Alberto Baiza Rodriguez v. State of Indiana
Supreme Court Case No. 18S-CR-143
Indiana Supreme Court
August 7, 2019
Opinion by Justice David
Argued: May 9, 2019 | Appeal from the Elkhart Superior Court, No. 20D06-1503-F6-264 | The Honorable David C. Bonfiglio, Judge | On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 20A03-1704-CR-724
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Goff concur.
We granted transfer in this case and a related case, Pebble Stafford v. State of Indiana, --- N.E.3d --- (Ind. 2019) (”Stafford II“), to resolve conflicting opinions from our Court of Appeals concerning recent amendments to Indiana‘s sentence modification statutes. As a matter of statutory interpretation, we find the decades-old rule of sentence modification remains undisturbed: courts may modify a sentence only if the new sentence would not have violated the terms of the valid plea agreement had the new sentence been originally imposed. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment that it was not authorized to modify the sentence imposed under Defendant‘s fixed-term plea agreement.
Facts and Procedural History
In March 2015, Defendant Alberto Rodriguez was charged with class A misdemeanor operating while intoxicated (“OWI“) and class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent of .08 or more. Due to prior OWI convictions, Rodriguez was also charged with level 6 felony OWI with a prior conviction and with being a habitual vehicular substance offender (“HVSO“).
Rodriguez entered into a plea agreement on January 6, 2016. In exchange for dismissal of the class C misdemeanor charge, Rodriguez pled guilty to the class A misdemeanor OWI, level 6 felony OWI with a prior conviction, and HVSO charges. The trial court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Rodriguez according to the plea agreement‘s terms: thirty months in Elkhart County work release for merged level 6 felony OWI with a prior conviction and class A misdemeanor OWI charges and an additional forty-two months on work release for the HVSO charge. A hand-written notation on the plea agreement read, “Agreed all time to Work Release no discretion to change.” (Appellant‘s App. Vol. II at 13) (emphasis in original). This note was incorporated into the trial court‘s sentencing order.1
On January 12, 2017, Rodriguez petitioned to modify his sentence under
The trial court denied Rodriguez‘s motion to modify his sentence. The court relied on
A person may not waive the right to sentence modification under this section as part of a plea agreement. Any purported waiver of the right to sentence modification under this section in a plea agreement is invalid and unenforceable as against public policy. This subsection does not prohibit the finding of a waiver of the right to sentence modification for any other reason, including failure to comply with the provisions of this section.
(Emphasis altered from court‘s order). Applying the above emphasized language to the specific terms of Rodriguez‘s plea agreement, the court found that a defendant who “enter[s] into a binding plea agreement waives the right to seek or receive a modification of [his or her] sentence.” (Appellant‘s App. Vol. II at 22.) Thus, the trial court held that it had no authority to modify Rodriguez‘s sentence. Rodriguez appealed.
In a split decision, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that “modification of Rodriguez‘s sentence is permissible under
Senior Judge Rucker dissented, finding that “[a]lthough
The State sought transfer, which we granted. Rodriguez v. State, 100 N.E.3d 696 (Ind. 2018). In a published order, we
On remand, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its original holding in Rodriguez I, finding that the retroactive application of 2018 amendments to the sentence modification statute violated the contract clause of the Federal Constitution. Rodriguez v. State, 116 N.E.3d 515, 524 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (”Rodriguez II“). Senior Judge Rucker again dissented for the reasons expressed in his earlier dissenting opinion in Rodriguez I. Id. (Rucker, S.J., dissenting).
The State sought transfer, which we granted, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals opinion.
Standard of Review
Matters of statutory interpretation present pure questions of law; as such, these questions are reviewed de novo. Nicoson v. State, 938 N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ind. 2010). This Court “presumes that the legislature intended for the statutory language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the statute‘s underlying policy and goals.” Id.
Discussion and Decision
The genesis of these proceedings came as a result of the legislature‘s 2014 amendments to
We resolve this split in interpretations today and conclude that the legislature‘s amendments did not change course from the previously accepted view of sentence modification in Indiana. As demonstrated below, this conclusion flows from our Court‘s precedent and the canons of statutory interpretation.
