EDGAR JOHNSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. NORM ROBINSON, WARDEN, Respondent-Appellee.
Case No. 14CA3460
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ROSS COUNTY
RELEASED: 06/08/2016
[Cite as Johnson v. Robinson, 2016-Ohio-3366.]
Hoover, J.
Edgar Robinson, pro se appellant.
Michael DeWine, Ohio Attorney General, M. Scott Criss, Assistant Attorney General, and Paul Kerridge, Assistant Attorney General, Columbus, Ohio for appellee.
Hoover, J.
{¶ 1} Petitioner-appellant Edgar Johnson (“Johnson“) appeals a decision from the Ross County Common Pleas Court that dismissed his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In his petition, Johnson sought immediate release from Chillicothe Correctional Institution (“CCI“), naming the warden, Norm Robinson (“Robinson“), as the respondent. In response, Robinson filed a
{¶ 2} The Ross County Common Pleas Court granted Robinson‘s motion tо dismiss. In its decision, the trial court based its ruling on both procedural defects and the substantive merits of Johnson‘s petition. The trial court found that Johnson had failed to file (1) a statement that sets forth the balance in his inmate account for each of the preceding six months and (2) an asset
{¶ 3} Here on appeal, Johnson presents four assignments of error, arguing that the trial court errеd in granting Robinson‘s motion to dismiss. Johnson‘s arguments address both the trial court‘s findings regarding the procedural defects of his petition, as well as the trial court‘s findings on the substantive merits of his petition. We overrule Johnson‘s arguments regarding the substantive merits of his petition. Johnson‘s maximum sentence has not expired; and nothing in Johnson‘s petition supports his сlaim that his lawful sentence has been modified.
{¶ 4} Habeas corpus relief is not available to a prisoner who has not served his maximum sentence. Therefore, we find that Johnson‘s petition cannot prove any set of facts that would support his claim that he is being held unlawfully. Johnson‘s arguments regarding the procedural defects of his petition are rendered moot.
{¶ 5} Accordingly, we overrule Johnson‘s assignments of error; and we affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing Johnson‘s petition for writ of habeas corpus.
I. Facts and Procedural Posture
{¶ 6} In 1992, a jury in the Miami County Common Pleas Court found Johnson guilty of one count of aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of
{¶ 7} Johnson is currently incarcerated at CCI. In Mаy 2014, Johnson filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Ross County Common Pleas Court against Robinson, the warden at CCI. In his petition, Johnson requested release from prison pursuant to
{¶ 8} Robinson, represented by the Ohio Attorney General, filed a
{¶ 9} The trial court granted Robinson‘s motion to dismiss on both procedural and substantive grounds. First, the trial court found that Johnson failed to satisfy the requirеments of
{¶ 10} The trial court also addressed the substantive merits of Johnson‘s petition. The trial court found that (1) Johnson‘s maximum prison term had not expired; and (2) habeas corpus is generally available only when the petitioner‘s maximum sentence has expired and he is being held unlawfully. Accordingly, the trial court concludеd that Johnson “would not have a claim cognizable in habeas corpus as he failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to immediate release from prison.” The trial court granted Robinson‘s motion to dismiss and rendered Robinson‘s motion for summary judgment moot.
{¶ 11} Thereafter, Johnson filed this timely appeal of the trial court‘s decisiоn to dismiss his petition.
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 12} On appeal, Johnson presents four “statements of error” for our review12:
First Statement of Error:
As to the matter of
Civil Rule 12(C) andCivil Rule 12(B)(6) , on the second page of the Journal Entry, it is my contention that the Court erred in it‘s Judgment. (sic)
Second Assignment of Error:
As to the matter of
O.R.C. §2969.22 andO.R.C. §2969.25(C) andO.R.C. §2969.25(C)(2) on the second and third page of the Journal Entry, it is my contention that the Court erred in it‘s Judgment as a whole. (sic)
Third Statement of Error:
Now as to the matter of Heddleston v. Mack (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 213, on the third page of the Journal Entry, it is my contentiоn that the Court Erred in it‘s Judgment. (sic)
Fourth Statement of Error:
As to the matter of
O.R.C. §2969.25(A) , on the fourth page of Respondent‘s Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment, it is my contention that the Respondent erred. (sic)
III. Legal Standard- Civ.R. 12(B)(6) Motion to Dismiss
{¶ 13} “A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted tests the sufficiency of the complaint.” Volbers-Klarich v. Middletown Mgt., Inc., 125 Ohio St.3d 494, 2010-Ohio-2057, 929 N.E.2d 434, ¶ 11. In order for a court to dismiss a complaint under
{¶ 14} This same standard applies in cases involving claims for extraordinary relief, including habeas corpus. Boles v. Knab, 130 Ohio St.3d 339, 2011-Ohio-5049, 958 N.E.2d 554, ¶ 2 (“Dismissal under
{¶ 15} “Appellate courts review de novо a dismissal for the failure to state a claim.” Hammond v. Perry, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 12CA27, 2013-Ohio-3683, ¶ 11, citing Allen v. Bryan, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 12CA15, 2013-Ohio-1917, ¶ 7; Bartley v. Hearth & Care of Greenfield, L.L.C., 4th Dist. Highland No. 12CA13, 2013-Ohio-279, ¶ 11. “In other words, an appellate court affords no deference to a trial court‘s decision and, instead, applies its own, independent review to determine if the
IV. Law and Analysis- Writ of Habeas Corpus: Unlawful Imprisonment
{¶ 16} Here on appeal, Johnson argues that the trial cоurt erred in dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In his first and third assignments of error, Johnson addresses the trial court‘s findings regarding the substantive merits of his petition, while in his second and fourth assignments of error he addresses the trial court‘s findings regarding the procedural defects of his petition. We will address Johnson‘s arguments regarding the substantive merits of his petition first.
