Karen McQUISTION, Appellant, v. CITY OF CLINTON, Iowa; Mark Regenwether; Jeffrey Farwell; and Jeffrey Horne, Appellees.
No. 14-0413.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Dec. 24, 2015.
817 N.W.2d 817
Cynthia Sueppel of Scheldrup Blades Schrock Smith P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellees.
Thomas J. Duff of Duff Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, Kodi A. Brotherson of Becker & Brotherson Law Firm, Sac City, Katie A. Ervin Carlson of Babich Goldman P.C., Des Moines, and Emily E. McCarty of Fiedler & Timmer, P.L.L.C., Urbandale, for amicus curiae Iowa Association for Justice.
CADY, Chief Justice.
In this case, we are presented with the question whether a city discriminates under the Iowa Civil Rights Act and the Iowa Constitution by refusing to accommodate a pregnant employee with light duties when requested due to her pregnancy. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, City of Clinton and three
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Karen McQuistion is employed as an engineer and paramedic for the City of Clinton fire department. She was a ten-year veteran of the department during the events in question. She began as a firefighter in 2001 and was promoted to her current position in 2008.
In May 2011, McQuistion informed Fire Chief Mark Regenwether she was pregnant. McQuistion was in the early stages of pregnancy at the time. She requested light-duty assignments for the duration of her pregnancy. The requested accommodation was based solely on her pregnancy and the nature of her job and not on any underlying pregnancy-related medical condition amounting to disability.
The City of Clinton maintained an administrative policy governing light-duty assignments. The policy described the circumstances when light duty was available to employees, generally authorizing light duty for employees who had been injured on the job and were eligible for workers’ compensation benefits. This policy controlled light-duty assignments unless it conflicted with the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Under a collective bargaining agreement between police officers and the City, a police officer who becomes pregnant is entitled to light-duty assignments. The fire department‘s collective bargaining agreement did not contain a clause expanding light-duty assignments beyond the policy either to pregnant employees or any other employees suffering temporary disabilities resulting from off-the-job events.
The light-duty policy of the City defined light duty as “modified work for employees injured on the job unable to temporarily return to their regular classification.” It is work for an employee “who can return to work but is not yet physically capable of fulfilling the work normally assigned.”1 The policy articulates four benefits of light duty:
- Getting an employee back to the workplace as soon as possible after an on-the-job injury when there is not a risk to him/her and others;
- Minimizing financial hardship and emotional stress to an employee injured on the job;
- Retaining qualified and experienced workers;
- Minimizing cost of workers’ compensation and other related programs.
Light duty generally involves the modification of the worker‘s normal job duties. For a firefighter, this means conducting inspections, fire prevention duties, training assignments, and other duties that do not include the emergency response requirements of the job. These duties can be performed independent of the normal physical requirements for fire department employees. The normal job duties for an
- Responding to emergency fire incidents.
- Responding to emergency rescue incidents.
- Responding to hazardous materials incidents.
- Responding to emergency medical incidents.
- Responding to emergency airport incidents.
- Performing required training tasks.
- Performing required maintenance tasks.
- Performing Fire Prevention and Public Education Assignments.
Fire Chief Regenwether denied McQuistion‘s request for a light-duty assignment. He determined she was not entitled to light duty under the city administrative policy because she did not have a disabling injury that occurred on the job.
McQuistion continued to perform her regular job duties as an engineer and paramedic for the fire department after her request for light duty was denied. In June, Fire Chief Regenwether met with city officials in an effort to provide an accommodation for McQuistion, without success. The city officials who participated in this meeting and the decision to deny the request included Jeffrey Farwell, the city attorney, and Jeffrey Horne, the city administrator.
By the end of September, McQuistion‘s pregnancy had advanced to the point that she was no longer able to perform her required emergency-response duties safely and her protective uniform no longer fit her. Her doctor recommended she stop performing her regular duties. As a result, McQuistion took a leave of absence from work by using accrued vacation and sick leave time. She was paid during this time period. Once she exhausted the vacation and sick leave, however, her leave of absence was unpaid. McQuistion gave birth in January 2012. She returned to her job as an engineer and paramedic for the fire department in March.