I. Historically, courts were bound by the terms of the plea agreement.
The State‘s primary argument in this case is that the legislature never intended to change course from the well-established policy in Indiana that trial courts have no authority to reduce or suspend a sentence in a way that would violate the terms of a valid plea agreement. Applying that rule to this case, the State argues that Rodriguez could not petition for sentence modification because his plea agreement reserved no discretion for the trial court to change his work release placement.
Generally speaking, “[a] criminal defendant has no constitutional right to engage in plea bargaining.” Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134, 1144 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Coker v. State, 499 N.E.2d 1135, 1138 (Ind. 1986)). While the State is under no duty to offer a bargain, see id., plea agreements are often sought because they “facilitate expeditious disposition of criminal cases.” State ex rel. Goldsmith v. Marion Cnty. Super. Ct., (1981) 275 Ind. 545, 552, 419 N.E.2d 109, 114. See also Pannarale v. State, 638 N.E.2d 1247, 1248 (Ind. 1994) (noting that plea agreements “are designed to induce the defendant to plead guilty, typically in return for a promise of
Trial courts enjoy considerable discretion in deciding whether to accept or reject a proposed plea agreement. See Pannarale, 638 N.E.2d at 1248. If the court rejects a plea agreement, the case may move on to trial, the defendant may enter a guilty plea, or subsequent plea agreements may be filed. See id.;
In contrast, “[a] ‘fixed’ plea is one which specifies the exact number of years to be imposed for sentencing.” Allen v. State, 865 N.E.2d 686, 689 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citation omitted). When a court accepts a plea agreement that calls for a fixed sentence, “it has no discretion to impose anything other than the precise sentence upon which [the parties] agreed.” Childress, 848 N.E.2d at 1078 n.4 (citation omitted). See also Goldsmith, 419 N.E.2d at 114 (finding that when a trial court accepts an explicit agreement binding both the State and the defendant, the trial court may neither increase nor suspend the executed sentence because that “would deny the parties the essential purpose of their agreement“).
No matter the type of plea bargained for by the defendant and the State, plea agreements are contractual in nature. Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ind. 2004). As such, the State, defendant, and trial court become bound by the agreement‘s terms once the plea is accepted by the court. Pannarale, 638 N.E.2d at 1248 (citing
These underlying principles formed the basis for this Court‘s earlier decisions in Goldsmith and Pannarale. Those opinions found that once an agreement is accepted by the court, “a deal is a deal” and “the sentencing court possesses only that degree of discretion provided in the plea agreement with regard to imposing an initial sentence or altering it later.” Pannarale, 638 N.E.2d at 1248 (emphasis added). If a defendant who is sentenced pursuant to the terms of a plea agreement later petitions for modification of his or her sentence, “the trial court retains the authority to modify a sentence so long as the modified sentence would not have violated the plea agreement had it been the sentence originally imposed.” Id. at 1249.
The logical application of this rule—that a defendant may not petition for modification of a fixed-plea sentence because the plea agreement authorized the court to
II. Although the General Assembly amended the sentence modification statutes, the changes did not alter the general rule regarding modification.
It was against this backdrop that the General Assembly began its revisions of the sentence modification statute. The relevant amendments came in three waves: first in 2014, second in 2015, and finally in 2018.4 The primary point of conflict in the present action stems from the 2014 amendments to
heels of the substantial 2013 criminal code revision effort. See H.E.A. 1006 (2013); 2013 Ind. Acts 1155-1630.
Specifically, the legislature added a new subsection in 2014 to
A person may not waive the right to sentence modification under this section as part of a plea agreement. Any purported waiver of the right to sentence modification under this section in a plea agreement is invalid and unenforceable as against public policy. This subsection does not prohibit the finding of a waiver of the right to sentence modification for any other reason, including failure to comply with the provisions of this section.
Then, in 2015, the legislature moved this aforementioned subsection to its current location at
In 2018—after the Court of Appeals handed down Stafford I and Rodriguez I—the legislature clarified two relevant provisions. First, subsection (e) was amended to provide:
At any time after: (1) a convicted person begins serving the person‘s sentence; and (2) the court obtains a report from the department of correction concerning the convicted person‘s conduct while imprisoned; the court may reduce or suspend the sentence and impose a sentence that the court was authorized to impose at the time of sentencing. However, if the convicted person was sentenced under the terms of a plea agreement, the court may not, without the consent of the prosecuting attorney, reduce or suspend the sentence and impose a sentence not authorized
by the plea agreement. The court must incorporate its reasons in the record.
