Joseph L. Wilson, Appellant-Petitioner, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent
Court of Appeals Case No. 21A-CR-2308
Court of Appeals of Indiana
June 2, 2022
May, Judge.
Appeal from the Jay Circuit Court. The Honorable Brian D. Hutchison, Judge. Trial Court Cause No. 38C01-1712-F5-45
Brandon E. Murphy
J. Patrick Wright
Cannon Bruns & Murphy
Muncie, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
George P. Sherman
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
May, Judge.
[1] Joseph L. Wilson appeals the trial court‘s denial of his motion to modify sentence. He argues the trial court erred as a matter of law when it determined
Facts and Procedural History
[1] On December 19, 2017, the State charged Wilson with Level 5 felony incest1 and Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy2 for alleged crimes in which his daughter was the victim. On August 16, 2018, Wilson pled guilty to Level 5 felony incest and the State dismissed the invasion of privacy count. The trial court sentenced Wilson to four years incarcerated.
[2] On December 30, 2020, Wilson completed his sentence and was placed on parole. On September 20, 2021, Wilson filed a motion to modify sentence in which he argued “it would be in the best interest of [Wilson] if his sentence were modified and he were released from parole and would service [sic] the remainder of his sentence on supervised probation.” (App. Vol. II at 57.) Wilson asserted the modification should be granted
so that the Court can fashion appropriate restrictions on [Wilson‘s] interactions with his own family as opposed to parole officials including where and with whom [Wilson] may reside. Specifically, parole and program officials are requesting [Wilson] incur substantial financial hardship by moving out [of] a
previously approved home in which other relatives3 are voluntarily residing with him.
(Id. at 57-8.)
[3] On September 30, 2021, the trial court held a hearing. At the end of the hearing, the trial court stated: “Okay. Well at this [unreadable] I don‘t think I have the authority. You could take 10 days to teach me otherwise if you‘d like. If I do [unreadable] the authority I don‘t know. I don‘t know.” (Tr. Vol. II at 13.) Wilson filed his post-hearing memorandum in support of sentence modification on October 12, 2021. On October 21, 2021, the trial court denied his motion for modification of sentence in an order that explained: “Insomuch as this Court did not suspend any portion of the sentence imposed (which would have allowed for probation), and that the Court knows of no lawful mechanism whereby probation can be imposed after service of a fully executed sentence, the Court finds that the relief sought is not available to [Wilson].” (App. Vol. II at 62.)
Discussion and Decision
[4] We generally review a trial court‘s decision on a motion for sentence modification for an abuse of discretion. Johnson v. State, 36 N.E.3d 1130, 1133 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. However, when, as it does here, the matter
When interpreting a statute, “our primary goal is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature.” Daniels v. FanDuel, Inc., 109 N.E.3d 390, 394 (Ind. 2018) (citing Moryl v. Ransone, 4 N.E.3d 1133, 1137 (Ind. 2014)). We must “give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of statutory terms,” State v. Hancock, 65 N.E.3d 585, 587 (Ind. 2016), and there is a presumption that the legislature “intended the statutory language to be applied logically and consistently with the statute‘s underlying policy and goals.” Daniels, 109 N.E.3d at 394 (quoting Walczak v. Labor Works-Ft. Wayne LLC, 983 N.E.2d 1146, 1154 (Ind. 2013)).
Rodriguez v. State, 129 N.E.3d 789, 798 (Ind. 2019). Additionally, when interpreting a statute, “we will not read into the statute that which is not the expressed intent of the legislature” and “it is just as important to recognize what the statute does not say as to recognize what it does say.” N.D.F. v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1085, 1088 (Ind. 2002).
[5]
(e) At any time after:
(1) a convicted person begins serving the person‘s sentence; and
(2) the court obtains a report from the department of correction concerning the convicted person‘s conduct while imprisoned; the court may reduce or suspend the sentence and impose a sentence that the court was authorized to impose at the time of sentencing.
Wilson contends that, under that statutory language, the sentencing court can modify a sentence “any time after the Defendant begins serving their sentence” and the statute “contains no specific language confining its application to the executed portion of the Defendant‘s sentence, nor does it preclude application to defendants on parole at the time of the petition.” (Br. of Appellant at 10) (emphasis in original omitted).
[6] Pursuant to plain language of
[7] Further, a person who is on parole “is not discharged [from parole] until the Indiana Parole Board acts to discharge him.” Majors v. Broglin, 531 N.E.2d 189, 190 (Ind. 1988). “It has long been the law in Indiana that the Parole Board has almost absolute discretion in carrying out its duties and that it is not subject to the supervision of the Courts.” Murphy v. Indiana Parole Bd., 272 Ind. 200, 204, 397 N.E.2d 259, 261 (Ind. 1979). Indiana courts “can not act as a ‘Super Parole Board.‘” Id. Therefore, the appropriate place for Wilson to request modification would be the Parole Board, not a trial court.
Conclusion
[8] Wilson has not demonstrated the trial court has authority to modify Wilson‘s sentence while he is on parole. Accordingly, we affirm.
[9] Affirmed.
Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.