JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v. MalickJPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v. Malick
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Syllabus
Pursuant to the rules of practice (
The plaintiff bank sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the named defendant, M, after he defaulted on a promissory note secured by the mortgage. After the trial court granted the plaintiff‘s motion for summary judgment as to liability, the plaintiff moved for judgment of strict foreclosure and submitted an affidavit of debt pursuant to
Held that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court improperly had relied on the plaintiff‘s affidavit of debt to establish the amount of debt M owed instead of requiring the plaintiff to present evidence as to the amount of the debt:
- This court clarified the standards applicable to trial court rulings on the admissibility of affidavits of debt offered under
Practice Book § 23-18 (a) : To preclude the admission of a plaintiff‘s affidavit of debt pursuant to§ 23-18 (a) , a defense challenging the amount of the mortgage debt must be actively made, must specifically concern the amount of the debt, and must be based on some articulated legal reason or fact as to why the amount of debt asserted is incorrect. Moreover, a defense is insufficient if it focuses on matters ancillary to the amount of the debt, such as issues involving liability, that is, whether the loan is actually in default, involving the credibility of the affiant, or involving defects in the execution of the affidavit itself. - In the present case, M‘s objection to the plaintiff‘s affidavit of debt properly implicated the amount of the debt by challenging the plaintiff‘s calculation of interest and municipal taxes that M allegedly owed.
- The plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that, to properly interpose a defense within the meaning of
Practice Book § 23-18 (a) , an objection to an affidavit of debt must be accompanied not only by legal or factual argument, but also by supporting, admissible evidence: In construing the phrase “where no defense as to the amount of the mortgage debt is interposed,” as used in§ 23-18 (a) , this court looked to the commonly accepted usage of the words “defense” and “interpose,” and concluded that§ 23-18 (a) merely requires a defendant to advance a stated reason, in law or fact, as to why the amount of the debt is incorrect; an objection clearly falls within the broad scope of the term “interpose,” insofar as an objection interferes with a plaintiff‘s ability to rely on an affidavit to prove the amount of indebtedness; this broad definition of “interpose” was supported by Appellate Court case law, and M‘s specific objection to the affidavit of debt in the present case satisfied the requirements of§ 23-18 (a) because it advanced a supporting legal or factual argument, namely, that the plaintiff incorrectly calculated the interest that M owed and failed to include certain property tax abatements that the municipality had allegedly afforded M. Moreover, the plaintiff‘s contention that an objection to an affidavit of debt must be accompanied by supporting, admissible evidence, in addition to legal or factual argument, was not supported by this state‘s appellate case law, and this court‘s construction of§ 23-18 (a) as not requiring that supporting, admissible evidence accompany an objection to an affidavit of debt was consistent with the fact that it is the plaintiff in a foreclosure action that bears the burden of establishing the amount of the debt owed, and that burden remains with the plaintiff after the defendant sufficiently interposes a defense as to the amount of the debt. In the present case, M went beyond what the rules of practice required when he attached to his objection the year-to-year breakdown of what he claimed were the accurate taxes; that objection was based on an articulated reason and sufficed to prevent the trial court from relying on the plaintiff‘s affidavit of debt alone to support the calculation of the amount of property tax that M owed; and, although M did not provide official records from the municipal tax collector to support his calculation of the amount of property tax he owed, neither this court nor the language of§ 23-18 (a) has ever required a defendant to provide such evidence.
Argued January 10—officially released July 4, 2023
Action to foreclose a mortgage on certain of the named defendant‘s real property, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, where the defendant Shujaat Malick was defaulted for failure to appear; thereafter, the court, Bruno, J., granted the plaintiff‘s motion for summary judgment as to liability; subsequently, the case was tried to the court, Bruno, J.; judgment of strict foreclosure, from which the named defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, Moll, Alexander and Bishop, Js., which reversed the trial court‘s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, and the plaintiff, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Brian D. Rich, with whom, on the brief, was Logan A. Carducci, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Jeffrey Gentes and Theresa Dudek filed a brief for the Connecticut Fair Housing Center as amicus curiae.
Joseph R. Dunaj filed a brief for USFN as amicus curiae.