McQuistion brought a lawsuit against the City of Clinton and the individuals who participated in the decision to deny her light duty (collectively referred to as the City). She alleged pregnancy discrimination under
The district court found McQuistion was unable to show an inference of discrimination under the Iowa Civil Rights Act because the City policy denies light work to both pregnant employees and nonpregnant disabled employees who are not injured on the job. It found the undisputed facts of the case failed to establish pregnancy discrimination under the Iowa Civil Rights Act or the Iowa Constitution. It found the policy of the City treated all employees who were not granted separate rights under a collective bargaining agreement the same. It also found the policy did not impinge upon McQuistion‘s fundamental right to procreate. McQuistion appealed.
We review district court summary judgment rulings for corrections of errors at law. Goodpaster v. Schwan‘s Home Serv., Inc., 849 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 2014). Summary judgment is properly granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. We construe the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. However, to survive a motion for summary judgment, sufficient facts must be in the record to support the claim that a reasonable fact finder could find in the nonmoving party‘s favor. See Smidt v. Porter, 695 N.W.2d 9, 15 (Iowa 2005).
Statutory interpretation is reviewed for errors at law. State v. Romer, 832 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Iowa 2013). “If the statute is capable of being construed in more than one way, one of which is constitutional, we must adopt the constitutional construction.” Hensler v. City of Davenport, 790 N.W.2d 569, 578 (Iowa 2010). Our review of constitutional claims is de novo. State v. Groves, 742 N.W.2d 90, 92 (Iowa 2007).
III. Statutory Analysis.
The Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965 makes it an unfair or discriminatory practice for any person to discriminate in employment against an employee based on various classifications, including the “sex .... or disability of such employee.”
In response to Gilbert, Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA) to extend Title VII protections to pregnant women as a subset of sex discrimination. See Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, Unprotected Sex: The Pregnancy Discrimination Act at 35, 21 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol‘y 67, 74-75 (2013). Congress rejected the approach taken in Gilbert and set a course more in line with the approach taken under the Iowa Civil Rights Act. Congress did this by adding new language to the definitions section of Title VII. Id. at 75-76; see
The Supreme Court recently discussed the scope of the rights provided to pregnant employees under the PDA in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 135 S. Ct. 1338, 191 L. Ed. 2d 279 (2015). In Young, the Court found the discrimination analysis under the PDA consists of two key components. First, it found the Act only requires pregnant employees to be treated the “same” as “other persons” in similarly situated jobs with a similar ability (or inability) to work.
Thus, a plaintiff alleging that the denial of an accommodation constituted disparate treatment under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act‘s second clause may make out a prima facie case by showing, as in McDonnell Douglas, that she belongs to the protected class, that she sought accommodation, that the employer did not accommodate her, and that the employer did accommodate others “similar in their ability or inability to work.”
Young, 575 U.S. at 1354, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 298 (quoting
After establishing the criteria for a claimant to show a prima facie case, the Young Court turned to the question of what the employer was required to show. Id. The Court observed that the body of law built by the courts over the years governing disparate treatment claims generally permits an employer to maintain employment policies that may harm members of a protected class as long as the policies are not intended to harm the class and “the employer has a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, nonpretextual reason” for the different treatment. Id. at 1350, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 294. Once the employer has proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the claimant has the chance to show that the reason offered is mere pretext to disguise discriminatory intent. Id. at 1354, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 299. The Court placed limits on what could constitute the reason, noting it “normally cannot consist simply of a claim that it is more expensive or less convenient to add pregnant women to the category of those (‘similar in their ability or inability to work‘) whom the employer accommodates.” Id. at 1354, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 298 (quoting
Accordingly, the PDA does not mandate employers provide pregnant employees with benefits such as light-duty assignments, but rather requires an examination of the facts and circumstances in each individual case whether the employer was treating the pregnant employee the same as others “similar in their ability or inability to work.” See id. at 1353-54, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 298 (quoting
The path to legal recognition and prohibition of pregnancy discrimination in Iowa began in 1972 when the Iowa Civil Rights Commission (ICRC), established under the Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965, promulgated a rule that classified pregnancy-related disabilities as temporary disabilities for job-related purposes. Davenport Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm‘n, 277 N.W.2d 907, 909 (Iowa 1979) (discussing the promulgation of administrative rule 4.10 on pregnancy discrimination in 1972). As with the approach later taken by Congress under the PDA in 1978, and following the lead of federal regulations promulgated earlier in 1972 by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the ICRC first declared, “Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy ... are, for all job-related purposes, temporary disabilities....” Iowa Departmental Rule 4.10(2) (1973); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1973). Second, the ICRC declared that the “employment policies and practices involving ... the availability of benefits and privileges ... shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy ... on the same terms and conditions as they are applied to other temporary disabilities.” Iowa Departmental Rule 4.10(2).
