KITSAP COUNTY CONSOLIDATED HOUSING AUTHORITY, Respondent, v. KIMBRA HENRY-LEVINGSTON, Appellant.
No. 47696-7-II
Division Two
November 15, 2016
688
Stephen J. Parsons (of Northwest Justice Project), for appellant.
¶1 MAXA, A.C.J. — Kimbra Henry-Levingston appeals the trial court‘s ruling that she was in unlawful detainer of her federally subsidized apartment. Kimbra1 rented her apartment from Kitsap County Consolidated Housing Authority (known as “Housing Kitsap“), a public housing authority (PHA) that owns and manages subsidized housing. Housing Kitsap lawfully terminated Kimbra‘s lease effective at the end of the lease term because she violated certain lease provisions. Housing Kitsap then brought this unlawful detainer action under
¶2 Kimbra argues that a combination of federal public housing law and Washington unlawful detainer law required Housing Kitsap to give her an opportunity to cure her lease violations before filing an unlawful detainer action. She relies on
¶3 We hold that under
¶4 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court‘s ruling that Kimbra was in unlawful detainer.
FACTS
Signing the Lease
¶5 On January 10, 2014, Kimbra signed a lease with Housing Kitsap to rent a federally subsidized apartment. Under the lease‘s provisions, Kimbra‘s tenancy began on January 10 and the initial term of the lease was 12 months. But the lease provided that “[t]he first month of the lease shall be the calendar month during which [the] initial tenancy commences.” Clerk‘s Papers (CP) at 327. Therefore, December 31, 2014 was listed as the end date. The lease further stated that the lease “shall automatically be renewed for successive terms of 12 months” unless modified or terminated in accordance with certain lease provisions or not renewed for noncompliance with statutorily required community service. CP at 327.
¶6 On the day of signing, Kimbra met with Megan Hastings, a Housing Kitsap employee, to review the lease terms. At that meeting, Kimbra was accompanied by the father of her three children, Gregory Levingston. Hastings asked Kimbra if Levingston would be living in the apartment, and Kimbra said that he would not be part of the household. Hastings told Kimbra that under the lease terms, Kimbra was required to inform Housing Kitsap of any changes to the household‘s income or composition.
Breach and Termination
¶7 In October, Hastings discovered that Kimbra and Levingston had married. The couple‘s marriage license listed Kimbra‘s subsidized apartment as Levingston‘s residence
¶8 Hastings requested that Levingston attend Kimbra‘s standard recertification meeting. At the meeting, Hastings asked Levingston to confirm that he had not been living at the Housing Kitsap apartment. While Levingston was pulling papers out of his wallet, Hastings saw a form indicating that Levingston was a registered sex offender. Housing Kitsap confirmed that Levingston was a registered sex offender and also discovered that Levingston had previously listed Kimbra‘s apartment as his address in his sex offender registration.
¶9 Shortly after the recertification meeting, Housing Kitsap gave Kimbra a 30-day notice that her lease was being terminated effective December 31, 2014. The notice stated that if Kimbra did not vacate the apartment by December 31, Housing Kitsap would bring an unlawful detainer action. The notice cited Levingston‘s residence at the apartment and Kimbra‘s failure to stay current on her utility bills and subsequent decision to transfer her utility account to Levingston as reasons for termination.2 The notice did not offer Kimbra a chance to cure the alleged violations, but it informed her of her right under federal law to request a grievance hearing.
Grievance Hearings
¶10 Kimbra requested an informal grievance hearing on her termination notice and submitted letters from herself and other witnesses. A Housing Kitsap housing manager upheld the decision to terminate Kimbra‘s tenancy.
¶11 Kimbra then requested a formal grievance hearing, which was scheduled for December 16 before a hearing officer. The hearing officer considered documentation from Housing Kitsap and heard testimony from several witnesses. The hearing officer upheld the termination decision, concluding after reviewing all required policies and procedures in both the lease and the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regulations that Housing Kitsap could proceed with the termination of Kimbra‘s tenancy.
Unlawful Detainer Lawsuit
¶12 On January 9, 2015, Housing Kitsap filed a summons and complaint for unlawful detainer. The complaint alleged that Kimbra had remained unlawfully on the premises after her lease ended on December 31, 2014. Housing Kitsap obtained a show cause order requiring Kimbra to vacate the apartment.
¶13 Kimbra filed an answer in which she asserted affirmative defenses and moved to dismiss the complaint. She acknowledged that the initial term of the lease was from January 10 to December 31, 2014. But her affirmative defense stated that the lease terms and federal law required that her lease automatically renew. Kimbra also moved to dismiss on the ground that Housing Kitsap failed to allow her to cure her alleged lease violations as required by
¶14 After an expedited bench trial, the trial court ruled that Kimbra had in fact violated the terms of her lease. The trial court entering findings of fact that (1) Kimbra‘s lease expired on December 31, 2014 and would have automatically renewed if it had not been terminated for material breaches of the lease; (2) Kimbra violated the lease terms by improperly allowing Levingston to stay with her and failing to pay her utilities; (3) Housing Kitsap terminated Kimbra‘s lease under federal law by giving notice and an opportunity for a hearing; (4) because of the termination the lease did not renew and the lease and tenancy expired on December 31, 2014; and (5) on January 1, 2015 Kimbra was in unlawful detainer of the property. The trial court concluded that Housing Kitsap was entitled to possession and an award of reasonable attorney fees.
