clark call compel consumer, the Clarks filed a motion to addi- munication with the the debt discovery tional and moved for collector shall not communicate further judgment on their state law claims. respect with the consumer with to such .... fully

The district court never considered compel the motion to on its Rath- merits. 1692c(c). 15 U.S.C. er, it opinion denying issued an and order regard Capital Brumley, With summary judgment the Clarks’ motions district court granted summary judgment granting Hasson’s motion for sum- because it concluded that —within the mary judgment. disposition, the same of scope request Mrs. Clark’s for informa- district court denied tion from Hasson —the Clarks had waived Brumley’s summary judgment motion for objection “any sought to return call that relating Brumley’s claims oral merely provide information request- July communications with on Mrs. Clark ed.” Whether a consumer waive a so- 30, 2002, but granted the motion as to the called “cease communication directive” ap- Later, balance the Clarks’ claims. pears to impression issue of first granted district court the Clarks’ motion circuits, this and other so charged we are compel July relating documents to the with interpreting the FDCPA to determine 30, 2002, conversation and as moot denied 1692c(c). scope remainder the motion.2 appeal This followed. statutory Well-established canons

DISCUSSION provide any inquiry construction into 1. District Ruling Court’s on Cross-Mo- the scope and of a meaning statute must Summary Judgment tions for begin with the text of the statute itself. We review both de novo the district E.g., Int’l Ass’n Machinists & Aero court’s interpretation the Fair Debt Col space BF Workers v. Aerospace Goodrich (“FDCPA”), lection Practices Act Romine Group, Aerostructure Serv., Inc., Collection Diversified (9th Cir.2004). that, They further caution 1142, 1145(9th Cir.1998), F.3d and the dis “where language plain, the statute’s trict rulings court’s on cross-motions for sole function of the courts tois enforce it summary judgment, see v. Slenk Trans according to its terms ... for courts must 1072, world Systems, 236 1074 F.3d presume that a legislature says a statute (9th Cir.2001). what it means and means in statute a what says (citing there.” Id. United States v. A. Enters., 235, 241, Ron Pair 489 U.S. 109 that, argue The Clarks of because 1026, (1989) S.Ct. 103 L.Ed.2d 290 Mr. “preclud[ing] Clark’s letters Germain, Conn. Nat’l Bank v. 503 U.S. phone calls [Mrs. ... Clark] or to 249, 253-54, 1146, 112 S.Ct. 117 L.Ed.2d home,” Brumley’s telephone [their] call of (1992)) (internal 391 quotation marks omit July 30, 2002, constituted a violation of . ted) 1692c(c), § which provides following: 1692c(c) plain If a language notifies a The of consumer debt collector in in- writing ... explicit cludes exceptions permitting consumer wishes a the debt collector to cease further com- debt subject collector ato cease communi- 30, parties proceeded 2002, 2. The Oregon during trial on the residu- or July eral law of al issue whether had violated fed- communication.

1169 Armbrust, 670, 284 F.2d 674 the consumer Matheson to contact cation directive (9th Cir.1960) (quoting S.E.C. v. C.M. three circumstances: 344, Leasing Corp., Joiner 320 U.S. 350- (1) consumer that the to advise the 120, 51, (1943)); L.Ed. 88 see 64 S.Ct. 88 ter- being efforts are collector’s further Rasmussen, Longview also Fibre Co. (2) minated; notify the consumer (9th Cir.1992) 1307, (holding F.2d may or invoke collector creditor the debt expressio interpre- a unius “is rule ordinarily which are specified remedies tation, not a rule of law. maxim is ‘a collector or credi- by such debt invoked sense,’ product logic prop- and common (3) notify tor; applicable, where erly only applied when.it makes sense as that the debt collector the consumer (citation legislative purpose.”) matter specified to invoke a creditor intends omitted). remedy. 1692c(c).3 Moreover, ex- we are not None of those bound 15 U.S.C. its may plain meaning a statute where literal provide that debt collector ceptions application produce consumer’s re- will result “demon a consumer contact strably at its language of odds with the intention of quest, plain nor does the Been, 1692c(c) 1034, 1036 In re drafters.” F.3d contemplate waiver. Cir.1998) (9th (citing Ron United States v. affirmatively desig the statute Because Enters., Inc., 235, 242, Pair 489 U.S. operation, we are certain manners of nates (1989)); 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 see S.Ct. that, doctrine of ex- counseled under the Combs, 564, also States v. United alterius, these pressio unius est exclusio (9th Cir.2004) (“[W]e are not required equivalent of exclusions. omissions are the in a man interpret statute formalistic Dept. Air Ecology ARC v. U.S. See interpretation ner such an would when (9th 1092, Force, 1099-1100 Cir. 411 F.3d contrary statute’s produce result Gerwer, 730, 2005); In re results.”) purpose or lead to unreasonable Cir.1990) (“The (9th express enumeration Brown, (citing Comm’r v. 380 U.S. indicates that other ex exception] an [of (1965)). 14 L.Ed.2d 75 85 S.Ct. ceptions implied.”). should not be Never context, strictly abiding present In the theless, long have held that 1692c(c) §of do plain language would ... helpful rules of construc- however just that. Lewis v. Business ACB Cf. be, ... “con- tion the courts will Services, Inc., Cir. conformity act in strue the details (“While 1998) appears Congress to have will dominating general purpose, with its to eliminate abusive intended the[FDCPA] will light text in of context and read - practices, language collection interpret meaning so far as the text 1692c(c) ....”). is broader fairly permits so as of the words history indicates that Con- particular general- Legislative carry out cases protect the FDCPA to ly policy.” gress enacted expressed legislative Commission, (FDCPA) (2005), charged Act 17-18 available 3. Practices The Federal Trade FDCPA, http://www.ftc.gov/re- administering at has taken the with also position language permits ports/fdcpa05/050729fdcparpt.pdf.; see the debt that this Commission, Re- 28th with the Federal Trade collector to communicate consumer Annual more," Congress port on the Fair Debt respect "only once Collection with to the debt (FDCPA) (2006), times, available separate each contact Practices Act 11-12 not three http:// purposes. relating permissible to one of Commission, www.ftc.gov/os/2006/04/P0648042006FDCPA Re- Federal 27th Annual Trade Report.pdf. port Congress on the Fair Debt Collection 1170 Olano, 725, “improper 733,

