KENNETH HALL, Plaintiff–Appellant, BYRON SHARPER, Intervenor Plaintiff–Appellant, v. STATE OF LOUISIANA; JOHN BEL EDWARDS, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Louisiana; JEFF LANDRY, in his official capacity as Attorney General; TOM SCHEDLER, In his official capacity as the Louisiana Secretary of State; CITY OF BATON ROUGE; PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE; SHARON WESTON BROOME, Official Capacity as the Mayor-President of Baton Rouge, Defendants–Appellees.
No. 15-30858
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
March 13, 2018
PRISCILLA R. OWEN, Circuit Judge
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and OWEN, Circuit Judges. FILED March 13, 2018. Lyle W. Cayce, Clerk.
Kenneth Hall and Byron Sharper appeal the district court‘s denial of their
I
In 1993, the Louisiana Legislature enacted Act 609, which replaced Baton Rouge‘s at-large electoral system with one that divided the city into two electoral sections, demarcated Election Section One and Election Section Two. The Legislature then subdivided the majority-black Election Section One into two electoral divisions (B and D) and the majority-white Election Section Two into three electoral divisions (A, C, and E). This electoral formulation is known as a “2-3” districting system.
In this system, each division elects one judge to Baton Rouge City Court. After the enactment of Act 609, Baton Rouge elected two black judges to divisions B and D and three white judges to divisions A, C, and E in every election, resulting in a court that was constantly composed of two black judges and three white judges. During this time, Baton Rouge‘s demographics shifted from 43.9% black and 53.9% white to 54.5% black and 39.4% white.
In light of these facts, Hall initiated a suit, in which Sharper subsequently intervened, against the State of Louisiana, the City of Baton Rouge, the Parish of East Baton Rouge, and various state officials (collectively the Government). Hall and Sharper (collectively Hall) asserted claims under the Voting Rights Act, requesting declaratory and injunctive relief under the theory that the “2-3” districting system violated Section 2 of the Act and requested that the court declare the State of Louisiana subject to the Act pursuant to its Section 3(c). Also alleging that the “2-3” districting system contravened the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Hall sought damages, inclusive of costs, pursuant to
Two days after the district court issued its judgment, the Louisiana Legislature enrolled House Bill 76, which sought to replace the “2-3” districting
Hall timely moved pursuant to
The district court denied Hall‘s motion to vacate. The court reasoned that, although Hall‘s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief under the Voting Rights Act were moot, vacatur is not an automatic right and Hall did not show that the balance of equities warranted such an “extraordinary remedy.”1 To reach its decision, the court assessed “twin considerations of fault and public interest.”2 Fault, the court held, weighed in favor of vacatur because Hall had not caused his claims to become moot. Nevertheless, the court determined that the public interest in preserving precedent and furthering judicial consistency, when combined with the judgment‘s minimal effect on non-parties, was sufficient to offset Hall‘s lack of fault, resulting in the denial of Hall‘s
II
We review the denial of a
Hall contends there are three principal errors in the district court‘s assessment of whether vacatur was appropriate. First, Hall asserts that the district court misapplied the Supreme Court‘s decision in U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Company v. Bonner Mall Partnership9 and our court‘s en banc decision in Staley v. Harris County, Texas.10 Second, Hall argues that the district court erroneously speculated that its judgment influenced the Louisiana legislature and erred in concluding that this influence weighed
Hall‘s briefing relies on court decisions in which the controversy became moot while the case was on appeal, and an appellate court considered the question of whether to vacate the district court‘s judgment and opinion or order.11 The source of a district court‘s authority to vacate a judgment when a controversy has become moot is
United States v. Munsingwear, Inc.15 and Bancorp are two of the Supreme Court‘s seminal decisions regarding the propriety of vacatur when a case is rendered moot. Both of these cases, and others applying them,
Driving this decision is the basic judicial tenet that “cases cannot be read as foreclosing an argument [with which] they never dealt.”18 Neither the Supreme Court nor our court has addressed the standard for assessing a
For the reasons articulated by the Fourth Circuit,23 we conclude that “absent unusual circumstances, the appellate vacatur decision under Bancorp is informed almost entirely, if not entirely, by the twin considerations of fault and public interest,”24 and that those considerations “must also be largely determinative of a district court‘s decision whether to vacate its own judgment due to mootness under
III
To understand fully the Supreme Court‘s decisions as to whether vacatur is appropriate when a case becomes moot, we must consider its decision in Munsingwear. In that case, the Government contended that the defendant
[t]he established practice of the Court in dealing with a civil case from a court in the federal system which has become moot while on its way here or pending our decision on the merits is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss.33
The Court reasoned that vacatur “clears the path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties and eliminates a judgment, review of which was prevented through happenstance. When that procedure is followed, the rights of all parties are preserved; none is prejudiced by a decision which in the statutory scheme was only preliminary.”34 Notably, the Court apparently
The Supreme Court subsequently decided Bancorp, in which it considered “whether appellate courts in the federal system should vacate civil judgments of subordinate courts in cases that are settled after appeal is filed or certiorari sought.”35 Both parties in Bancorp “agree[d] that vacatur must be decreed for those judgments whose review is . . . ‘prevented through happenstance‘” or by “unilateral action of the party who prevailed in the lower court.”36 The precise question was whether the Court should “extend[] Munsingwear to settlement.”37 The Court held that it should not.38 The reasons it gave are relevant to the case presently before us.
