Cherie YOUNG, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.
Civil Action No. 11-167(AK).
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
May 11, 2012.
ALAN KAY, United States Magistrate Judge.
Richard Allan Latterell, Office of Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
ALAN KAY, United States Magistrate Judge.
This matter is pending before this Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for [summary judgment on the issue of] Fees and Costs
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is the parent of a minor child who prevailed in an administrative action brought pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Improvement Act (collectively “IDEA“),
Petitioner‘s counsel complied with Paragraph 76 of the Consent Decree by notifying DCPS in writing that Petitioner had elected to request a compensatory education meeting instead of making a selection from the catalog. The hearing officer further concludes that DCPS violated the terms of the Consent Decree by refusing to honor the letter from Petitioner‘s counsel requesting a compensatory education meeting, and by insisting that such a meeting could only be requested by means of a selection card, because the Consent Decree does not require the use of any particular method for electing a compensatory education meeting.
(January 18, 2008 Impartial Due Process Hearing Officer‘s Decision (“HOD“) at 5, attached to Notice of Removal [1].) The Hearing Officer inter alia ordered DCPS to “convene an IEP/MDT meeting to discuss and determine the form and amount of compensatory education it proposes to award Student in accordance with ... the Consent Decree.” (HOD at 6.)
Plaintiff originally filed her complaint for legal fees and costs with the Small Claims and Conciliation Branch of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Defendant removed this and other simultaneously filed cases to this Court and the parties subsequently consented to the referral of all such cases to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for all purposes. The parties were directed to brief the issues in these cases in the form of motions for legal fees and responses thereto.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The IDEA gives courts authority to award reasonable attorney‘s fees to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party.
The plaintiff has the burden of establishing the reasonableness of any fee requests. See In re North, 59 F.3d 184, 189 (D.C.Cir.1995); Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C.Cir.1995) (“[A] fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award, documenting the appropriate hours, and justifying the reasonableness of the rates.“) “An award of attorneys’ fees is calculated by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended on the case.” Smith, 954 F.Supp. at 364 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984). The result of this calculation is the “lodestar” amount. Smith, 954 F.Supp. at 364.
A party moving for summary judgment on legal fees accordingly must demonstrate prevailing party status and the reasonableness of the fees requested in terms of hours spent and hourly rate. Under
The court is required to draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving party‘s favor and to accept the nonmoving party‘s evidence as true. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The nonmoving party must establish more than “the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of its position. Id. at 252. Nor may the non-moving party rely on allegations or conclusory statements; instead, the non-moving party is obliged to present specific facts that would enable a reasonable jury to find in its favor. Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C.Cir.1999).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Reasonableness of Hourly Rates
Plaintiff seeks fees for the services of two lawyers and three paralegals, to be paid at the following rates: $475.00/hour for Douglas Tyrka, an attorney with approximately 10 years experience during
Tyrka further asserts that “clients have retained Tyrka & Associates with the understanding and agreement that the client would retain full responsibility for all fees regardless of what was reimbursed by third parties, at rates consistent with ‘the Laffey [M]atrix’ as adjusted per the finding in Salazar v. District of Columbia, 123 F.Supp.2d 8, 14-15 (D.D.C.2000), and other cases.” (Exh. 2 ¶ 4.)3 Plaintiff relies upon the rates set forth in the “enhanced” Laffey Matrix in her request for attorney‘s fees but Tyrka‘s Verified Statement does not indicate how frequently Plaintiff‘s counsel is paid at these “enhanced” Laffey rates.4 Nor has counsel presented affidavits attesting to the actual billing rates of lawyers who do similar IDEA work. Furthermore, the Plaintiff has not provided specific information about the nature or complexity of the IDEA administrative work performed in this case.
