Lead Opinion
May an anonymous civil defendant who files and prevails on a special motion to quash a subpoena for identifying information under D.C.Code § 16-5503 (2012 RepL), part of the District’s Anti-SLAPP Act. (the Act), be awarded attorney’s fees under D.C.Code § 16-5504(a) without showing that the suit prompting the subpoena was frivolous or improperly motivated? We answer that question yes. We further hold, after considering the language and legislative history of the Act, that a successful movant under § 16-5503 is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in the ordinary course — ie., presumptively— unless special circumstances in the case make a fee award unjust. Because no such circumstances .exist on the record of this case, we reverse the order of the trial court denying altogether the defen-dani/movant’s-request for .attorney’s fees, and remand the case solely for the court to consider the reasonablenesg.-of the amount of fees requested. ¡ ,
L
A.
The Anti-SLAPP. Act, as- explained in our earlier opinion, Doe No. 1 v. Burke, 91-A3d 1031 (D.C.2014) (Doe I), was enacted by the D.C. Council to “protect the targets of ... suits’- intended “as a weapon to chill or silence, speech.” Id. at 1033.
the moving party must “make[ ] a prima facie showing that the underlying claim arises from an act in furtherance of the right of advocacy on issues of public interest.” D.C.Code § 16-5502(b); see also D.C.Code § 16-5503(b). Upon such a showing, the motion will be granted unless the opposing party demonstrates a likelihood of success on the merits of his or her underlying claim. Id.
Doe I,
In this case, áppellee Susan L. Burke, an attorney, sued multiple anonymous defendants (“John Does 1-10”) alleging defamation and other torts arising from edits made to a Wikipedia webpage established in Ms. Burke’s name. John Doe 1 had allegedly added information to the page using the name Zujua. After Ms. Burke caused a subpoena to be issued to obtain Wikipedia’s user data and thereby learn Zujua’s (and others’) identity, Zujua filed a special motion to quash the subpoena. The trial court denied the motion, but this court reversed. We held as a matter of law that Zujua had shown “that his speech is of the sort that the statute is designed to protect,” id. at 1036, 1043-44,
B.
On remand, Zujua moved to be awarded attorney’s fees under D.C.Code § 16-5504(a), which provides that “[t]he court may award a moving party who prevails, in whole or in part, on a motion brought under ... § 16-5503 the costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney fees.” In response, attorney Burke argued mainly that the trial court in its discretion (“[t]he court may award ... attorney fees”) should award no fees in the circumstances of the case. The trial judge agreed and denied the fee request entirely.
The judge reasoned further that, “even if an action is construed as a SLAPP suit, attorneys’ fees and costs are not automatic and máy be recovered only upon a showing that a frivolous claim has been ■ made against defendants.” Exercising the discretion he understood to be afforded him by the fee provision’s “permissive language,” he determined that because the plaintiffs suit, although unsuccessful, had not been filed “with [the] intent to inflict costly litigation fees, bring a frivolous suit, or ... stifle speech,” attorney’s fees were unjustified in light of “the equities” of the case, “the aims of the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act and the purpose for awarding fees,” and the findings of merit (or nori-frivolousness) and proper motivation the court had made regarding the underlying suit.
II.
A.
For the trial judge, it is apparent, “a moving party who prevails” on a motion to quash under § 16-5504 may not be awarded attorney’s fees, presumptively or otherwise, without consideration by the court of the merits of, and motive behind, the underlying lawsuit. Only if the suit, besides having failed the test of § 16-5503(b) (“likely to succeed on the merits”), has been determined to be frivolous or intended to stifle speech by causing undue litigation costs is it one within the “meaning” of the Act — a “classic SLAPP suit” — so as to justify the statutory shift of the obligation to - pay costs including. attorney’s fees to the plaintiff.
