*1 CARR, M. PATRICIA Respondent, Plaintiff and v. M. BETT,
IAN
Appellant.
Defendant
97-310 and 311.
Nos.
March
1998.
Heard
April
Submitted
1998.
5, 1998.
Decided November
266.
1998 MT
St.Rep.
1098.
For Mazurek, Joseph Attorney General; Hon. P. Amicus Curiae: For Attorney General; Assistant Helena (argued), Tweeten Chris of the Court. opinion REGNIER delivered Justice 17,1995, petition Ian M. Bett filed a for dissolution of On March ¶1 Court, Eighteenth County. in the Judicial District Gallatin marriage wife, Carr, Patricia M. filed a divorce com- On June 30,1996, Wyoming district court. On October plaint a decree of divorce and to Patricia default. court issued 21,1997, January Patricia filed the Wyoming judgment On with the County summary judg- Gallatin District Court. She then moved for proceeding. ment in Ian’s Montana dissolution Subsequently, Wyoming judgment to set aside the moved Patricia in the 11,1997, County April Gallatin District Court. On the District Court orders, granting two one Patricia’s summary judg- issued motion for proceeding, ment in the dissolution denying another Ian’s motion the Wyoming judgment. appeals to set aside Ian now from both the or- granting summary judgment der Patricia in the proceed- dissolution denying and the order his motion to set aside the Wyoming judg- Wyoming judgment the case where the was transcribed. We affirm. following We address the appeal: issues on 1. Did Ian Bett file his notices of in a manner? Ian Bett file proper Did motion under the Montana Rules of
Civil Procedure to set aside the filed in the District Court? 3. Did the District Court err when it denied Ian Bett’s motion to
set aside the Eighteenth filed in the Judicial Dis- Court, County? trict Gallatin AND
FACTUAL PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Idaho, Patricia M. Carr and Ian Driggs, M. Bett were married in 18,1991. They November lived a rather bohemian lifestyle, travel- ing throughout camper the West in a while Ian worked as a rep- sales resentative for a company. They apart also lived at times. Sometime they separated but maintained contact. In Pa- August, *4 Jackson, Bozeman, tricia Wyoming moved to and Ian moved to Montana. 17,1995, On March Ian petition filed a for dissolution of mar-
riage Eighteenth Court, Judicial District County Gallatin (Cause Gallatin). 95-120, No. later, More then year 9,1996, on July Jackson, Patricia was served in Wyoming, with a summons and peti- tion of Ian’s cause of action filed in Montana. She filed an answer to 2,1996. this petition August on 28, 1996, On June before being served with process of Ian’s action,
Montana Patricia complaint filed a seeking a decree of divorce in the District Court of County, District, Teton Ninth Judicial in Jack- son, Wyoming. Bozeman, Montana, Ian was served in copy with a and complaint summons of the Wyoming August 21, action on respond 1996. Ian did not to the complaint, summons and and on Oc- 30,1996, tober judgment against decree of divorce and Ian and in fa- vor of Patricia in Wyoming was entered action. Wyoming di- vorce decree marriage dissolved and Patricia’s in Wyoming and $95,000 awarded Patricia as her share of the marital assets. January 21,1997, On Patricia filed an copy authenticated decree Wyoming with the Gallatin County Clerk of pursuant Court to the Uniform Foreign Judgments Enforcement of (Cause Gallatin). Act, -508, MCA, 25-9-501 through 97-22, No. §§ On January Patricia filed a summary judgment motion for seeking to dismiss Ian’s petition marriage. for dissolution of On Feb- 10,1997, Ian ruary filed a motion to set aside the Wyoming judgment. motion, however, This was not filed in the case Wyoming where the (Cause 97-22, Gallatin), was transcribed No. but in the case (Cause 95-120, he petition where Gallatin). filed his for dissolution No. argument The District Court heard oral on Patricia’s motion for 27,1997. summary judgment February on During argument, the oral questioned Patricia whether Ian filed his properly motion to set aside decree and in the same as cause action his Thereafter, 28,1997, for dissolution of petition marriage. February Ian filed a motion set aside the decree and the cause of action wherein it had been transcribed in Montana Pa- (Cause Gallatin). 97-22, No. tricia 11,1997, the District Court ruled in April On favor Patricia’s action, summary judgment resulting in Ian’s Montana day, denying the same the court entered an order
its dismissal. On cases, set In both Wyoming judgment motion to have the aside. entry April April was filed on 1997. On notice of *5 1997, judgment pursuant to alter or amend to Rule Ian filed motions M.R.Civ.P., by in each case. Both motions were denied the Dis- 59(g), 19, May 1997. trict Court 30,1997, In Case No. 97-311 May appeal. Ian filed notices of On