consumers from conduct” v. and States 507 U.S. 113 illegitimate 1770, (1993)). practices “without S.Ct. 123 L.Ed.2d For unnecessary imposing instance, on restrictions eth appropriate “waiver is not when 95-382, S.Rep. ical debt collectors.” No. it is provision inconsistent with the creat- n (1977), reprinted i 1977 ing right sought secured,” to be New 1695, 1696, U.S.C.C.A.N. 1698-99. Cer Hill, 110, 116, York v. 528 U.S. 120 S.Ct. tainly, inherently there nothing 659, abu (2000), right 145 L.Ed.2d “a sive, harassing, or deceptive unfair about private party, affecting conferred on but telephone a return call.4 interest, may public not be waived or if released such waiver or release contra- Indeed, to hold that a may debt collector statutory venes the policy.” (quoting Id. respond to a telephone debtor’s call Brooklyn O’Neil, Savings Bank v. would, regarding his or her in many debt 697, 704, 895, U.S. 65 S.Ct. 89 L.Ed. 1296 eases, “force honest debt seeking collectors (1945)). right Because the comes into ex- peaceful resolution of the debt file suit only istence affirmatively when the debtor in order to something resolve the debt — directs the debt-collector to cease commu- clearly at odds language with the nications, permitting the debtor to waive purpose of the FDCPA.” Lewis v. or hardly revoke such a Services, directive is incon- ACB Business 135 F.3d at provision sistent with the possible creating the 399(discussing a restriction on right or public with the ability policy of the payment collector’s to offer 1692c(c)(2) communication). options in a FDCPA. Applying principles these protec- to the that, general We further note as a 1692c(c), tions of we hold that a debtor

rule, may “a party waive benefit of a rights waive the by created a cease provision of a statute ... ... enacted s communication directive. hi protection.” Globe Milling Grain & v.Co. De Tweede Northwestern & Pacific generally Under the accepted defi Hypotheekbank, 418, Cir. nition, a voluntary waiver is “the relin 1934). respect rights With secured quishment express implied or ...— —of statute, federal “absent some affirmative legal right advantage.” Black’s Law indication of Congress’ intent preclude 1574(7th Dictionary ed.2004); see also waiver, presumed have statutory Olano, 733, 1770; 507 U.S. at S.Ct. provisions subject are to waiver volun Zerbst, 458, 464, v. Johnson 304 U.S. tary agreement parties.” United 1019, (1938). S.Ct. 82 L.Ed. 1461 What Mezzanatto, 196, States 513 U.S. depends, constitutes a waiver in the first (1995). 115 S.Ct. 130 L.Ed.2d 697 instance, on the nature of the right at There is no such indication the FDCPA. Hill, issue. See 528 U.S. at 120 S.Ct. course,

Of all rights permissible, “[n]ot are Where waivers are they Perez, waivable.” United States 116 are only often enforced if the waiver was (1997) 845 n. (citing “knowing” “intelligent,” United which means Legislative history 4. gal rights; simulating also reveals a process; non-ex- court ob- that, practices haustive list of enacting taining pretenses; information under false FDCPA, the Congress be collecting considered to ille- legally owing; is more than and gitimate: violence; "threats of misusing postdated obscene S.Rep. checks.” No. language; lists;’ publishing 2, 4, the of ‘shame reprinted 95-382 at 1977 harassing anonymous calls; telephone 1695, 1696, or U.S.C.C.A.N. 1698. A return impersonating call, itself, government a official 'or telephone at- in and of is disanalo- torney; misrepresenting gous practices. the consumer's le- to these

