Johnson v. BaldrickJohnson v. Baldrick
WALSH, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Justin A. Johnson, Sr., appeals a decision of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees, Victoria Baldrick and Karen Johnson-Jordan. We affirm the decision of the trial court.
{¶3} Appellant brought an action against appellees, two employees of Butler County Children Services, for recklessly investigating reports that Aimee was abusing and/or neglecting Justin and failing to initiate child-protection proceedings in juvenile court. Appellees were granted summary judgment by the trial court.
{¶4} Butler County Children Services first became involved with Aimee while she was still a minor. In June 1989, Aimee made a false allegation of sexual abuse against her father. At that time, children services compiled an evaluation of Aimee, finding that she had a limited IQ of 72 and, as a result, acted immature, and often displayed fits of anger and rage.
{¶5} In December 1993, Aimee had her first child, Scott. On the day after the child‘s birth, children services received a report alerting that the nurses at the hospital “did not want to release the infant with Ms. Leonard due to her mental retardation and alleged violent episodes.” Children services conducted a lengthy investigation finding that Aimee lacked the intellectual and emotional capacities to independently parent and protect a child, and that a child left in her care would be at a definite risk of harm. Children services also noted reports that Aimee acted abusively towards the child‘s father, broke out windows in their home, and intentionally flooded their apartment. In 1994, Aimee‘s parental rights for Scott were permanently terminated.
{¶6} In September 1995, Aimee was charged with rape for engaging in sexual conduct with a 12-year-old boy. Aimee was convicted of gross sexual imposition and sentenced to two years in prison.
{¶8} Justin was born on June 28, 2003. In December, children services received an anonymous complaint of neglect concerning Aimee‘s treatment of Justin. Appellee, Karen Johnson-Jordan, assigned appellee, Victoria Baldrick, to investigate the complaint which alleged that Aimee “throws Justin into the crib and yells at him.” On or around December 29, 2003, Baldrick met with Aimee and Aimee‘s mother at Aimee‘s home. Baldrick noted Aimee‘s past history1 in the report. Despite these concerns, Baldrick reported that there was no evidence of the alleged complaint and Aimee denied the allegations. Baldrick further reported that no physical injuries were observed; Aimee had familial support;2 Aimee responds appropriately to the baby; she has a strong bond with the baby; Aimee was very protective; Aimee appeared to understand the child‘s developmental stages; and Aimee “was very cooperative” and “seemed to accept responsibility.”
{¶9} According to an affidavit submitted by Johnson-Jordan, a “roundtable discussion” was conducted by children services to determine what action to take. Based on the evidence gathered, appellees believed there was an insufficient basis to remove Justin
{¶10} Appellant timely appeals, raising a single assignment of error:
{¶11} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO BALDRICK AND JOHNSON-JORDAN.”
{¶12} Appellant argues in his sole assignment of error that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to appellees and presents multiple issues for review. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding that appellees had no duty and were immune from suit based on the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act. Further, appellant disagrees with the trial court‘s definition of “reckless.” Ultimately, appellant argues a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether appellees recklessly conducted the investigation.
Standard of Review
{¶13} This court‘s review of a trial court‘s ruling on a motion for summary judgment is de novo. Broadnax v. Greene Credit Service (1997), 118 Ohio App.3d 881, 887. In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court must apply the standard found in
Analysis
{¶14} The gravamen of the legal issues presented by appellant in his sole assignment of error involves the tension between the principles of duty and immunity.
Duty
{¶15} Appellant first argues that children services workers have an “actionable duty” to investigate reports of child abuse and, when appropriate, initiate child-protective services. Appellant argues that
{¶16}
{¶17} In Brodie, a guardian ad litem brought suit against a county children services board and caseworkers for allegedly failing or refusing to investigate reports of suspected child abuse or neglect. 51 Ohio St.3d at 113. The Ohio Supreme Court held “that children services board and its agents have a duty to investigate and report their findings as required by
{¶18} Appellees urge, however, that the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act
{¶19}
{¶20} The Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act does not extinguish appellees’ duty. Rather, if it is determined that the Act immunizes appellees, it extinguishes their liability.
