DIANE JONES, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GEAUGA COUNTY REPUBLICAN PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
CASE NO. 2016-G-0056
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT GEAUGA COUNTY, OHIO
May 22, 2017
2017-Ohio-2930
THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J.
Civil Appeal from the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 15 M 000679. Judgment: Affirmed.
Mark S. O‘Brien, 2460 Fairmount Boulevard, Suite 301B, Cleveland Heights, OH 44106 (For Plaintiffs-Appellants).
Nancy C. Schuster, Schuster & Simmons Co., L.P.A., Bevelin House, 2913 Clinton Avenue, Cleveland, OH 44113 (For Defendants-Appellees).
O P I N I O N
{¶1} Appellants, Diane Jones, Thomas Jones, and Jimmy Lee Holden, appeal the trial court‘s decision granting appellees’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. We affirm.
{¶2} Appellants filed suit against appellees, the Geauga County Republican Party Central Committee and Nancy McArthur (collectively “the committee“), seeking declaratory judgment, a permanent injunction, and other unspecified relief.
{¶3} Appellants’ first count seeks declaratory judgment that the committee on August 15, 2015 held a closed meeting at which it “deliberated, and voted upon two issues: (a) the amendment of the Central Committee‘s bylaws, and (b) the appointment of six (6) new members to the Central Committee to fill vacancies.” Appellants aver that McArthur, as chairperson of the committee caused members of the public including appellants to be removed from the meeting. However, the soon-to-be appointed, newest members of the committee were permitted to stay and attend the meeting. Appellants claim that the committee violated
{¶4} They also aver that the committee did not hold a roll call vote to adjourn to executive session and it did not indicate the matters on which it would vote in executive session contrary to
{¶5} Accordingly, appellants sought the trial court to declare pursuant to
{¶6} In its second count, appellants seek to enjoin the committee from future violations of
{¶7} In lieu of an answer, the committee filed a motion to dismiss based on
{¶8} Appellants assert one assigned error on appeal:
{¶9} “The trial court committed prejudicial error in granting Appellees’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), based upon its opinion that the August 15, 2015 meeting of the Geauga County Republican Party Central Committee was not subject to O.R.C. 121.22 because a meeting of a county central committee of a political party held for the purpose of appointing new members to the committee to fill vacancies and to deliberate over amendments to its bylaws does not constitute public business, as contemplated by that code section, but the private, internal affairs of the committee.”
{¶10}
{¶11} “[C]ourts of record may declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding is open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for under this chapter. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect. The declaration has the effect of a final judgment or decree.”
{¶12} A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is procedural and tests whether the complaint is sufficient. State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 65 Ohio St.3d 545, 548, 605 N.E.2d 378 (1992). A trial court may not rely on allegations or evidence outside the complaint, but can only review the complaint and dismiss the case if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling it to recover. State ex rel. Fuqua v. Alexander, 79 Ohio St.3d 206, 207, 680 N.E.2d 985. The court must presume that all factual allegations in the complaint are true and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192, 532 N.E.2d 753 (1988). However, a court should not accept as true any unsupported legal conclusions in the complaint. Eichenberger v. Petree, 76 Ohio App.3d 779, 782, 603 N.E.2d 366 (10th Dist.1992); Morrow v. Reminger & Reminger Co. LPA, 183 Ohio App.3d 40, 2009-Ohio-2665, 915 N.E.2d 696, ¶7 (10th Dist.).
{¶13} “The effect of a dismissal of a declaratory judgment action without making a declaration of the parties’ rights is a determination that the plaintiff in the declaratory judgment action has no right to a declaratory judgment[,]” and only establishes that the complaint failed to state a viable claim for declaratory judgment. State ex rel. Fenske v. McGovern, 11 Ohio St.3d 129, 133, 464 N.E.2d 525 (1984).
{¶14} This court reviews decisions granting
{¶15} Ohio‘s open meetings act,
{¶16} Further, “[a]ny person may bring an action to enforce [
{¶17} The committee alleged in its motion to dismiss that it is not subject to the requirements of Ohio‘s open meetings act since it is a private organization that considers and conducts public business only in certain, limited situations, and that the specific subject matter addressed at its August 15, 2015, meeting, i.e., the appointment of new committee members to fill vacancies and potential changes to its internal bylaws, does not constitute public business.
{¶18}
{¶19} A “public body” is:
{¶20} “(a) Any board, commission, committee, council, or similar decision-making body of a state agency, institution, or authority, and any legislative authority or board, commission, committee, council, agency, authority, or similar decision-making body of any county, township, municipal corporation, school district, or other political subdivision or local public institution;
{¶21} “(b) Any committee or subcommittee of a body described in division (B)(1)(a) of this section* * *.”