In 1987, our legislature amended the Iowa Civil Rights Act to add a section governing employment policies relating to pregnancy, substantively tracking with the 1980 version of the administrative rule promulgated by ICRC. Compare
employment policies and practices involving matters such as the commencement and duration of leave ... and other benefits and privileges ... shall be applied to a disability due to the employee‘s pregnancy ... on the same terms and conditions as they are applied to other temporary disabilities.
Id. A 1980 amendment adding a third provision to the rule was subsequently adapted into the statute by the legislature in 1987, making a disability caused by a legal abortion a temporary disability under a health, temporary disability, or sick leave plan. Id. § 216.6(2)(c); see Iowa Admin. Code r. 161—8.55(3).
The statute then goes beyond the administrative rule to add two additional provisions governing employment policies relating to pregnancy. It makes it illegal for an employer to “terminate the employment of a person disabled by pregnancy because of the employee‘s pregnancy.”
The amendment to the Iowa Civil Rights Act that added the provisions governing pregnancy as section
The five provisions of
No provision in section
The language of section
[E]mployment policies and practices involving matters such as the commencement and duration of leave ... and other benefits and privileges ... under any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan ... shall be applied to a disability due to ... pregnancy ... on the same terms and conditions as they are applied to other temporary disabilities.
Id.
Yet, this language does not readily answer the more difficult question at the center of this case: whether an employment plan for benefits complies with the statutory requirement to be applicable to disabilities due to pregnancy on the same terms and conditions as “other temporary disabilities” when a gender-neutral term or condition applicable to all disabilities under the plan excludes a class of temporary disabilities that includes disabilities caused by pregnancy. See id.; see also Young, 575 U.S. at 1351, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 295. This was the same situation faced by the Court in Young under the language of the PDA. See Young, 575 U.S. at 1347-48, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 291-92. The Iowa statute only demands that a light-duty policy be applied to pregnancy-related disabilities “on the same terms and conditions” as the policy is applied to other temporary disabilities.
Thus, we reject the argument by McQuistion that the legislature established as facially discriminatory any exclusion of a pregnant employee from any policy or plan that provides benefits for any other temporary disability. Instead, our legislature only established that the exclusion of pregnant employees and applicants by an employment policy or practice because of their pregnancies constituted prima facie evidence of discrimination.
Overall, our legislature intended to provide institutional protection by placing pregnant employees who become unable to complete their job duties due to a pregnancy-related disability on equal footing with other employees who become unable to perform their regular job duties because of any other temporarily disabling bodily condition. See
This outcome largely disposes of the arguments by the City. The City‘s statutory argument tracked those made by UPS before the Supreme Court in Young—that the employer need not accommodate disability caused by pregnancy unless it falls within specifically defined categories singled out for accommodation. See id. at 1344, 135 S. Ct. at 1344, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 288. The City argued McQuistion‘s treatment under the policy should only be compared with how the City treats those suffering from a disability arising outside of employment. The district court, without the benefit of the Young decision at the time, agreed the narrow classification was the proper comparison group. Yet, as with Young, the statutory remedy provided in section