¶12 (Cause Gallatin), 95-120, the order of the District appeals Ian No. summary judgment for and dismiss- Patricia’s motion granting Court of In Case No. 97-310 marriage. for dissolution ing petition Ian’s (Cause 97-22, Gallatin), Court appeals the order of District No. Wyoming judgment. to set aside the decree denying his motion 11,1997, filed motions with this Court to dis- June Patricia On ¶13 25, 1997, Case Nos. 97-310 and 97-311. On June appeals, miss both to consolidate Case Nos. 97-310 and 97-311. On Ian filed a motion First, 2, 1997, July separate granted we issued two orders. we consolidate, and No. was consolidated motion to Case 97-310 with purposes appeal. July No. 97-311 for of this In the second Case 1997, order, ruling we reserved on Patricia’s motions to dismiss and parties took her motions under advisement. We ordered both to in- arguments authority respective positions clude on their regard- motions to dismiss the in their appeals Patricia’s briefs. 6,1997, briefing appeal by On November after initial of the MCA, 25-9-503, this Court raised the issue of whether parties, Clause, IV, light of the Full Faith and Credit Article constitutional supplemen- of the United States Constitution. We ordered Section briefing by parties argu- tal both on this issue and stated that an oral Also, be scheduled at a later date. because a decision in would constitutionality may implicate this case of we Attorney party proceeding General a to this named the Montana present separate argument. invited the State to file a brief and oral 4,1997, suspension On December Ian moved this Court for a Court, In the District Ian had filed a motion to proceedings. 9,1997, Wyoming judgment. granted set aside the On December grounds proceedings regarding on the that further this the motion being Wyoming. held in case were County, On December the District Court of Teton District, Jackson, Wyoming, denied Ian’s request
Ninth Judicial by judgment the default obtained Patricia on October set aside appeal Ian did not this decision of the court and the default is now final.
ISSUE 1 appeal timely Ian Bett file his notices of in a manner? Did At the time Ian filed his motions to alter or amend and his sub- 5(a), sequent appeal, notices Rule M.R.App.R, provided perti- nent part:
(1) In civil cases the notice of required Rule 4 shall be filed with the clerk of the district court days within 30 from the entry from, date of the of the or order appealed except entry in cases where service of notice of is re- 77(d) quired by Rule of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure the days time shall be 30 from entry the service of notice of (4) aIf motion under the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure (i) filed in the any party: district court under (ii) 52(b) 50(b); under Rule to amend or make additional find- fact, ings of whether or not an alteration would be *6 (iii) if the required granted; motion is under Rule 59 to alter or (iv) amend the judgment; trial, under Rule 59 for a new the time parties for for all entry shall run from the deny- of the order granting a new trial or or denying any other such motion.... In her motions to dismiss Ian’s appeals, Patricia makes two First, different arguments. Patricia contends that both of Ian’s mo judgment were, substance, tions to alter and amend motions for re If, claims, consideration. as Patricia are, fact, Ian’s motions motions reconsideration, for the motions would not toll the filing time for of an 5(a)(4), appeal under Therefore, Rule M.R.App.P. Patricia argues that appeals Ian’s notices of were not timely they filed since were filed thirty days more than after the entry notice of of judgment. (1995), Patricia relies on Miller v.Herbert 272 Mont. 900 argue P.2d that Ian’s motions to alter or amend should be considered motions for reconsideration that do not extend filing First, time allowed for an appeal. she contends that Ian of- facts, fers no new and no new evidence or new in support law of his arguments motions. The that Ian presents, claims, Patricia are the arguments previously Second, same submitted to the District Court. argues Patricia that Ian’s motions are not 59(g) Rule motions because they ask the District Court to completely reverse its earlier orders request rather than the court to alter or amend its decision. Ian counters that both his legitimate 59(g) motions were judgment. motions to alter or amend Ian states that in both his mo- briefs, pointed tions and he out to the District Court that it had com- ignored arguments. one of his main pletely Ian claims that rather decision, asking than the court to reconsider its he was requesting the court consider the argument merits of his regarding the pro- priety of the default issued the Wyoming court. Ian ar- gues 59(g) that his Rule motions are not motions for reconsideration defined in Miller. Finally, that in as states the context of altering decision, amending only the District Court’s possible option complete available to the court was a reversal. Miller, In this Court was faced with whether a motion that was, fact,
entitled “motion for reconsideration”
a Rule 59(g) motion
to alter or amend
that tolled the time for the filing of a no
stated
appeal.
