73 Fla. 832 | Fla. | 1917
Lead Opinion
Charles B. Kersey was indicted for. the crime of murder in the first degree, tried'before ,a jury, convicted of the crime of murder in the second degree and sentenced to confinement at hard labor in the State prison during the remainder, of his natural life. Before taking' up- for consideration the errors which have been assigned and argued before us we think it advisable to state that the evidence adduced establishes the fact that Edith Kersey, for causing whose death by shooting her with a shot gun the defendant was placed on trial under an indictment, charging him with the crime of mur
The second and third assignments, which are argued together, are as follows:
“II. Because of the admission, under the objection of plaintiff in error, of the testimony of the witness, J. R. Johnson, to the effect that, in his opinion, if the gun had been fired from the position in which it was found, the load or shot,'would have ranged or gone straight into the head of deceased and not inward and upward.”
“HI. Because the lower court, in passing- upon the admissibility of the evidence complained of, in assignment of error number two, left it to the witness, J. R. Johnson, to decide whether or not it was opinion evidence and therefore admissible whereas that question should have been decided by the court and not'the witness.”
The bill of exceptions discloses that, after Dr. Frederick A. Grossman and W. T. Jones, the Sheriff of St. Lucie County, had been introduced as witnesses on behalf of the State and had testified, among other things, as to the position in which the body of the deceased was found and also as to its condition, J. R. Johnson was called to the witness-stand by the State and testified that he was County Judge of St. Lucie County and that he
In order to render our discussion of these two assignments the more readily intelligible, we would state that there were no eye-witnesses to the shooting and, as the defendant frankly says in his brief: “It was the theory of plaintiff in error that deceased committed suicide; that she pulled the chair (which was found lying on the floor upon its back near the bed) up near the bed, placed the stock of the gun in the bottom of the chair so as to have the proper range and so that she could hold it and reach it when she was lying- down; and that she, with her left hand holding the barrel or muzzle of the gun to her head, with her right hand pushed the broom stick (which was found near the bed) against the trigger of the gun and discharged it.”
It must be’admitted that what has come to be known as the “Opinion Rule” in evidence has given the courts and text-writers much trouble. Prof. Wigmore devotes an entire Chapter to it. See Chapter LXV, beginning with Section 1917 on page 2541 in Vol. 3 of Wigmore’s Evidence. In section 1926 he announces his conclusion as follows: “That the test of the Opinion rule is a flexible, a living one; 'that there is no fixed form of words, no mere shibboleth—such as the word ‘opinion’ conveys— this is the important aspect of the principle never to be lost sight of. The question must be asked on each occasion, Can'the jury be fully equipped, by the mere recital of the data, to draw inferences ?—in other words, Can all the data be exactly reproduced by'mere testimonial words and gestures?” An interesting discussion bf this vexed’ question will be found in Vol. 5 of Ency. of Ev., beginning on page 651, and numerous authorities are cited in
In Hardy v. Merrill, 56 N. H. 227, text 241, Mr.
But if a general rule will comfort any who insist upon excluding and suppressing- truth, unless the expression of the truth be restrained within the confines of a legal rule, standard, or proposition, let them be content to adopt a formula like this : Opinions of zmtnesses derived from observation are admissible in evidence, when, fronl the nature of the subject under investigation, no better, evidence can be obtained. No harm can result from such a rule, properly applied. It opens a door for the reception of important truths which would otherwise be excluded, while, at the same time, the tests, of cross-examination, disclosing- the witness’s means of knowledge, and his intelligence, judgment, and honesty, restrain the force of the evidence within reasonable limits, by enabling the jury to form a due estimate of its weight and value.” Also- see 5 Ency. of Ev. 669; Elsner v. Supreme Lodge, Knights and Ladies of Honor, 98 Mo. 640, 11 S. W. Rep. 991; Indiana, B. & W. R. Co. v. Hale, 93 Ind. 79.
