THE STATE EX REL. LONG v. COUNCIL OF THE VILLAGE OF CARDINGTON ET AL.
No. 00-857
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Decided June 13, 2001
92 Ohio St.3d 54 | 2001-Ohio-130
Submitted March 13, 2001
IN MANDAMUS.
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} Respondent Council of the Village of Cardington, Ohio, and its members, respondents Robert Doolin, Cecil Maxwell, Laurie Plotner, David Sheets, Joel Sherman, and Vicki Wise, conduct public business of the village through prearranged discussions by a majority of the village council members. The village council characterizes these prearranged discussions as regular sessions, special sessions, work sessions, joint sessions, personnel committee meetings, and finance committee meetings. Respondent Cardington Mayor William Christian attends and presides over village council meetings, and respondent Cardington Clerk/Treasurer Belva Bowеrs prepares minutes for the meetings.
{¶ 2} On May 9, 2000, after becoming dissatisfied with respondents’ responses to her request for certain public records and to her claims that respondents had violated Ohio‘s Sunshine Law,
{¶ 3} In her complaint, Long claimed that village council minutes for meetings held by respondents were inadequate and incorrect. More specifically,
{¶ 4} Fоr example, the minutes of the January 3 council meetings erroneously included Long‘s name in the roll call, but she was not a member of the village council at that time. In addition, the January 3 council work session included the following generalized statements:
“The Mayor discussed the plans for this meeting. The Mayor‘s belief in how committee chairs will operate. * * * There was a discussion regarding the wet retention area at Bantry Farms. Future Developers must not have the same engineer as the village.”
{¶ 5} Long further claimed that minutes for the January 13 work session, the January 17 regular session, the January 26 special session, and the March 20 regular session failed to state with the requisite specificity the purpose or purposes of convening executive sessions (i.e., meetings closed to the public) during the council‘s sessions. Instead, the minutes for these meetings referred to executive sessions for the purposes of “personnеl and finances,” “personnel,” and “personnel matters.”
{¶ 6} In addition, Long asserted that minutes of the January 17 finance committee meeting, the January 24 personnel committee meeting, the January 25 personnel committee meeting, the February 22 finance committee meeting, and the March 20 finance committee meeting did not record motions or votes.
{¶ 7} Long requested a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to prepare, file, and maintain full and accurate meeting minutes for all meetings and executive
{¶ 8} Respondents Bowers, Christian, Doolin, and Maxwell filed an answer and a motion for judgment on the pleadings. In the motion, they claimed that this court lacks original jurisdiction over an action for a mandatory injunction in common pleas court under
{¶ 9} After mediation failed to resolve the parties’ dispute, this case was rеturned to the regular docket. We denied the motions for judgment on the pleadings and for default judgment and granted an alternative writ. 90 Ohio St.3d 1415, 735 N.E.2d 455.
{¶ 10} The parties then filed evidence and briefs. Respondents’ evidence included an affidavit of respondent Plotner in which she stated that council meetings, with the exception of executive sessions, are audiotaped, that the tapes are available to the public, and that the minutes are prepared from thе tapes and notes of the meetings. Respondents subsequently filed audiotapes and transcripts of audiotapes of the following council meetings: the January 3 joint session, the January 17 regular session, the January 26 special session, and the March 20 regular session.
{¶ 11} This cause is now before the court for a consideration of the merits.
{¶ 12} Long requests a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to prepare, file, and maintain full and accurate minutеs for all meetings and to conduct all meetings in public except for properly called executive sessions.
{¶ 14} Construing
{¶ 15} Respondents contend that they fully complied with these duties to prepare and make available minutes by audiotaping council meetings and making the audiotapes of the meetings available to the public. In White, 76 Ohio St.3d at 424, 667 N.E.2d at 1229, we observed that audio recordings could be a “legitimate mеans of satisfying the requirements of
{¶ 17} Second, respondents did not tape all of their meetings. For example, respondents have not introduced tapes of any of the village council‘s finance or personnel committee meetings, or for that matter, any council meetings other than the four filed in this proceeding.
{¶ 18} Third, at the April 17, 2000 village council meeting, the council unanimously voted to erase tapes of council meetings after the written minutes had been аpproved. If the tapes were truly the minutes required by
{¶ 19} Finally, even if the few tapes and accompanying transcripts provided by respondents could be considered minutes, they contain too many inaudible portions to satisfy the requirement of a full and accurate record. For еxample, the tape of the January 3 joint session contains approximately thirteen instances in which the tape cannot be understood, and the tape of the January 17 regular session contains approximately twenty-six inaudible portions. Notably, absent a transcript of each audiotape, a member of the public might not know the identities of the speakers.
{¶ 20} Therefore, in determining whether respondents complied with their statutory duties, wе consider the written minutes provided to Long rather than the audiotapes.