IV. Equal Protection Claim.
McQuistion‘s first constitutional claim, intertwined with her discrimination claim, is an equal protection challenge under
The district court found that McQuistion failed to offer sufficient evidence that the City treated her less favorably than it treated other similarly situated City employees. It found the equal protection claim failed because McQuistion failed to show she suffered disparate treatment as a matter of law. In addressing this issue, we observe the City did not raise any argument that a constitutional claim was not available as a companion remedy or that the Civil Rights Act provides the exclusive remedy under state law. Instead, the City argued that McQuistion did not make a prima facie case of discrimination
The equal protection analysis used by the district court failed to properly consider the critical aspect of the right to equal protection that the law itself be equal. See Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 882-83. The district court essentially held McQuistion failed to show any disparate treatment because she was not similarly situated to the employees covered under the City policy. It found the primary purpose of the policy was to get employees receiving workers’ compensation, who were unable to perform their normal work duties because of a work injury but capable of performing light-duty work, back to work earlier. Consequently, the district court reasoned that McQuistion was not similarly situated to those employees covered by the policy, and she failed as a matter of law to show she was subjected to any disparate treatment.
The problem with this analysis is that it excludes any examination of whether the purpose of the law is legitimate. See id. The district court only considered the purpose of the policy when defining the classification imposed by the policy. This approach caused the classification to be defined too narrowly and foreclosed any real analysis to determine if the purpose of the policy at least satisfied rational-basis scrutiny.
McQuistion did identify groups of temporarily disabled employees—pregnant police officers and City employees injured on the job—that were provided light-duty accommodations. She also offered evidence that she was similarly situated to those groups with respect to the purpose of the employment policy. This evidence showed she was not just similarly situated to City employees who became temporarily disabled off the job, but was similarly situated to all City workers with temporary disabilities that prevent them performing their regular duties. In this respect, we recognize McQuistion does not need to show she was similarly situated in all respects to those injured on the job. Thus, construing the record in the light most favorable to McQuistion under the summary judgment standard, sufficient evidence of disparate treatment has been put forth to raise a question for the jury on the threshold issue, and McQuistion‘s claim needs to be evaluated based on the reasons for the disparate treatment.
Once disparate treatment has been proven, the claimant must show the reasons for the classification in the policy were not sufficiently important or related to the government‘s interest. RACI, 675 N.W.2d at 7. First, we note the policy‘s classification is based on whether the disabling condition arises out of the employment, not on the gender of the claimant—except in this as-applied challenge—making the proper level of scrutiny rational basis. This analysis involves three questions. First, the court must determine whether there was a valid, “realistically conceivable” reason for the classification. Id. (quoting Miller v. Boone Cty. Hosp., 394 N.W.2d 776, 779 (Iowa 1986)). Next, the court must evaluate whether the “reason has a basis in fact.” Id. at 7-8. Finally, it must determine if the relationship between the classification and the purpose for it “is so weak that the classification must be viewed as arbitrary.” Id. at 8. The burden is not on the government to justify its action, but for the plaintiff to rebut a presumption of constitutionality. King, 818 N.W.2d at 28; RACI, 675 N.W.2d at 8.
The purpose, scope, and provisions of the City‘s light-duty policy all classify eligibility and the purpose of the policy as
Next, we consider whether the reason has a basis in fact. The City has provided examples of several other firefighters denied light duty when disabled from nonjob-related events, including cancer. The City has also provided an example of McQuistion being required to work light duty when she suffered an on-the-job injury. McQuistion has not challenged either the workers’ compensation reason for the classification in the policy, nor its basis in fact, but argues the reason is not good enough to support the classification.
Therefore, we must determine if the relationship between the classification and the purpose for it is so weak as to be arbitrary. While some of the policy‘s articulated benefits, such as minimizing the employee‘s financial hardship and retaining workers, would apply to all temporarily disabled employees no matter the source of the injury, other benefits articulated like minimizing costs of workers’ compensation programs and the provision changing eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits upon refusal of light duty are clearly related only to workers’ compensation situations. Providing benefits to those harmed during the course of their employment and minimizing extra costs associated with workers’ compensation are legitimate purposes for the City. McQuistion has not demonstrated the classification of on- versus off-the-job injury or disability to be so tenuously related to its purpose as to render the classification arbitrary. The classification of on- or off-the-job injuries is rationally related to the legitimate purpose of minimizing workers’ compensation benefits. Therefore, we find the classification does not violate the equal protection clause.
