Jonas v. JonasJonas v. Jonas
For Appellant:
Ronald F. Waterman, Gough, Shanahan, Johnson & Waterman, PLLP, Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Quentin M. Rhoades, Robert D. Erickson, Sullivan, Tabaracci & Rhoades, P.C., Missoula, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: March 14, 2012
Decided: May 15, 2012
Filed:
Clerk
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court‘s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 Edwin R. Jonas, III (Edwin), appeals the Twentieth Judicial District Court‘s denial of his
ISSUES
¶3 Edwin raises three issues on appeal and Linda raises one. We restate the issues as follows:
¶4 1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying Edwin‘s Rule 60 motion on the basis of res judicata and law of the case?
¶5 2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying Linda‘s request that Edwin and his attorney be required to pay her costs, expenses, and attorney fees for this round of litigation pursuant to
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶7 On May 23, 2006, a New Jersey superior court entered judgment (2006 Judgment) against Edwin for unpaid child support and alimony, among other things, in the amount of $695,476.97, interest totaling $147,205.35 as of December 31, 2005, a $3,000 per month ongoing alimony obligation, and attorney fees and costs in the amount of $7,552.50, together with applicable interest. A New Jersey appellate court dismissed Edwin‘s appeal, affirming the decision and the judge‘s application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, which bars a fugitive from “seek[ing] relief from the judicial system whose authority he or she evades.” Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 792 A.2d 1222, 1227 (N.J. 2002) (citation omitted). Edwin did not appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court.
¶8 In December 2009, Linda domesticated the New Jersey judgment in Montana and provided notice, pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act,
¶9 Edwin then moved for relief from the 2006 Judgment under
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶10 Generally, we review a district court‘s ruling on a Rule 60 motion for an abuse of discretion. Orcutt v. Orcutt, 2011 MT 107, ¶ 5, 360 Mont. 353, 253 P.3d 884. We review a district court‘s determination to award costs and fees under
DISCUSSION
¶11 In seeking relief from the District Court‘s denial of his Rule 60 motion, Edwin argues that because the 2006 Judgment entered in New Jersey was entered by default, it is not entitled to full faith and credit in Montana. We disagree. For one thing, Edwin‘s default in New Jersey was occasioned by his own misconduct, having disobeyed court orders and refused to personally appear in court. Moreover, a default judgment from a sister state is entitled to full faith and credit in Montana, as long as it was not obtained in a manner rendering it invalid or unenforceable. Carr v. Bett, 1998 MT 266, ¶¶ 42, 45, 291 Mont. 326, 970 P.2d 1017. In Carr, we concluded that because the Wyoming court where the default judgment was entered had refused to set it aside, the judgment was entitled to full faith and credit in Montana. Carr, ¶¶ 47-48. The same conclusion is compelled here. Edwin is precluded by principles of res judicata from repeating his
¶12 As to Issue Two, Linda asked the District Court to require Edwin and his attorney to pay her costs, expenses, and attorney fees associated with this round of litigation pursuant to
CONCLUSION
¶13 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for noncitable memorandum opinions. The issues in this case are ones of judicial discretion and there clearly was not an abuse of discretion.
¶14 We therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court.
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
/S/ JIM RICE