As just noted, the Supreme Court recognized in Bancorp that the statement in Munsingwear that vacatur was the “established practice” was “dictum.”39 The Court also noted that the practice of vacatur “was not entirely uniform,” observing that “at least three cases ha[d] been dismissed for mootness without vacatur within the four Terms preceding Munsingwear”40 and that “the post-Munsingwear practice [has not] been as uniform as petitioner claims.”41 The Court therefore examined vacatur anew.42 The Court equated “happenstance” with “‘circumstances unattributable to any of the parties,‘”43 and, in distinguishing a case mooted by settlement, the Court said
The “equitable tradition” to which the Court referred was the disposition of moot cases in the manner “most consonant to justice,” and in arriving upon that determination, the Court explained that “[t]he principal condition to which we have looked is whether the party seeking relief from the judgment below caused the mootness by voluntary action.”45 The Court reasoned that “[a] party who seeks review of the merits of an adverse ruling, but is frustrated by the vagaries of circumstance, ought not in fairness be forced to acquiesce in the judgment,” and that “[t]he same is true when mootness results from unilateral action of the party who prevailed below.”46 But the Court also reasoned that “when federal courts contemplate equitable relief, our holding must also take account of the public interest.”47 Judgments “should stand,” the Court concluded, “unless a court concludes that the public interest would be served by vacatur” because “[j]udicial precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the legal community as a whole” and “[t]hey are not merely the property of private litigants.”48 Elucidating these precepts, the Court concluded that “the public interest is best served by granting relief when the demands of ‘orderly procedure’ cannot be honored.”49
The Fifth Circuit sitting en banc addressed the interplay between Munsingwear and Bancorp in Staley v. Harris County, Texas. In Staley, our
In the present case, the appeal was mooted by actions of the Louisiana legislature, which is not a party to this suit. No “fault” in mooting the appeal is attributable to any of the defendants, even though some of them are officials of the State of Louisiana. Bobby Jindal, who was Governor when the new legislation was passed, signed the bill that was presented to him, but the legislative body crafted it, and there is no evidence that he was the moving force behind the legislation. Hall is not subject to a money judgment or any injunctive relief as a result of the district court‘s judgment. In this regard, Hall is not “forced to acquiesce in the judgment.”53 One of the equitable principles animating the Supreme Court‘s exposition of the considerations when vacatur due to mootness is sought was whether a party seeking vacatur who was not at fault would be forced to comply with the judgment. The res judicata effect, if any, of the district court‘s rulings pertain specifically to a state election law that no longer exists. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that Hall was not entitled to vacatur under
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the order of the district court denying relief under
I generally concur with the majority‘s reasoning and outcome. However, where the mooting action in a case consists of a state‘s passage of new legislation, I think it unhelpful to assign comparative “fault” to the distinct public officials who play some role in the legislative process. Other courts have suggested that the governor‘s role may be relevant in the past,1 for instance, but I remain unpersuaded. The state—with its Legislative and Executive Branches—acts in unity to pass legislation, and therefore other equitable considerations should govern vacatur in such cases.
