Kimberly Lomastro v. Margaret Iacovelli, in her capacity as interim superintendent for the Town of Johnston et al.
No. 2015-93-Appeal. (KC 10-368)
Supreme Court of Rhode Island
December 1, 2015
Associate Justice Gilbert V. Indeglia
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ. Source of Appeal: Kent County Superior Court. Lower Court Judge: Associate Justice Bennett R. Gallo.
Justice Indeglia, for the Court. The plaintiff, Kimberly Lomastro (Lomastro or plaintiff), appeals from an order of summary judgment entered against her and in favor of Margaret Iacovelli, in her capacity as interim superintendent for the Town of Johnston, and David Cournoyer, the director of facilities and transportation for Johnston public schools (collectively defendants). Lomastro, a school bus driver, contends that the defendants intentionally interfered with her contract with her employer, Durham School Services (Durham), when the Town of Johnston School Department (the school department) sent a letter to Durham stating that it was exercising its contractual right to withdraw its approval for Lomastro to drive school bus routes within the town. On November 4, 2015, this case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised should not be summarily decided. After hearing the arguments of counsel and reviewing the memoranda submitted on behalf of the parties, we are satisfied that cause has not been shown. Accordingly, we shall decide the appeal at this time without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
Facts and Travel
This is the second time that these parties have come before us. While we present a brief overview of the facts pertinent to this appeal, we refer the reader who seeks additional detail regarding the facts and procedural history to our opinion in Lomastro v. Iacovelli, 56 A.3d 92 (R.I. 2012) (Lomastro I).
In January of 2008, Lomastro was employed as a bus driver by Durham, a private bus company. At the time, Durham was under contract with the school department to provide transportation for Johnston public school students. A section of that contract, entitled “Driver Withdrawal,” provided: “It is understood that the Superintendent of Schools or designee reserves the right to withdraw, with or without cause, at any time, their approval of any driver. The contractor will immediately upon receipt thereof replace the driver.”
On January 18, 2008, Lomastro was driving a bus that was full of elementary-school children, without a bus monitor on board, when she broadcast over the radio that someone had shot at her bus and that the children were panicked. After an investigation was conducted, an employee disciplinary report was completed by a supervisor at Durham. In this report, the supervisor determined that Lomastro should be given a warning, but noted that this action was “[p]ending communication with [the] school [department].” On January 23, 2008, Morris Bochner (Bochner), the director of transportation for Johnston schools, wrote a letter to Durham on behalf of the school department stating that it found Lomastro‘s conduct “unacceptable.” The letter stated that, although Lomastro reported that the school bus was shot at, “[a]s the facts unfolded, the Providence Police responded along with Durham and School Department
In her amended complaint,2 Lomastro alleged that the school department‘s letter “constituted an intentional interference with Contract as to [her] then employment with her then current employer * * * as well as intentional interference of prospective economic relations * * * with her employer[.]” In due course, defendants moved for summary judgment. In response, Lomastro argued that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether she was an at-will
The hearing justice determined that the school department was a customer of Durham and, as a customer, exercised a right that it had reserved in its contract with Durham to “indicate that [it] didn‘t want a particular driver assigned to [the school department‘s] route.” He further determined that Lomastro was not an employee of the school department, but an employee of Durham. Thus, he concluded that her claims against the school department must fail, noting that “her gripe is with [Durham].”3 Accordingly, he granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. Lomastro timely appealed to this Court.
II
Standard of Review
This Court reviews a hearing justice‘s grant of summary judgment in a de novo manner, applying the same standards and rules as did the motion justice. Pichardo v. Stevens, 55 A.3d 762, 765 (R.I. 2012). In conducting our review, we remain mindful that “[s]ummary judgment is a drastic remedy, and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously.” DeMaio v. Ciccone, 59 A.3d 125, 129 (R.I. 2013) (quoting Estate of Giuliano v. Giuliano, 949 A.2d 386, 390 (R.I. 2008)).
However, it is well settled that “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court determines that there are no issues of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Pichardo, 55 A.3d at 765 (quoting Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Neary, 785 A.2d 1123, 1126 (R.I. 2001)). In making a summary judgment determination, the
III
Discussion
On appeal, Lomastro first contends that summary judgment was improper on her wrongful termination claim because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether she was an at-will employee. Specifically, she asserts that the normal “custom and usage” period for school bus drivers is for an academic year and that defendants presented no evidence demonstrating that she was an at-will employee. However, the issue of whether Lomastro was an at-will employee is not material. Lomastro was employed by Durham which, in turn, contracted with the school department for transportation of the school students. Importantly, Lomastro had no employment contract with the school department. Without an employment relationship with the town upon which to base a wrongful termination claim, her claim must fail. See Hyatt v. Village House Convalescent Home, Inc., 880 A.2d 821, 825 (R.I. 2005).