V. Substantive Due Process Claim.
We now turn to consider the second constitutional claim asserted by McQuistion. She asserts that the absence of a light-duty accommodation by the City infringes on her fundamental right to procreate in violation of the due process clause under
We have adopted a two-step analysis when presented with a substantive due process claim. The first step involves a determination of the nature of the right at stake. State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 662 (Iowa 2005). The second step turns to an analysis of the appropriate level of scrutiny. Id. at 662-63. Under this step, if a fundamental right is involved, we apply a strict-scrutiny analysis. This analysis requires us to determine “whether the government action infringing the fundamental right is narrowly tailored
The claim articulated by McQuistion identifies the individual liberty alleged to be at stake as the right to procreate. McQuistion asserts that women have a fundamental right to procreate and that this right has been implicated by the absence of a light-duty accommodation by the City for those women who work at a job that would require a light-duty accommodation during pregnancy, such as firefighters. Her claim is built on the assertion that the absence of a light-duty policy interferes with the right to procreate by interfering with her ability to work.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the “freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40, 94 S. Ct. 791, 796, 39 L. Ed. 2d 52, 60 (1974). We, too, have recognized familial rights to be fundamental liberties under our Iowa Constitution. In re Guardianship of Kennedy, 845 N.W.2d 707, 714 (Iowa 2014) (finding a guardian sterilizing a ward without court involvement raises “serious due process concerns“); Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 663. The right to procreate is implied in the concept of ordered liberty and qualifies for due process protection as a fundamental right. See Kennedy, 845 N.W.2d at 714-15.
Consequently, McQuistion has asserted a substantial due process claim built on a fundamental right. Yet, she must additionally establish that the fundamental right asserted—her right to procreate—has been implicated by the particular governmental action at issue. See Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 663 (requiring accuracy and specificity in the claim to allow the court to proceed on appropriate grounds). Not every government action that relates in any way to a fundamental liberty must be subjected to strict-scrutiny analysis. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-87, 98 S. Ct. 673, 681, 54 L. Ed. 2d 618, 631 (1978). Instead, the alleged infringement is unconstitutional only when it “has a direct and substantial impact” on the fundamental right. Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 663. Reasonable regulations that do not directly and substantially interfere with the right may be imposed. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386, 98 S. Ct. at 681, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 631.
In Seering, we identified numerous cases in which the statute or government action at issue did substantially and directly impact the fundamental interest at stake. 701 N.W.2d at 663-64. We cited three U.S. Supreme Court cases examining familial rights as fundamental rights. In Zablocki, the Court found a state statute that prohibited a noncustodial parent ordered to pay child support from marrying without a court order substantially interfered with the right to marry. 434 U.S. at 388-90, 98 S. Ct. at 682-83, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 632. The Court in Moore v. City of East Cleveland found a city ordinance that excluded a grandchild from living in a single-family household substantially interfered with the freedom of personal choices in matters of family life. 431 U.S. 494, 499-500, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1935-36, 52 L. Ed. 2d 531, 537-38 (1977). Finally, in Loving v. Virginia,
Following Seering, we again confronted and applied the requirement of a substantive due process claim to consider whether the governmental action infringed on a fundamental right in Hensler, 790 N.W.2d 569 (Iowa 2010). There, we faced a challenge to a city ordinance that imposed a duty on parents to control their children and prevent them from committing unlawful acts. Id. at 575. The ordinance included graduated sanctions against parents for breaching this duty. Id. at 576. The first violation resulted in a warning letter. Id. The second violation required the parents to complete a parenting class. Id. The third or subsequent violation resulted in a civil penalty between $100 and $750. Id. We held the ordinance did not have a direct and substantial impact on the fundamental right to parent and exercise care and control over a child. Id. at 583. The force of the penalties under the ordinance did impact the right to parent, but not enough to violate the constitutionally protected right. Id.