H71 Although have of we not before em “sufficient awareness the individual has likely ployed sophisticated and con- the least debtor stan the relevant circumstances the decision, meaning dard evaluate debtor Brady his v. Unit- sequences” conduct, 742, 748, 1463, or States, 90 would attach his her own we S.Ct. ed 397 U.S. (1970). appropriate are convinced that its use is generally 747 See 25 L.Ed.2d Navarro-Botello, support for our decision 912 here. We find States v. United Cir.1990) (“A (9th 318, already in which we have knowing from the manner F.2d 321 the statutory right employed judging is the standard. voluntary waiver of a enforceable.”) collector, added); invariably actions of a debt we (emphasis United (9th Michlin, 896, provided ask whether the information it v. 34 F.3d States Cir.1994) (“A confusing were or mis knowing voluntary waiv- was its actions leading. Kaplan, 109 F.3d E.g., to our of a Terran v. prerequisite enforcement er is Cir.1997). (9th 1428, Quite rights.”); sim waiving appellate 1432-33 plea agreement Clark, ply, we that seek ensure even the least F.3d 889-90 Leonard understand, Cir.1993) (“First is may sophisticated debtor able to rights Amendment about, convincing partic make informed decisions clear and evi- upon be waived the fully meaningfully volun- debt knowing, ipate dence that the waiver is Terran, process. intelligent.”). tary and Cf. 1434(debt did not violate FDCPA collector a heightened conclude that We encourage did “not threaten or because it appropriate standard of voluntariness debtor to his sophisticated the least waive us statute now before here because the Swa/nson, F.2d at statutory right[s]”); of debt collectors measures the behavior 1226(debt notice the collector’s violated sophisticated the the “least rubric of under encouraged it debtor to FDCPA because Baker v. Services E.g., G.C. debtor.” right days verify “ignore his take (9th Cir.1982); F.2d Corp., 677 immediately”). and act That his debt Oregon Credit Ser Swanson v. Southern therefore, sophisticat the least goal—and, 1222, 1227(9th vice, Inc., Cir. important standard—is no less ed debtor 1988). objective standard “ensure[s] This considering relevant the actions when consumers, all protects the FDCPA considering the ac the debtor than when ... gullible as well as the shrewd tions a debt collector. and the credu ignorant, unthinking Jackson, important, Most because lous.” Clomon (internal (2d Cir.1993) a remedial statute aimed quotations FDCPA is 1318-19 omitted). curbing Congress considered be Focusing on that what and citations propensity industry-wide pattern of and we will enforce sophistication, level debtors, logical abusing di towards waiver of the cease communication likely collectors—repeat players only sophisticated rective where least legal gov standards acquainted or she would understand he debtor industry—to bear the brunt erning their waiving rights his or her under was repeated, it does 1692c(c).5 As have oft the risk.6 Eaton, 659; caution, Johnson v. 5. we further S.Ct. accord Out of an abundance of (M.D.La.1995) (finding F.Supp. note what should be obvious: consumer's “op- alleged waiver defense could not that an protection waive from the consent cannot plaintiffs protection erate as a waiver eliminate, practices FDCPA seeks to such misleading against receiving commu- false or false, harassing misleading, or abusive nications”). Permitting such waiver communications. goals pursued public policy would violate appreciate Although we "common Hill, by the FDCPA. See 528 U.S. preferred standard—is sense”—the dissent’s require not seem “unfair to who with one collector which that debt collector deliberately goes perilously close an to may collaborating to collect the same of proscribed area conduct take the shall debt.7

risk that cross line.” he FTC v. justifies The instant perfectly case our Co., Colgate-Palmolive 380 U.S. It decision. is obvious that Mrs. Clark did (1965); 85 S.Ct. 13 L.Ed.2d 904 see Hasson, not by calling realize that she was Swanson, also at 1228. Other consenting telephone to a return call from 1692c(c), permitted by than as a debt Brumley. Crediting Mrs. Clark’s charac- collector has who received a cease commu- terization of her interactions with Brum- nications order from a debtor must not ley, it perfectly is clear that Mrs. Clark’s contact the debtor unless it has received (or Brumley choice of Hasson over any clear waiver of that order. other employee Capital) was not fortui- tous. Capital That was a better source of information about the Clark account is un- Applying newly our articulated still, disputed; Mrs. to Clark chose call us, waiver to the standard facts before it is Hasson her mental because health suffered sophisticated obvious that even the least following Brumley. her with talks recognize debtor would that Mrs. Clark’s request for information constituted con subjective The reason for Mrs. Clark’s Hasson, for attorney, sent Capital’s to re (or debtor’s) any behavior, however, other telephone turn Mrs. Clark’s call in to order not inquiry. ques- is the focus of the provide specific information she re tion that must be answered is this: “Was quested. words, In other no reasonable it clear from request Mrs. for in- Clark’s trier fact could conclude that Mrs. Clark formation that she consented to a return did not waive the cease communications telephone call any from debt collector?” respect directive with to Hasson. We know Clark give Mrs. did not her consent to receive directly communications

Whether Mrs. Clark’s actions also collector, to the debt but whether she oth- constituted waiver of the communi cease erwise demonstrated her waiver cations directive Capital Brumley as to cease communication respect directive with is a question. more difficult In this re gard, is unclear. As we decline to we create a rule that noted, 1692c(c) waiving protection parties conflicting offered as to testi- collector, one debt mony regard a debtor with waives that the substance of Mrs. protection regard Thus, request. other debt Clark’s the answer inex- necessary step judg- together attractive working routinely attempt first could ing the bypass 1692c(c). actions debtors and debt collectors the strictures of As the alike, notes, we not are sure that "common sense” is dissent telephone return call sufficiently provide any however, common to reasoned inherently deceptive harassing; guide uniform basis to individual conduct many practices neither are proscribed other and, then, review. The dissent’s common by the FDCPA. It is the task of courts to sense request led it to be whether, assured that for light determine before facts it, information from one individual welcomed a telephone a particular call violated the another, but, response apparently, from Mrs. Though FDCPA. the dissent finds it "nonsen- Clark’s did not. sical” to allow one collector to return the phone preventing call while that debt collec- so, 7. To sup- hold otherwise would—rather than tor’s cohorts do find nonsensical port purpose the remedial loopholes FDCPA-— to create needless work pave way practices disadvantage novel abusive ne- of the individuals the FDCPA cessitating litigation. further protect. Debt collectors was enacted to fact, to disputed speak complied to issues of not debtors and tricably linked appeal, Thus, not decide on summary which we do with that instruction. summary judgment Cap- favor of partial proper. judgment was improper.8 ital and was B. the district court

