Kassem v. BarnesKassem v. Barnes
Albert T. Brown, Jr., for Defendant-Appellant.
MOCK, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Ronald Barnes, the tenant, appeals the trial court‘s judgment, following a jury trial, in favor of plaintiff-appellee Nasser Kassem, the landlord, on his action for forcible entry and detainer, restitution of the premises and unpaid rent. Because the trial court erroneously prohibited Barnes from presenting the defense of retaliation to the eviction proceeding, we reverse the trial court‘s judgment and remand this matter for further proceedings.
I.
{¶2} Kassem filed a complaint for eviction and unpaid rent on November 14, 2016. Two weeks later, Barnes filed an answer generally denying the allegations of the complaint and asserting three counterclaims. Barnes did not plead specific supporting facts under these counterclaims nor did he request a specific amount of monetary damages in the prayer for relief. The first two counterclaims simply alleged that Kassem filed the eviction action in retaliation against Barnes. The third counterclaim only alleged that the tenant was owed “damages and attorney fees.”
{¶3} Prior to trial, Kassem moved to dismiss Barnes‘s counterclaims, which the trial court granted. On the first day of trial, Barnes made an oral motion for leave to amend his counterclaims, which the court denied. During the trial, Kassem objected to Barnes‘s attempt to introduce evidence of retaliation. Barnes argued that although his counterclaims had been dismissed, that only meant that he could not be awarded monetary damages for Kassem‘s retaliatory conduct, but he could still introduce evidence of retaliation solely as a defense against the eviction. The trial court disagreed, noting that Barnes had not asserted retaliation as a defense in his answer filed with the court. Believing that Barnes now had no defenses to assert,
{¶4} Several days later, the trial judge placed of record an entry titled “Entry Granting Plaintiff‘s Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim.” In this entry, the court reiterates that the tenant‘s counterclaims are dismissed, and that, therefore, the tenant is prohibited from introducing any evidence to establish that the landlord retaliated against the tenant by filing an action for eviction. On October 11, 2017, the trial court asked that the case be reassigned to a different judge.
{¶5} Prior to the start of the second trial before a different trial court, Barnes moved for leave to amend his answer and add six counterclaims. The trial court denied the motion and stated in the entry “[a]ll previous [m]otions are to remain as ruled on by [the prior trial judge].” On the first day of trial, the court reminded the parties that the tenant‘s counterclaims had been dismissed and that the tenant was not permitted to argue retaliation. At trial, Kassem testified that the rental rate was $550 per month under the rental agreement between the parties. The rental agreement was admitted into evidence. During the trial, Barnes maintained he owed no rent because the rental value of the property in its defective condition was zero; however, the trial court prohibited him from introducing evidence of the condition of the property.
{¶6} At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found in favor of Kassem, granting him restitution of the premises and awarding him $11,000 in unpaid rent. Barnes now appeals, asserting four assignments of error.
{¶8} In Ohio, “a landlord may not evict a tenant in retaliation for the tenant‘s complaint either to an appropriate governmental agency or to the landlord himself concerning the conditions of the premises.” Smith v. Wright, 65 Ohio App.2d 101, 416 N.E.2d 665 (8th Dist.1979);
{¶9} Here, the record demonstrates that Barnes had been depositing his rent with the Hamilton County clerk of court since the beginning of the eviction action. Therefore, Barnes should have been permitted to present a defense of retaliation under
{¶10} Barnes also argues that the trial court erred by denying his motions for leave to amend. We disagree. The decision whether to grant a motion for leave to amend a pleading is within the discretion of the trial court. Wilmington Steel Prods., Inc. v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 60 Ohio St.3d 120, 573 N.E.2d 622 (1991). To constitute an abuse of discretion, the ruling must be more than legal error; it must be unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
{¶11}
{¶12} Here, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion by denying the tenant‘s motions for leave to amend, as both were untimely. In the first instance, Barnes had filed his counterclaims well before the start of the jury trial, but only
{¶13} To the extent that the trial court prohibited Barnes from introducing evidence of his defense of retaliation, we sustain the first, second and third assignments of error. In all other respects, we overrule these assignments of error.
{¶14} Finally, Barnes argues that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the defective condition of the property in defense of the cause of action for unpaid rent. Although Barnes argues that this evidence demonstrates the reasonable rental value of the premises, this was never at issue at trial; the rental rate was at issue. The rental contract admitted into evidence supports Kassem‘s testimony that the parties had agreed to the rental rate of $550 per month. Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of the alleged defective conditions of the property in defense of the claim for unpaid rent. See State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 182, 510 N.E.2d 343 (1987). The fourth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶15} Because the trial court erred to the extent that it prohibited Barnes from introducing evidence of retaliation in defense of the eviction proceeding, we
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
ZAYAS and CROUSE, JJ., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.