126 A.3d 470
R.I.2015Background
- Lomastro was a Durham School Services bus driver; Durham contracted with Johnston School Department to provide student transportation.
- Contract between Durham and the school department reserved the superintendent’s right to withdraw approval of any driver at any time.
- On January 18, 2008, while driving a bus of elementary students, Lomastro radioed that someone had shot at the bus; police and school personnel later concluded that the broadcast was unfounded.
- The school department sent a letter to Durham invoking its contractual "Driver Withdrawal" right and requesting that Lomastro not transport Johnston students; Durham then involuntarily separated Lomastro.
- Lomastro sued for wrongful termination and tortious interference with contract and prospective economic relations; after remand from this Court to permit amendment, the Superior Court granted summary judgment for the defendants and Lomastro appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wrongful termination | Lomastro contends she was not an at‑will employee and thus wrongful termination claim could lie against the town. | School dept. contends Lomastro was employed by Durham, not the town, so no employer‑employee relationship with town exists. | Court: No wrongful termination claim against town; Lomastro had no employment contract with town. |
| Intentional interference with contract/prospective relations — existence of factual dispute | Lomastro argues a genuine issue exists whether her broadcast was truthful (not a hoax), so town’s justification is disputed. | Defendants argue they acted pursuant to a contractual right and honestly relied on information available at the time (police and personnel concluded broadcast was unfounded). | Court: Whether broadcast was ultimately truthful is immaterial; town acted in good faith based on information available when it invoked its right. Summary judgment affirmed. |
| Justification / privilege for interference | Lomastro asserts the town’s letter was unjustified and motivated the termination. | Defendants assert a legally protected interest (contract with Durham) and good‑faith assertion of that interest justified interfering. | Court: Good‑faith assertion of a protected contractual right is a valid justification; plaintiff failed to show lack of justification. |
| Standard for summary judgment | Lomastro contends factual issues preclude summary judgment. | Defendants rely on record showing no material fact dispute about the town’s good faith and contractual authority. | Court: De novo review; viewing facts in light most favorable to Lomastro, no material factual dispute on justification — summary judgment proper. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lomastro v. Iacovelli, 56 A.3d 92 (R.I. 2012) (prior appeal addressing procedural history and remand to permit tortious‑interference claim)
- Belliveau Building Corp. v. O’Coin, 763 A.2d 622 (R.I. 2000) (elements of intentional interference and legal‑malice/justification framework)
- Avilla v. Newport Grand Jai Alai LLC, 935 A.3d 91 (R.I. 2007) (equating elements for interference with contract and prospective relations)
- Hyatt v. Village House Convalescent Home, Inc., 880 A.2d 821 (R.I. 2005) (no wrongful‑termination claim where no employment relationship with defendant)
- Pichardo v. Stevens, 55 A.3d 762 (R.I. 2012) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- DeMaio v. Ciccone, 59 A.3d 125 (R.I. 2013) (summary judgment is drastic and must be applied cautiously)