KATRINA WALKER v. CARL WEATHERSPOON, et al.
No. 17-2665
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
August 13, 2018
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 12 C 8571 — Andrea R. Wood, Judge.
ARGUED APRIL 24, 2018 — DECIDED AUGUST 13, 2018
Before BAUER, EASTERBROOK, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.
This appeal came many months too late under
A district judge who announces a final decision yet postpones issuing the opinion sets a trap for the losing side, because a plan to provide an explanation does not delay the date of decision. See United States v. Bradley, 882 F.3d 390, 394 (2d Cir. 2018). Most litigants who represent themselves, and many lawyers, are unaware of
As it happens, however, this appeal has been saved by the fact that until recently everyone missed the significance of
The only jurisdictional requirement is the need for an appeal within 30 days of the judgment or an extension. See
Although the Rules of Appellate Procedure are not jurisdictional, they remain mandatory. We must apply them if properly invoked. The “properly invoked” qualifier is important, for a litigant may waive or forfeit the benefit of these rules. We held on remand in Hamer that the appellees waived the benefit of
The jurisdictional section of appellees’ brief in this court says (some citations omitted):
On March 31, 2016, the district court issued a minute order granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all of Walker’s claims. On August 15, 2017, the district court issued its memorandum opinion and order setting forth the reasons for its grant of summary judgment in defendants’ favor. On the same
day, Walker filed her notice of appeal. The judgment was entered on August 16, 2017. A premature notice of appeal is treated as filed on the date the judgment is entered.
By treating the appeal as early rather than late, appellees relinquished the benefit of
After the appellees filed their brief, this court alerted the parties to a problem with the appeal’s timing. Once we did so, appellees filed a supplemental jurisdictional statement asserting that the appeal is late. And so it is—but because, under Hamer, the benefit of Rule 4 may be waived or forfeited, appellees’ belated invocation of the Rule is unavailing. Indrelunas shows that the appeal is jurisdictionally timely, and no more is needed when the litigants do not notice other problems until after the briefs have been filed.
Enforcing waivers and forfeitures gives litigants incentives to explore issues themselves rather than wait for the court to do the work. It is best to have defects detected in time to dismiss the appeal without the need for briefs and argument. Because no one paid attention to
This brings us to the merits. Police arrived at Katrina Walker’s house with a warrant authorizing them to search for heroin and “T,” a drug dealer. The warrant was supported by information from “J. Doe,” a drug user whose source was T (who Doe knew by sight and street name rather than
full name). Doe told police that for the previous six months she regularly bought heroin from T in the living room of a house, which she knew by sight rather than street address. She identified the house while driving with the police. Police prepared an application for a search warrant and took Doe with them when presenting the application to a state judge. After placing Doe under oath, the judge asked her several questions, believed Doe’s answers, and issued the warrant.
Executing the warrant, officers found Walker but not T. The house was a mess; one officer attested (without contradiction) that it had the appearance of a place from which drugs were sold. Walker told the officers that she had a gun but could not remember where it was. The search for this gun, drugs, and evidence that T did (or didn’t) live in the house took between 90 minutes and 2 hours. The officers left without drugs or evidence of T’s whereabouts, and Walker then filed this suit under
According to Walker the state judge was not entitled to rely on Doe, a first-time informant whose information had not been corroborated by the police. Walker proceeds as if Doe were an anonymous tipster, and, if she had been, then corroboration would have been essential. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000). But Doe was not anonymous; we use a pseudonym to protect her from retaliation, not because her identity was unknown to the police. They knew her name and background (she had an arrest record but not a conviction); they met with Doe and her father, and Doe said that she wanted to break her drug habit, a good reason for turning in her supplier. Doe testified in person before the judge who issued the warrant and by doing this exposed herself to as much as three years in prison if she was lying.
Walker faults the warrant-application process for withholding from the state judge the lack of corroboration. Yet neither Doe nor the officer who signed the application for the warrant stated that Doe’s information had been corroborated; a reasonable judicial officer thus would have inferred that it had not been. Nothing was concealed from the
judge—nor does it matter exactly when Doe pointed to the house in which, she said, she had bought heroin (another topic on which Walker faults the affidavit seeking the warrant).
As for Walker’s contention that the police should have left the house as soon as they discovered T’s absence: What sense would that make? Drug dealers do not stay in their distribution points 24 hours a day. The police arrived at a disordered house that looked like a drug-distribution point. Walker admitted having a gun. It took a while for the officers to sort through the debris, locate the gun, search for drugs, and determine whether T lived in or used the house. It cannot be called unreasonable to take two hours to accomplish these things.
AFFIRMED