In rе: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff, v. Sienna JOHNSON, Defendant.
Supreme Court Case No. 16SA96
Supreme Court of Colorado.
October 3, 2016
2016 CO 69 | 382 P.3d 1269
Attorneys for Defendant: Douglas K. Wilson, Public Defender, Ryann S. Hardman, Deputy State Public Defender, Ara Ohanian, Deputy State Public Defender, Helen M. Hoopes, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Amici Curiae Colorado Juvenile Defender Center and Colorado Behavioral Health Care Council Hоlland & Knight LLP, David R. Fine, Maxwell N. Shaffer, Sara C. Sharp, Denver, Colorado
CHIEF JUSTICE RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 This case raises two questions involving what a trial court may order when a juvenile seeks reverse-transfer of her criminal case from trial court to juvenile court. First, when a juvenile requests a reverse-transfer hearing, does she waive her psychotherapist-patient privilege,1 thereby authorizing a trial
¶2 As to the first question, we hold that, because nothing in the statute states that a juvenile waives her psychotherapist-patient privilege by requesting a reverse-transfer hearing, a trial court cannot order the juvenile to producе privileged mental health records. As to the second question, we hold that, because nothing in the statute explicitly grants a trial court the power to order a mental health assessment, a trial court cannot order such an assessment. The reverse-transfer statute only requires that the trial court consider mental health records “made available“—i.e., voluntarily waived by the privilege-holder—to the trial court and the parties.
I. Facts and Procedural History
¶3 The district attorney directly filed a criminal complaint against Defendant Sienna Johnson in trial court, treating her as an adult and charging her with two counts of conspiracy to commit first-degreе murder. Johnson requested a reverse-transfer hearing under
¶4 Arguing that
¶5 The trial cоurt ruled for the prosecution on both counts. First, the trial court found that, under the reverse-transfer statute, when a juvenile requests a reverse-transfer hearing she waives all privilege in existing mental health and psychological records and must produce those records for the court and prosecution. Second, the trial court found that, also under the reverse-transfer statute, when a juvenile requests a reverse-transfer hearing the trial court may order her to submit to a “mental health or psychologiсal assessment or screening” by a state doctor, regardless of whether the juvenile plans to present any mental health evidence at the reverse-transfer hearing.
¶6 Johnson petitioned this court for relief under C.A.R. 21, arguing that the trial court lacked authority to order her to (1) release her past psychotherapy and mental health records and (2) submit to a state-administered mental health screening. We issued a rule to show cause why the trial court‘s order should not be vacated.
II. Original Jurisdiction
¶7 “This court will generally elect to hear C.A.R. 21 cases that raise issues of first impression and that are of significant public importance.” People v. Steen, 2014 CO 9, ¶ 8, 318 P.3d 487, 490. This case raises two issues of first impression regarding reverse-transfer proceedings. Furthermore, these issues are of significant public impоrtance because they are likely to be implicated in future juvenile proceedings.
¶8 This court also has discretion to exercise original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 when “a remedy on appeal would prove inadequate.” People v. Sisneros, 55 P.3d 797, 799 (Colo. 2002). When a party is “wrongfully required tо disclose confidential records, the damage will occur upon disclosure, regardless of any ruling on appeal.” Id. Therefore, original jurisdiction is appropriate in this case.
III. Standard of Review
¶9 The interpretation of the reverse-transfer statute is a questiоn of law, which we review de novo. See Bostelman v. People, 162 P.3d 686, 689 (Colo. 2007).
IV. Analysis
¶10 Under
A. Section 19-2-517(3)(b)(VI) does not give thе trial court power to order a juvenile to produce mental health records.
¶11 Johnson argues that her request for a reverse-transfer hearing did not constitute a waiver of her privilege. We agree. Colorado‘s psychotherapist-patient privilege provides that a psychotherapist “shall not be examined without the consent of” the patient “as to any communication made by the client to the [psychotherapist].”
¶12 “To determine whether there was a waiver, the proper inquiry is not whether the information sought may be relevant.” Id. at 801. “Instead, the proper inquiry is whether the victim has injected her physical or mental condition into the case as the basis of a claim or an affirmative defense.” Id. As we noted in Sisneros, a finding that a party waives the privilеge should not be made lightly:
The relationship between therapist and patient must be confidential. The possibility that documents relating to treatment may later be obtained in discovery decreases the likelihood that a victim will seek treatment, let alone be willing to reveal intimate details during treatment. The mere threat of disclosure destroys the sanctity of the psychologist-patient relationship. For this reason, we will not hastily find an implied waiver of the privilege in this type of situation.
¶13 This framework makes plаin that a juvenile does not waive the privilege when she seeks a reverse-transfer hearing because she has not “injected her physical or mental condition into the case.” See id. at 801. The reverse-transfer statute only requires that the trial court consider mental health records “made available“—i.e., voluntarily waived by the privilege-holder—to the trial court and the parties.
¶14 Furthermore, because the privilege is so important, the General Assembly explicitly states when a party waives her privilege. See
¶15 When a juvenile requests a reverse-transfer hearing, the statute only requires that the trial court cоnsider “relevant mental health or psychological assessments or screenings that are made available to both the district attorney and defense counsel.”
¶16 Accordingly, we hold that when a juvenile requests a reverse-transfer hearing, she does not waive her psychotherapist-patient privilege. Therefore, the trial court erred when it ordered Johnson to release her past mental health records.
¶17 We now turn to the second issue, whether the rеverse-transfer statute gives a trial court the power to order a state-administered mental health assessment when a juvenile requests a reverse-transfer hearing.
B. Section 19-2-517(3)(b)(VI) does not give the trial court power to order a juvenile to submit to mental health screening.
¶18 Johnson argues that the trial court lacked authority to order her to submit to a state-administered mental health evaluation. We agree. Just as a juvenile has a significant interest in preserving the confidentiality of past mental health records, a juvenile also has a significant interest in the confidentiality of future mental health records. And, similar to the release of past mental health records, nothing in the reverse-transfer statute authorizes a trial court to order a juvenile to submit to а state-administered mental health evaluation.
¶19 Similar to the release of privileged mental health records, see supra Part IV.A, when the General Assembly intends to give a court the power to order a mental health screening, it does so expliсitly. See, e.g.,
¶20 Here, the reverse-transfer statute requires only that the trial court take into account “relevant mental health or psycholоgical assessments or screenings that are made available to both the district attorney and defense counsel.”
¶21 Accordingly, we hold that the reverse-transfer statute does not authorize the trial court to order a juvenile to undergo a mental health assessment. Therefore, the trial court erred when it ordered Johnson to submit to a mental health assessment.
V. Conclusion
¶22 We conclude that nothing in
JUSTICE BOATRIGHT does not participate.