Conversely, argue Capital The Clarks also that sum-mary to granted judgment properly verify properly and Hasson failed the First, just principles under the Hasson. debt, § alleged violating 1692g.9 this forth, As the cease set Mrs. Clark waived merit, is contention without directive as Hasson. communication Second, a supra judgment proper. at 1170. as mat was op. See law, held ter Hasson could liable of In Mahon v. Credit Bureau of for of his client. the actions County way Placer we described one Although recognized we have vicarious provide proper verification: FDCPA, Fox see liability under the Bureau, Credit when received [T]he Servs., Inc., 15 F.3d Citicorp Credit request, promptly con- the[verification] (9th Cir.1994) (holding that “Con- office, tacted verified the [the creditor’s] attorney of an gress intended the actions outstanding nature and of the balance client on whose behalf imputed to be the bill, monthly learned statements taken”), legal is they are there no authori- had from creditor’s] been sent office [the attorney ty the that an proposition for for years, over two the[debtors] for the actions of his generally liable client. established that the balance was still the facts un- impressed Nor are we unpaid. The Credit Bureau then derlying provide this case reason for conveyed promptly this information for holding Capital’s actions. Hasson liable [debtors], along with an itemized general agency—which of principles Under statement of the account. liability form the basis vicarious under (9th Cir.1999). Now, 1197, 1203 FDCPA, Newman v. Checkrite see urge us hold that Mahon the Clarks F.Supp. California, a standard below which a debt collec- sets (E.D.Cal.1995)—to for the actions be liable fall. tor’s verification efforts must not another, “principal” must exercise impose high decline to such thresh- We control over the conduct or activities Rather, adopt baseline old. (Second) “agent.” See Restatement by reasonable standard articulated more (1958). § The no Agency Clarks offered Chaudhry v. Galler- the Fourth Circuit trier of upon evidence which reason-able (4th Cir.1999). izzo, At the 174 F.3d 394 fact that Hasson could conclude exercised minimum, “verification of a involves fact, debt Brumley. Capital control over nothing than debt collector con- more opposite: demonstrates the evidence being firming writing that the amount office instructed Hasson’s was 1692g requires § pertinent portion parties' disagreement on 9. The 8. the substance 30, 2002, July conversation also dem- verification of the debt collector to "obtain Brumely’s Capital’s con- consumer, onstrates request upon the debt” summary judgment proper was tention that 1692g(a)(4), to cease collection U.S.C. fell within the ex- because the communication verifi- efforts until the debt collector obtains 1692c(c) invoking specified ception §to consumer, 15 U.S.C. mails it to the cation and ordinarily that are invoked remedies 1692g(b). collector, 1692c(c)(2), see 15 U.S.C. Clearly, genuine issue of without merit. Slenk, material fact exists. 1174 claiming

demanded is what the creditor is that neither nor Hasson Capital violated Hay is owed.” Id. at 406 Azar (citing § 1692g’s verification provisions. The ter, (N.D.Fla.), F.Supp. 874 1317 argue Clarks also that the evidence estab- (11th Cir.1995)). aff'd, 66 342 F.3d Capital lishes conclusively and Hasson Undisputed that, upon alleged facts demonstrate knew by the debt Dr. Evans was verification, request the Clarks’ misstated, invalid amounting primarily obtained Dr. information from Evans 1692e(2)(a), § to a pro- violation of which about the nature and out balance of the hibits the representation false of “the char- standing provided bill and Clarks acter, amount, legal any or status of debt.” documentary evidence the form of the itemized statement. Hasson also sent the 1. statement, copy Clarks the itemized § may Whether violation of 1692e be Capital.

which he had received from predicated upon conduct that is neither limits, Capital Within reasonable and Has- knowing appears nor intentional to be an rely son were entitled to on their client’s issue of first impression the Ninth Cir- verify statements the debt. Accord cuit, again so must thrust ourselves Bleich v. Revenue Group, Maximization murky statutory into the waters of inter- (E.D.N.Y. F.Supp.2d 233 500-01 before, pretation. As we start with the 2002), Collections, Inc., Beattie v. D.M. 754 statutory text of provision at issue: (D.Del.1991) F.Supp. 383, (“Generally, A may any false, debt collector not use reasonably may rely upon debt collector or deceptive, misleading representation by provided information a creditor who has or means in connection with the collec- provided accurate information in the any tion of past.”). Moreover, limiting debt. Without the FDCPA did general impose upon duty investigate application them of the foregoing, the independently presented following the claims Dr. by conduct is a violation of this Evans. Accord Ducrest v. Alco Collec section .... tions, Inc., (M.D.La. F.Supp. (2) representation The false of— 1996). actions, Capital’s and Hasson’s (A) character, amount, legal or sta- then, requirement satisfied the they any debt; tus of or confirm with their" particular client the (B) any compensa- services rendered or being amount claimed. Chaudhry, tion may lawfully which be received (holding that debt collectors do any debt collector for the collection of a not have to “vouch for validity debt. debt”),