A person may not waive the right to sentence modification under this section as part of a plea agreement. Any purported waiver of the right to sentence modification under this section in a plea agreement is invalid and unenforceable as against public policy. This subsection does not prohibit the finding of a waiver of the right to: (1) have a court modify a sentence and impose a sentence not authorized by the plea agreement, as described under subsection (e); or
(2) sentence modification for any other reason, including failure to comply with the provisions of this section.
Because these amendments created considerable confusion amongst courts and practitioners, we must provide a cognizable path forward to interpret these provisions. Stated plainly, the legislature either intended to allow defendants to petition for sentence modification regardless of the terms of a plea agreement or it didn‘t. Rodriguez argues that
reading in light of the legislature‘s recent amendments to
When interpreting a statute, “our primary goal is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature.” Daniels v. FanDuel, Inc., 109 N.E.3d 390, 394 (Ind. 2018) (citing Moryl v. Ransone, 4 N.E.3d 1133, 1137 (Ind. 2014)). We must “give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of statutory terms,” State v. Hancock, 65 N.E.3d 585, 587 (Ind. 2016), and there is a presumption that the legislature “intended the statutory language to be applied logically and consistently with the statute‘s underlying policy and goals.” Daniels, 109 N.E.3d at 394 (quoting Walczak v. Labor Works-Ft. Wayne LLC, 983 N.E.2d 1146, 1154 (Ind. 2013)).
Here, we are asked to construe two seemingly conflicting provisions. Accordingly, before applying any other rule of statutory construction, we “should attempt to give effect to both [statutes] and must attempt to harmonize any inconsistencies or conflicts....” Moryl, 4 N.E.3d at 1137 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). If the two statutes are incompatible with one another, the most recent amendment controls and operates to repeal the earlier provision. Id. But “such implied repeal should be recognized only when a later act is so repugnant to an earlier one as to render them irreconcilable, and a construction which will permit both laws to stand will be adopted if at all possible.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). Recognizing that a valid interpretation exists so as to reconcile and harmonize both provisions in the present case, we will—and must—give effect to both provisions.
The language of
We do not think the waiver language of subsection (l) casts irreconcilable doubt on this interpretation. By its terms, the provision prohibits a defendant from “waiv[ing] the right to sentence modification as part of a plea agreement” and declares “[a]ny purported waiver of the right to sentence modification ... in a plea agreement is invalid and unenforceable as against public policy.”
But the legislature placed important qualifiers in this same subsection that suggest any purported right to modification is potentially limited by other unenumerated factors. The subsection itself “does not prohibit the finding of a waiver of the right to sentence modification for any other reason, including failure to comply with the provisions of this section.”
the waiver of a right to sentence modification when the waiver of that right is contemplated by the same subsection.
We think a reasonable harmonization of these provisions is that the legislature sought only to ban the explicit waiver of the right to sentence modification within the text of the written plea agreement. This interpretation comes directly from the plain language of subsection (l). When referencing waiver of the right to sentence modification, the legislature used language like ”as part of a plea agreement” and ”in a plea agreement.” See
This view also reinforces the well-established principle that plea agreements are contractual in nature. See Lee, 816 N.E.2d at 38. When the trial court accepted Rodriguez‘s plea agreement, it—along with Rodriguez and the State—became bound by the terms of the agreement. The State agreed to drop certain charges in exchange
Conclusion
Understanding that the legislature‘s amendments did not alter the settled law of Pannarale and its progeny, the trial court appropriately found it had no discretion to modify Rodriguez‘s sentence because it was bound by the terms of the valid plea agreement.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Jessica R. Merino
South Bend, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Attorney General of Indiana
Ellen H. Meilaender
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Notes
At any time after: (1) a convicted person begins serving the person‘s sentence; and (2) the court obtains a report from the department of correction concerning the convicted person‘s conduct while imprisoned; the court may reduce or suspend the sentence and impose a sentence that the court was authorized to impose at the time of sentencing. The court must incorporate its reasons in the record.