DONALD KAIDER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JULIE HAMOS, DIRECTOR OF THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES; MICHELLE R.B. SADDLER, SECRETARY OF THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES; DAN RUTHERFORD, ILLINOIS STATE TREASURER; JUDY BAAR TOPINKA, ILLINOIS STATE COMPTROLLER, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 1-11-1109
Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fifth Division
July 20, 2012
2012 IL App (1st) 111109
District & No.: First District, Fifth Division Docket No. 1-11-1109
Filed: July 20, 2012
Held (Note: This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.): Plaintiff was properly denied leave to sue to enjoin the disbursement of state funds to pregnant women and children under the “All Kids” and “Moms and Babies” programs if the recipients are not lawfully in the United States, since Illinois opted out of the provision of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 barring states from extending “any State or local public benefit” to aliens “not lawfully present in the United States” by enacting state laws affirmatively providing for such eligibility, and the Illinois statutes are not impliedly conflict preempted.
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 11-CH-08344; the Hon. Leroy K. Martin, Jr., Judge, presiding.
Judgment: Affirmed.
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael Scodro, Solicitor General, and Brian F. Barov, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees.
Panel: PRESIDING JUSTICE EPSTEIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices McBride and Howse concurred in the judgment and opinion.*
OPINION
¶ 1 Plaintiff Donald Kaider appeals from the circuit court‘s denial of his petition for leave to file a taxpayer‘s suit to enjoin the disbursement of state funds under section 11-303 of the
¶ 3 Plaintiff filed his petition for leave to file a taxpayer suit in the circuit court against several state officials who are responsible for disbursing, maintaining, and securing state funds: Julie Hamos, Director of the Illinois Department of Health and Family Services; Michelle R. B. Saddler, Secretary of the Illinois Department of Human Services; Dan Rutherford, Illinois State Treasurer; and Judy Baar Topinka, Illinois State Comptroller. Plaintiff challenged the use of state funds under two healthcare benefits programs: the All Kids health insurance program, part of the
¶ 4 At this stage, we take all well-pled facts in the taxpayer complaint as true (Daly v. County of Madison, 378 Ill. 357, 359 (1941)), though here the relevant facts—describing the operation of the programs at issue—are not in dispute. The All Kids and Moms & Babies programs are an outgrowth of Illinois‘s Medicaid program and the Children‘s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), which provide medical assistance to low income children and their families. To be eligible for Medicaid, recipients generally must earn income of no more than 133% of the federal poverty guidelines (see
¶ 5 The Moms & Babies and All Kids programs are administered through a single application by the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services (Department). The Moms & Babies program provides benefits for pregnant women and their babies, including the mother‘s outpatient and inpatient hospital services during pregnancy and for 60 days after the baby is born. See http://www.allkids.com/pregnant.html (referenced in plaintiff‘s proposed complaint). The family income limit for Moms & Babies is 200% of the federal poverty guidelines. Id. The recipient mother does not need to be a United States citizen or legal alien to receive benefits under the program. Id. The All Kids program offers uninsured children subsidized health insurance that covers immunizations, doctor visits, hospital stays, and prescription drugs. See
¶ 6 In his proposed complaint, plaintiff alleges, and defendants do not dispute, that pregnant women and children without lawful immigration status receive benefits under the Moms & Babies and All Kids programs. While plaintiff argued in the circuit court that extending medical services to unlawful aliens under the Moms & Babies and All Kids violates
¶ 7 ANALYSIS
¶ 8 On appeal, plaintiff again argues that the Illinois statutes authorizing the All Kids and Moms & Babies programs violate
¶ 9
¶ 10 Section 1621 was enacted as part of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRA). Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 411, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). “The PRA creates a comprehensive statutory scheme for determining aliens’ eligibility for federal, state and local benefits and services. It categorizes all aliens as ‘qualified’ or not ‘qualified’ and then denies public benefits based on that categorization.” League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1251-52 (C.D. Cal. 1997). As relevant here, the PRA establishes a general prohibition against extending state and local benefits to aliens who are not lawfully present in the United States:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law and except as provided in subsections (b) and (d) of this section, an alien who is not—
(1) a qualified alien (as defined in section 1641 of this title),
(2) a nonimmigrant under the Immigration and Nationality Act [citation], or
(3) an alien who is paroled into the United States under 212(d)(5) of such Act [citation] for less than one year, is not eligible for any State or local public benefit (as defined in subsection (c) of this section).”
8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (2006).
Section 1621(b) recognizes exceptions to this benefits bar for certain categories of state and local benefits, including immunizations and emergency labor and delivery.