The threshold' defect in this statutory reading is that nowhere does the Act refer to or define a ‘«classic” SLAPP suit, as distinct from one against which the defendant may invoke the statute’s protections after a threshold prima facie showing. As explained above, the-burden of maintaining the suit shifts to the plaintiff once the defendant has made “a prima facie showing that the underlying claim arises from an act in furtherance of the right of advocacy on issues of public interest....” D.C.Gode § 16-5503(b). A “claim” is defined as “any civil lawsuit, claim, complaint, cause of action ... or other civil judicial pleading — ” Id. § 16-5501(a) (emphasis added). Nothing in this language, or in the words of the attorney’s fee provision, § 16-5504(a), implies that to qualify for fees the anonymous defendant successful in quashing a subpoena must have resisted a SLAPP claim “classic” or exemplary in nature, rather than one arising — solely but pivotally — from the defendant’s exercise of a special form of speech or advocacy. The protections of the Act, in short, apply to lawsuits which the D.C. Council has deemed to be SLAPPs, and
More important, however, than this' illusory distinction the trial judge saw between “classic” SLAPP suits and others is that the Act, by its [terms, impliedly but clearly rejects the additional showing of frivolousness or wrongful motivation the judge required before a party, who, files a special motion to quash and prevails may recover attorney’s fees. The costs provision, D.C.Code § 16-5504, provides in full:
(a) The court may award a moving -party who prevails, in whole' or in part, on a motion brought- under § 16-5502[6 ] or § 16-5503 the costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney fees.
(b) The court may award reasonable attorney fees and costs to the responding party only if the court finds that a motion brought under § 16-5502' or § 16-5503 is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.
The distinction could hardly be clearer between when, to qualify for attorney’s fees, a party must show frivolousness or improper motive in the opponent’s action, and when not. Unlike the “moving party who prevails .... on a motion,” “the responding party”- — the original plaintiff— may be awarded fees only if the court finds a complete lack of merit or improper motivation in the special motion to quash. This distinction between what the Council required in one of two companion provisions but not the other must be assumed to be deliberate:
When the legislature uses a term or phrase in one .., provision but excludes it from another, courts do not imply an intent to include the missing term in [the] .,.. provision where the term or phrase is excluded. Instead, omission of the same provision from a similar section is significant to show different legislative intent for the two sections.
2A Norman Singer & Shajíbie Singee, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46.6 (7th ed.2015). In the same vein, the Supreme Court has stated:
“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion”.... Had Congress intended to restrict [the subsection in question to a particularly meaning], it presumably would have done so expressly as it did in the immediately following subsection .... We would not presume to ascribe this difference to a simple mistake in draftsmanship.
Russello v. United States,
The Act’s silence in not requiring the moving party on a special motion to quash to show more-than that it prevailed thus speaks eloquently as to the Council’s intent regarding entitlement to reasonable attorney’s fees. In departing, for example, from the traditional American Rule governing fees,
.From the text of the statute alone, therefore, we think it a fair inference that the D.C. Council intended the successful movant under § 16-5503 to be awarded attorney’s fees in the ordinary course, i.e., presumptively, on request. But the issue is not wholly without uncertainty or ambiguity because, as the trial judge emphasized, the legislature used the verb “may” to authorize the shift in fees; it did not use “shall” or “must,” as it might have, and as a general rule “may” connotes latitude or choice — in a word, discretion. See, e.g., In re Langon,
B.
That history begins with the Long Title to Bill 18-893, the “Anti-SLAPP Act of 2010,” which defines the purpose of the legislation as including: “to provide a motion to quash attempts to seek personally identifying information; and to award the costs of litigation to the successful party on a special motion.”
That inference. gains further strength from the Committee Report accompanying Bill 18-893. In ¡citing the threat to free expression posed by SLAPP suits “over the past two decades” and the corresponding need for local Anti-SLAPP legislation, the Committee recognized the substantial cost to defendants (named or “unnamed”) of litigating SLAPP actions even equipped with the means the Bill provided — special motions to dismiss or to quash — “to move expeditiously, and equitably, to dispense [with] a. SLAPP.” -.Committee Report at 1, 4. The Committee Report therefore repeatedly pairs the “substantive rights” the
C.