underlying they did not violate Though plain §§ U.S.C. 1692e. lan- 1692g(a)(4) 1692g(b). or No reasonable guage trier of does fact could conclude 1692e not include an in- otherwise. element, tent employs “false, words— C. deceptive, or misleading” connote —that inquiry Examining provision Our into the volition.10 verification of iso- then, the debt lation, does not end with the conclusion it is reasonable conclude— 10. False "intentionally wrong defined as un- "lead[s] in direction into a mistak- ... adjusted true or made so as to ... deceive en action or belief often deliberate deceit.” mislead,” course, false, intended tending Webster’s Id. at 759. Of deceptive, and (1987). Collegiate Dictionary Ninth misleading New each have innocent definitions as Something deceptive (also E.g., if it tends or has the well. defining id. at 447 "false” power "give impression.” simply false Id. as "not true” or "inconsistent with the And, something facts”). misleading if it whole”) (internal a harmonious parts suc- into “[t]o other courts—that have some omitted). pursuant a claim and citation cessfully quotation state 1692e(2), plaintiff] must show [the the aim Parsing the FDCPA with knowingly or intention- collector] debt [the context, § 1692e in placing proper its we amount of the misrepresented the ally 1692k(c), which provides: encounter McStay v. in its collection letters.” debt A not held debt collector be liable Inc., 42 System, F.Supp.2d 174 I.C. brought in action this any under sub- (S.D.N.Y.2001) (citing v. Rosen- Stonehart chapter by if the collector shows a debt 910771, 651, thal, No. 01 2001 WL *6 Civ. preponderance of evidence that the vio- (S.D.N.Y. 13, 2001)); Bleich, see also Aug. not lation was intentional and resulted Ducrest, 500-01; 931 F.Supp.2d at 233 notwithstanding from a bona error fide Beattie, 462; F.Supp. 754 at at F.Supp. procedures the maintenance of reason- ably adapted to avoid such error. However, statutory a analyzing “[i]n colleagues As our in other circuits have in text, do look its iso we not words concluded, this to language broad seems exegesis necessarily is a lation. Textual liability make the FDCPA a strict statute. Thus, look not we holistic endeavor---- Perrin, Taylor Landry, deLaunay See v. itself, but to ... language to the also only Durand, (5th 1232, & 103 F.3d 1238-39 as context of the statute a the broader 1051(in- Cir.1997); A.R.S., Goodrich, Equifax v. 74 BF F.3d at Russell whole.” 387 omitted). (2d Cir.1996); quotations 30, ternal and citations F.3d 33 see also Irwin Indeed, explained (N.D.Cal. elsewhere we have Mascott, 112 F.Supp.2d 937 are, course, words of statute “[t]he 2000); Intyre Pittman v. J.J. Mac Co. of pur weights unless animated dead Inc., Nevada, F.Supp. 969 pose of the statute.” Favish v. 609(D.Nev.1997); Office of v. Account Kuhn Con 1171(9th Counsel, 1168, 217 Indep. F.3d Inc., 1443, Technology, F.Supp. trol .2000). Cir (D.Nev.1994). end, “obliged give To that we are conclusion, Latching onto that the Sev- effect, possible, every Congress if word “§ applies Circuit has held that 1692e enth used,” Baker, Reiter 778(citing F.2d representation was unin- even when false 339, 330, Corp., 442 v. Sonotone U.S. Brokerage Gearing tentional.” Check 2326, (1979)), 60 L.Ed.2d 931 S.Ct. (7th Cir.2000) Corp., 233 rejected] have ... in consistently “[w]e (holding misrepresentation unintentional render that would a statuto terpretations legal collector’s status violated nullity,” or a re ry provision surplusage FDCPA); Turner v. J.V.D.B. & see also (9th Cervantes, 955, 961 Cir. 219 F.3d Associates, 991, 995 330 F.3d 2000). (noting See also id. that “statutes Cir.2003) misrepre- unintentional (holding in a which should not construed manner obligated pay that debtor was sentation specific ef provisions independent robs discharged bankruptcy violated a debt (citations fect”) omitted). require This FDCPA); College, 917 Patzka v. Viterbo consistency pursue ment demands (W.D.Wis.1996) (hold- 654, 658-59 F.Supp. only particular provision but within prohibit- fee ing attempt that an collect among provisions also the FDCPA. action that ed law and threat take Gould, Am. Ass’n v. See Bankers legally be taken violated could not (“Our (9th Cir.2005) goal FDCPA). adopted has The Second Circuit interpreting a statute is understand Russell, 74 F.3d at position. a similar See symmetrical reg coherent statute fit, contradictory possible, (holding sending if all ulatory and to scheme Act, though even seq., required notices violated FDCPA 15 U.S.C. 1601 et intent); plaintiff proof construction); did not offer Ca- liberal accord Johnson v. Lucas, (10th Cir.2002) cace v. F.Supp. Riddle, 1107, 1117 505-06 (D.Conn.1990) (“Because (holding that an overstate- the FDCPA ... is a remedial ment of debt “that was a mistake” violated statute, liberally it should be construed FDCPA). consumer.”). favor of the agree

