Johnathan J. Billewicz, et al. v. Town of Fair Haven
No. 2020-173
Supreme Court of Vermont
2021 VT 20
On Appeal from Superior Court, Rutland Unit, Civil Division. December Term, 2020. Robert A. Mello, J.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
Daniel R. Long and David M. Pocius of Paul Frank + Collins P.C., Burlington, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
James F. Carroll and Kevin L. Kite of Carroll, Boe & Pell, P.C., Middlebury, for Defendant-Appellee.
PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Robinson, Eaton and Carroll, JJ., and Pearson, Supr. J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned
¶ 1.
¶ 2. The relevant facts are undisputed for purposes of summary judgment. At issue in this case are four properties located
¶ 3. In 2013, the Town‘s tax collector, then Herbert Durfee III, sent notices to plaintiffs advising them that outstanding taxes were due with respect to each of the four properties and that tax-sale procedures would be commenced if they remained unpaid. Plaintiffs did not pay the taxes owed. Therefore, on November 26, 2013, Durfee mailed plaintiffs a notification indicating that the properties would be sold at a tax sale if the delinquent amounts were not paid before December 15, 2013. Two days before this deadline, plaintiffs entered into agreements with the Town wherein they promised to pay the taxes in installments. That same day, they furnished the Town with a check for $1500 which was to satisfy the first of these installments. The check was returned for insufficient funds. On December 30, Durfee sent plaintiffs letters advising that the check had been returned for insufficient funds and the four properties had therefore been forwarded to the Town‘s attorney for tax sale.
¶ 4. On February 5, 10, and 11, 2014, Durfee delivered copies of the notices of tax sale, warrants, tax bills, levies, and descriptions of the four properties to the Fair Haven Town Clerk; the documents were duly recorded in the Town‘s land records. On the same three dates, Durfee sent plaintiffs corresponding notices indicating that the four properties would be sold at a tax sale on March 18, 2014. Durfee published advertisements of the pending sale for three successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the county and posted notices of the sale in the town hall.
¶ 5. Plaintiffs did not pay the delinquent taxes before the appointed time on March 18 and the sale proceeded. Plaintiffs did not attend. The Town was the only—and therefore, the winning—bidder for all four properties.
¶ 6. During the one-year period following the sale, plaintiffs did not exercise their statutory right of redemption. Accordingly, on April 1, 2015, Durfee executed four tax collector‘s deeds transferring the properties to the Town. The deeds were recorded in the Town land records. However, the reports of sale regarding all four properties were not recorded in the Fair Haven Town Clerk‘s office until November 30, 2017.
¶ 7. Plaintiffs do not dispute that the taxes were both validly assessed and delinquent as to all four properties, the resulting written notices of tax sale were sufficient and timely, and the tax sale was properly conducted. The only respect in which they allege the procedure followed by the Town deviated from the statutory requirements was that the reports of sale were not recorded within the thirty days of the tax sale as required under
¶ 8. Plaintiffs, proceeding pro se, filed the instant action on March 22, 2018. Therein, they asserted claims of quiet title, trespass to real property and to chattel, invasion of privacy, and conversion. Each claim was predicated on the theory that the tax deeds conveying the properties to the Town were void because the tax collector did not record the reports of sale within the thirty-day period following the tax sale.
¶ 9. The Town moved for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that plaintiffs’
¶ 10. The trial court found that there was no material dispute of fact and concluded that the Town was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiffs’ challenge to the tax collector‘s deeds was subject to
¶ 11. Plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend the summary-judgment ruling, arguing that the court erred in concluding their claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion, explaining that both the plain language of the statute and Turner dictated the result. Plaintiffs, now represented by counsel, appealed.
¶ 12. The sole question before us is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the Town on the ground that plaintiffs’ action was time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations at
¶ 13. “We review motions for summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard of review as the trial court.” In re All Metals Recycling, Inc., 2014 VT 101, ¶ 6, 197 Vt. 481, 107 A.3d 895. Thereunder, summary judgment is granted if the moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
¶ 14. “When interpreting statutory provisions, we begin with the plain language of the statute, and, if possible, resolve any questions on this basis alone.” Clark v. DiStefano, 2018 VT 82, ¶ 8, 208 Vt. 139, 195 A.3d 379 (considering which of two statutes of limitation apply to an action). In interpreting statutes, our goal is
¶ 15. Accordingly, our inquiry begins with the language of the statutory provisions at issue. Each of plaintiffs’ claims for damages and the recovery of the subject properties turns on the argument that Durfee did not satisfy the requirements of
¶ 16. We consider first the language of the one-year statute of limitations found applicable below. Under
Unless commenced within one year from the time that collection is sought to be enforced against the taxpayer by arrest, distraint or levy, an action shall not lie wherein a taxpayer may question the validity of ... [a]cts of the tax collector relating to the collection of the tax either before or after the tax became delinquent.
As used here, “collection of a tax” is defined broadly to encompass
all acts required by law to be done or permitted by law to be done in respect to such tax, by either the town treasurer or the town tax collector, from the time specified ... as marking the end of the assessment of the tax, up to and including the last act required or permitted by law to be done by the town tax collector in the enforcement of the collection of the tax.
¶ 17. Meanwhile, at all times relevant to this appeal,1
An action for the recovery of lands, or the possession thereof, shall not be maintained against the grantee of such lands in a tax collector‘s deed, duly recorded, or his or her heirs or assigns, when the grantee, his or her heirs or assigns have been in continuous and
open possession of the land conveyed in such deed and have paid the taxes thereon, unless commenced within three years after the cause of action first accrues to the plaintiff or those under whom he or she claims.