In light of all we have seen, it is plain to us that D.C.Code § 16-5504(a) contemplates a presumptive award of attorney’s fees to the moying party -who prevails on a special motion to quash under § 16-5503. In treating differently for fee purposes the successful moving party (subsection (a)) and successful opponent of the motion (subsection (b)), § 16-5504 is most naturally read .as patterned after existing laws that, while couching the authority to award fees in the permissive verb “may,” distinguish similarly between prevailing plaintiffs and defendants, and in
Furthermore, • although the Newman/Christiansburg distinction' favoring prevailing plaintiffs rests on what the. Supreme' Court “found to be the important policy objectives of the Civil Rights statutes,” id. at 523,
D.
No such circumstances disqualifying Zujua from an award of reasonable fees appear on the record of this case. Appellant Burke cites, presumably as one such circumstance, the trial judge’s determination that Zujua’s attorneys are employed by a public interest organization that, judging from its wébsite-stated mission, “already achieved an award by succeeding in its own interest” through having “protected Zujua’s] right to anonymous free speech.” See note 6, supra. But § 16-5504(a) provides for an award of fees to the “moving party who prevails” (emphasis added), not to a party’s counsél. See Evans v. Jeff D.,
It likewise cannot count, as a circumstance making a fee award “unjust,” Chris-tiansburg,
was on notice from the time [that] motion was filed that [Zujua] believed her lawsuit was a SLAPP. The fee-shifting provision is plain on the face of the Anti-SLAPP statute. Had Ms. Burke*579 wished to minimize her potential exposure to a fee award, she could have dismissed her lawsuit at any time, rather than continue after- [Zujua] rejected her settlement offer.
Brief for Amicus Curiae at 21-22.
E.
In light of the trial judge’s refusal to award attorney’s fees altogether, he did not reach Ms. Burke’s summary challenge to the reasonableness of the amount of fees Zujua was requesting. Despite the largely conclusory nature of that challenge,
Reversed and remanded.
Notes
. "SLAPP” stands for a "strategic lawsuit against public participation.” Doe I,
. The same standards apply to a "special motion to dismiss,” D.C.Code § 16-5502 (2012 Repl.), not at issue in this case. Doe I, 91 A,3d at 1036. Our analysis thus focuses on the “special motion to quash,” though most of what we say applies to the former motion as well.
. Specifically, in editing Ms. Burke's web-page, Zujua had spoken' — or "advoca[ted]”— on an “issue of public interest,” namely one "related to ... a public figure,” § 16-5501(3), because Ms. Burke is "a limited-purpose public figure” under standards applied by this court and others in the defamation context. Doe I,
.When the judge denied the fee request, Ms. Burke’s suit against all of the defendants, including Zujua, was still pending. Her subsequent voluntary dismissal of the entire action removes any basis for her present, halfhearted contention that we lack jurisdiction to review the denial of the fee award. See, e.g., Anderson v. United States,
. As one "equity” counting against a fee award, the judge cited website indications that Zujua’s attorneys, employed by an organization named the Center for Individual Rights (the Center), in general "pursue this type of litigation to further their own [institutional] self-interest and need no encouragement [through a fee award] to do so.” In “protecting [Zujua's] right to anonymous free speech,” which accorded with the Center’s . own stated "public policy positions,” Zujua’s “counsel ha[d] already achieved an award by succeeding in its own interest.” Further counting against an award, in the judge’s view, were representations the judge found undisputed that Zujua had rejected a settlement offer by plaintiff Burke "that would not require [Zujua] to reveal his identity.” Both of these matters are discussed in part II. D., infra.
Having denied Zujua’s request for attorney's fees entirely, the judge had no. occasion to, consider the reasonableness of the fee amount requested. .See part II. E„ infra.
. See note 2, supra.
. "[T]his jurisdiction follows the American Rule under which .. every party to a case shoulders its own attorneys’ fees, and recovers from other litigants only in the presence of statutory authority, a contractual arrangement,. or certain narrowly-defined common law exceptions_” Oliver T. Carr Co. v. United Techs. Commc'ns Co.,
. The trial judge cited Rubel v. Daily News, LP,
. D.C. Council, Committee on Public Safety and the Judiciary, Report on Bill 18-893 at 26 (Nov. 18, 2010) (Committee Report) (emphasis added).