“[w]e
tice
We
shall look to the substance of a mo
tion,
title,
just
not
identify
its
what
presented.”
motion has been
Miller, 136, 900
at
Mont.
P.2d at 275. We held that a motion for re
may be equated
consideration
to a motion to alter or amend
judg
in limited circumstances where the motion “contain[s] state
allegations
ments or
demonstrating
such motion
equiva
is the
Miller,
lent to a motion to amend or a
motion to alter a judgment.”
Mont,
136, 900
at
P.2d at 275. This Court further elaborated on when
reconsideration would be construed substantively
as a
motion to alter or amend pursuant
to Rule 59(g) in Nelson v.Driscoll
285 Mont.
ISSUE Rules file the motion under Montana proper Did Ian Bett filed in the District aside the Procedure to set Civil Court? argument about the Patricia’s above addressed Whereas motions, argu- 59(g) we now discuss Patricia’s of Ian’s
substance *8 timing the of Ian’s Rule regarding 59(g) motion filed Cause (Case 97-310), 97-22 the Wyoming judgment transcribed in Montana. again argues Patricia that Ian’s motion to alter or amend and, therefore, timely was not time for filing the a notice of appeal was not extended. Patricia that in states order for Ian’s Rule 59(g) filed, timely motion to be considered it must have been filed within days any judgment, entry ten or judgment. However, notice it day is unclear Patricia arguing period whether is that the ten for fil- 30, a run on 59(g) begins Rule motion October the day by Court, was entered the District or on January 21, 1997, when the Wyoming judgment was transcribed in the Montana District Court. case, In either Patricia asserts that Ian’s 59(g) Rule motion is
untimely it because is not related to the District Court’s April 60(b) denying order his Rule motion to set aside the Wyoming Rather, judgment. 59(g) Patricia states that Ian’s Rule motion refers directly Wyoming judgment Thus, to the itself. argues Patricia that untimely Ian’s Rule motion was 59(g) because it was not filed within ten days by after the entered was District Court or when the Wyoming judgment was transcribed in the Montana Court. District We determine that argument clearly Patricia’s does not rep 59(g)
resent Ian’s Rule motion in Cause 97-22/Case 97-310 or the pro ceedings below in the District alter Court. Ian’s motion to or amend April 29,1997, clearly filed on states he that seeks to alter or amend the order and by memorandum issued the District Court on 11,1997. April goes He on to state that his his reasons for motion are the court presented parties, failed to consider all the issues by the court’s are memorandum order erroneous as a matter of law. supported 6,1997. Ian’s May motion was a brief Although, essence, seeking to alter amend Wyoming judgment, or we conclude 59(g) Rule motion is related to the District 11,1997, April Furthermore, Court’s order and thus made. 60(b) argument ignores Patricia’s the fact a Rule motion is the appropriate motion to file to seek of a foreign judgment review filed in a Montana district court. Moreover, 59(g) conclude that a Rule would not be the
appropriate challenging motion make in a filed in Montana, commonly Montana. In Rule are 59(g) motions made after entry judgment by of a a Montana district court either one hand, appeared before court. parties On other both 60(b) district sets numerous circumstances in which forth a order, judgment, proceeding. a final party court relieve a from 60(b) practice agree with Ian and other states that Rule We motion to file in order to seek review of or appropriate motion is See, Marworth, judgment. e.g., Inc. v. relief from McGuire *9 (Colo. 1991), 653; Systems, 810 P.2d Data Inc. v. EDP Management (Utah 1985), 709 P.2d Corp. 377. 60(b) Therefore, we hold that Ian’s Rule motion and his