Opinion
D‘AURIA, J. The sole issue in this certified appeal concerns the applicability of the hearsay exception contained in
The Appellate Court‘s opinion contains most of the undisputed facts and procedural history required to resolve this appeal; see JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v. Malick, 208 Conn. App. 38, 39–41, 263 A.3d 920 (2021); which we summarize along with other facts in the record. “The defendant is the owner of real property in Fairfield (property). In [its] complaint . . . the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had executed and delivered to Washington Mutual Bank, N.A., its predecessor in interest, a note in the principal amount of $417,000, of which the plaintiff became the holder, secured by a mortgage on the property. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant was in default on the note and that it had elected to accelerate the
The plaintiff moved for summary judgment as to liability, which the trial court granted. The plaintiff then moved for a judgment of strict foreclosure. Prior to the trial court‘s hearing that motion, “the plaintiff filed an affidavit of debt, signed by . . . an [a]uthorized [s]igner of the plaintiff, attesting that the defendant owed the plaintiff $749,420.60 as of June 13, 2019. . . . [Two weeks later] the plaintiff updated its affidavit of debt to include the interest that had accumulated since [it filed the first] affidavit.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 40.
After the plaintiff filed its updated affidavit, the defendant “object[ed] to the plaintiff‘s affidavit of debt on the grounds that it contained hearsay and inaccurate calculations as to the defendant‘s municipal tax liability and the interest owed on his loan. . . . [T]he court held a hearing on the plaintiff‘s motion for judgment of strict foreclosure, and [it] issued an order granting the defendant [one week of] additional time . . . to obtain and submit verified documentation to support his contention that the plaintiff had miscalculated the outstanding interest due, as well as the defendant‘s municipal tax liability. The defendant thereafter filed another objection to the plaintiff‘s affidavit in which he claimed that according to ‘town records,’ the plaintiff had overstated his municipal taxes by $4208.83, and that it had miscalculated his interest by ‘tens of thousands of dollars.’ The defendant also claimed an offset for damages in the amount of $5,810,000.” (Footnote omitted.) Id., 40-41. The defendant‘s objection included an exhibit listing the property taxes owed on the property for the years 2009 through 2017, which he had obtained from the records of the town tax collector.
One week later, the trial court conducted a second hearing on the plaintiff‘s motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure for the purpose of considering the defendant‘s offer of proof in support of his objection to the amount of the mortgage debt established by the plaintiff‘s affidavit of debt. Id., 41. At the hearing, the defendant3 discussed with the court alleged discrepancies in the municipal tax records, relying on the exhibit he had filed with his most recent objection to the affidavit. The court stated that it was “able to make a finding that the property taxes that are owed on the [property] are somewhere between $49,185.64, which is . . . what [the defendant] believes they are based upon his investigation, and $43,394.47, which is what they were stated to be in the affidavit of debt. . . .” As to the alleged miscalculated interest, the defendant did not provide the court with the documentation it had requested at the first strict foreclosure hearing. Instead, the defendant asked the court to order the plaintiff to provide him with a breakdown of the interest rate that had been applied for each year of his loan. The court declined to order the plaintiff to do so, indicating that
Before adjourning that hearing, and relying on the plaintiff‘s affidavit of debt and other submissions, the court rendered judgment of strict foreclosure, making “all of the necessary findings except as to the amount of the interest and the taxes.” The court then directed the plaintiff to clarify via documentation the breakdown of the escrow payments to resolve the discrepancy between the parties’ calculations of property taxes. It requested the plaintiff to do so within two weeks. As to amount of interest the defendant owed, the court accepted the figure in the plaintiff‘s affidavit of debt, stating that it would adjust this finding only if the defendant “provide[d] any proof and documentation of that interest figure being inaccurate.” Nine days later, the plaintiff moved for an extension of time to prepare a year to year summary of the disputed tax charges in response to the court‘s order that it do so. Notwithstanding its earlier direction to the plaintiff to provide this information, the court denied the motion, stating that “no extension is necessary, as no action is necessary on the part of counsel. The plaintiff owes the court nothing. Judgment has entered.” Thus, the trial court did not require the plaintiff to provide, and did not consider, any evidence in support of the amount of the debt stated in the affidavit. Nor did the defendant ever provide the court with the documentation it requested regarding the allegedly miscalculated interest.