{¶ 17} In his first assignment of error, Johnson asserts that his petition sets forth a viable claim of unlawful imprisonment. Johnson contends that he has suffered constitutional violations
{¶ 18} In his third assignment of error, Johnson further asserts that his sentence has been tabulated incorrectly. Johnson references “good day” rules, which reduce the number of days he must serve. Johnsоn repeatedly cites the 1992 Ohio Criminal Law Handbook for his argument that his incarceration has exceeded the lawful term of his 1992 sentence. Johnson also claims that after placement in the Mansfield Correctional Institution, his unit manager provided him with paperwork indicating that if he was not given parole by November 2007, then he would be released “* * *by law on a mandatory parole for 1 year, and termination of sentence after that time.”
{¶ 19} In rebuttal, Robinson argues that Johnson is not entitled to release because his maximum sentence has not expired. According to Robinson, Johnson is serving a maximum prison term of 25 years that began on January 22, 1992. Robinson cоntends that any “good time” credit, under former
{¶ 20} In his petition, Johnson declared that “* * *under the worst case senario [sic], 16 years and 8 months was the most time I could do if no parole was granted by the Parole Board. With only 9 months served after any technical parole violation, until approximately 80% of 25 years was completеd and termination of sentence.” Further, on appeal Johnson reasserts the argument that his sentence has been tabulated incorrectly. Johnson states in his appellate brief that “* * *all the O.R.C. rules of 1992 are still enforce [sic] upon my sentence. Such as 64 days equal 1 good day, or 4 years and 7 months of diminutive good days off back end [sic] of
{¶ 21} Johnson attached a parole board decision to his “Affidavit of Verity,” which he filed with his petition. The decision indicates that Johnson was previously granted parole; but due to a violation, his parole was revoked.
{¶ 22} Habeas corpus petitions are governed by
{¶ 23} “A petitioner seeking habeas corpus relief must state particularly the extraordinary circumstances entitling him to such relief.” State v. ex rel. Walker v. Carter, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 00CA2740, 2001 WL 438704, *2 (Apr. 20, 2001), citing State ex rel. Jackson v. McFaul, 73 Ohio St.3d 185, 187, 652 N.E.2d 746 (1995). “Unsupported conclusions are not considered admitted and are insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.
{¶ 24} As we have stated, Johnson has argued in his petition, in pleading filings below, and here on appeal, that he is entitled to release because his sentence should have been reduced;
{¶ 25} It is clear, however, that in 1992 the Miami County Common Pleas Court sentenced Johnson to an indeterminate sentence of 10 to 25 years in prison for one count of aggravated burglary and one count of rape. Johnson began to serve his prison term in January 1992. According to a confinement document attached to Johnson‘s petition, Johnson was given 126 days of jail time credit. Therefore, his sentence carried a maximum incarceration date of September 2016. It is well established that a prisoner has no constitutional or statutory right to be conditionally released from prison prior to the expiration of his sentence. See Corrin v. Huffman, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 00CA2700, 2000 WL 1234068, *4 (Aug. 25, 2000).
{¶ 26} In his arguments, Johnson also makes referencеs to “good time” credit. As Robinson has pointed out here on appeal, “good time” credits do not reduce an inmate‘s maximum sentence. Although Johnson did not cite former
{¶ 27} Johnson further claims that correctional officials altered his conviction/sentence from rape to child molestation. However, nothing contained in or attached to his complaint supports that claim. Johnson attached a document to his petition that contains his offender number, along with his convictions. Johnson‘s convictions are listed as aggravated burglary and rape; the same convictions that appear in the judgment entry from the Miami County Common Pleas Court. Therefore, we find no merit to his claim that correctional officials have altered his convictions.
{¶ 28} Additionally, Johnson is being held by virtue of the sentence handed down by the Miami County Common Pleas Court. Johnson has not challenged the jurisdiction of that court.
{¶ 29} Even when reviewing only the complaint, accepting all factual allegations contained in the complaint as true and making all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, Johnson, it remains that Johnson‘s sentence has not expired. Therefore, Johnson did not have a claim cognizable in habeas corpus. State ex rel. Abercrombie v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 141 Ohio St.3d 64, 2014-Ohio-4768, 21 N.E.3d 316, ¶ 8, quoting Morgan v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 68 Ohio St.3d 344, 346, 626 N.E.2d 939 (1994) (“Habeas corpus relief is not available to a prisoner who has not served his maximum sentence; ‘habeas corpus is available where an individual‘s maximum sentence has expired and he is being held unlawfully.’ “). Therefore, we find that the trial court was correct in dismissing Johnson‘s petition pursuant to Robinson‘s
{¶ 30} With respect to the second and fourth assignments of error, Johnson argues that he complied with statutory procedures, particularly those contained in
V. Conclusion
{¶ 31} Having overruled Johnson‘s assignments of error, the judgment of the Ross County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED. Appellant shall pay the costs.
The Court finds that reasonable grounds existed for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ross County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Harsha, J. & McFarland, J.: Concur in Judgment Only.
For the Court
BY:
Marie Hoover, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date оf filing with the clerk.