This court has several times -been confronted with this, question.’ In Mann v. State, 23 Fla. 610, 3 South. Rep. 207, we held: “The opinion of a witness, except in expert testimony, is not legitimate evidence, as to any matter that may be reproduced before the jury by a witness, it being the province o'f the jury to form their own opin
The fourth assignment is as follows: “Because the lower court over objection of plaintiff in error, permitted the witness, George Long, to state that there were no powder burns upon the face of deceased.”
George Long, a State witness, testified that he was a member of the coroner’s jury that held the inquest and that he made an examination of the body of Edith Kersey ánd described its áppearance and condition, going into details about the wound. We copy the following portion of his direct examination: “Q. What did you see on the sheets there if anything-? A. Nothing but blood. Q. Have you had any experience in shooting guns? A. A little. Q. What was the color of the flesh of that wound on the front side of it? A. Around the gash? Q. Yes. A. It was just like the rest of her flesh. Q. Did you find anything there that did not belong there? A. No, sir, not that I know of. Q. Was there or was there not any indications of powder burns there? By M'r. Adcock: We object to that because it is leading-. The witness has stated the color of the flesh there, and because it is leading, and also1 because it calls for the opinion of the witness. Pie states the color of the flesh. By the Court: Did you make a thorough examination of the wound? A: Yes sir. Q. From your examination made of the wound could you tell whether or not there was any powder burns on the flesh? By Mr. Adock: To which we interpose the same objection. By the Court: Objection is overruled. Exception is noted. By the witness : No sir, I did not see any powder burns at all.”
It will be observed that the question to which the objection interposed was overruled and upon which ruling this assignment is founded-was, «“From your examina
We now reach the fifth assignment: “Because the lower court, by his attitude and remarks, and by his action in having the Court Stenographer to repeat the testimony of the witness, Everett Hamilton, to the jury, gave undue prominence and emphasis to the testimony of said witness, Everett Hamilton.”
The bill of exceptions shows that Everett Hamilton, a State witness, was a boy eleven years of age, who gave in his testimony in such a low tone that the trial judge, apprehending' that it might not be audible to the jury, asked the jury if they could hear the witness, to which question one of the jurors replied, “No, sir, not very well.” The following proceedings then occurred: “By Mr. Jones: We0 had better have the testimony read to
Several times subsequently the trial judge asked the jury if they could hear the witness, and the witness was requested to “talk up.” -The stenographer’s notes are not shown to 'have been further read to the jury, but the last time the court asked the jury if they could hear the witness, the following transpired: “By Mr. Adcock: May it please the Court, we do not care for this testimony, but we want to make an objection to the action of the court in putting this before the jury in such an emphatic way, the jury might attach some importance to your asking them if they hear— By the Court: Do you think that the jury will attach some importance to the court asking them if they can hear? I want the jury to hear. Gentlemen of the jury, I want you to distinctly understand that, I want -to leave no impression with you of my own anxiety in this except for you to hear the testimony of the
No error is made to appear here. The witness was of tender years and inexperienced in court proceedings, doubtless excited and perhaps somewhat frightened. It was important for the proper administration of justice that the jury should hear his testimony. See Wilson v. Johnson, 51 Fla. 370, 41 South. Rep. 395, and Adams v. State, 55 Fla. 1, 46 South. Rep. 152, which we have previously cited. Also see our discussion and holding in Barton v. State, 72 Fla. 408, 73 South. Rep. 230.
The sixth assignment is: “Because the lower court denied the motion of plaintiff in error, to strike the testimony of the witness, Everett Hamilton, to the effect that he had previously’made statements out of court to third parties consistent with those made by him in court upon the witness stand.”