¶15 Kimbra appeals the trial court‘s decision.
¶16 Kimbra argues that under
¶17 We hold that
A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
1. Standard of Review
¶18 The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law following a bench trial. Kimbra does not assign error to the trial court‘s factual findings. Therefore, they are verities on appeal. State v. Westvang, 184 Wn. App. 1, 5, 335 P.3d 1024 (2014). But included in the trial court‘s findings of fact were “findings” that Housing Kitsap‘s termination of Kimbra‘s lease prevented it from automatically renewing. That determination was a legal conclusion that required the trial court to interpret the lease provisions and federal law. We review legal conclusions de novo, even if denominated as findings of fact. Robel v. Roundup Corp., 148 Wn.2d 35, 43, 59 P.3d 611 (2002).
2. Federal Public Housing Law
¶19 The terms of PHA lease agreements are dictated by federal statute, specifically
¶20 Other provisions of
¶21 Public housing leases also must require that PHAs give “adequate written notice” of lease termination, which usually means a 30-day notice.
¶22 A PHA cannot terminate a public housing lease without complying with the requirements of federal law. Hous. Auth. v. Bin, 163 Wn. App. 367, 371, 260 P.3d 900 (2011).
3. Washington Unlawful Detainer Law
¶23 “An unlawful detainer action is a statutorily created proceeding that provides an expedited method of resolving the right to possession of property.” Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wn.2d 365, 370-71, 173 P.3d 228 (2007). The unlawful detainer statute, beginning at
¶24 A tenant can be guilty of unlawful detainer under
¶25 First, under
¶26 Second, under
¶27 A trial court cannot grant relief in an unlawful detainer action when a landlord has failed to comply with the relevant subsection of
4. Requirements for Public Housing Evictions
¶28 As discussed above,
¶29 Kimbra does not contest that her lease was lawfully terminated under federal law. Both the hearing officer and the trial court concluded that the termination was lawful. The question here is which subsection of
B. APPLICATION OF RCW 59.12.030(1)
¶30 Whether
1. Statutory Interpretation
¶31 Statutory interpretation is a matter of law that we review de novo. Jametsky v. Olsen, 179 Wn.2d 756, 761, 317 P.3d 1003 (2014). The objective in interpreting a federal statute is to ascertain Congress‘s intent. First-Citizens Bank & Tr. Co. v. Harrison, 181 Wn. App. 595, 602, 326 P.3d 808, review denied, 181 Wn.2d 1015 (2014). To determine legislative intent, we first look to the plain language of the statute, considering the text of the provision, the context of the statute, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Gray v. Suttell & Assocs., 181 Wn.2d 329, 339, 334 P.3d 14 (2014). We also may consider dictionary definitions of undefined statutory terms. Nissen v. Pierce County, 183 Wn.2d 863, 881, 357 P.3d 45 (2015).
¶32 If a statute is unambiguous, we apply the statute‘s plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent without considering other sources of such intent. Jametsky, 179 Wn.2d at 762. If the plain language of the statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the statute is ambiguous. Id. We resolve ambiguity by considering other indications of legislative intent, including principles of statutory construction, legislative history, and relevant case law. Id.
¶33 We will interpret statutory language in a way that avoids an absurd or unlikely result. Five Corners Family Farmers v. State, 173 Wn.2d 296, 311, 268 P.3d 892 (2011). In limited situations, we will interpret language to avoid an absurd result “even if [we] must disregard unambiguous statutory language to do so.” In re Dependency of D.L.B., 186 Wn.2d 103, 119, 376 P.3d 1099 (2016). The purpose of this canon of construction is “to prevent obviously inept wording from thwarting clear legislative intent.” Id.
2. Specified Term of PHA Lease
¶34 Initially, Kimbra argues that
¶35 However, this argument is inconsistent with the plain statutory language. The plain language of
¶36 Kimbra relies on FPA Crescent, where the landlord terminated a lease for failure to pay rent in 2014 even though the lease‘s expiration date was in 2021. 190 Wn. App. at 669. The landlord argued that once the lease was terminated, the lease term expired. Id. at 676. Division Three of this court disagreed, distinguishing expiration of the lease term from a landlord‘s unilateral lease termination before the specified term ended. Id. The court held that the landlord could not file an unlawful detainer action under
¶37 But unlike in FPA Crescent, Housing Kitsap did not terminate the lease before the end of the specified lease term. As stated above, the term of Kimbra‘s lease expired on December 31, 2014. Housing Kitsap‘s termination
¶38 We hold that Kimbra‘s lease had a specified term that expired on December 31, 2014, unless it automatically renewed as discussed below.