. H.R. 4364, the "Citizenship Participation Act of 2009,” H.R. 4364, 111 Cong. (2009). H.R. 4364 was not enacted into law.
. The attorney's fee provision of H.R. 4364 stated, in relevant part, as follows:
SEC. 8. FEES AND COSTS.
(a) Attorney’s Fees — The court shall award a moving party who prevails on a special motion to dismiss or quash the costs of litigation, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.
(b) Frivolous Motions and Removal — If the court finds that a special motion to dismiss, special motion to quash, or the removal of a claim under this Act is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court may award ... reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to the responding party.
The Committee Report also' took note of the very large number of states that had enacted Anti-SLAPP laws "creat[ing] a similar special motion to dismiss.” The District’s Bill was "[fjollowing the lead” of these "other jurisdictions" as well in both "extendpngl substantive rights” and pairing them with the allowance of costs and fees to "the successful party of a special motion to dismiss or ..; quash.” Committee Report at 3-4.
.Indeed, what may be termed "unofficial legislative history,” see Public Invest. Ltd. v. Bandeirante Corp.,
. An ««successful motion to quash under § 16-5503, by contrast, does not implicate the strong protective concerns underlying the special motion: the defendant’s speech will not have been shown to "arise[] from an act in furtherance of the right of advocacy bn issues of public interest," or the plaintiff will have shown a likelihood that the speech was “malicious," so as to largely trump First Amendment concerns, D.C.Code § 16-5502(b). That is why, contrary to Judge McLeese’s view, post at 583-84, it is not "counterintuitive” for the statute to deny a presumptive fee award to the defendant
. Ms. Burke argues that, her use of Zujua’s refusal to settle as a "shield” against a fee request, rather than a "sword,” was consistent with Fed.R.Evid. 408, cited in Lively. , But the federal rule precludes the admission of evidence of "conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations about [a] claim” to "either ,.. prove or disprove the validity ... of [the] ... claim _” Fed. R.Evid. 408(a) (emphasis added). Burke undeniably was seeking to "disprove" Zujua’s entitlement to fees.
. Ms. Burke asserted, for example, that the requested fee amount was "unreasonable on its face” given that "[t]his lawsuit did not result in extensive work, such as reviewing voluminous documents, talcing and defending depositions, and going to -trial”; and that "[t]he Center devoted all three of its lawyers to this case and then billed for a significant number of meetings amongst themselves.”
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree that the trial court’s order denying attorney’s fees to Mr. Doe should be vacated. I write separately because my reasoning differs from the court’s reasoning in several significant respects.
The court interprets, the District’s Anti-SLAPP Act as presumptively entitling a successful movant to an award of attorney’s fees, unless. special circumstances would render such an award unjust. Although the issue is not free from doubt, I conclude that the Act is better read to give trial courts discretion whether to award attorney’s fees to successful movants.
I.
A. Statutory Language. ■
The Act provides that trial courts “may” award attorney’s fees to successful mov-ants. D.C.Code § 16-5504(a) (2015 Supp.). As the court acknowledges, “[u]se of the word ‘may’ in a statute ordinarily denotes discretion.” In re Langon,
It is true that “may” sometimes can be interpreted to mean “shall” or “presumptively shall.” See, e.g,, In re Langon,