{¶22}
{¶23} “‘Public office’ includes any state agency, public institution, political subdivision, or other organized body, office, agency, institution, or entity established by the laws of this state for the exercise of any function of government.”
{¶24} “‘State agency’ includes every department, bureau, board, commission, office, or other organized body established by the constitution and laws of this state for the exercise of any function of state government, including any state-supported institution of higher education, the general assembly, any legislative agency, any court or judicial agency, or any political subdivision or agency of a political subdivision.”
{¶25} “Public business” is not statutorily defined, but has recently been defined by the Ohio Supreme Court as “the business of the government” or “‘those matters over which the public governmental body has supervision, control, jurisdiction or advisory power.‘” (Citations omitted.) White v. King, 147 Ohio St.3d 74, 2016-Ohio-2770, 60 N.E.3d 1234, ¶21.
{¶26} Under limited circumstances,
{¶27} Appellants’ complaint is founded on the premise that the committee is a public body or comprised of “public officers” when it meets to amend its internal
{¶28} However, a few cases have considered this issue in an unrelated context and have found that a central committee of a local political party is only comprised of “public officers” when the committee is actually undertaking its limited, governmental duties. State ex rel. Cain v. Kay, 38 Ohio St.2d 15, 18-19, 309 N.E.2d 860 (1974) (construing State, ex rel. Hayes, supra); Banchy v. Republican Party of Hamilton Cty., 898 F.2d 1192, 1194-1195 (6th Cir.1990).
{¶29} In State ex rel. Hayes, supra, the Supreme Court considered an action in quo warranto by a relator seeking the pro tempore clerk of courts to surrender the office to allow the relator to take the office. The relator challenged the constitutional authority of the General Assembly to confer by statute on the county central committee of a political party the authority to appoint an individual for a vacancy in a county office until a successor is elected. Id. at 372. The Supreme Court found the statute constitutionally sound and explained in part that the power conferred “upon central committeemen makes them public officers.” Id. at 374.
{¶30} In State ex rel. Cain v. Kay, supra, however, the Ohio Supreme Court clarified the extent of its holding in Hayes, stating:
{¶31} “In Hayes, it was the delegation by statute of one of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised for the public benefit, to the county central committeemen that outweighed the traditional reluctance of the court to interfere in the internal affairs of political parties. Political parties are basically voluntary associations of persons who act together principally for party and community purposes. Courts should defer to the appropriate party tribunals established by the members for the resolution of internal disputes of the party. For purposes of quo warranto, it is only where party officers assume duties affecting activities beyond the sphere of the internal affairs of the party and exercise official powers that are part of the sovereign functions of the state, properly exercisable for the public benefit, that the courts will intercede.” Id.
{¶32} What constitutes the “internal affairs” of a central committee of a political party is not defined by case law or statute, but “internal” means “1. Of, relating to, or situated within the limits or surface of something : INNER. 2. Residing in or dependent on the essential nature of something : INHERENT.” Webster‘s II New College Dictionary, 579 (1999).
{¶33} More recently, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Banchy v. Republican Party of Hamilton Cty., supra, also addressed the extent of Hayes’ holding and concluded:
{¶34} “While section 305.02 delegates to the central committees of a state party the power to appoint certain county officials when a vacancy occurs, this does not mean that all actions of a central committee constitute state action. When performing the narrow duties assigned to it under section 305.02, the Central Committee of the Republican Party may well be engaging in state action. State ex rel. Hayes v. Jennings, 173 Ohio St. 370, 374, 19 Ohio Op. 2d 314, 182 N.E.2d 546 (1962) (‘the power conferred by Section 305.02, Revised Code, upon central committeemen makes them public officers‘); see also Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663, 88 L. Ed. 987, 64 S. Ct. 757 (1944) (‘the party takes its character as a state agency from the duties imposed upon it by state statutes; the duties do not become matters of private law because they are performed by a political
{¶35} Although none of the foregoing cases deals with the application of Ohio‘s Open Meetings Act to a central committee meeting to amend its internal bylaws and appoint new members, a collective reading of the above establishes that although members of a central committee of a political party are public officers upon acting under the authority granted in
{¶36} In addition, while not controlling authority, the Ohio Attorney General has considered the precise issue on appeal and concluded:
{¶37} “The convening of the county central committee for the purpose of conducting purely internal party affairs, unrelated to the committee‘s duties of making appointments to vacant public offices, is not a ‘meeting’ as defined by
{¶38} Upon liberally construing
{¶39} Accordingly, appellants’ sole assigned error lacks merit, and the judgment of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, J.,
COLLEEN MARY O‘TOOLE, J.,
concur.