John DOE 1, et al., Appellants/Cross-Appellees, Plaintiffs, v. The BOONE COUNTY PROSECUTOR, in his official capacity, et al., Appellees/Cross-Appellants, Defendants.
Court of Appeals Case No. 06A01-1612-PL-2741
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
October 24, 2017
79 N.E.3d 902
By concluding that because the Board does not presently create, receive, retain, or maintain the data requested by LexisNexis the Board is not subject to APRA, the trial court—and now the majority—truncated and ignored the plain statutory language of
In sum, the majority‘s conclusion today amounts to an open invitation to erode the transparency of governmental affairs which is one of the fundamental bedrocks of the American constitutional form of representative government. I would reverse the trial court‘s judgment and enter summary judgment in favor of LexisNexis on its Complaint for violation of APRA.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE BOONE COUNTY PROSECUTOR: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Aaron T. Craft, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE BOONE COUNTY SHERIFF: Robert V. Clutter, Taylor, Chadd, Minnette, Schneider & Clutter, P.C., Lebanon, Indiana
Robb, Judge.
Case Summary and Issues
In July of 2015, the Sheriff of Boone County, Indiana, sent a letter to his county‘s registered sex offenders informing them of the passage of Indiana‘s “serious sex offender” law. This law prohibits “serious sex offenders” from entering “school property.” Under the Boone County Sheriff and Prosecutor‘s (the “State“) interpretation of the statute and the definition of “school property,” “serious sex offenders” cannot attend church, without facing arrest and prosecution, if their church conducts Sunday school or has child care for children of the ages described in the statute.
John Doe 1, John Doe 2, and John Doe 3 (collectively, “Appellants“) are resi
Appellants now appeal, raising three issues for our review: 1) whether the trial court erred in concluding the churches are “school property” at any time; 2) if the churches are “school property,” whether the statute and the State‘s efforts to enforce the statute violate RFRA; and 3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellants’ request for a permanent injunction. The State cross-appeals, arguing the trial court erred in concluding the churches are not “school property” when they are not actively conducting Sunday school or child care. Concluding the Appellants’ churches are not “school property” within the meaning of the statute, we reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to enter an order granting Appellants’ motion for a permanent injunction.1
Facts and Procedural History2
In 2015, the Indiana General Assembly passed
“School property,” as used in the serious sex offender statute, is defined by
In July of 2015, the Boone County Sheriff sent a letter to the county‘s registered sex offenders informing them of the recent passage of Indiana‘s “serious sex offender” law. Citing these two statutes, the letter provided if the offenders’ churches have “programs that benefit children who are at least three (3) years of age and not yet enrolled in kindergarten, which most churches have childcare and/or Sunday school classes for children, then the offender is prohibited from entering those facilities.” Appellants’ Appendix, Volume 2 at 36. The letter also provided the offenders are permitted to attend church “[a]s long as the church has only regular services and has no Sunday school for the age group denoted in the new law.” Id.
John Doe 1 is a Boone County, Indiana, resident and a “serious sex offender” under Indiana law. John Doe 1 was convicted in another state of soliciting a minor through the use of a computer and is currently on probation, although he is not prohibited by the terms and conditions
John Doe 2 is a Boone County resident and “serious sex offender” under Indiana law. John Doe 2 was convicted of child seduction and is not on probation or parole. He and his wife regularly attend their church. John Doe 2‘s church conducts Sunday school programming for children, including children who are at least three years old and who are not yet enrolled in kindergarten. At his church, Sunday school programming is offered during the church services. After receiving the letter from the Boone County Sheriff, John Doe 2 contacted the employee of the Boone County Sheriff‘s Department responsible for sex offender registration who informed him that under the law he may no longer attend his church and there were no churches in Boone County he could attend as they all offer Sunday school. See id. at 73.
John Doe 3 is a Boone County resident and “serious sex offender” under Indiana law. John Doe 3 was convicted of child seduction and possession of child pornography. He is not on probation or parole, although even when he was on parole, he was approved to attend church. John Doe 3 formerly attended his church every Sunday and also attended a men‘s group on Monday evenings. John Doe 3‘s church conducts Sunday school programming for children, including children who are at least three years old and who are not yet enrolled in kindergarten. At his church, Sunday school is offered during each church service.
On May 26, 2016, Appellants filed their complaint against the State seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and damages. The Appellants’ complaint alleged the State misinterpreted
Following the hearing on September 26, 2016, the trial court issued its findings of fact and conclusions thereon denying relief to the Appellants. The trial court concluded the Appellants’ churches are not at all times “school property” within the meaning of the statute. Rather, in the trial court‘s view, the churches are “school property” only when they hold programs for children who are at least three years old and not yet enrolled in kindergarten. If the Appellants attend church
Appellants filed their motion to correct error on November 30, 2016. The trial court denied their motion on December 5, 2016. Appellants now appeal.
Discussion and Decision
I. Appellants’ Churches are Not “School Property”
A. Standard of Review
Ordinarily, we review a trial court‘s findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). However, when a trial court‘s factual findings merely refer to stipulated facts and no other evidence is offered at the hearing or considered by the trial court, our review is de novo. Dedelow v. Pucalik, 801 N.E.2d 178, 183 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
Further, whether Appellants’ churches are “school property” under the statute is a question of statutory interpretation. The meaning of a statute is a question of law and is also subject to de novo review. Adams v. State, 960 N.E.2d 793, 797 (Ind. 2012).
B. Indiana Code Sections 35-42-4-14 and 35-31.5-2-285
Indiana‘s “serious sex offender” law provides as follows:
(b) A serious sex offender who knowingly or intentionally enters school property commits unlawful entry by a serious sex offender, a Level 6 felony.