We with the Second and Seventh summary judgment, pre- At the Clarks Requiring Circuits. violation of 1692e purporting sented evidence establish knowing to be needlessly or intentional that the debt on collectors’ reliance Dr. 1692k(c). See, superfluous § e.g., renders representations Evans’ regarding then- Security Pac. Bank Tr. Nat'l v. Resolution debt was unreasonable. Notes taken (9th Cir.1995) (“We 900, Corp., 63 F.3d Brumley indicated that she of the knew must a avoid construction which renders bookkeeping serious difficulties and bill- any language of the superflu enactment ing problems Dr. expe- Evans’ office was ous.”); v. Hearn W. Team Conference of riencing. Arguably, Brumley’s collection Fund, Tr. sters Pension 68 F.3d 304 notes also evidenced her concern over Cir.1995) (“Only where re sensible possible inconsistencies between the debt may sult isn’t reachable we resort to the Dr. respect Evans claimed with to the step ignoring statutory drastic ... lan Clark account and the itemized statement ....”) (citation omitted).11 Instead, guage provided. Dr. Evans oth- Affidavits from only intent is relevant to the determination patients er of the Evans & Sullivan Clinic damages. Taylor, 103 F.3d at to litigation pre- attested successful over 1239(“the fact that violations innocu were Evans, vious false claims Dr. involving ous not may abusive be considered well as and Hasson. As discussed only in mitigating liability, and not as de below, the compel Clarks also moved to fenses”); Bentley v. Great Lakes Collec production of additional documents al- Bureau, (2d Cir.1993) tion legedly relating to this claim. Given the (“the degree of culpabili collector’s] a[debt district court’s failure to consider may only ty be in computing considered motion, below, merits of that discussed damages”). We are convinced that this we need determine whether this evi- reading of the in harmony FDCPA more dence summary sufficed withstand statute, with the remedial nature of the judgment. which requires interpret liberally. us 1692k(c)’s Eby Inc., Cf., e.g., § Pursuant Realty, Reb bona (9th Cir.1974) defense, fide (concluding the re error a debt collector is not purpose medial of the Truth in Lending liable for its violations of the if FDCPA thoroughly added); ("The 11. As Kaplan (emphasis 1692f(3) discussed § v. Asset- 15 U.S.C. care, Inc., (S.D.Fla.2000), F.Supp.2d any postdat- solicitation of a debt collector of "Congress require took care purpose threatening an ele- ed ... check or for knowledge por- instituting ment of or prosecution.”) intent in (emphasis certain criminal added); ("a tions § of the FDCPA it deemed such a 15 U.S.C. 1692c debt collector where requirement necessary” supports may further our not communicate awith consumer in 1692k(c) § generally conclusion that makes any connection with the debt at liability any place FDCPA strict Id. statute. at unusual time or ... known or which see, 1362; e.g., 1692d(5)("Caus- § 15 U.S.C. should known to be inconvenient to the ing ring consumer.”) added). telephone engaging any Here, per- or (emphasis we are telephone son repeatedly persuaded Congress employed conversation spe- such abuse, continuously annoy, qualifiers general intent to cific to limit the more lan- any number.”) Hearn, person harass guage the called of 1692k. See F.3d consumers of the and re- collectors inform not intentional violation was “the debt). notwith- fide error of the For the from bona amount reasons sulted procedures above, standing the maintenance appellants have discussed any such er- reasonably to avoid adapted material pre- triable issues of fact raised 1692k(c). if a Logically, 15 U.S.C. ror.” on cluding judgment these is- the debt reasonably relies on collector debt sues, as well. creditor, the collector by the reported Although never squarely we have errors. On not be liable

will liability of overlapping addressed issue hand, fide error defense the bona other FDCPA, prior our leave under the cases collector whose reli- not shield a debt will action can give convinced one rise us representation is ance on creditor’s Act. multiple In Fox v. violations represents to the or who unreasonable summary judgment Citicorp, reversed that is different debt amount consumer claim on a debtor’s 1692d because she Smith report. Accord from creditor’s that the evidence debt col Systems, presented Transworld had (6th Cir.1992) no viola- (finding despite had called her at work her lector incorrectly listed so, tion because the creditor it not do which violates requests it the debt owed when referred the amount 1692c(a)(1). § In 15 F.3d at 1516 n. 10. Clontz, Jr., collector); Ralph C. the debt to holding, specifically that “it is so noted and Credit Prac- Lending Fair Federal action to more not unusual an violate ¶ (“[A] debt 14.09[3][a][ii] tices Manual Fox, 15 F.3d provision.” than one FDCPA intentionally an claim cannot collector n. of (citing at 1516 Statements General greater actually than is owed amount Commentary Policy Interpretation or Staff owing to get to the consumer admit order Act, Fair Debt Practices on the Collection debt.”). nar- true amount of the This the (Fed. 50,097, 50,101 Fed.Reg. Trade liability the exception under row to strict (“In 1988) many Dec. cases Comm’n defense, Capi- an so FDCPA is affirmative different or subsections of several sections tal, burden Brumley and Hasson bore the given ato factual apply the FDCPA Fox, 15 summary judgment. proof of situation.”)). (as And, appears it that we Yet, they presented no evi- at 1514. F.3d courts) routinely al as other have well reliance dence to demonstrate their to causes actions pursue debtors of lowed reason- representations Dr. Evans’ was on FDCPA, multiple under sections procedures to they or that maintained able upon each was based though even violation Thus, the debt collectors avoid errors. See, e.g., Renick circumstances. the same summary on judgment were entitled Manage Receivable v. Dun & Bradstreet §of or 1692e alleged either violation (9th Services, 1057-58 ment affirmative defense. (Because Cir.2002) notice not vio did requirements of 15 U.S.C. late support finding § 1692g(a), it would not argue also that seek Clarks “false represen used collector] that [debt or collect a known be invalid ing to debt deceptive means collect tation insufficiently constitutes a viola verified debt.”); to collect Charles attempt (which § collec states debt tion 1692d P.C., Associates, 119 F.3d 739 & Lundgren “harass, oppress, cannot or abuse” tors (9th Cir.1997) (same of conduct course in connection consumers sections for violations three stated claim 1692f(l) debt), § the col (prohibiting aof FDCPA); Fields v. Wilber Law law), accord by of a not authorized lection debt Cir.2004) (7th Firm, P.C., 1692g(a)(l)(whieh requires the debt 1692e, §§ (contemplating noncompliance” violations under of ... as factor be con- 1692f, letter). 1692g for one collection determining damages). sidered when difficulty accepting have little