¶33 motion, they involving Wyo to the 59(g) proceeding Rule as relate the Montana, timely were ming judgment appropriate filed both 60(b)(1), M.R.Civ.P., Rule a that asserts excusable party filed. Under sixty judgment days reason for relief from a final has af neglect as a 60(b) file a motion. As judgment the was entered to Rule discussed ter 60(b) above, foreign a to aside judgment Ian filed Rule motion set the days Wyo Patricia sixty in Montana within after recorded the filed by hearing, Dis ming briefing parties After both and a the judgment. 11, April entry ruled on of of against trict Court him 1997. Notice April 15,1997. then a motion alter was filed on Ian filed within ten-day period by the Rule prescribed or amend that that this motion related the District Court’s 59(g). We conclude 1997, After denied the on 15, order. the District Court motion April 30, 1997, 1997, on May bis notice of well May Ian filed thirty-day period prescribed M.R.App.P. time Rule within the Thus, 59(g) Rule motion was filed. conclude that Ian’s ISSUE 3 set the Court err when it denied Ian’s motion to Did District Eighteenth Judicial District Wyoming aside the Court? first, summary entered At we note that District Court as a The District Court’s decision
judgment against Ian matter law. ju personal its court had on conclusion that was based 11,1997, April de court’s related order risdiction over Ian and in Montana. set aside the nying failure to set aside appeal, challenges Ian the District Court’s On relating review filed in Montana. Our standard of Wyoming judgment interpretation judge’s is whether the trial to conclusions law (1995), Co. v. Union Reserve Coal County Carbon law correct. Steer, Department v. Revenue 459, 469, 898 680, 686; P.2d Inc. Mont. 470, 474-75, 803 P.2d Mont. Ian contends that Montana’s version of the Uniform Enforce- (UEFJA), Foreign Judgments -508, ment of Act through 25-9-501 §§ 60(b), M.R.Civ.R, and Rule permit district court to set aside default judgment against obtained him in Wyoming because of inadvertence, mistake, neglect his there. Specifically, argues Ian 25-9-503, MCA, anytime that under a foreign judgment is filed in court, treated, Montana district it is to be in all respects, judg- as a Accordingly, ment of this state. he foreign contends once a judg- Montana, subject is filed in it is to the same proce- defenses or dures, 60(b), such as relief from a under any as other Therefore, Montana judgment. because the Wyoming judgment against him was obtained default and Montana generally law disfavor, argues holds default in that the judgment should be set aside as invalid under Montana law. Patricia counters that a Montana district court not set
aside a valid of a sister state. Patricia contends that Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution does permit not a district court to set aside a valid judgment under 60(b), Therefore, and Rule M.R.Civ.P. Patricia ar- gues that the District Court did not err when it denied Ian’s motion to set aside the Wyoming judgment. The United States Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause
provides, “Full Faith and Credit
given
shall be
in each State to the
Acts, Records,
public
judicial
and
Proceedings of every other State.
Congress may
And the
by general
prescribe
Laws
the Manner
Acts, Records,
which such
Proceedings
and
shall
proved,
be
and the
Const,
IV,
Effect thereof.” U.S.
art.
1.§
Supreme
The U.S.
Court
has held that the full faith and
obligation
credit
judgments
owed to final
exacting.