Plaintiff asserts that in order to demonstrate prevailing market rates, she may “point to such evidence as an updated [enhanced] version of the Laffey Matrix or the U.S. Attorney‘s Office [“USAO“] Matrix, or [her] own survey of prevailing market rates in the community.” (Memorandum in support of Fee Motion (“Memorandum“) at 8 (citing Covington, 57 F.3d at 1109)). In the Covington case, which involved allegations of civil rights violations, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit did look to Laffey rates for prevailing market rates but the relevant market therein was “complex federal litigation,” 57 F.3d at 1110. In contrast, this case involves IDEA litigation, which is not complex federal litigation because most if not all of the attorney‘s
Plaintiff additionally relies upon Rooths v. District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 09-0492, Report and Recommendation of March 31, 2011, and Friendship Edison Pub. Charter Sch. v. Suggs, Civil Action No. 06-1284, Motion for Attorneys’ Fees of July 10, 2008 and Memorandum Opinion of March 30, 2009 at 5-8. (Fee Motion, Exhs. 5-7).5 According to Plaintiff, in these two IDEA cases litigated in this United States District Court, the firm‘s clients received an award of fees “based on rates exactly in line with those presented here,...” (Memorandum at 8.)
As a preliminary matter, this Court notes that the mere showing that a high hourly rate was approved in another case does not in and of itself establish a new market rate or prove that the new rate is reasonable. Furthermore, Plaintiff‘s reliance on Rooths v. District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 09-0492, Report and Recommendation of March 31, 2011 at 10-11 (Fee Motion, Exh. 5), is misplaced because the trial court ultimately rejected the application of enhanced Laffey rates, applied Laffey Matrix rates as a starting point, and then reduced those rates by 25%. Rooths v. District of Columbia, 802 F.Supp.2d 56, 63 (D.D.C.2011).
In Rooths, the Honorable Paul L. Friedman noted that “[i]n this circuit, the rates contained in the Laffey Matrix are typically treated as the highest rates that will be presumed to be reasonable when a court reviews a petition for statutory attorneys’ fees.” 802 F.Supp.2d at 61. The trial court declined “to approve as reasonable the inflated rates contained in a proposed alternative fee matrix.” Id.; see Blackman v. District of Columbia, 677 F.Supp.2d 169, 176 (D.D.C.2010) (in determining prevailing market rates, the court declined to apply enhanced Laffey rates). The Rooths court further refused to apply enhanced Laffey rates, in part because it found that the “[enhanced Laffey] matrix was generated using national statistics rather than measurements particular to the District of Columbia area.” 802 F.Supp.2d at 62 (emphasis in original); see also DL v. District of Columbia, 256 F.R.D. 239, 243 (D.D.C.2009) (because the USAO [Laffey] Matrix accounts for price inflation within the local community, it more aptly focuses on the relevant community than the [enhanced] Laffey Matrix based on the legal services index). The Rooths court commented that “[w]hile it is doubtless true that some sectors of the legal services industry have experienced rapid fee inflation in recent years, [it was] unconvinced that fees associated with IDEA litigation in the District of Columbia have increased at the same rate.” 802 F.Supp.2d at 62.
