Julia McCain LAMPKIN-ASAM, Ph.D., J.D., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VOLUSIA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, Judy Anderson, Chairman, Volusia County School Board, Dr. Margaret A. Smith, Superintendent of Schools, Volusia County School Board, Tamara E. Wenzel, Esquire at Smith, Hood, Perkins, Loucks, Stout, Bigman, Lane and Brock, P.A., attorneys for Volusia County School Board, Mark Corruthers, Assistant Principal, Deltona Middle School, Volusia County School Board, Dr. Michael Gebel, Dr. Bruce Hoffen, United Self Insured Services, CEO, USIS, Suzanne Evans, R.N., USIS, Dr. Al Williams, Chairman, Volusia County School Board, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 07-12704
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Jan. 9, 2008.
Construing the facts in the light most favorable to the government, as the prevailing party below, the evidence shows that the officers went to Susini‘s residence based on a tip that there was a marijuana grow operation taking place. Since they did not have a warrant to search the residence, they knocked and asked for permission. Both Susini and his wife gave verbal consent to search the residence and Susini‘s wife signed a consent to search form. There was testimony that, as part of a grow operation, there are pots, plants, lights, and tampering with electricity. While the officers were in the bedroom, one of them observed gray electrical lines leading into the closet. On this record, since the officers had a general consent to search the residence, and pots, plants, and other evidence of a dismantled grow operation could have been in the closet, the officers were not acting outside the scope of the consent to search when they looked in the closet. See Martinez, 949 F.2d at 1120.
As for suppression of the credit cards, the evidence shows that, while in the process of performing a consensual search, one of the officers heard a loud noise coming from the rear of the residence. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to the government, when the officers responded to that area of the home, the officers found Susini standing in the bedroom with a large amount of embossed, but not imprinted, credit cards at his feet. Officer Rodriguez testified that he immediately recognized the credit cards to be contraband. The officers had permission to be in the residence; therefore, even though they had initially entered to look for evidence of a marijuana growth operation, it was lawful for them to seize the credit cards on the floor because they were in plain view. See Harris, 390 U.S. at 236, 88 S.Ct. 992; see also Horton, 496 U.S. at 137, 110 S.Ct. 2301.
We likewise discern no error in the decision to deny suppression of the machine. In light of the fact that the officers had already found hundreds of embossed, but not imprinted, credit cards in plain view in the home, it was reasonable for the officers to believe that the machine they found in the closet was incriminating evidence. Therefore, the officers had probable cause to believe that the machine was contraband and to seize it. See Brown, 460 U.S. at 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535. The fact that they did not immediately recognize what it was, or that it was contraband, is not dispositive, given the existence of this probable cause.
After thorough review of the record, we discern neither clear error in the district court‘s findings of fact nor error in its application of the law to those facts.
AFFIRMED.
Julia McCain Lampkin-Asam, Deltona, FL, pro se.
Charles D. Hood, Jr., Tamara R. Gaines, Smith, Hood, Perkins, Loucks, Stout, et al., Bruce A. Hanna, Cobb & Cole, Daytona Beach, FL, Michael R. D‘Lugo, Wicker, Smith, O‘Hara, McCoy, Graham & Ford, P.A., Geoffrey D. Ringer, Ringer, Henry, Buckley & Seacord, PA, Orlando, FL, Karina P. Gonzalez, Law Offices of Steven M. Ziegler, P.A., Hollywood, FL, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before ANDERSON, CARNES and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Julia McCain Lampkin-Asam appeals the district court‘s sua sponte dismissal of her second amended complaint for violating the command of
Lampkin-Asam is, according to her complaint, a substitute teacher, a “cancer scientist,” and a former attorney.1 In her
Before dismissing Lampkin-Asam‘s second amended complaint, the district court had dismissed two prior versions of the complaint for violating Rule 8. The first time, the defendants moved to dismiss her complaint, asserting that it was so full of “incomprehensible allegations” that it was impossible to formulate an answer. In dismissing Lampkin-Asam‘s initial complaint, the district court agreed with the defendants, and observed that the complaint was “disjointed, repetitive, disorganized and barely comprehensible.” The district court also noted that because the complaint grouped several claims under each “count,” it was not possible to “decipher which claims [were] brought against which parties under which counts.” The district court dismissed that complaint without prejudice, giving Lampkin-Asam twenty days to file an amended complaint.