Immunity
{¶21} In this case, appellant alleges that appellees recklessly investigated the report of child abuse. Appellees urge that the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act grants them immunity from the instant action.
{¶23} Nevertheless, appellees claim that the Ohio Supreme Court Case of Marshall v. Montgomery Cty. Children Serv. Bd. insulates them from any liability in this case, including reckless actions. In Marshall, the estate of a child who was beaten to death by his mother brought a wrongful death action against the county, the county children services board, and caseworkers. 92 Ohio St.3d at 351. The estate alleged that appellee knew or should have known about the previous acts of violence perpetrated by the mother against her other children and that appellee negligently failed to investigate and failed to remove the child from the mother‘s custody. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court accepted review on the limited question of whether: “For the purposes of the immunity exceptions in
{¶24} The application of Marshall is limited as it applies only to
{¶25} We find Grimm v. Summit Cty. Children Serv. Bd., Summit App. No. 22702, 2006-Ohio-2411, persuasive on this issue. In Grimm, the plaintiff filed a complaint for personal injury against a hospital, the Summit County Children Service Board, and multiple
Recklessness
{¶26} Next, Appellant disagrees with the trial court‘s holding that “recklessness under
{¶27} Appellant argues that a difference exists between reckless and wanton conduct and the trial court erred by conflating these terms into a single standard. Appellant further contends that the trial court failed to apply the distinct definition for recklessness to the facts of the case.
{¶28} This issue is well-settled in the state of Ohio. Ohio courts state that “an individual acts ‘recklessly’ when he ‘does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which is in
{¶29} Wantonness is also described as a “degree greater than negligence.” Id. Wanton misconduct is the failure to exercise any care whatsoever. Fabrey at 356. “Mere negligence is not converted into wanton misconduct unless the evidence establishes a disposition to perversity on the part of the tortfeasor.” Id., citing Roszman v. Sammett (1971) 26 Ohio St.2d 94. Such perversity must be under such conditions that the actor must be conscious that his conduct will in all probability result in injury. Id.
{¶30} The trial court noted these definitions in its decision. Further, the Second Restatement of Torts states for recklessness that “conduct described in this section is often called ‘wanton or willful misconduct’ both in statutes and judicial opinions. On the other hand, this phrase is sometimes used by courts to refer to conduct intended to cause harm to another.” 2 Restatement of Law 2d, Torts (1965), at 587, Section 500.
{¶31} Similarly, in Thompson v. McNeill (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 102, the Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged that “[t]he term ‘reckless’ is often used interchangeably with ‘willful’ and ‘wanton.’ Our comments regarding recklessness apply to conduct characterized as willful and wanton as well.” Id. at footnote 1. See, also, Fabrey, 70 Ohio St.3d at 356.
Summary Judgment
{¶32} Although the issues raised by appellant regarding appellees’ duty and the “reckless” predicate for nonimmunity have merit, to survive summary judgment appellant must still demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether appellees
{¶33} Generally, the issue of malice, bad faith, and wanton or reckless behavior is a question for the jury. Fabrey v. McDonald, 70 Ohio St.3d at 356. However, the standard for demonstrating such conduct is high. Id.
{¶34} After a review of the record, appellant has failed to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether appellees recklessly conducted the investigation and failed to initiate proceedings in the juvenile court. Appellees conducted an investigation into the anonymous report. No phone number was left with the report for follow-up with the person making the report. Appellees were clearly aware of Aimee‘s background, including her criminal record, other children, and mental health issues. That information was included in the report. Children services conducted a “roundtable discussion” following the investigation. According to appellees, Aimee‘s previous history was considered in determining the risk level. Other than the unsubstantiated, anonymous report which children services investigated, there was no evidence of abuse or neglect to Justin, nor was there any evidence that Justin was in immediate danger. Based on the evidence gathered, appellees believed that there was insufficient basis to remove Justin from Aimee‘s care due, in part, to the conclusion that Aimee was not experiencing any present-day mental health issues despite such issues being present in the past. Such evidence does not support a finding of recklessness.
{¶36} Judgment affirmed.
YOUNG, P.J., and POWELL, J., concur.