B. Statutory Structure.
As the court points out, a party who successfully opposes an Anti-SLAPP Act motion may be awarded fees only if the motion was “frivolous or ... solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.” D.C.Code § 16-5504(b). No such limitation is imposed on fee awards to successful movants. D.C.Code § 16-5504(a). I agree with the court that this difference “impliedly but clearly rejects” the view that fee awards to successful movants could properly be limited to cases in which the respondent’s position was frivolous or taken in bad faith. The court goes further, though, and infers from this difference “alone” that successful movants should presumptively be awarded fees. I see no basis for this further inference. Rather, the structure of section 16-5504 is entirely consistent with a conclusion that trial courts have discretion whether to award fees to successful mov-ants. The Second Circuit has reached the same conclusion under 15 U.S.C. § 3611 (2014), which has a structure quite similar to that of D.C.Code § 16-5504. See 305 E. 24th Owners Corp. v. Parman Co.,
The Second Circuit’s interpretation of 15 U.S.C. § 3611 contradicts the reasoning of the court in this case. Closer to home, this court recently analyzed the fee provision in the District of Columbia Freedom of Information Act, D.C.Code § 2-537(c) (2015 Supp.), which provides that prevailing plaintiffs “may” be awarded fees but
In support of the statement that fee provisions with a structure like that of section 16-5504 call in the ordinary course for an award of attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs, the court cites as a “paradigmatic example” the fee provisions in federal civil-rights statutes. In reality, however, the Supreme Court concluded that prevailing plaintiffs should presumptively be awarded fees under the civil-rights statutes not because of the structure of the fee provisions in those statutes but rather because successful civil-rights plaintiffs act as private attorneys general, “vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.” Newman v. Piggie Park Enters.,
C. Legislative History.
The court concludes that “[njothing in the legislative history implies ... that the Council had in mind granting broad or loosely constrained discretion to the trial court to award or deny.attorney’s fees” to a successful movant. In my view, however, the legislative history on balance points in favor of the conclusion that the legislature meant “may” to be understood in its usual sense of conferring discretion. The strongest indications appear in the applicable committee report. We have found committee reports to be particularly persuasive evidence of legislative intent. Cf. e.g., Board of Trs. of Univ. of District of Columbia v. Joint Review Comm. on Educ. in Radiologic Tech.,
The applicable committee report at one point refers to the Act as “[p]rovid[ing] for the awarding of fees” to successful mov-ants. D.C. Council, Report on Bill 18-893 at 8 (Nov. 18, 2010). That reference does not shed light on whether the Council intended such awards to be discretionary or presumptively mandatory. Two other statements in the committee report, however, speak more directly to that question, describing the Act as “allow[ingj” for an award of fees to successful movants. Id. at 4, 6. As the Supreme Court of Colorado observed when interpreting a constitutional amendment that “allowed’’ reasonable attorney’s fees to successful plaintiffs, “[djictionary definitions of the common us
In concluding that the legislative history of the Act supports a conclusion that fee awards to successful movants are presumptively mandatory, the court relies on two main points. First, the court relies on the Act’s lo.ng title, which lists among the Act’s purposes “to award the costs of litigation to the successful party on a special motion.” It is appropriate to consider a statute’s title when interpreting the statute. Mitchell v. United States,
' Second, the court notes the committee report’s observation that the Act “closely mirrored” then-pending federal Anti-SLAPP legislation.
Finally, the court mentions in a footnote an email exchange between a Council staff member and a witness who testified in support of the Act. In my view, the court appropriately places little weight on that email exchange. Cf, e.g., In re Kline,
D. Analogy to Federal Civil-Rights Statutes.
As previously noted, the court suggests that the Act’s fee provision is analogous to the fee provisions in certain federal civil-rights statutes, which use discretionary language but have nevertheless been interpreted to presumptively require fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs. See Christiansburg,
The Supreme Court has identified two primary rationales for presumptively requiring an award of- fees to' prevailing plaintiffs under the federal civil-rights statutes: (1) such plaintiffs serve as private attorneys general, and (2) the defendants in such cases violated federal law. Martin,
I do not deprecate the.free-speeeh interests that can be protected by a successful
. In my view, the procedural character of motions under the.Act tends to weaken the view that fee awards to successful movants should be presumptively mandatory. For example, imagine a libel defendant who is sued for speaking out on a matter of public concern, but who is unable to prevail in a pretrial Anti-SLAPP Act motion. Imagine further that the defendant nevertheless ultimately persuades a factfinder that the plaintiffs suit was not meritorious. Barring bad faith or other unusual circumstances, such a defendant has no right to attorney’s fees. It seems somewhat counterintuitive to construe the Act as presumptively mandating a fee award to defendants who can prevail pretrial, given that defendants who prevail after a trial will only be eligible for a fee award in unusual circumstances. The court responds that a plaintiff who successfully opposes an Anti-SLAPP Act motion in a cáse involving public advocacy “will have shown a likelihood that the speech was ‘malicious,’ so as to largely trump First Amendment concerns.” The court does not explain, however, why a plaintiffs simply making a pretrial showing of likely success on the merits “largely trump[s]” First Amendment concerns, even where the defendant ultimately persuades the jury that the speech at issue could not under the First Amendment be the basis for a libel award.