is
A final judg
ment rendered
a state court is entitled to full faith and credit in the
courts
itsof
sister states. Underwriters National Assur. Co. v. North
Carolina
and Accident and Health Insurance Guaranty Ass’n
Life
(1982),
455 U.S.
102 S. Ct.
writers omitted). (citations Ed. 2d at 570 district UEFJA allows Montana Ian claims that Montana’s vacate, judgments under Rule foreign or set aside reopen, to
courts 25-9-503, MCA, Montana’s version of the 60(b), Section M.R.Civ.R UEFJA, provides: judgments. copy any foreign A of status of
Filing and or congress in accordance with an act of authenticated judgment any of the clerk of may be filed in the office of this state the statutes foreign judg- treat state. The clerk shall court of this district a district court of this as a of in the same manner subject to the the same and is so has state. A effect reopening, vacating, defenses, proceedings procedures, same for may this state and be a district court as a staying of manner. in like or satisfied enforced added.) the statute’s allows argues (Emphasis M.R.Civ.R, 60(b), relief to for- provide courts to Montana district indicates that reading of the statute plain and a eign judgments, vacating a do- defenses, reopening for proceedings procedures, foreign judgment. apply registered to a judgment also mestic contrary the pur is interpretation to implement The UEFJA was enacted of the UEFJA. and intent pose Constitution. Clause of the United States and Credit the Full Faith enforcing foreign for framework procedural provides UEFJA purpose enacted it. The UEFJA’s that have in the states judgments a judgments providing enforcements “facilitate interstate creditor enforce the by which procedure summary jurisdiction manner in which the any expeditious in an (Minn. 1983), 333 Matson Matson v. is found.” debtor as to and construed “interpreted to be 862, 867. The UEFJAis N.W.2d those states uniform the law of to make purpose general its effectuate guide 25-9-508, Considering MCA. these it.” Section enact which to obtain the UEFJA order to construe required Court is this posts, sister state courts. rulings uniformity with that, under interpretation with Ian’s disagree We can be filed in Montana duly or va reopening proceedings the same defenses subjected full faith *11 consistent with and remain judgment, a domestic cating as may be raised that Rather, only that the defenses hold we credit. owed to a final obligation and credit destroy full faith to
339
validity
foreign judgment.
directed at the
are those defenses
(“a
at
11
been
held
sim
in
ilar to that found
does not allow the merits of a
by
or reexamined
foreign judgment
reopened
be
the state where it
Marworth,
653; Matson,
P.2d
862;
is recorded.
333 N.W.2d
(Nev. 1987),
230;
v.
747 P.2d
Lapidus
Rosenstein
Steele
Morris
Asso
(Penn.
Inc.,
1976),
660;
Airportels,
ciates v.
361 A.2d
Wooster v.
(S.D. 1987),
330;
Management Systems,
Wooster
N.W.2d
Data
avoid the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States fact, In Constitution. Montana’s version of the UEF JA recognizes this by defining foreign judgment decree, deference as “a judgment, any order of a court of the United States or other court which is enti- tled to full faith and credit in this state.” Section MCA. challenge validity Ian does not upon personal subject jurisdiction based lack of matter Wyo of the court, ming fraud in procurement judgment, pro lack of due cess, any satisfaction or other grounds that would make Wyoming Instead, invalid or argues unenforceable. Wyo that the default, ming judgment, by obtained should be set aside based on his neglect tending judicial excusable to the proceedings there. He con tends that his failure to file an answer complaint Wyo to Patricia’s ming engaged negotiations was excusable because he was to re solve the case and had filed a dissolution proceeding the Montana District Court. However, argument premise is based on the duly obtained default and filed in Montana should be set law judgments
aside because Montana disfavors obtained default. See, e.g., Deposit Corp. Waldher v.Federal Insurance 282 Mont. *12 (In judgment 1101, setting aside a default ob P.2d court, policy “[t]he stated of law is to district we in a Montana