Recognizing the difficulty courts encounter in determining what are reasonable legal fees, this Court agrees with the rationale set forth in Rooths, and finds that the Plaintiff‘s reliance on an enhanced Laffey Matrix is unsupported because such Matrix does not provide an accurate representation of District of Columbia legal fees applicable to IDEA cases. Nor has Plaintiff demonstrated that IDEA litigation involving administrative hearings is the type of “complex federal litigation” encompassed by the Laffey rates. See McClam v. District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 11-381(RMC), September 6, 2011 Memorandum Opinion at 8 (declining to apply Laffey rates in part on grounds that “IDEA cases are generally not complex [and in that case,] Plaintiffs ... pointed to no novel issue or other complexity that turned this, particular IDEA case into a complicated piece of litigation.“)6
Defendant‘s argument against imposition of Laffey rates primarily focuses on the Rooths and McClam decisions, supra. but the Defendant also asserts that “Plaintiffs have made no serious attempt to show that rates under the Laffey Matrix are appropriate in this case or, more specifically, that Laffey rates were necessary to attract competent counsel in the underlying, special education matters.” (Opposition at 13.) Defendant further argues that there is no “inherent right to Laffey rates.” (Opposition at 13 (citation omitted)); see Lively v. Flexible Packaging Assoc., 930 A.2d 984, 990 (D.C.2007) (accepting the Laffey Matrix as one legitimate means of calculating attorney‘s fees and using it as a starting point instead of an automatic application). Federal courts do not automatically have to award Laffey rates but instead they can look at the complexity of the case and use their discretion to determine whether such rates are warranted. See Muldrow v. Re-Direct, Inc., 397 F.Supp.2d 1, 4-5 (D.D.C.2005) (awarding fees at a rate 25% less than Laffey in a “relatively straightforward negligence suit“).7
This Court follows the reasoning of the Rooths case and other cases declining to apply enhanced Laffey rates. Considering that this is a straightforward case seeking IDEA legal fees, this Court concludes that the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the hourly rates set by her counsel, which are based on enhanced Laffey rates, are reasonable.8 Such enhanced rates do not reflect what the local legal market will bear in terms of legal fees for IDEA litigation. Using the [USAO] Laffey Matrix as a starting point for determination of a reasonable hourly rate, this Court determines that the hourly rate for Douglas Tyrka [attorney with 10 years experience] would be $315.00/hour instead of $475.00/hour, the hourly rate for Zachary Nahass [attorney with 2 years experience] would be $215.00 instead of $268.00, while the rate for paralegals Patrick Meehan, Camille McKenzie and Yanet Scott would be $125.00/$130.00 instead of $146.00/$150.00.
These rates should be further reduced however because the Laffey Matrix rates are the presumed maximum rates appropriate for “complex federal litigation,” Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d at 1103, and IDEA litigation generally does not fall within that category. The case at issue is no exception to that general rule insofar as it involves a routine administrative proceeding summarized in the Impartial
B. Challenges to Time Charges
Defendant claims that some of the hours billed by Plaintiff‘s counsel should not be compensated because they are too remote in time as to “preclude a meaningful relationship with the hearing.” (Opposition at 16, citing Czarniewy v. District of Columbia, 2005 WL 692081, at *4, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5161, at *11 (D.D.C. March 25, 2005)). See also Role Models America, Inc. v. Brownlee, 353 F.3d 962, 973 (D.C.Cir.2004) (where administrative fee charges have no temporal proximity to the proceeding on which the right to fees is based but instead appear to be administrative matters between counsel and his client, these charges are not appropriate for reimbursement). Defendant asserts that “[t]he statute does not contemplate an undefined form of ongoing representation of students [but instead] [i]t quantifies the activities for which school districts are obliged to reimburse legal representation to the administrative process described in
A review of the time sheets submitted by Plaintiff shows that the time charges noted by counsel have sufficient temporal proximity to the date of the HOD. Some of the time entries pre-date the due process hearing, reflecting preparation for and attendance at the hearing; there is one time entry regarding attendance at the hearing, and additional time entries reflect follow-up by counsel and HOD compliance. This Court will not further reduce time charges based on Defendant‘s claim that some charges are remote.
C. Costs
Plaintiff seeks costs in the amount of $100.78 for expenses arising from copying ($.10 per page) and faxing ($1.00 per page). Costs for copying, faxing and postage are customarily included in fee awards in IDEA litigation. Kaseman v. District of Columbia, 329 F.Supp.2d 20, 28 n. 7 (D.D.C.2004). These total costs are not contested by the Defendant and will be awarded to the Plaintiff.
D. Fees and Costs Awarded
The amount of fees and costs requested by Plaintiff is $1,859.53. The legal fees claimed were based on 1.25 hours billed at
John V. BUCKLEY, Plaintiff, v. PAPERBOY VENTURES, LLC, Defendant.
Civil Action No. 11-00208 (CKK).
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
June 19, 2012.