The bill of exceptions shows the following, the State Attorney examining’ the witness: “Now Everett has Mr. Parker, this gentleman here right there or me drilled you as to what you should say on this stand, or are you telling the things you saw at that time? A. Well I am stating what I saw. Q. Stating what you saw? A. Yes sir. Q. Who did you first tell about that what you say if you remember? A. I do not remember—-Well I remember telling it at Quay of course— Q. Telling it at Quay? A. Yes sir, and I have told my brothers. Q. Which brother was that? A. Well I have told both of them part of it. I never have brought it all in. Q. But you told them about what you have told to this jury to-day is that right? A. No sir. Q. I say you have told part to
The seventh assignment is: “Because the lower court, in passing upon the admissibility of the testimony of the witness, J. T. McCall, as to’ an alleged confession of plaintiff in error, refused to determine the question of fact as to whether said alleged confession was freely and voluntarily made.” This assignment does not call for any extended discussion. The trial court did not refuse to determine whether or not the confession of the defendant was freely and voluntarily made, but after the witness had testified as to the facts and circumstances under which the confession was made the court overruled the objections interposed by the defendant and permitted the witness to testify as to such confession and afterwards overruled the motion of the defendant to strike out such testimony. See Thomas v. State, 58 Fla. 122, 51 South. Rep. 410, and McDonald v. State, 70 Fla. 250, 70 South. Rep. 24.
The twelfth assignment is: “Because the lower court, over the objection of plaintiff in error, excluded the testimony of plaintiff in error to the effect that the deceased had stated to him just previous to the time that her body
The defendant took the witness-stand in his own behalf and during his direct examination, after offering testimony as to what Dr. Grossman stated to the witness as to the result of his examination of the body of Edith Kersey, which was objected tO' by the State and the objection sustained, no exception being taken to such ruling, the following proceedings took place: “Q. Did, if at any time after Doctor Grossman was there to see your wife and during the week previous to the time her body was found, if she ever made a statement to you to the effect that she had taken poison, please state to the jury what that was. By Mr. Jones: If the conversation between the alleged conversation between the deceased and this man is to- be permitted to go' in I do not know where the range of evidence is limited. • It would be in the nature of attempting a self serving statement, wh'at did she say to you before her death. Now then the State should be permitted to put in what she said to others in regard to the fight between this defendant and herself, which I am frank to admit are inadmissible, because they would be hearsay, now if the matters that he is inquiring into were res gestae and if they occurred at the time of the tragedy some exclamation something- that she said then and there but not conversation that may have occurred between husband and wife prior would not be admissible under the old rule that communications where marital relation exists were improper. Why because it might be a violation—because there might be that intimate relation which prevents and forbids under the law to set aside the veil of marital communications. In this instance this is used for the purpose of bringing in a shielding statement to himself and under the circumstances I submit to the
We have examined all of the authorities cited by the respective parties, but shall not undertake an analysis or discussion of-them. If the indictment had charged the defendant with the murder of his wife by the administration of poison to her, we think that the proffered testimony as to the statements of the deceased might have been admissible. However, the indictment did not so charge and the uncontradicted proofs shows that the deceased came to her death from a wound inflicted by a discharge. from a shot gun. We are also of the opinion that the evidence'establishes that it was a practical impossibility for the deceased to have committed suicide by shooting herself. It necessarily follows that no reversible error was committed in excluding the proffered testimony. Among the authorities cited are the following to which we think it well to refer: Commonwealth v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180, 31 N. E. Rep. 961, 24 L. R. A, 235; State
The thirteenth assignment, which is argued in connection with the twelfth, is as' follows: “Because the lower court erred in refusing to permit the plaintiff in error to testify to an attempt upon the part of deceased to commit' suicide a 'few days prior to her death.”