“A State may provide that an alien who is not lawfully present in the United States is eligible for any State or local public benefit for which such alien would otherwise be ineligible under subsection (a) of this section only through the enactment of a State law after August 22, 1996, which affirmatively provides for such eligibility.”
8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) .
¶ 11 The central question in this appeal is whether the provisions governing the All Kids and Moms & Babies programs “affirmatively provide[ ]” eligibility to undocumented aliens under
¶ 12 Where section 1621(d) left the term “affirmatively” undefined, we may consult a dictionary to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of that term. Gaffney v. Board of Trustees of the Orland Fire Protection District, 2012 IL 110012, ¶ 60. Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary defines the adjective “affirmative” as: “asserting that the fact is so“; “declaratory of what exists“; or “assertive, positive.” Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary 36 (1986). Both parties draw on these definitions and give the statute a similar construction. Plaintiff contends that “affirmatively provides” means “positively assert,” while defendants argue that “the term ‘affirmatively’ *** ordinarily means a positive statement.” With those definitions in hand, the parties disagree, however, on what section 1621(d) actually requires. According to plaintiff, the state law must expressly or specifically reference “illegal aliens” (or use a similar term, such as “undocumented alien“). Defendants contend that section 1621(d) is satisfied by any state law that is an “unambiguous and positive” expression of legislative intent to provide coverage for unlawful aliens and opt out of section 1621(a), even if the statute does not use the term “illegal aliens” or some similar term.
¶ 13 Plaintiff‘s argument that the statute requires “specific” or “express” reference to “illegal
¶ 14 To support his public notice theory, plaintiff relies on the decision of the California Court of Appeals, which reasoned that section 1621(d) was meant to “put the public on notice that tax dollars are being used to benefit illegal aliens.” Martinez v. Regents of the University of California, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 518, 544 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that the statute was meant to ensure “democratic accountability, forcing state legislators to take public responsibility for their actions“), rev‘d, 241 P.3d 855 (Cal. 2010). Initially, we note that the California Supreme Court soundly rejected the court of appeals’ conclusion that the California law ran afoul of section 1621(d) because it opted out of section 1621(a) in a ” ‘convoluted manner.’ ” See Martinez, 241 P.3d at 867-68. We also see no basis in the statutory text to conclude that Congress intended to impose a public notice requirement. In passing the PRA, Congress effectively invalidated all existing state laws, regulations, or executive orders that extended state or local benefits to unlawful aliens, based on Congress‘s asserted interest in “remov[ing] the incentive for illegal immigration provided by the availability of public benefits.”
¶ 15 Indeed, section 1621(d) could have, but does not, require a “specific” or “express” reference to “illegal aliens,” “undocumented aliens,” or any similar term. Affirmative language does not equate with specific or express language. See Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary 803 (1986) (defining “express” as “directly and distinctly stated or expressed rather than implied or left to inference“; “not dubious or ambiguous“; “definite, clear, explicit, unmistakable“; “exactly represented“); id. at 2187 (defining “specific” as “constituting or falling into the category specified“; “characterized by precise formulation or accurate restriction (as in stating, describing, defining, reserving)“; or “free from such ambiguity as results from careless lack of precision or from omission of pertinent matter“). As defendants explain, Congress has shown its understanding of the distinction between affirmative and specific language. See, e.g.,
¶ 16 Section 1621(d) also does not require that the state statute expressly reference the federal provision—the best way to put Congress on notice of the extension of benefits to unlawful aliens. Again, Congress has shown that it knows how to require reference to a specific provision, as Congress has often imposed requirements on states seeking to legislate in a certain area. See, e.g.,
¶ 17 Congress could have easily imposed these conditions—requiring the state legislature to specifically refer to “illegal aliens” or some similar term or requiring reference to subsection (d)—in order to put the public on notice of the extension of benefits to unlawful aliens. Instead, Congress provided states the authority to opt out of section 1621(a) without imposing those requirements, and this court is not free to read into statutes limitations or conditions not expressed by the legislature. See Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 83 (1994) (“Where an enactment is clear and unambiguous, as this one is, a court is not at liberty to depart from the plain language and meaning of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions that the legislature did not express.“). We therefore agree with defendants that section 1621(d) is satisfied by any state law that conveys a positive expression of legislative intent to opt out of section 1621(a) by extending state or local benefits to unlawful aliens. Where Congress has shown that it knows how to require states to expressly reference a federal statute, and it could have easily proscribed the exact wording of the state law, we conclude that Congress did not intend to impose those conditions by using the less restrictive language of section 1621(d).