tained merits.”); Although MCA. excusable the a trial on favor judgment set have a Montana default party to might entitle neglect here, 60(b), M.R.Civ.P., application it has no since under Rule aside argument, Ian’s Wyoming. During in oral rendered judgment was the the public policy in between there is a difference argued that counsel and deference regarding the status Wyoming of Montana states Supreme States Court As the United judgments. to default accorded to the full faith held, policy exception no public there is recently has Baker Thomas v. General judgments. final accorded to and credit 657, 1390 222, 118 L. Ed. 2d 580. (1998), S. Ct. 522 U.S. Corp. Motors Clause, give to ef obligated we are and Credit the Full Faith Under underlying the assuming the law even Wyoming judgment, fect to the of Montana. public policy the contravenes Wyoming. in case, was obtained the default In this ¶46 grounds were to set and inadvertence Tan, neglect that his believing argument his before the must make judgment, Wyoming the aside (1962), 140 Mont. Blair Wyoming. See Blair v. rendering court in (“[T]his upon attack a for 873, 878 case is a collateral 287-88, 370 P.2d court attack is with the jurisdiction for such Therefore eign decree. rendered.”). wherein Court, this Ian before fact, during appeal proceedings In ¶47 to set attempted court in rendering back to went based, neglect. excusable part, upon in the default aside to that he had failed finding request, denied Ian’s Wyoming court judgment. Hav- the default showing to set aside necessary make the court, litigate cannot continue to lost before in Montana. issues same denying Ian’s Court did not err that the District conclude We The for- filed in Montana. to set aside
motion This and credit in Montana. to full faith is entitled eign judgment, final is a recognizes Court prop- an enforceable Ian and divorce from Patricia a valid granting the District Court conclude that Accordingly, we also erty division. summary judgment motion for Patricia’s granting not err did proceeding. dissolution Affirmed. GRAY concur. JUS- TURNAGE and JUSTICE JUSTICE CHIEF NELSON, LEAPHART, specially TRIEWEILER HUNT TICES opinions. concur and 3.1 in the result of Issues 2 and concur I our discussion concur rationale, however. disagree I our 1; with
of Issue identi- 1 we that when has party discussion of Issue hold In our pursuant or amend to a motion as one alter and titled fied M.R.Civ.P, analyze not the substance of going Court is this 59(g), of a to alter or to see it comes under the definition motion motion if this rule. disagree I with amend. 132, 135-36, 900 272 Mont. P.2d In Miller v.Herbert controls, of a document that not held it is the substance look to of a Specifically, we stated: “We shall the substance caption.
its title, identify has motion, just presented.” been not its what *13 Miller, 136, 900 P.2d was in 272 Mont. at at 275. Our decision in Miller 142, Sky (1986), 224 Big Association Unit Owners v. Mont. line with of 469, 472, disregard wherein “[w]e 729 P.2d we stated discussing More in terminology recently, in the title of summons.” Owners, [.Association we noted that “in Unit Association Unit important ti the content of the summons was more than its Owners] (1997), 494, 498, County 285 948 Yarborough v. Glacier Mont. tle.” 1181, 1183. P.2d Moody Royalty this v.Northland Notwithstanding precedent,
Co. (1997), 89, 951 to exception 286 Mont. P.2d we carved out an rule proce for “documents which have the substance-controls-title In those cases significance beyond the merits of their content.” dural theory underly controls the substance the document. The the title busy attorneys accord amounts of exception this is that different labeled, depending upon to documents how the document is “urgency” presumed consequence P.2d that misla Moody, 951 at with responded My disagree documents will not be read or to. beled Moody, this will not reiterated here. See ment with decision be (Nelson, J., dissenting). P.2d at 23 bar, the sub- yet exception In the case at we carve out another might This be denominated as exception
stance-controls-title rule. no exception, “Rule 59” Under this matter what exception. labeled, motion, as as it is we practitioner puts long properly in the The for this analyze to further it to content. rationale going are not as will, if it is assure movants that their motion exception latest is to labeled, properly fall within the framework of apparently Rule 59— actually even when does not. Thus, the substance-controls-title rule now seems to be: of a document controls
substance over its title unless the document procedural significance beyond has a the merits of its content or un- happens less the document to be labeled as a Rule 59 motion in which don’t care what Hopefully case we substance is. this re- approach inspire will sult-oriented sort of confidence and cer- tainty practice proponents in the of law that its suggest. Frankly, I it finessing going doubt that will. No amount of the rules is to save lawyers habitually mail; fail who to read their who fail to calendar dates; mandatory response who fail to timely discovery answer re- extensions; quests or obtain who conduct their practice in the elev- hour; who ignore requirements enth of the rules of civil and appel- late and take on procedure; who more work and clients than they can responsibly competently handle. Rather, I respectfully suggest that in attempting judicially are,
