JOINER V. STATEJOINER V. STATE
PER CURIAM
In 2007, a jury found appellant Shequita L. Joiner guilty of aggravated robbery and theft of property and sentenced her to an aggregate term of 480 months’ imprisonment. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed. Joiner v. State, CACR 08-151 (Ark. App. June 18, 2008) (unpublished). Appellant, who was represented by counsel, timely filed in the trial court a verified petition for postconviction relief under
In her Rule 37.1 petition, appellant alleged that she was not afforded effective assistance of counsel at trial. She contended that counsel failed to request a jury instruction on the need for corroboration of a confession and failed to make a proper and complete motion for directed verdict. On appeal, appellant argues that the court erred in not finding that counsel’s errors were of such magnitude that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
In an appeal from a trial court’s denial of postconviction relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the sole question presented is whether, based on a totality of the evidence, under the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the trial court clearly erred in holding that counsel’s performance was not ineffective. Smith, 2010 Ark. 137, 361 S.W.3d 840; French v. State, 2009 Ark. 443 (per curiam); Small, 371 Ark. 244, 264 S.W.3d 512. Under the two-pronged Strickland test, a petitioner raising a claim of ineffective assistance must first show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Harrison v. State, 371 Ark. 474, 268 S.W.3d 324 (2007); Barrett, 371 Ark. at 95–96, 263 S.W.3d at 546. In doing so, the claimant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Barrett, 371 Ark. at 96, 263 S.W.3d at 546.
With respect to the second prong of the test, the petitioner must show that counsel’s deficient performance so prejudiced petitioner’s defense that he or she was deprived of a fair trial. Jamett, 2010 Ark. at 28; Walker v. State, 367 Ark. 523, 241 S.W.3d 734 (2006) (per curiam). Such a showing requires that the petitioner demonstrate a reasonable probability that the fact-finder’s decision would have been different absent counsel’s errors. Sparkman v. State, 373 Ark. 45, 281 S.W.3d 277 (2008). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id.
Several witnesses testified at appellant’s trial that she told them that she committed the aggravated robbery and theft of property. Appellant contends that the jury should have been instructed that evidence of her having confessed to the witnesses would not warrant a conviction absent proof that the offense was committed. She relies on
In regard to appellant’s allegation that her attorney was remiss in not making a proper and complete motion for directed verdict, appellant points to the fact that the court of appeals in its opinion on direct appeal declined to reach portions of the argument concerning the directed verdict because the issues were raised for the first time on appeal. Specifically, the court of appeals said that appellant was arguing for the first time on appeal that witness testimony was contradicted by the physical evidence and that the evidence was purely
Appellant next argues on appeal that the trial court erred in ruling on the Rule 37.1 petition a mere twenty-five days after it was filed. Appellant contends that the prompt action by the court denied her the opportunity to amend her petition to raise “other constitutional errors which came to counsel’s knowledge after the filing of the petition.” The nature of the constitutional errors is not otherwise explained, and appellant offers nothing to support the suggestion that the errors would have been cognizable in a Rule 37.1 proceeding. She also
Finally, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying the petition without first holding an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.
CORBIN, J., not participating.