The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court erred as a matter of law by accepting the plaintiff‘s affidavit of debt and relying on it to establish the amount of the defendant‘s indebtedness over his objections to the interest and property tax calculations. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v. Malick, supra, 208 Conn. App. 39. The Appellate Court agreed with the defendant and reversed the trial court‘s judgment; id.; based on this court‘s decision in Burritt Mutual Savings Bank of New Britain v. Tucker, 183 Conn. 369, 374-75, 439 A.2d 396 (1981). The plaintiff sought certification to appeal to this court, which we granted, limited to the issue of whether “the Appellate Court incorrectly determine[d] that an objection to an affidavit of debt is sufficient to challenge the affidavit under
I
We agree with the Appellate Court‘s helpful and lucid statement in Bank of America, N.A. v. Chainani, 174 Conn. App. 476, 483-84, 166 A.3d 670 (2017), of the applicable standard of review of trial court rulings on the admissibility of affidavits of debt offered under
“A trial court‘s decision to admit evidence, if premised on a correct view of the law . . . calls for the abuse of discretion standard of review. . . . In other words, only after a trial court has made the legal determination that a particular statement . . . is subject to a hearsay exception, is it [then] vested with the discretion to admit or to bar the evidence based upon relevancy, prejudice, or other legally appropriate grounds related to the rule of evidence under which admission is being sought. . . . Therefore, a trial court‘s legal determination of whether
Thus, to preclude the admission of an affidavit of debt pursuant to
The plaintiff recognizes that the defendant‘s objection in this case correctly implicated the amount of the debt by challenging the plaintiff‘s calculation of interest and municipal taxes. Instead, it argues that, to “interpose” a “defense,” as those words are used in
II
The Appellate Court concluded that this court‘s holding in Burritt Mutual Savings Bank of New Britain v. Tucker, supra, 183 Conn. 369, required it to reject the trial court‘s admission of the affidavit of debt in the present case because the defendant had objected to the amount of the debt. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v. Malick, supra, 208 Conn. App. 41-42. A review of Burritt Mutual Savings Bank of New Britain is beneficial to our analysis because, although that case is not solely dispositive in resolving the present case, it requires us to address a critical aspect of the plaintiff‘s claim that was not sufficiently considered by the Appellate Court.
After the trial court in Burritt Mutual Savings Bank of New Britain rendered a default judgment, the plaintiff submitted an affidavit to establish the amount of the mortgage debt. Burritt Mutual Savings Bank of New Britain v. Tucker, supra, 183 Conn. 374. The defendant objected to the affidavit, specifically disputing “the amounts shown thereon for principal, interest, taxes, and late charges.” Id. After allowing the defendant to testify as to his own calculation of the debt, the trial court found the debt to be the amount claimed in the affidavit. Id. The court did not require the plaintiff to present any additional evidence as to the amount of the debt. Id., 374–75. On appeal to this court, the defendant claimed that the trial court had improperly relied on the affidavit the plaintiff submitted to establish the amount of the debt and argued that, because he had raised a defense to the debt,
In the present case, the defendant objected in relevant part on the ground that the plaintiff‘s accounting of his property tax payments and interest was inaccurate. Based on these challenges, the Appellate Court correctly held that the defendant had raised a specific objection “concerning the amount of the mortgage debt” established by the plaintiff‘s affidavit. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v. Malick, supra, 208 Conn. App. 43. What the Appellate Court did not sufficiently address, however, was whether, to properly “interpose” a “defense,”
III
The plaintiff argues that, to constitute a defense under
When construing our rules of practice, we apply the rules of statutory construction. E.g., Meadowbrook Center, Inc. v. Buchman, 328 Conn. 586, 594, 181 A.3d 550 (2018). “[W]e follow the clear meaning of unambiguous rules, because [a]lthough we are directed to interpret liberally the rules of practice, that liberal construction applies only to situations in which a strict adherence to them [will] work surprise or injustice.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 595.
Moreover, because the plaintiff challenges the sufficiency of the defendant‘s defense, we also must define what it means to “interpose” a defense. Our rules of practice do not define the word “interpose,” and this court has not defined the word in the context of
Appellate Court case law supports this broad defini-tion. Although the Appellate Court has not defined the term “interpose,” it has addressed how a defense to the amount of the debt may be interposed. Specifically, the Appellate Court has held that a defense to the amount of the mortgage debt may be raised by an objection challenging the amount of the debt when the plaintiff attempts to introduce the affidavit into evidence; see Bank of America, N.A. v. Chainani, supra, 174 Conn. App. 486; as defenses relating to the mathematical calculation of the mortgage debt need not be disclosed before the foreclosure hearing.5 Suffield Bank v. Berman, supra, 25 Conn. App. 374. An objection clearly falls within the broad scope of the plain meaning of the word “interpose,” as an objection interferes with the plaintiff‘s ability to rely on the affidavit to prove the amount of indebtedness. See Black‘s Law Dictionary (11th Ed. 2019) p. 1290 (defining “objection” as “[a] formal statement opposing something that has occurred, or is about to occur, in court and seeking the judge‘s immediate ruling on the point“).