¶ 18 Plaintiff nevertheless claims that two cases in the state appellate courts have endorsed his construction of the statute and should serve as persuasive authority for this court. First, plaintiff relies on the decision of the Florida appellate court in Department of Health v. Rodriguez, 5 So. 3d 22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). While the Florida court determined that the statutes governing Florida‘s brain and spinal cord injury (BSCI) program did not meet the requirements of section 1621(d), we find that decision inapposite. The only questions discussed on appeal in Rodriguez were whether BSCI benefits were “State or local public benefits” under the PRA and whether the BSCI program was exempt under other sections of the PRA. See id. at 25-26. Once the court concluded that the PRA applied to the BSCI program, the “affirmatively provides” language of section 1621(d) was never at issue because the Florida legislature simply had not enacted any law after August 22, 1996 in response to the PRA. The governing provisions of the BSCI program were enacted in 1994, renumbered in 1999, and certain sections were amended in 2000, but the appellant could point to no law enacted after August 22, 1996 that touched on the citizenship requirements to satisfy section 1621(d). Id. Plaintiff relies on the Rodriguez court‘s statement that “[a]t no time since
¶ 19 Plaintiff next relies on the California Supreme Court‘s decision in Martinez v. Regents of the University of California, 241 P.3d 855 (Cal. 2010). In that case, the court considered a California education statute, section 68130.5, which provided that ” ‘a person without lawful immigration status’ ” could be exempt from paying nonresident tuition at California state colleges and universities under certain circumstances. Id. at 866 (quoting
“Section 1621 requires no specific words, and certainly not the specific words ‘illegal alien,’ which not even section 1621 uses. We agree with the Regents’ argument that ‘in order to comply, the state statute must expressly state that it applies to undocumented aliens, rather than conferring a benefit generally without specifying that its beneficiaries may include undocumented aliens.’ ” Id. at 868.
The court thus concluded that the California statute under consideration, referencing persons “without lawful immigration status,” clearly complied with section 1621(d). Id.
¶ 20 Relying on Martinez, plaintiff contends that section 1621(d) requires express reference to “illegal aliens” or a similar term. We disagree. Initially, we note our agreement with this decision in Martinez insofar as it holds that conferring a benefit generally, without any indication that the legislature intends to opt out of section 1621(a) and extend coverage to unlawful aliens, would not satisfy that statute. Id. We also agree with the court‘s conclusion that “[s]ection 1621 requires no specific words.” Id. To the extent that the California Supreme Court‘s holding requires an express reference to “illegal aliens” or “undocumented alien,” “aliens without lawful immigration status,” “aliens not lawfully present,” or some similar term, however, we depart from the court‘s decision. There is no requirement in the statute for an express or specific reference to undocumented aliens, even if the statute before the court in Martinez provided such a reference. As discussed above, section 1621 establishes that states have the authority to provide benefits, so long as there is a positive expression of intent to opt out of section 1621(a) and provide benefits to unlawful aliens. This ensures that the state legislature does not inadvertently override the bar established in section 1621(a). Accordingly, to comply with section 1621(d), the statutes underlying the All Kids and Moms
¶ 21 The Moms & Babies Program
¶ 22 There is no dispute that the state laws authorizing the Moms & Babies program, sections 1-11 and 12-4.35 of the
“To the extent not otherwise provided in this Code or federal law, all clients who receive cash or medical assistance under Article III, IV, V, or VI of this Code must meet the citizenship requirements as established in this Section. To be eligible for assistance an individual, who is otherwise eligible, must be either a United States citizen or included in one of the following categories of non-citizens:
[listing several categories of legal noncitizens]
The Illinois Department may, by rule, cover prenatal care or emergency medical care for non-citizens who are not otherwise eligible under this Section. Local governmental units which do not receive State funds may impose their own citizenship requirements and are authorized to provide any benefits and impose any citizenship requirements as are allowed under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-193).”
305 ILCS 5/1-11 (West 2008) .
Similarly,
“Notwithstanding Section 1-11 of this Code or Section 20(a) of the Children‘s Health Insurance Program Act, the Department of Healthcare and Family Services may provide medical services to noncitizens who have not yet attained 19 years of age and who are not eligible for medical assistance under Article V of this Code or under the Children‘s Health Insurance Program created by the Children‘s Health Insurance Program Act due to their not meeting the otherwise applicable provisions of Section 1-11 of this Code or Section 20(a) of the Children‘s Health Insurance Program Act. The medical services available, standards for eligibility, and other conditions of participation under this Section shall be established by rule by the Department ***.”
305 ILCS 5/12-4.35 (West 2008) (referencing Medicaid immigration standards (305 ILCS 5/1-11 (West 2008) ) and CHIP immigration standards (215 ILCS 106/20(a) (West 2008) )).