{¶ 21} In analyzing these minutes, it is apparent that they do not provide a full and accurate record of council proceedings. The challenged minutes contain
{¶ 22} In addition, the minutes do not include sufficient facts to understand and appreciate the rationale behind some of the village council‘s decisions. “[F]ull and accurate minutes must contain sufficient facts and information to permit the public to understand and appreciate the rationale behind the relevant public body‘s decision.” White, 76 Ohio St.3d at 424, 667 N.E.2d at 1229. The minutes of the January 3 work session, for example, state that futurе developers “must not have the same engineer as the village,” but there is no recorded vote ordering this, nor is there any rationale offered to support this apparent council decision. And the minutes of the January 26 special session indicate that respondent Sherman was appointed council member but include no rationale for the appointment or a properly scheduled executive session under
{¶ 23} In fact, respondents’ minutes of finance and personnel committee meetings do not include motions and votes, much less the detail to meet the comprehensive requirements of
{¶ 24} Respondents counter that they need not provide full and accurate minutes of any committee meetings because the village council does not conduct
{¶ 25} ” ‘[W]here, as here, the members of a public body agree to attend, in their official capacity, a meeting where public business is to be discussed and a majority of the members do attend,
{¶ 26} Furthermore, the minutes reflect that respondents often failed to specify the appropriate statutory рurpose or purposes before conducting private, i.e., executive sessions. If a public body decides to conduct an executive session for the purpose of considering one or more of the matters listed in
{¶ 28} In fact, even if we were to accept respondents’ invitation to consider the provided tapes and transcripts in оrder to “fill in the blanks” of their official minutes, no tapes were provided of the January 13 regular session, the tape of the January 17 council meeting indicates that the motion to go into executive session that was approved by council only generally referred to an executive session for “personnel,” and the tape of the January 26 motion merely reiterated the laundry list of possible matters from
{¶ 29} Therefore, respondents have not complied with
{¶ 30} Respondents finally contend that Long is precluded from seeking extraordinary relief in mandamus because she has an adequate legal remedy by way of her
{¶ 31} An action for a mandatory injunction, however, is an extraordinary remedy that does not preclude a writ of mandamus to enforce
{¶ 32} Based on the foregoing, Long has established her entitlement to thе requested extraordinary relief in mandamus. She is also entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs.
{¶ 33} As we observed in White, 76 Ohio St.3d at 419, 667 N.E.2d at 1226, “One of the strengths of American government is the right of the public to know and understand the actions of their elected representatives. This includes not merely the right to know a government body‘s final decision on a matter, but the ways and means by which those decisions were reached.” Respondents have circumvented these crucial rights by preparing and maintaining insufficient and inaccurate minutes.
Writ granted.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur.
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents.
THE STATE EX REL. LONG v. COUNCIL OF THE VILLAGE OF CARDINGTON ET AL.
No. 00-857
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Decided June 13, 2001
92 Ohio St.3d 54 | 2001-Ohio-130
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.
{¶ 35} I respectfully dissent. I believe that
{¶ 36} Mandamus may not be issued when there is a plain and аdequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.
{¶ 37} This court has held that in order to foreclose relief in mandamus, an alternative remedy to mandamus must be complete, beneficial, and speedy. State ex rel. Natl. Elec. Contrs. Assn., Ohio Conference v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Serv. (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 179, 183, 699 N.E.2d 64, 67; State ex rel. Walker v. Lancaster City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 216, 218, 680 N.E.2d 993, 995. The remedy must be appropriate to the circumstances and secure relief
{¶ 38}
{¶ 39} The majority rejects this argument on the basis that injunction is an “extraordinary” remedy. In State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm. (1967), 11 Ohio St.2d 141, 40 O.O.2d 141, 228 N.E.2d 631, Chief Justice Taft disagreed with the majority‘s conclusion that a mandatory injunction is an extraordinary remedy that cannot be an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. He believed that a mandatory injunction would be sufficient reason for the court to deny a writ of mаndamus. Id. at 165-170, 40 O.O.2d at 156-159, 228 N.E.2d at 649-653. In cases decided prior to 1967, this court had denied a writ of mandamus because the relator had an adequate remedy by way of mandatory injunction. See, e.g., State ex rel. Cent. Serv. Station v. Masheter (1966), 7 Ohio St.2d 1, 36 O.O.2d 1, 218 N.E.2d 177; State ex rel. Adams v. Rockwell (1957), 167 Ohio St. 15, 3 O.O.2d 433, 145 N.E.2d 665. Likewise, this court affirmed or reversed judgments of courts of appeals because the lower courts had or should have denied a writ of mandamus when the relator had an adequate remedy by way of mandatory injunction. State ex rel. Danford v. Karl (1967), 9 Ohio St.2d 79, 38 O.O.2d 203, 223 N.E.2d 602;
{¶ 40} I believe that Pressley was wrongly decided when it, in effect, overruled these cases. The rationale of Pressley is illogical when injunctive relief is, in fact, an adequate legal remedy as in this case. I would adopt the reasoning of Chief Justice Taft‘s dissenting opinion as to why a statutory mandatory injunction is an adequate legal remedy and correct the path where Pressley has led us. Where the General Assembly has expressly provided for injunctive relief for a violation or alleged violation of
{¶ 41}
{¶ 43} I believe that mandamus, an extraordinary remedy, should be available only when other procedures are incapable of affording rеlief. Here, relator has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that is complete, beneficial, and speedy. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Alden, Taylor & Durkin, LLC, Randolph W. Alden and James R. Taylor, for relator.
Manos, Martin, Pergram & Deitz Co., L.P.A., Dennis L. Pergram and James M. Deitz, for respondents.