We wisdom of our in Fox and the conclusion II. Failure To Rule on Motion To Com- commentary Trade Federal Commission pel Discovery instance, which it upon relied. For trier Finally, we address Clarks’ certainly of fact would reasonable contention that the district court erred that, finding if Brumley the debt she knew ruling on the cross-motions for collecting invalid, was was the natural con judgment ruling before on mo the Clarks’ calling sequence repeatedly Mrs. Clark compel discovery. tion to additional Gen payment to demand of that debt was to erally, permit the district court’s refusal “harass, oppress, or Mrs. abuse” Clark. discovery further an reviewed for abuse 15 U.S.C. way, See 1692d. the same of discretion. Garrett City County Capital pursues when knows is debt Francisco, San overstated, Capital simultaneously misre Cir.1987). However, by denying as moot presents in contravention of appellants’ the bulk motion without con 1692e seeks to collect amount merits, its sidering the district court failed permitted is not contraven law discretion, its exercise review de so we 1692f(1).12 §of tion novo. Id. at 1518-19. Moreover, as the Trade Federal Com- explained, applicability mission has Among the relevant information the the same conduct of multiple subsections motion compel Clarks’ to elicit sought of the Act “results from the effort Capital’s procedures were for debt verifi in Congress drafting the FDCPA to be cation and document identified Brum explicit and comprehensive, both in order ley’s deposition provides that purportedly opportunities to limit the for debt collec- beyond additional verification of the debt tors evade under-lying legislative the the itemized statement. It is nec neither 50,101. intention.” 53 Fed.Reg. at We essary appropriate pass nor for us to on guess see no reason to second the decision Garrett, the of merits the motion. Congress. of Nonetheless, F.2d at 1519 n. 4. it is obvi ous that the Still, sought evidence the Clarks that, we in cannot believe its provided “potentially could have favorable quest loop-holes, Congress avoid intend information,” Thus, particularly relating to ap ed to create windfalls. we conclude pellants’ claim that appellees that the fact knew that that numerous violations of they sought the predicated the FDCPA are to collect invalid. one set of was upon (“summary Id. judgment circumstances should not should be considered and be granted timely that it is best while during opposing party considered the calcu seeks lation of damages. discovery potentially See 15 U.S.C. favorable informa 1692k(a)(1) tion”) § (2)(A)(limiting (citing & damages Schering Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., (2d damages 4, Cir.1983)); the actual suffered debtor 712 F.2d see also $1,000); damages, additional not to exceed Intern. VISA Service Ass’n v. Bankcard 1692k(b)(1) America, 15 U.S.C. (including “nature Holders 1475- 12. That it is not automatically unusual for an action constitutes violation of anoth- Fox, Rather, provision, violate more than one FDCPA applicability er. the of more than one way implies 1517 n. in no that depends particular section the Act on the provision a violation of one underpinnings the FDCPA factual of each violation. Cir.1986) practices on the minds of unso- (discussing general collection thereto). phisticated exceptions debtors. rule and circumstances, might AFFIRMED, REVERSED, part, In other in this had the excuse error: inclined to REMANDED part, pro- for further discovery- pursue failed to Clarks ceedings opinion. consistent with this Brae compel, motion to in their sought cf. O’SCANNLAIN, Judge, Circuit Coopers Lybrand, Transp., Inc. v. & concurring part, dissenting part. (9th Cir.1986) (“the mov- pursue if complain it fails ant cannot I agree generally While with the Court’s summary judg- discovery diligently before “to reinforce remedi- desire broad ment”), com- they had moved the court to al purpose [Fair Debt Collection for discovery only the deadlines pel after primarily Practices is concerned Act] mo- dispositive discovery or submission likely prac- effect of various until they waited passed, had had tions of unsophisticated tices on the minds debt- the mo- district court ruled on after the ors,” join I specifically parts and while summary judgment, Gault for tions cf. I.B., I.C., majority’s opinion, and II. of the Co., F.R.D. Biscuit Nabisco I dissent from I.A. I respectfully part must (D.Nev.1999) that motion to (explaining agree cannot that Mrs. waiver Clark’s discovery during period compel filed 1692c(c)’s protections did not extend untimely). rarely be considered would (“Brumley”) Janine However, they did not. The active- Clarks (“Capital”); Credit & Collection Service the eve of ly the information until pursued properly trial court concluded on the cross motions argument oral 1692c(c) by re- Brumley did not violate summary judgment. They requested also that rea- turning Mrs. Clark’s call. For motions be judgment son, I dissent to must that extent. of dis- pending completion continued circumstances, the dis- covery. In such I required was to determine trict court majority that a debt- properly The holds discovery the Clarks’ pending merits of protections or the of 15 U.S.C. waive ruling the motion before on 1692c(c), requires a debt collector which Garrett, at motions. 818 F.2d judgment debtor cease communication with the to Here, request. Mrs. Clark upon written a with by initiating communication did so CONCLUSION (“Hasson”) infor- Jeffrey Hasson to obtain a web of presents complicated case This majority her waiver mation. The extends a problems required that has us to address Hasson, view, in my but the waiver only to for which there is a dearth litany of issues Brumley Capital. and apply should also precedent. doing, In applicable of so adopt a construction have endeavored A recognizes that “there is room the FDCPA enacted the Fair Collec- Congress Debt debt collec- the ethical [FDCPA] within (“FDCPA”), Act 15 U.S.C. tion Practices make occasional unavoidable er- tors to 1692-1692o, §§ in order to eliminate “abu- Beattie, 392, rors,” at and 754 F.Supp. col- practices by debt sive debt collection restrictions imposing avoids unreasonable debt to insure that those [and] lectors Simultaneously, on the collection debt. using refrain abusive collectors who from reinforce the broad reme- we wish to that competi- not practices are debt is concerned purpose dial FDCPA disadvantaged.” 15 U.S.C. tively various primarily likely with the effect of 1692(e). FDCPA”). majority acknowledges, alleged the that As the violate To abusive, nothing end, ha- inherently “there is we examine communications with “tendency or unfair a return towards the rassing, deceptive eye language about Maj. phone Op. sophisticated call.” at 1170. This is so the deceive” “least debtor.” 775, call. regardless Corp., of who makes the The Baker v. G.C. Servs. 778(9th Cir.1982); Brumley fact that returned Mrs. Clark’s see also Renick v. Dun Servs., suddenly Mgmt. call instead of Hasson & Bradstreet does not Receivable (9th Cir.2002) 1055, practice. (holding into an transform the call abusive F.3d majority recognizes misleading The the not possibility that communication “was 1692e(c)’s debtor”); protections sophisticated §of because to the least waiver even (9th 1428, 1431 Kaplan, F.3d failure to do would be with Terran so inconsistent Cir.1997) (stating that “whether initial purposes Refusing of the FDCPA. communication violates the de extend Mrs. waiver FDCPA Clark’s on pends likely whether it to deceive or similarly inconsistent. a hypothetical sophisticated mislead ‘least ” B (internal quotation debtor’ marks majority argues omitted)); that waiver Reg’l citation Wade Credit 1692c(c)’s (9th Ass’n, Cir.1996) protections knowing must be Maj. intelligent, Op. (stating and I do that a communication violates But, disagree. “likely conceivable FDCPA if to deceive mislead case, ”). phones sophisticated debtor who collector hypothetical ‘least debtor’ request said to information must be We have also it to used determine whether have “sufficient awareness of the relevant such a debtor would understand a debt likely circumstances and consequences” collector’s communication as a threat. See Larson, action, Serv., Inc., her United States v. 302 Swanson v. S. Or. Credit (9th Cir.1988). Cir.2002), 1222, 1227 namely F.3d F.2d someone will return the call with the re- Jackson, Significantly, Clomon v. quested fact, information. one would 1320(2d Cir.1993), cited certainly expect almost person majority, notes the “least sophisticat- place to be the information one to pur- ed consumer” standard serves a dual return majority call. But the concludes (1) pose. protection “[I]t ensures the of all sophisticated the “least debtor” would consumers, even naive and the trust- expected Brumley, anyone not have ing, against deceptive debt collection prac- Capital, to my return Mrs. Clark’s call. In tices, (2) protects debt collectors view, majority in applying errs such liability against idiosyncratic bizarre standard. interpretations of collection notices.” Id. sophisticated