This assignment has no basis in the record, as the bill of exceptions does not disclose any-offer on the part of the defendant “to testify to an attempt upon the part of deceased to committ suicide a few days prior to her death” and the refusal of such testimony by the court. We also refer to our discussion of the immediately preceding assignment. 1
The fourteenth assignment is as follows: “Because the lower court erred in refusing to give in charge plaintiff’s in error request number two, which was as follows: ‘If defendant picked the gun up to kill a chicken and accidentally dropped it and it accidentally went off and killed deceased, the defendant would not be guilty of murder as charged in the indictment and the jury should return a verdict of Not guilty.’ ”
The only possible basis for this requested instruction in the bill of exceptions is the testimony of J. T. McCall, a State witness, who testified that he was a deputy sheriff and that the defendant made a confession to- him iri which he stated that he did kill his wife, that he was going to kill a chicken which he saw out. of the window and stepped back and got the gun and “when I did I dropped it and it killed her.” ’The defendant postively denied ever having' made any such statement to McCall. • As the court fully instructed the jury in the general charge upon
The fifteenth and sixteenth assignments are argued together and are as follows :
“XV. Because the record does not show that plaintiff in error was present in court either in the forenoon or afternoon sessions of court upon the day of October 17th, 1916, at which time he was being tried for a capital offense.”
“XVI. Because the record does not show that plaintiff in error was present in court upon the afternoon of October 18th, 1916, at which time he was being tried for a capital offense.”
There is no occasion for any extended discussion of the question presented by these two assignments,- as the matter has often been before this court and thoroughly treated. In the case of Holton v. State, 2 Fla. 476, we held: “During the whole of the trial of a capital case, the prisoner has a right to be, and must be, present. This is a settled and well established principle of criminal law ; and this principle is violated by sending the charge of the court to the jury, if such a step' is taken in the absence of the prisoner.
“The prisoner in a capital casemust be. personally present 'during- the whole of the trial, and at every step taken in the cause. Fie has the right to discuss questions both of law and fact—and if, in any stage of the trial, any proceeding is had which he has been deprived of such right, it is the denial of a right which the Constitution guarantees to him. At every stage of the proceedings, he must, have an opportunity of coming into court,
The seventeenth assignment is: “Because plaintiff in error was not present when the jury, together with the trial judge, and officers of court, went to view and did view the upper or second story of the county jail.”
We find that the record discloses that the defendant “made a motion that the jury be allowed to visit the jail
“State of Florida, )
County of St. Lucie, j
ss'
“Personally appeared before me, Loyce D. Hackett, a Notary Public in and for the State of Florida at Large, A. D. Penney an,d M. K. Adcock, who being duly sworn say: That they are the attorheys for the defendant in the case of State vs. Charles B. Kersey, and defended him in the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit of Florida in and for St. Lucie County, at the fall term of said Court, A. D. 1916, affiants state that, during the progress of above mentioned trial, the court upon motion of defendant, ordered the jury to view the upper or second story of the County Jail and the jury, together with all of the attorneys, the court, clerk and officers, left the court house for that purpose and went to said jail, and while viewing the same it was discovered that defendant was not present, whereupon the court ordered the jury to cease their view and immediately sent an officer for defendant and, when the officer returned with defendant, the view was resumed and continued.” While this was an irregularity, it does not constitute reversible error. See Haynes v. State, 71 Fla. 585, 72 South. Rep. 180, wherein we held: • “Where, in a- trial for murder, it clearly appears from the record that on the application of the counsel for the defendant, the defendant being present, the court directed a view by the jury of the place where the homicide was committed, that counsel for the
The only remaining assignment questions the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. AVe have no hesitancy in declaring that we are of the opinion that the evidence adduced is amply súfflcient to support the verdict rendered. See Rhodes v. State, 65 Fla. 541, 62 South. Rep. 653, and cases there cited. As we held in Seymour v. State, 66 Fla. 133, 63 South. Rep. 7, “A judgment of conviction will not be reversed on writ of error even if technical errors were committed in rulings on the admissibility of evidence or in charges given or refused or in other matters of procedure, where the evidence of guilt is clear and ample and no fundamental rights- of the defendants were violated, and it appears from the whole record that such technical errors, if any, were not prejudicial, to the defendants.”
No reversible errors having been made to appear to us, the judgment must be affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
I think the evidence is ample to justify the verdict; and on the doctrine laid down in Seymour v. State, 66 Fla. 133, 63 South. Rep. 7, quoted at the conclusion of the opinion in this case, I concur therein.