517 F. App'x 198
4th Cir.
2013

Kathleen BEUSTERIEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ICON CLINICAL RESEARCH, INC.; Oxford Outcomes, Inc.; Oxford Outcomes 2007 Limited; Paul Quarterman; Andrew Lloyd, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 12-2216

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

Submitted: March 26, 2013. Decided: April 5, 2013.

517 F. Appx. 198

U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1). Such prejudice can be proven by showing that the employee lost compensation or benefits “by reason of the violation,” id. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(I); sustains other monetary losses “as a direct result of the violation,” id. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(II); or suffers some loss in employment status remediable through “appropriate” equitable relief, such as employment, reinstatement, or promotion, id. § 2617(a)(1)(B).

Here, the only injury Anderson alleged as a result of Discovery‘s alleged unlawful denial of her request for a reduced work schedule was that she was not permitted to work a reduced schedule. She does not claim that she lost any compensation or benefits, sustained other monetary loss, or suffered loss in employment status as a result of the purported interference. While Anderson sought $786,000 back pay and reinstatement, she has failed to show that she is entitled to any of these amounts. As discussed above, Anderson‘s termination of employment was a separate and unrelated event, and from the record it appears that Anderson remained employed and was given full benefits until her termination. As such, her interference claim must also fail. See Yashenko, 446 F.3d at 549-50 (holding that where employee was terminated due to a legitimate reason, he cannot show that he is entitled to reinstatement even if the employer otherwise interfered with his FMLA rights by denying leave).

V.

For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the district court‘s judgment awarding summary judgment in favor of Discovery.

AFFIRMED.

Andrew J. Morris, Morvillo LLP, Washington, D.C.; Andrew A. Nicely, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Andrew K. Fletcher, Pepper Hamilton LLP, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Kathleen A. Mullen, Pepper Hamilton LLP, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, for Appellees.

Before DAVIS, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Kathleen Beusterien appeals the district court‘s order remanding the underlying civil action to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, and denying her request for a fee award to compensate her for the attorney‘s fees and costs she incurred in contesting Defendants’ removal of her civil action to federal court. Beusterien does not challenge the remand order, limiting this appeal only to the denial of her request for a fee award. We affirm.

We review for an abuse of discretion the district court‘s order denying attorney‘s fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2006). See In re Lowe, 102 F.3d 731, 733 n. 2 (4th Cir.1996). “There is no automatic entitlement to an award of attorney‘s fees.” Valdes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 199 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir.2000) (holding that the “mere determination that removal was improper” does not require a district court to award attorney‘s fees). As the Supreme Court has instructed, § 1447(c) authorizes the district court to award attorney‘s fees “when such an award is just[,]” Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 138, 126 S.Ct. 704, 163 L.Ed.2d 547 (2005), but whether to do so is committed to the court‘s sound discretion. Id. at 139-41, 126 S.Ct. 704.

Based on our review of the facts of this case and the relevant law, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Beusterien‘s request for a fee award. Accordingly, we affirm the district court‘s order. See Beusterien v. Icon Clinical Research, Inc., No. 8:12-cv-02720-RWT (D.Md. filed Oct. 1, 2012; entered Oct. 2, 2012). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.