Should this provision control, plaintiffs’ action was timely filed.2
¶ 18. We first observe that neither provision‘s plain language supports the trial court‘s conclusion that the distinction between the two statutes is contingent on whether a taxpayer or a party claiming under the taxpayer brings the action. Although the federal bankruptcy court for the District of Vermont so held in 1993, this construction is at odds with the language of the statute. See In re Brentwood Corp., 157 B.R. 83. In Brentwood, the bankruptcy court considered a mortgagee-bank‘s argument that a tax sale of the mortgagor‘s property was void ab initio because the tax collector failed to extend a warrant against the property, file a copy of that warrant with the town clerk, or record the sale within thirty days, all as required by statute. Id. at 85. With scant analysis, it concluded that the three-year limitations period at
¶ 19. However, the two statutes plainly do not create two separate and exclusive plaintiff-classes subject to differing limitations periods. Although
He could exercise his redemption rights under
32 V.S.A. § 5260 . This must be done within one year. He could also challenge as invalid acts relating to the collection of the tax, within the one[-]year limitation of32 V.S.A. § 5294 . Or he could, as was done here, sue the town as purchaser and grantee under the tax collector‘s deed, and its assigns, for recovery of his lands. This right of action is subject to a three[-]year limitation.32 V.S.A. § 5263 . A showing of invalidity in the sale is a prerequisite to recovery.
Id. at 53, 270 A.2d at 901-02 (emphasis added). And while a showing of invalidity in the sale is a prerequisite to a taxpayer‘s recovery under
¶ 20. Plaintiffs are right in arguing that they have filed an action for the recovery of lands against the grantee of those lands in a tax collector‘s deed, which could implicate the three-year statute of limitations of
¶ 21. Plaintiffs also argue that the use of the phrase “sought to be enforced” in
¶ 22. It remains, then, to resolve the ambiguity created by the fact that, read individually, the plain language of both the one- and three-year statutes of limitations appear to apply to this action. “In construing statutes to give effect to legislative intent, we seek to harmonize statutes and not find conflict if possible.” Athens Sch. Dist. v. Vt. State Bd. of Educ., 2020 VT 52, ¶ 30, 237 A.3d 671 (quotation omitted). “Longstanding rules of statutory construction counsel that a specific statute dealing with the same subject matter governs over a more general one” and that the two provisions “must be read together and harmonized if possible to give effect to a consistent legislative policy.” In re Snyder Grp., Inc., 2020 VT 15, ¶ 14, 233 A.3d 1077 (alteration omitted) (quotations omitted). Thus, “where there is a conflict between a general statute of limitations and a specific statute of limitations, the latter will prevail.” Aube v. O‘Brien, 140 Vt. 1, 4, 433 A.2d 298, 299 (1981).
¶ 23. Here,
since the issue on which this matter turns is not a question of the validity of the assessment of the tax or the procedural steps looking to the collection of the delinquency by the tax collector, the time
limitation provision of
32 V.S.A. Sections 5294 and5295 do not apply and this action is not thereby barred.
129 Vt. at 49, 270 A.2d at 900-01. The inverse result lies here: because the issue on which this matter turns is a challenge to the tax collector‘s procedural steps in collecting the tax,
¶ 24. The trial court was also correct in concluding that our holding in Turner v. Spera mandates this result. See 140 Vt. 19, 433 A.2d 307. In that case, we concluded that a taxpayer suit seeking to void a tax collector‘s deed on grounds that the tax collector failed to publish notice of the tax sale as required under
¶ 25. Plaintiffs also point out that
¶ 26. Finally, plaintiffs contend that construing
¶ 27. The doctrine relied upon by plaintiffs, however, “merely permits an otherwise reasonable construction when a plain reading of the statute would produce a result demonstrably at odds with any conceivable legislative purpose.” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. State, 2005 VT 108, ¶ 16, 179 Vt. 214, 892 A.2d 191 (quotation omitted). Assigning this claim, as plaintiffs request, to the three-year statute of limitations at
¶ 28. We are cognizant that “[s]tatutory time limits reflect legislative judgments concerning the relative values of repose on the one hand, and vindication of both public and private legal rights on the other.” Vt. Human Rights Com‘n v. State, Agency of Transp., 2012 VT 88, ¶ 14, 192 Vt. 552, 60 A.3d 702 (quotation omitted) (“Limiting the amount of time in which an action can be brought is a long-standing legislative prerogative.”). Although the canon of construction which counsels in favor of avoiding absurd or illogical results serves as a useful interpretive tool in some circumstances, we have cautioned that it “should be used sparingly” and with care to avoid “substitut[ing] this Court‘s policy judgments for those of the Legislature.” Judicial Watch, Inc., 2005 VT 108, ¶ 16 (quotation omitted). A statute “is not absurd simply because it causes an outcome that a ... litigant believes to be ‘anomalous or perhaps unwise.’” Weitz v. Weitz, 2019 VT 35, ¶ 20, 210 Vt. 248, 213 A.3d 1102 (quoting Gibbons v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 919 F.3d 699, 705-06 (2d Cir. 2019)).
¶ 29. It is reasonable to conclude that the limitations periods at issue represent a considered legislative value judgment about the importance of finality in these circumstances; therefore, we do not consider the result to be absurd here, where plaintiffs were on ample notice of the omission giving rise to their claim before the limitations period expired. See Gibbons, 919 F.3d at 705-06 (explaining that courts should employ canon against absurdity “only where the result of applying the plain language would be, in a genuine sense, absurd, i.e., where it is quite impossible that [the Legislature] could have intended the result and where the alleged absurdity is so clear as to be obvious to most anyone” (quotation omitted)). The Legislature may wish to examine the issue identified by plaintiffs, but—where there is a clear path to harmonize
¶ 30. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the Town because the applicable one-year limitation period of
Affirmed.
FOR THE COURT:
Associate Justice