Use of the “least debtor” used to When determine whether a debtor here, meaning standard to determine the a “would understand he or was she actions, debtor would ascribe to her own waiving is his her rights under unique. Previously, 1692e(c),” employed § we have it the standard serves neither of only to determine purposes. whether a debt collec Maj. Op. these at 1170-1171. tor’s communications to a debtor violate Because returning a debtor’s call not a is Dunlap FDCPA. deceptive practice, See Credit Prot. I no see reason for the Ass’n., L.P., majority’s application Cir. novel of the “least 2005) (judging impact language “[t]he sophisticated debtor” standard here.1 1. sophisticated appropriate, majority by Even were the “least debtor” standard errs

C I Brumley, affirm district would summary judgment all grant court’s Indeed, any stan- I reason to use see no 1692c(c) § parties on Clarks’ claim. Mrs. common sense. other than dard seeking infor- office called Hasson’s Clark debt, despite specific concerning

mation instruc- communication

her earlier cease so, view, doing Clark my In Mrs.

tion. commu- right her to avoid return

waived limited to specifically one

nication—albeit Al- requested. the information

providing Brumley’s employer, Hasson and though WALLACE, D. James Plaintiff- entities, they were are Capital, different Appellant, specific collect the working together Al- inquired. which Mrs. Clark about DIEGO; City SAN of San CITY OF call to return the

lowing parties one Diego Department, Police doing so the others from preventing while Defendants-Appellees. nonsensical, par- where one particularly is to the information. has better access ty No. 03-56552. Brumley Here, Capital, specifically, of Appeals, United States Court requested; information Mrs. Clark had the thus, should, a mat- Ninth Circuit. Mrs. Clark’s waiver sense, apply of common both ter May 4, Argued and 2005. Submitted Brumley.2 Filed Aug. view, then, Brumley my Capital and 1692c(c) § FDCPA not violate did call, and the

by returning Mrs. Clark’s judg- grant

district court’s proper. on the was

ment issue

II her cease-

Because Mrs. Clark waived as to Hasson directive both

communication is, 1692c(c) § should extend injecting subjective element into what Capital. admission, “objective” standard. its own subjec- Majority Op. Mrs. at 10151. Clark's might claim that debt collector 2. A debtor expectations are not rele- tive intentions and waiver abu- scope or was exceeded vant; previ- of her nor her characterization Abusive conduct violates 1692dofthe sive. Brumley. Clark Mrs. ous interactions FDCPA, collector who exceeds the and debt by Brumley's upset have been might scope of a still violate waiver efforts; however, 1692c(c), FDCPA and the However, 1692c(c). unnecessary prohibits only deceptive abu- generally, because, although question the ma- reach that practices, and all sive not actions dispute parties sub- jority states that the Thus, alleged upset Mrs. Clark's debtors. call, specific Brumley's return this stance therapy only on the issue is relevant need following jury district was tried to a issue damages flowing from actual violations summary judgment. partial grant of court's unhappiness col- the FDCPA. with the Her was abusive jury found scope process generally is not to the Clark's lection relevant did not exceed the Mrs. request. her limited waiver information issue of whether

Case Details

Case Name: Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Services, Inc.

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Date Published: Aug 23, 2006

Citation: 460 F.3d 1162

Docket Number: 04-35563, 04-35795

Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.