JOHN DOE NO. 1 v. SUSAN L. BURKE
133 A.3d 569
| D.C. | 2016Background
- Burke (plaintiff) sued multiple anonymous Wikipedia editors (John Does) for defamation and sought subpoenas to obtain identifying information; one editor using the name Zujua moved to quash the subpoena under D.C. Anti‑SLAPP Act § 16‑5503.
- This court previously reversed denial of the quash motion in Doe No. 1 v. Burke, holding Zujua’s edits were protected advocacy on a matter of public interest and Burke failed to show likelihood of success on the merits.
- On remand Zujua moved for attorney’s fees under D.C. Code § 16‑5504(a); the trial court denied fees entirely, reasoning fees were discretionary and should be denied where the underlying suit was not a “classic SLAPP” or frivolous.
- The central legal question on appeal was whether a prevailing movant under § 16‑5503 is presumptively entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees under § 16‑5504(a), or must show the plaintiff’s suit was frivolous or brought in bad faith.
- The D.C. Court of Appeals reversed the fee denial and remanded for the trial court to evaluate reasonableness of requested fees, holding successful movants are presumptively entitled to fees unless special circumstances make an award unjust.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Burke) | Defendant's Argument (Doe / Zujua) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a prevailing movant under § 16‑5503 must show the plaintiff’s suit was frivolous or in bad faith to recover attorney’s fees under § 16‑5504(a) | The court has broad discretion and may deny fees where the underlying suit was non‑frivolous and not motivated to chill speech; trial court properly denied fees | § 16‑5504(a) permits awarding costs to a prevailing movant; subsection (b) separately conditions awards to responding parties on frivolousness — thus prevailing movants need only prevail to recover; fees presumptively awarded absent special circumstances | Prevailing movants under § 16‑5503 are presumptively entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees under § 16‑5504(a); no additional showing of frivolousness or improper motive is required |
| Remedy and scope of remand | Deny or substantially reduce fees as court discretion allows | Award fees absent special circumstances, and remand only to determine reasonableness and amount (including fees on fees and appellate fees) | Reversed denial and remanded solely for trial court to assess reasonableness of the requested fee award |
Key Cases Cited
- Doe No. 1 v. Burke, 91 A.3d 1031 (D.C. 2014) (interpreting Anti‑SLAPP protections for anonymous speakers)
- Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (prevailing civil‑rights plaintiffs ordinarily recover fees unless special circumstances)
- Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978) (standards for awarding fees to prevailing defendants in civil‑rights cases)
- Tenants of 500 23rd St., N.W. v. D.C. Rental Hous. Comm’n, 617 A.2d 486 (D.C. 1992) (presumptive fee award to prevailing tenants under statutory scheme)
- Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986) (fee awards are to prevailing parties, not attorneys)
- Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984) (fee calculations should not vary based on representation by nonprofit counsel)