McQuistion supports her claim that the City substantially interfered with her right by relying on the holding in Rodgers v. Berger, 438 F. Supp. 713 (D. Mass. 1977). In that case, the court considered the constitutionality of a mandatory pregnancy leave provision in a school collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 721. The provision required a pregnant teacher to be on leave for a year after the end of the pregnancy. Id. at 715. In finding the policy violated substantive due process, the court relied on LaFleur, which found that “overly restrictive” maternity leave regulations create a heavy burden on the exercise of the right to procreate. Id. at 722 (quoting LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 640, 94 S. Ct. at 796, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 60).7
Unlike the claim of governmental interference in each of these cases, this case does not allow us to consider the extent of the interference. Instead, it requires us to consider a more fundamental question of whether the interference alleged by McQuistion was created by government action. We have expressed doubt in the past about the viability of a substantive due process claim based on the failure of government to act. King, 818 N.W.2d at 31. The substantive due process protections under our constitution have traditionally been applied when government has engaged in actual conduct that interferes with a right. Id. Yet, we do not apply the affirmative and negative act distinction as a legal principle to deny relief when based on the failure of government to act, but
McQuistion claims the City interfered with the exercise of her right to have children when it acted to deny her request to alter her job duties to enable her to work during her entire pregnancy. This claim identifies a governmental act, but it fails to further identify how McQuistion‘s inability to work throughout pregnancy interfered with the exercise of her right. McQuistion answered by pointing to the financial burdens and resulting difficult decisions imposed on women and families by the loss of income associated with the inability to work throughout pregnancy. However, the City‘s decision to deny McQuistion‘s request for light duty did not change any of the viable choices available to her, and she has failed to identify any specific effect of the City‘s action on her decision to procreate. Thus, the financial obstacle she offered to support her claim of infringement on her right to procreate was not created by the City‘s decision to deny relief. McQuistion has not identified any facts to establish any other form of governmental interference and, so, has failed to frame a claim of infringement on a fundamental right.
Without the infringement of a fundamental right, we turn to our rational-basis analysis. When applying the rational-basis test to evaluate the policy under the due process clause of the Iowa Constitution, the claim fails. The rational-basis analysis under the equal protection clause would be equally applicable to the due process claim, with the same result—that the policy is not unconstitutional. See RACI, 675 N.W.2d at 7.
The outcome we reach in this case does not in any way overlook or minimize the existence of an obstacle in society faced by many women in the workplace in the exercise of their right to procreate. Due to the range of financial circumstances of all people, the financial burdens resulting from the inability to continue in employment during pregnancy could substantially interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right. The obstacle is pervasive and affects both women and men in the exercise of their right to have children when an inability to work throughout pregnancy because of the pregnancy adversely impacts the overall family finances.
Yet, this case reveals that our constitution only declares a certain level of protection for people and that the constitutional powers of courts are limited. One of the limitations revealed is the preliminary requirement for a due process claim that government action create the interference. Government action allows for the elective branches of government to debate and balance the competing interests and policies behind the government action and for laws and policies to be made or rejected based on that process. The arm of the court, however, only protects the constitutional floor of the rights of people and ensures government provides nothing less. It is up to the other branches of government to provide more. Over the years, the Iowa Civil Rights Commission and the Iowa General Assembly have engaged in this process. The resulting laws passed over the years have differed in some respects from the earlier regulations from the agency and reflect the changing ideas and attitudes of society toward pregnant workers. These laws and rules can continue to evolve as time continues to pass to reflect the will of the people. The role of courts in the process is limited to interpreting those laws when challenged as ambiguous and make certain those laws and other
VI. Conclusion.
We reverse the district court decision granting the City summary judgment on the pregnancy discrimination claim. We remand to the district court for further consideration in light of our opinion today. We affirm the district court and dismiss the equal protection and due process claims. We tax the costs of this action equally between the parties.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.