craft these various exceptions, quote we Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “spending] great deal of ... shoveling time smoke.” law, requires Black-letter Montana respect we majority form less than substance. Our dissenting decisions — opinions special favorably concurrences espousing this alike — principle legion.11 precedent are submit that our prac- and Montana simply titioners would be better served if we followed this law instead re-creating perceived the wheel to obtain the preferred result each case. i.e., Using approach, analyzing this the substance of Ian’s mo- amend, was, fact, I
tion to alter or conclude that it what he labeled out, it. the Court’s opinion points As Nelson v.Driscoll 355,948 adopted Mont. P.2d established criteria under which *14 substantively a motion for reconsideration would be construed as a pursuant 59(g), motion to alter or amend to Rule In M.R.Civ.R so do- defined, substantively, we cited to various authorities which have what a motion to alter or amend is and is not. It is anomalous that we criteria in the substance of a motion determining look to those to re- particular purpose except lengthy string-cite A to the cases would serve no suggest performs up space. if the reader an electronic search of take I using query “form over substance” he or she will locate over Montana case law citing opinions dozen of one sort or another this maxim. six consider, ignore those same criteria where the yet purposely issue is actually a motion labeled motion to alter or amend is what it whether purports to be. event, contrary any ap- In to the Court’s head-in-the-sand was, fact, that Ian’s motion a motion to alter or
proach, I conclude
Specifically,
sought
amend under the Nelson criteria.
his motion
law,
correct what he believed was a manifest error of
occasioned
to address and determine one of his three inde-
failing
the trial court
setting
for
aside the
pendent
legal arguments
Wyoming judgment.
Mont,
(a
Nelson,
at
JUSTICE specially I concur with the Court’s conclusion affirming the Dis- granting summary trict Court’s of Patricia’s motion for I judgment. do not, however, agree with the Court’s rationale in reaching that con- clusion. Montana’s version of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign (UEFJA),
Judgments Act provides as follows: Filing foreign and status of judgments. copy any A foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with an act congress or the statutes of this state be filed in any the office of the clerk of foreign district court of this state. The clerk shall treat judg- in the same manner as a judgment of a district court of this subject state. A so filed has the same effect and is to the defenses, procedures, proceedings reopening, same vacat- staying as a of a district court of ing, this state and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner. very clearly provides of the Act that a subject reopening vacating on the grounds same as a language directly of the State of Montana. This conflicts
with the dictates of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United which, recognizes, requires Constitution as the Court that “the States credit, validity, of a state court should have the same ef- States, fect, court of the United it every other which had the state Co., pronounced.” where it was Underwriters Assur. 455 U.S. at (citations omitted). goes saying at 1365 It without that we S.Ct. *15 judgment question validity the same credit and give cannot (its and, origin) have in state of at the same that it would time, subj judgment reopening vacating ect that under the laws Montana, 60(b), including Rule M.R.Civ.P. by this conundrum purports interpreting The Court resolve 25-9-503, MCA, only in such a manner that the defenses allowed un- validity foreign are those directed at the judg- der the UEFJA personal subject jurisdiction, lack of mater fraud in the (e.g., process, grounds lack of due satisfaction or other that procurement, unenforceable). In the in- invalid or interests of make consistently purpose rulings with its and with our UEFJA terpreting states, language that the of § sister the Court holds from foreign judgment reopened allow the merits of a to be “does not by the state where it is recorded.” or reexamined interpre- achieved the Court’s consistency has been legerdemain. short of No matter how harmonious nothing tation is saying that the UEFJA does not allow va- our sister states be they change cannot the fact foreign judgment, cating reopening treated in provides UEFJA that a shall be that the of a district court of this state “same manner as a for, clarity goes is called the Act on to In the event more [Montana].” subject so filed has the same effect and is “A elaborate: defenses, reopening, vacat- proceedings procedures, the same (Em- a district court of this state ...” staying as a ing, or added.) majority the Uniform respect all due to the With phasis Commissioners, only subject interpreta- to one this Code Montana, is is, Wyoming, from filed in sub- that a tion: Montana, vacating including under the laws of reopening or ject to 60(b), In the of Rule M.R.Civ.P. words neglect provisions excusable consistency hobgoblin is the of little Emerson: “Afoolish Ralph Waldo and divines.” In minds, philosophers little statesmen and adored exists, fallen to the prey none we have consistency where creating statesmen, philoso- of the little joined and have the ranks hobgoblin and divines. phers to the ex- is unconstitutional hold that I would Full Faith and Credit Clause. with the it is inconsistent