The defendant in the present case objected to the amount of the debt listed in the plaintiff‘s affidavit, arguing that the plaintiff incorrectly calculated the interest and property taxes he owed, and, therefore, the plaintiff‘s calculation of debt was not valid. Using the previously mentioned
As for its contention that supporting evidence must accompany the objection, the plaintiff emphasizes that the defendant in Burritt Mutual Savings Bank of New Britain testified in support of his assertions that the mortgage debt was incorrect, whereas the defendant in the present case failed even to appear at the hearing at which he could have testified in support of his objection. As mentioned previously, the defendant did appear at the strict foreclosure hearing to testify in support of his objection. Moreover, our holding in Burritt Mutual Savings Bank of New Britain does not require that a defendant testify, as the defendant did in that case, for his objection to an affidavit of debt to suffice to prevent its admissibility. Nor did we hold in Burritt Mutual Savings Bank of New Britain that a defendant must provide documentation to support his defense, and, thus, the defendant‘s failure in the present case to do so, as the trial court ordered, does not distinguish his objection from the defendant‘s objection in Burritt Mutual Savings Bank of New Britain. See Burritt Mutual Savings Bank of New Britain v. Tucker, supra, 183 Conn. 374-75.
The plaintiff places greater reliance on Bank of America, N.A. v. Chainani, supra, 174 Conn. App. 476, to support its argument that the defendant‘s objection to its affidavit did not suffice because he did not provide evidence to support his objections. In Chainani, the first stage of the foreclosure action focused on whether the plaintiff had standing to commence the action. Id., 480. The defendant‘s answer in that case denied that the mortgage loan was in default and pleaded insufficient knowledge to admit or to deny the alleged amount of the debt. Id., 479–80. At the hearing in which the court addressed the issue of standing, the trial court admitted the plaintiff‘s affidavit of debt over the defendant‘s objection that he had advanced a defense implicating the amount of the debt in his answer to the plaintiff‘s complaint. Id., 480.
The trial court thereafter conducted a hearing to determine the amount of the debt and the form of judgment it would render. Id. Prior to that hearing, the plaintiff had submitted an updated affidavit of debt in support of its motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure, and the defendant once again objected on the same
On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant in Chainani claimed that his answer to the plaintiff‘s complaint contained responses to the allegations sufficient to bar the affidavit‘s admission. Id. The defendant argued that the trial court “should have understood these responses to be a challenge to the amount of the debt . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Id., 485. Holding that the trial court properly relied on the affidavit of debt, the Appellate Court reiterated what it previously had held in numerous cases—to preclude the admission of an affidavit of debt under
The plaintiff argues that the present case is “on all fours” with Chainani. We cannot agree. First, the plaintiff asserts that the Appellate Court in Chainani rejected the defendant‘s argument that
The plaintiff focuses on the following sentence in Chainani to support its claim that the defendant‘s objection was insufficient: “It is axiomatic that such a defense may be raised by pleading a special defense attacking the amount of the debt claimed, but it may also be raised by objection,
This construction is further supported by the fact that, in a foreclosure action, it is the plaintiff‘s burden to establish the amount of the debt. See
By attaching to his objection to the plaintiff‘s affidavit a document with a year to year breakdown of what he claimed were the accurate property taxes, the defendant went beyond what our rules of practice require. Along with argument based on an articulated reason, this objection certainly sufficed to prevent the court from relying on the affidavit for these calculations. Although the defendant did not provide official records from the town tax collector to support his calculation of the amount of property tax he owed, we have never required, and the language of
The plaintiff contends that a determination by this court that the defendant‘s objection to the affidavit of debt sufficed will effectively eliminate the hearsay exception in
The trial court in the present case improperly placed the burden on the defendant to prove that the amount of interest listed in the plaintiff‘s affidavit of debt was inaccurate. At all times, it was the plaintiff‘s burden to prove the amount of the debt. The defendant sufficiently objected to the amount of interest and municipal taxes, and it was not his burden to provide further evidence to “prove” his objection. By placing the burden on the defendant to establish that the affidavit of debt was inaccurate, the trial court prevented the defendant from having an opportunity to cross-examine the plaintiff‘s witnesses, including the affiant. Accordingly, the Appellate Court correctly held that the trial court had improperly relied on the plaintiff‘s affidavit of debt rather than having required the plaintiff to present evidence as to the amount of the debt.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.