She re-filed her complaint, adding additional “counts” and “claims,” but in the district court‘s estimation, she again failed to comply with Rule 8. The court characterized that first amended complaint as a “shotgun pleading,” and concluded that it was still “disjointed, repetitive, disorganized, and barely comprehensible.” Accordingly, the district court dismissed it, giving her twenty days to exercise a “final chance” to re-plead.
Lampkin-Asam took advantage of the opportunity to re-plead her complaint again. Her second amended complaint contained six “counts,” each comprised of various “claims.” Almost every “count” began with the phrase “Volusia County School Board is liable,” followed by a string of factual allegations. Five of the named defendants were not mentioned at all in any of the counts and claims. The complaint also included seventeen pages of numbered paragraphs, each containing scattered and sometimes inconsistent references to the counts and claims presented at the beginning of the complaint. In its order addressing her second amended complaint, the district court described it as a “labyrinth of claims, counts, accusations and repetition.” Because the court concluded that Lampkin-Asam had once again failed to comply with Rule 8, and because the court had warned her that her second amended complaint would be her last, it dismissed her second amended complaint with prejudice. Lampkin-Asam appealed.
II.
We review de novo the district court‘s order dismissing Lampkin-Asam‘s complaint. See Valderrama v. United States, 417 F.3d 1189, 1194 (11th Cir. 2005). While “a trial judge is to employ less stringent standards in assessing pro se pleadings than would be used to judge the final product of lawyers,” Hepperle v. Johnston, 544 F.2d 201, 202 (5th Cir. 1976),2 this leniency does not permit the district court to act as counsel for a party or to rewrite deficient pleadings, GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998); see also McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113 S.Ct. 1980, 1984, 124 L.Ed.2d 21 (1993) (“[W]e have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.“). In fact, we have recently observed that district courts have a “supervisory obligation,” under Rule 12(e), to sua sponte direct a plaintiff to better plead his complaint “when a shotgun complaint fails to adequately link a cause of action to its factual predicates.” Wagner v. First Horizon Pharm. Corp., 464 F.3d 1273, 1275 (11th Cir. 2006).
A complaint that fails to articulate claims with sufficient clarity to allow the defendant to frame a responsive pleading constitutes a “shotgun pleading.” Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1128-29 (11th Cir. 2001). Pleadings of this nature are prohibited by
After our own review of Lampkin-Asam‘s second amended complaint, we agree with the district court that it is confusing, incoherent, and clogged with seemingly irrelevant factual allegations. In it, Lampkin-Asam alleges the same facts repeatedly, and much of it is devoted to matters entirely outside the scope of this action. Because Lampkin-Asam failed to set forth in her second amended complaint a “short and plain statement of [her] claim” showing that she was entitled to relief, it does not pass muster under Rule 8. The district court provided Lampkin-Asam with two opportunities to correct this problem, and because she failed to do so, dismissal with prejudice was appropriate.
Lampkin-Asam‘s contention that the district court held her to a higher standard than a typical pro se plaintiff because she is a former attorney is of no moment. The district court gave her two opportunities to amend her complaint, and she failed to correct the deficiencies in it. Such leniency would have been sufficient even if Lampkin-Asam was a typical pro se litigant, which she is not. Cf. Friedlander v. Nims, 755 F.2d 810, 811-12, 813-14 (11th Cir. 1985) (concluding that dismissal with prejudice was appropriate where the district court gave “specific and repeated warnings,” which went ignored by the plaintiff, that the complaint required amendment). Moreover, even if the district court had held Lampkin-Asam to a higher standard, we would not reverse. We give a “liberal” reading to pro se filings because those litigants lack formal legal training. See GJR Invs., 132 F.3d at 1369 (“Courts do and should show a leniency to pro se litigants not enjoyed by those with the benefit of a legal education.“). Lampkin-Asam, as a former attorney and person who possess formal legal training, should have been able to draft a complaint that complies with Rule 8.
AFFIRMED.