tent reopened to be is, that it allows a to the extent That state. the laws of another under or vacated concurring. specially TRIEWEILER JUSTICE maj ority’s appellant’s I with the conclusions that the no- concur manner, in a that the appellant tices of were filed Wy- in the District Court to invoke relief from the the correct motions timely. and that those motions were oming judgment, majority’s I concur with the decision to affirm the District Wyoming judg- motion to set aside the plaintiff’s Court’s denial of however, affirm ment; I would the District Court for reasons other *16 majority opinion. in the than those offered conclusion, majority’s I with the based on extraneous disagree 25-9-503, MCA, that does not the interpretation, ap means of allow § 60(b), to Rule foreign judgment pursuant to attack a pellant M.R.Civ.P., that he could attack a domestic judg on the same basis 25-9-503, MCA, is plain pro ment. The of on its face and § state, vides, that a filed in this part, foreign in relevant “has defenses, subject procedures, and is to the same and the same effect reopening, vacating, staying as a of a dis proceedings this state and be enforced or satisfied in trict court of like man face, plain obligation our apply ner.” When a statute is its is to it as written, and not extraneous pur it has been to resort to sources for by poses construing what was intended the authors of the statute. v. Montana Social Dep’t State ex rel. Cobbs and Rehab. Servs. 157, 162, 906 204, 207. Section 274 Mont. P.2d clearly that filed in provides judgments this state can be at procedures tacked the same and for the same reasons as domestic majority’s it judgments. The reliance on what concludes was the intent, contrary to hold to our drafter’s otherwise is normal rules of statutory application. and construction that, however, Having said I do not believe that the appellant the right challenge repeatedly, has the 60(b) already equivalent filed and the of a Rule where he has lost mo- entered, directly I tion in the court where would precluded by principles judicata that he is of res from re- conclude challenge appellant that same in a Montana court. The did peating and, motion in post-judgment not from denial of his unsuccessfully therefore, is as final as if it had been 25-9-503, pursuant in Montana MCA. challenged § Because, majority recognizes, appellant already has as Wy- having his default set aside been unsuccessful neglect, I do not believe it was nec- oming upon court based excusable MCA, 25-9-503, essary interpret for this Court to as it has in order to § Court. affirm the District Furthermore, though plain language even appellant’s authorizes the action in the Montana District Court Wyoming judgment pursuant 60(b), aside the to Rule
to set M.R.Civ.R, authority I would conclude that to authorize such a requires 28 U.S.C. 1738 which challenge preempted that for- given they given be the same effect would be in the eign judgments words, they originated. which In other the federal stan- state from its attacking requires validity dard for be originated. based on the law of the state where it Montana considered foreign judgments subject are to attack for the provides law subject judgments reasons that domestic would be to attack. same preemp- are inconsistent and federal law has The two standards the. tive effect. supremacy pro clause of the United States Constitution constitution, “[t]his
vides that
the laws of the United States
pursuance
be made in
thereof... shall be the supreme
which shall
law
land;
judges
every
thereby, any
and the
state shall be bound
thing
any
contrary
constitution or laws of
state to the
notwith
Const,
VI,
standing.” U.S.
art.
cl. 2.
Interpretation
supremacy
has created the doctrine of federal preemption, pursuant
clause
laws that conflict with
preempted
which state
federal
law are
*17
Maryland
effect.” See
v.
“without
Louisiana
451 U.S.
2114, 2128-29,
101 S. Ct.
68 L. Ed. 2d
agree
concurring opinion
Neither do I
with the
of Justice
Leaphart
is unconstitutional
in violation of the
§
IV,
full faith and credit clause found Article
Section
of the United
I
States Constitution.
believe that the fiill faith and credit clause sim-
ply requires
give
foreign judgments
Montana
the same effect to
give
it would
to domestic
and that
judgments
plain
is what the
(Ariz.
See,
e.g.,
does.
Phares v. Nutter
1980),
However,
JUSTICE