3. Automatic Renewal
¶39 Kimbra argues that
¶40 However, when determining the plain language of a statute, we consider not only the text of the provision at issue but also the context of the provision, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Gray, 181 Wn.2d at 339. This principle means that we cannot interpret subsection (1) in isolation from the other subsections of
¶41 Considered as a whole,
¶42 Further, we interpret statutory language in a way that avoids an absurd result. Five Corners, 173 Wn.2d at 311. It simply makes no sense to hold that a lease that has been lawfully terminated can automatically renew.
¶43 We hold that under
C. CHALLENGES TO RCW 59.12.030(1) UNLAWFUL DETAINER
¶44 Kimbra argues that even if
1. Required Notice under Federal Law
¶45 Kimbra relies on federal regulations addressing eviction in arguing that Housing Kitsap violated federal law. Under
¶46 However,
¶47 Because the terms of
2. Constitutional Claims
¶48 Kimbra argues that her eviction without an opportunity to cure the grounds for terminating her lease violated both her due process and equal protection rights. We disagree.
¶49 A PHA is a state actor for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Hous. Auth. v. Saylors, 19 Wn. App. 871, 873, 578 P.2d 76 (1978). Therefore, Housing Kitsap is subject to constitutional provisions. But Housing Kitsap did not violate Kimbra‘s constitutional rights.
a. Due Process
¶50 Kimbra argues that Housing Kitsap violated due process in terminating her lease and evicting her. “Procedural due process prohibits the State from depriving an individual of protected liberty interests without appropriate procedural safeguards. At its core, procedural due process is a right to be meaningfully heard.” In re Det. of Johnson, 179 Wn. App. 579, 587-88, 322 P.3d 22 (citation omitted), review denied, 181 Wn.2d 1005 (2014). Consistent with due process requirements, a PHA must adhere to “elementary standards of fairness” before evicting public housing tenants, including notice and a full adversary hearing. Saylors, 19 Wn. App. at 873. These standards of fairness include complying with federal regulations and a PHA‘s own grievance procedures. Bin, 163 Wn. App. at 371.
¶51 Here, before her eviction Kimbra received notice of the grounds for terminating her lease and had an opportunity to argue her case in a formal hearing before a neutral decision-maker. This procedure complied with the notice and hearing requirements of procedural due process. Kimbra cites no authority for her claim that due process includes an opportunity for a public housing tenant to cure a lease violation before being evicted. We hold that Housing Kitsap‘s termination of Kimbra‘s lease and eviction did not violate due process.
b. Equal Protection
¶52 Kimbra also argues that her eviction under
¶53 But Kimbra does not explain why application of the two subsections violates equal protection. And she cites no authority to support her equal protection argument. We will not consider arguments for which a party has not cited legal authority. Johnson Forestry Contracting, Inc. v. Dep‘t of Nat. Res., 131 Wn. App. 13, 25, 126 P.3d 45 (2005). “‘[N]aked castings into the constitutional sea are not sufficient to command judicial consideration and discussion.‘” Crystal Ridge Homeowners Ass‘n v. City of Bothell, 182 Wn.2d 665, 679, 343 P.3d 746 (2015) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Rosier, 105 Wn.2d 606, 616, 717 P.2d 1353 (1986)). We reject Kimbra‘s equal protection argument.
3. Premature Filing of Unlawful Detainer Action
¶54 Kimbra argues that even if her lease did not automatically renew after it was terminated and
¶55 But Kimbra did not argue in the trial court that the unlawful detainer action was premature. We generally do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.
¶56 Here, Kimbra not only failed to argue in the trial court that her lease expired on January 9, 2015, she affirmatively agreed that her lease term expired on December 31, 2014. In her answer to Housing Kitsap‘s unlawful detainer action she acknowledged that the initial term of the lease was from January 10, 2014 to December 31, 2014. During oral argument, she stated that the lease term was set to expire on December 31, 2014. Therefore, the trial court clearly had no opportunity to address whether Kimbra‘s lease should have ended on January 9, 2015.
¶57 In addition, Kimbra did not assign error to the trial court‘s finding that the lease term ended on December 31, 2014. And Kimbra offers no argument as to why we should consider this issue for the first time on appeal.
¶58 We decline to consider Kimbra‘s argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that Housing Kitsap‘s unlawful detainer lawsuit was premature.
D. ATTORNEY FEES
¶59 Both parties claim entitlement to attorney fees under
CONCLUSION
¶60 We hold that under
¶61 We affirm the trial court‘s ruling that Kimbra was in unlawful detainer.
WORSWICK and MELNICK, JJ., concur.
Reconsideration denied December 15, 2016.