(1) A building or other structure owned or rented by:
(A) a school corporation;
(B) an entity that is required to be licensed under IC 12-17.2 or IC 31-27;
(C) a private school that is not supported and maintained by funds realized from the imposition of a tax on property, income, or sales; or
(D) a federal, state, local, or nonprofit program or service operated to serve, assist, or otherwise benefit children who are at least three (3) years of age and not yet enrolled in kindergarten, including the following:
(i) A Head Start program under
42 U.S.C. 9831 et seq.(ii) A special education preschool program.
(iii) A developmental child care program for preschool children.
(2) The grounds adjacent to and owned or rented in common with a building or other structure in subdivision (1).
The question before this court is whether Appellants’ churches, which offer Sunday school and/or child care services for children in the relevant age group, meet the statutory definition of “school property.” Appellants argue they do not fit within this definition because the
The goal of statutory interpretation is to discern and further the intent of the legislature. Day v. State, 57 N.E.3d 809, 812 (Ind. 2016). “[W]e do not presume that the [l]egislature intended language used in a statute to be applied illogically or to bring about an unjust or absurd result.” Anderson v. Gaudin, 42 N.E.3d 82, 85 (Ind. 2015) (internal quotation omitted). In interpreting a statute, we consider the structure of the statute as a whole and “avoid interpretations that depend on selective reading of words that lead to irrational and disharmonizing results.” ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep‘t, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195-96 (Ind. 2016). The “best evidence” of the legislature‘s intent is the statute‘s language; and, if that language is clear and unambiguous, we simply apply the statute‘s plain and ordinary meaning, heeding both what it “does say” and what it “does not say.” Day, 57 N.E.3d at 812 (citation omitted).
In considering the structure of the statute and viewing it as a whole, we cannot say the legislature intended to prohibit Appellants or other “serious sex offenders” from entering church property if that church offers Sunday school or child care services for children in the relevant age group. The statute is expansive and defines “school property” as a “building or other structure” owned or rented by: 1) a school corporation, 2) an entity required to be licensed under
We further disagree with the State‘s argument that a church providing child care services such as babysitting or nurseries meets the statutory definition provided by
In sum, Appellants’ churches are not “school property” and they do not become “school property” by virtue of conducting Sunday school or offering child care services for children who are three years old but not yet enrolled in kindergarten.
II. Unconstitutional As Applied
Assuming, for the sake of argument, Appellants’ churches are “school property,” Appellants allege the statute‘s application to them on these facts is unconstitutional as applied. Even under an intermediate level of scrutiny, it is unlikely the State could prevail in this case. See S.V. v. Estate of Bellamy, 579 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (noting intermediate scrutiny requires the challenged law to further an important governmental interest by means that are substantially related to that interest). The law, as applied to Appellants, seeks to keep them from associating with or being near children at least three years old but not yet enrolled in kindergarten. Consequently, this statute keeps Appellants from attending their churches. However, the law is overly broad as to these three men. First, none of the Appellants are restricted from being around children in this age group, nor were they restricted from attending church pursuant to the terms and conditions of their probation or parole. Second, none of the crimes committed by Appellants would be prevented by this statute. John Doe 1 was convicted of solicitation of a minor through the use of a computer. And John Doe 2 and John Doe 3 were both convicted of child seduction, a crime that does not involve children of the age group identified by the statute.9 In addition, two of the Appellants were no longer under the supervision or authority of the State by way of parole or probation during this litigation, and Appellants’ counsel represented to this court at oral argument the third is off of or will likely be off of probation soon. Finally, all three Appellants can and will likely come in contact with children in this age group either at a church without Sunday school or child care or elsewhere. In sum, the statute does not further the interest it seeks to redress as applied to these three men.10
III. Permanent Injunction
Appellants also contend they are entitled to a permanent injunction to prohibit the State from arresting and prosecuting them for entering their churches. The granting or denying of an injunction is within the discretion of the trial court, and our review is limited to the determination of whether the trial court clearly abused that discretion. City of Gary, Ind. v. Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 905 N.E.2d 1076, 1082 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009),
Generally, the trial court considers four factors when determining whether to grant permanent injunctive relief:
(1) whether plaintiff[s‘] remedies at law are inadequate; (2) whether the plaintiffs [have succeeded on the merits]; (3) whether the threatened injury to the plaintiff[s] outweighs the threatened harm a grant of relief would occasion upon the defendant; and (4) whether the public interest would be disserved by granting relief.
Ferrell v. Dunescape Beach Club Condos., 751 N.E.2d 702, 712-13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). The party seeking the injunction carries the burden of demonstrating an irreparable injury; however, when the acts sought to be enjoined are unlawful, the plaintiff need not make a showing of irreparable harm or a balance of the hardships in his favor. Id. at 713. A permanent injunction is limited to prohibiting injurious interference with rights and must be narrowly tailored so that its scope is not more extensive than is reasonably necessary to protect the interests of the party in whose favor it is granted. Id.
Appellants have succeeded on the merits in demonstrating their churches are not “school property” at any time within the meaning of the statute. Further, arrest and prosecution of Appellants for entering their church would constitute an unlawful act and Appellants therefore need not show irreparable harm or the balance of hardships weighs in their favor. See id. In concluding the public interest would not be served by the grant of an injunction, the trial court found the statute was necessary to keep “serious sex offenders” away from children. The trial court‘s conclusion was based on a misinterpretation of law and the public interest is not disserved by ensuring that Appellants, who are lawfully present in churches that conduct Sunday school and/or provide child care services, will not be unlawfully arrested and prosecuted. The trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellants’ motion for a permanent injunction.
Conclusion
We conclude Appellants’ churches are not “school property” at any time within the meaning of
Reversed and remanded.
Vaidik, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.