¶ 23 Initially, we note that section 1-11 (which is also referenced in section 12-4.35), became effective just one year after PRA and explicitly references “the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.” The General Assembly was therefore clearly cognizant that the PRA imposed requirements on the distribution of public benefits in Illinois. In fact, the legislature directed local government units to “impose their own citizen requirements” as to the distribution of purely local benefits only if they were “allowed” under the PRA.
¶ 24 Plaintiff argues that these statutes do not comply with section 1621(d) because the State has delegated the implementation of the opt-out to the Department of Healthcare and Family Services (Department), an administrative agency.2 We disagree. Sections 1-11 and 12-4.35 are the “state laws enacted after August 22, 1996” that express the legislature‘s intent to opt out of section 1621(a). Through those statutes, the legislature has clearly expressed its intent to opt out of the benefits bar in section 1621(a), and nothing in section 1621(d) prevents state legislatures from delegating the implementation of the opt-out to administrative agencies once it affirmatively provides for it in the state statute. Plaintiff‘s argument again depends on his theory that compliance with section 1621(d) is determined by whether the public has adequately been put on notice: he contends that “trying to follow/understand these obscure rules/regulations, which reference numerous other statutes is extraordinarily difficult and confusing for the general public.” This is not the test for compliance with section 1621(d). Here, by passing a statute that positively conveys the intent to opt out of section 1621(a), the General Assembly has fully complied with section 1621(d) with respect to the benefits offered under the Moms & Babies program.
¶ 25 The All Kids Program
¶ 26 Plaintiff additionally challenges the benefits extended to children under the All Kids program. The foregoing discussion regarding the Moms & Babies program largely forecloses plaintiff‘s argument.
¶ 27 Plaintiff nevertheless argues that because section 12-4.35 only applies to benefits to children who meet the income requirements of the
¶ 28 Thus, after the General Assembly expressed its intent to opt out of section 1621(a) by providing benefits to unlawful alien children at the income levels of the Medicaid and CHIP programs, the General Assembly positively established its intent to allow “all children of this State to access affordable health insurance.” (Emphasis added.)
¶ 29 Implied Conflict Preemption
¶ 30 Finally, plaintiff argues that even if the Illinois statutes discussed above comply with section 1621(d), they nonetheless constitute a misuse of public funds because they are preempted by federal law. Under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution,
¶ 31 Plaintiff‘s preemption claim runs into a significant hurdle: the plain language of section 1621. While section 1621(a) establishes a general bar against state and local benefits to unlawful aliens, section 1621(d) expressly states that a state “may” provide public benefits if the state complies with the statutory requirements. Plaintiff responds that section 1621(d) does not end the preemption inquiry because the United States Supreme Court has held that a saving clause “does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles.” (Emphasis in original.) Geier v. Honda American Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000). In Geier, the Supreme Court held that a federal safety standard, which gave car manufacturers a “range of choices” in installing passive restraint systems, impliedly preempted a tort suit that created a duty for defendant-manufacturers to install air bags. 529 U.S. at 874-75. The federal law at issue in Geier contained a clause expressly preempting state regulations, along with a saving clause, which provided that ” ‘[c]ompliance with’ a federal safety standard ‘does not exempt any person from any liability under common law.’ ” Id. at 868 (citing
¶ 32 It is true that section 1621(d) is a sort of “saving clause,” in that it is an “exception of a special thing out of the general things mentioned in the statute.” Black‘s Law Dictionary 1343 (6th ed. 1990). But the saving clause at issue in Geier was limited, establishing “room for state tort law to operate” and foreseeing “the possibility that a federal safety standard will pre-empt a state common-law tort action with which it conflicts.” Geier, 529 U.S. at 868, 870. In contrast, while Congress has expressed a “compelling government interest to remove the incentive for illegal immigration provided by the availability of public benefits” (
¶ 33 Plaintiff takes the argument further, claiming that the programs here conflict with federal law because they allow unlawful aliens “medical benefits on a long-term basis, and with no limits on the amount of benefits received.” But section 1621(d) recognizes no such limits on the duration, extent, or quantity of state or local benefits that states may provide. As we have explained above, the Illinois statutes comply with the minimal conditions set out in section 1621(d). Where Congress provided the states with broad authority to extend state and local benefits to those not lawfully present in the United States, we conclude that “Congress did not impliedly prohibit what it expressly permitted.” Martinez, 241 P.3d at 869 (finding no implied conflict preemption or field preemption for California benefits law in light of Congress‘s express permission for states to extend benefits in section 1621(d)). The Illinois statutes are not impliedly conflict preempted.
¶ 34 CONCLUSION
¶ 35 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 36 Affirmed.