E. Anti-SLAPP Statutes in Other Jurisdictions,
The committee report concerning the Act noted that, as of January 2010, approximately twenty-eight other jurisdictions had adopted Anti-SLAPP statutes. Report at 3. The report also indicated that the Act “follows the model set forth in a number of other jurisdictions.” Id. at 1. On the issue of fee awards, however, the Act is worded quite differently from most other Anti-SLAPP statutes. Most Anti-SLAPP statutes explicitly make fee awards to successful movants mandatory, typically using the word “shall.” See, e.g., Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 425.16(c) (West, Westlaw through ch. 1 2016 Reg. Sess. & ch. 1 2015-2016 2d Ex.Sess.); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.295(4) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess. & Special A Sess.); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 110/25 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-500 2015 Reg. Sess.). Several Anti-SLAPP statutes, however, explicitly limit fee awards to specific circumstances; such as when the plaintiffs suit lacked a substantial basis. See, e.g., DeLCode Ann. tit. 10, § 8138(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 80 Laws 2015, ch. 194); N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 70-a(l)(a) (McKinney, Westlaw through chs. 1-589 2015). I have located only one Anti-SLAPP statute that uses language similar to the pertinent language in the fee provision of the District’s Anti-SLAPP Act. See Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 556 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.) (court “may award” fees to successful movant); That statute has been interpreted by the Maine Supreme Court to give trial courts discretion as to whether to award fees, not to require that fees be
I draw two principal conclusions from the approaches taken by other jurisdictions. First, legislatures have taken various views on whether, as a matter of policy, fee awards to successful Anti-SLAPP Act movants should be mandatory or available only in more limited circumstances. Second, when the Council enacted the fee provision of the District’s Anti-SLAPP Act, it had numerous models to consider. The Council did not adopt either of the two most common models: making fee awards mandatory or making them available only in specified circumstances. Rather, it picked language that, most naturally understood, charts a middle course, leaving to the discretion of trial judges whether to awards fees to successful Anti-SLAPP Act movants. Under well-settled principles of statutory interpretation, we should infer that the Council’s choice was intentional. See, e.g., Russello,
F. Conclusion.
In sum, I view the language of the Act’s fee provision as pointing in favor of the conclusion that trial judges have discretion whether to award fees to successful Anti-SLAPP Act movants. The other tools of statutory interpretation, considered as a whole, on balance point in the same direction. I therefore would so hold.
II.
Although I do not agree with the court 'that a fee award here was presumptively mandatory rather than discretionary, I nevertheless agree with the court that the trial court’s order denying a fee award should be vacated. Specifically, I agree with the court that the trial court placed undue emphasis on the conclusions that Ms. Burke’s suit was not frivolous or brought in bad faith. I also agree with the court that the trial court erred by placing weight on the fact that Mr. Doe was represented pro bono by an advocacy group. I assume arguendo that settlement negotiations might in some circumstances be admissible in determining whether to award attorney’s fees. But cf. Lively v. Flexible Packaging Ass’n,
In some contexts, this court has adopted specific tests to govern a trial court’s discretionary determination whether to award fees. See, e.g., FOP,
. Mr. Doe interprets the committee report as stating that the fee-shifting provision of the Act mirrored fee-shifting provisions in othér federal statutes. I do not read the committee report that way. • Rather, although the committee report at one point refers imprecisely to thfe pending federal legislation as "federal law,” both references in the committee report in context, indicate that the Council was mirroring other Anti-SLAPP provisions, not fee-shifting provisions in previously enacted federal statutes. Report at 1 (Act "follows the model set forth in a number of other jurisdictions, and mirrors language found in federal law, by incorporating substantive rights that allow a defendant to more expeditiously, and more equitably, dispense of a SLAPP”), 4 (Act "closely mirrored the federal legislation introduced” in 2009).
