John Doe 1 v. The Boone County Prosecutor, in his official capacity
85 N.E.3d 902
Ind. Ct. App.2017Background
- In 2015 Indiana enacted a statute making it a felony for a “serious sex offender” to knowingly enter “school property.”
- “School property” includes, among other things, a “federal, state, local, or nonprofit program or service operated to serve, assist, or otherwise benefit children who are at least three (3) years of age and not yet enrolled in kindergarten.”
- Boone County sent letters notifying registered sex offenders they could not attend churches that conduct Sunday school or provide child care for the covered age group.
- Three Boone County residents (John Doe 1–3), classified as serious sex offenders, sued for declaratory and injunctive relief contending their churches are not “school property” and, if they are, the statute violates RFRA as applied.
- The trial court held churches are only “school property” when child programs are actively conducted and denied permanent injunctive relief; the court also rejected the RFRA claim.
- The Court of Appeals reversed: it held churches are not “school property” under the statute and directed entry of a permanent injunction preventing prosecution of the appellants for attending their churches.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether churches that offer Sunday school or child care qualify as “school property” under Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-285(1)(D) | Churches are not schools; offering programs for children does not transform a church into statutorily defined school property | A church’s Sunday school/nursery is a nonprofit program/service that serves or benefits the covered children and thus falls within the definition | Churches are not “school property” under the statute; Sunday school/childcare do not convert a church into school property |
| Whether applying the statute to bar appellants from church violates constitutional scrutiny (as-applied; intermediate/RFRA) | Application imposes an unconstitutional burden: statute is overbroad as to these men and unlikely to further the State’s interest here | The restriction is necessary to keep serious sex offenders away from children and is a valid protective measure | Court assumed arguendo applicability and concluded the statute would likely fail intermediate scrutiny as applied; did not decide RFRA because it resolved statutory issue |
| Whether a permanent injunction prohibiting prosecution for attending church should issue | Injunction needed because churches are not school property and prosecution would be unlawful; plaintiffs succeeded on the merits | Denial appropriate because statute serves public safety (keeping offenders from children) | Trial court abused discretion in denying injunction; Court of Appeals ordered entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting arrest/prosecution for attending church |
Key Cases Cited
- Day v. State, 57 N.E.3d 809 (Ind. 2016) (interpreting statutory text and emphasizing plain meaning controls legislative intent)
- ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep’t, 62 N.E.3d 1192 (Ind. 2016) (use of noscitur a sociis and reading lists to give words consistent meaning)
- Dedelow v. Pucalik, 801 N.E.2d 178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (de novo review where findings rest on stipulated facts)
- Adams v. State, 960 N.E.2d 793 (Ind. 2012) (statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo)
- S.V. v. Estate of Bellamy, 579 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (discussion of intermediate scrutiny standard)
- City of Gary v. Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 905 N.E.2d 1076 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (standard of review for granting/denying injunctions)
- Ferrell v. Dunescape Beach Club Condos., 751 N.E.2d 702 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (factors governing permanent injunctive relief)