Lomastro‘s second contention on appeal is that summary judgment was inappropriate with regard to her claims for intentional interference with contractual relations and intentional interference with prospective economic relations. Specifically, she asserts that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Lomastro‘s broadcast was truthful and not a “hoax” as the school department‘s letter suggested.
The elements required to establish a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic relations “are identical to those required [for] a claim based on intentional interference
Here, the sole issue is whether a genuine issue of material fact exists as to justification for the school department‘s actions. In expounding upon the doctrine of intentional interference with contractual relations, we have recognized that one way in which a defendant‘s actions may be justified is if that defendant interferes by making a good-faith assertion of a legally protected interest. See Belliveau Building Corp., 763 A.2d at 629. Specifically, we have declared that:
“One who, by asserting in good faith a legally protected interest of his own or threatening in good faith to protect the interest by appropriate means, intentionally causes a third person not to perform an existing contract or enter into a prospective contractual relation with another does not interfere improperly with
the other‘s relation if the actor believes that his interest may otherwise be impaired or destroyed by the performance of the contract or transaction.” Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) Torts § 773 at 52 (1977)).
The touchstone of our inquiry is the defendant‘s good faith at the time that the defendant exercises its legally protected interest. See id. at 630 (noting that there was no evidence to show that, when the defendants asserted their legally protected interest, “they did not ‘honestly suppose[] such right to exist‘”) (quoting Hopkins v. Drowne, 21 R.I. 20, 25, 41 A. 567, 568 (1898)). Indeed, this Court has repeatedly recognized that, even where a defendant‘s assertion of a right ultimately turns out to be unfounded, “if at the time he [or she] spoke, he [or she] honestly supposed such right to exist, no action lies.” Id. (quoting Hopkins, 21 R.I. at 25, 41 A. at 568-69). Accordingly, so long as a defendant is acting in good faith at the time it asserts its interest, based on all information available to it at that time, the assertion of such interest is protected—even if it is later determined that the basis for the defendant‘s action was invalid. See id.
We first recognize that there is no doubt that the school department had a legally protected interest in its contract with Durham. Indeed, such contract provided that the school department “reserve[d the school department‘s] right to withdraw, with or without cause, at any time, their approval of any driver.”4
Our inquiry next turns to whether the school department was justified because it invoked this provision in good faith. In the case at hand, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the school department was not acting in good faith at the time that it sent the letter to Durham exercising its right to remove Lomastro from routes within the town. In invoking this provision
Nevertheless, Lomastro contends that the school department‘s letter to Durham asking that she be replaced creates a genuine issue of material fact as to justification because the letter stated that the broadcast was a hoax and, thus, it must be determined whether Lomastro had a basis to broadcast that the bus had been shot at. In support, Lomastro asserts that she was not criminally charged as a result of the incident and that the surveillance video from the bus at the time of the incident shows that she had a reasonable basis to believe she was being shot at.
Lomastro‘s argument misses the mark: Whether it can be determined in hindsight that Lomastro had a basis to broadcast that the bus had been shot at is of no consequence. In assessing whether a defendant acted in good faith, what is relevant is the information available to that defendant at the time of the allegedly improper action. See Belliveau Building Corp., 763 A.2d at 630. At the time the school department sent the letter to Durham, all of the information available to it suggested that Lomastro had no basis for her broadcast. Specifically, the school department was aware that Lomastro had broadcast over the radio that her school bus had been shot at, but that the Providence Police, together with Durham and school department personnel, determined that this was not the case. Notably, Lomastro has not presented any evidence that, at the time that the letter was sent, the school department knew or had reason to know that she had
It is Lomastro‘s failure to provide evidence that the school department invoked its contractual right without justification that prevents her from establishing a prima facie case and, thus, causes her claim to fail. Accordingly, we hold that the hearing justice did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The materials associated with this case may be remanded to the Superior Court.
Associate Justice Gilbert V. Indeglia
CASE NOS: No. 2015-93-Appeal. (KC 10-368)
COURT: Supreme Court
DATE OPINION FILED: December 1, 2015
JUSTICES: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
WRITTEN BY: Associate Justice Gilbert V. Indeglia
SOURCE OF APPEAL: Kent County Superior Court
JUDGE FROM LOWER COURT: Associate Justice Bennett R. Gallo
ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL: For Plaintiff: Thomas M. Petronio, Esq. For Defendants: Kathleen M. Daniels, Esq.